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This book addresses the political dimension of consumption and violence in 
postwar West Germany and historically pinpoints criticism of “regimes of pro-
vision,” a key analytical term that will be defined subsequently. The focus is on 
political articulations among the Left between the late 1950s and the unifica-
tion of Germany in 1990, and these articulations are related to social practices 
of radical and militant protest. The analysis draws on sources by people who, 
in theory and practice, criticised their contemporary “regimes of provision” 
and sought to develop alternative semantics of consumption. This includes phi-
losophers working on a critical theory of affluent society, inhabitants of com-
munes or squats, and political activists involved in protest campaigns on a wide 
array of issues from public transport fare increases to the institutions of global 
governance as well as prominent militants commonly labelled as terrorists. The 
book is thus not about the average consumer or about those who chose the label 
of consumer to organise themselves but about discourses, ideas, and practices 
of consumption, about their impact and implementation in left- wing political 
protest, and about the ensuing confrontations with the state authorities seeking 
to uphold not only law and order but also the realities and ideals of existing 
“regimes of provision,” especially in the context of the Cold War system con-
frontation. The following chapters provide ample evidence of how those in-
volved in discourses over “regimes of provision” and militant protest trans-
ferred their perceptions of complex economic developments into emotive and 
confrontational acts of political communication. It makes sense to ask where 
narratives were constituted that not only made political violence possible but 
also made it appear advisable. Drawing on extensive archival material on new 
social movements and militant groups— so far never analysed with respect to 
issues of consumption— it will become clear that post– World War II debates 
about consumption were historically interlinked with discourse on the state’s 
monopoly on violence, terrorism, war, revolution, and genocide.
It is therefore necessary to ask more fundamental questions about the con-
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nections between consumption, on the one hand, and conflict, destruction, and 
violence, on the other. The etymology of the word to consume suggests an in-
trinsic connection. The transitive verb combines “senses relating to physical 
destruction” (such as “to burn with fire” or “to kill or destroy”) and “senses 
relating to the use or exploitation of resources” (such as “to eat or drink,” “to 
use up” a commodity or resource; “to purchase or use” goods or services; “to 
spend” money or “to squander” goods).1 Although in the German language the 
sense relating to physical destruction has been largely obsolete since the nine-
teenth century,2 it is easy to see that this semantic field can turn into a battle-
field when social and political meanings of the concept are contested.
Consumption in a Field of Tension
The construction of a modern consumer economy is commonly seen as an in-
tegral part of the Bonn Republic’s successful modernisation process. A recent 
study of “the consumer” in postwar West German history offers a four- phase 
periodisation of this process characterised by specific images of the consumer. 
For the present enquiry, the latter two periods are of special interest. Between 
the mid- 1960s and the mid- 1970s, consumption was no longer predominantly 
regarded as an agent of social levelling, as had been the case in the previous 
period, but emerged as a means of constructing new social distinctions. Critics 
spread the idea of the strong manipulative powers of advertisement. This was 
followed by a period of “postmodern consumers” between the mid- 1970s and 
1989 when older models, including the manipulation thesis, were qualified and 
responsibility for the consequences of consumption was shifted onto the con-
sumers, who were increasingly characterised as self- determined, critical, and 
free.3 Such an approach to the West German development can be embedded in 
larger narratives of American- inspired consumer societies driving a process of 
democratisation via the dismantling of hierarchies and class differences in life-
styles. Most studies dedicated to this interpretation highlight the contrasts be-
tween postwar affluent societies and the misery and destruction of the age of 
the world wars, but their analysis usually does not go significantly beyond the 
early 1970s.4
1. “consume, v.1,” Oxford English Dictionary, http://0- www.oed.com.unicat.bangor.ac.uk/
view/Entry/39973 (accessed 12 July 2012).
2. Schrage, Verfügbarkeit der Dinge, 50.
3. Gasteiger, Konsument, 11.
4. See Grazia, Irresistible Empire; Maase, Grenzenloses Vergnügen.
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The late 1960s, and especially the early 1970s were a period when the 
immense economic optimism of the postwar boom period began to show 
cracks. Strong social contrasts reappeared, and they ultimately proved the be-
ginning of what Eric Hobsbawm called “the crisis decades.”5 The early 1970s 
constituted a veritable turning point in West German history, with growing 
unemployment and the crisis of the welfare state reintroducing social hierar-
chies and undermining the integrating effects of the earlier expansion of con-
sumer markets.6
At the same time, contemporaries displayed a tendency to downplay the 
extent of the crisis against the backdrop of the collective memory of an infi-
nitely more terrible crisis: the violence and destruction of war. Victoria de Gra-
zia insightfully addresses the specific historical relativity of European percep-
tions of what she calls the American “Market Empire”: “Born as an alternative 
to European militarism, it progressed as a model of governing the good life in 
a century beset by successive decades of total war, fratricidal civil conflict, 
nuclear holocaust, and genocidal murder.” Its “winning weapons came from 
the arsenal of a super- rich consumer culture,” which obscured the fact that “the 
Market Empire advanced rapidly in times of war and that its many military 
victories— and occasional defeats— were always accompanied by significant 
breakthroughs to the benefit of its consumer industries and values.”7 The un-
derlying soft- power strategy required the constant radiation of images of afflu-
ence and magnetism and highlighted the long- standing ideological competi-
tion over the superior way of providing for the needs of the people. A diffuse 
transatlantic Cold War consumption debate provided the ground for a far- 
reaching and lasting link between issues of consumption and scenarios of vio-
lent conflict. Discourse on consumption was inherently connected with East- 
West tensions and the nuclear arms race. The so- called Kitchen Debate between 
American vice president Richard Nixon and Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev 
at the American exhibition in Moscow in 1959 is the most prominent example 
of this amalgamation: a remarkable blend of discussion on colour television, 
the Captive Nations Resolution, rockets, washing machines, gadgets, the good 
life, and army bases in foreign lands.8
Austrian American psychologist and marketing expert Ernest Dichter em-
phasised in 1960 that the most important weapon in the Western camp’s “arse-
5. See Fourastié, Trentes glorieuses; Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes, 403– 4.
6. See Haupt, “Konsument,” 310– 11.
7. Grazia, Irresistible Empire, 8– 9.
8. Cf. Castillo, Cold War on the Home Front, 158– 60; Grazia, Irresistible Empire, 454– 56; 
Hixson, Parting the Curtain, 151– 214.
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nal” was desire and thus consumption. This contained the key to more success-
ful Cold War weapons that had the power to transcend material objects: “We 
are fighting a sham battle with rockets and hydrogen bombs while underneath 
the real struggle, the silent war, is for the possession of men’s minds.”9 In a 
German context, such ideas smacked of propaganda and violent abuse, as Al-
dous Huxley had already observed in 1958: “Twenty years before Madison 
Avenue embarked upon ‘Motivational Research,’ Hitler was systematically ex-
ploring and exploiting the secret fears and hopes, the cravings, anxieties and 
frustrations of the German masses. It is by manipulating ‘hidden forces’ that 
the advertising experts induce us to buy their wares— a toothpaste, a brand of 
cigarettes, a political candidate. And it is by appealing to the same hidden 
forces . . . that Hitler induced the German masses to buy themselves a Fuehrer, 
an insane philosophy and the Second World War.”10 Huxley acknowledged that 
he was inspired by Vance Packard’s Hidden Persuaders. While Packard did not 
mention Hitler, his exploration of consumer motivational research triggered a 
wave of critical attitudes towards advertisement.11 Since the late 1950s, critical 
accounts of the “affluent society” and its social manipulations by American 
scholars— next to Packard John Kenneth Galbraith12 and David Riesman13— 
became best sellers in West Germany. Market researchers and critics shared the 
assumption that the consumer was manipulable. The most influential critical 
account of advanced industrial society and a key text for the developments 
analysed in this book— Herbert Marcuse’s One- Dimensional Man— also origi-
nated in the Cold War intellectual debate over well- being. Marcuse’s original 
draft for a study on mentality change in industrial societies included both the 
capitalist West and the Soviet Union. He shifted focus in favour of a study 
solely of the Soviet Union commissioned by the Rockefeller Foundation. He 
continued to work with the Rockefeller Foundation, and One- Dimensional 
Man became in many ways a counterpart to Soviet Marxism.14
More broadly, there was a tendency to introduce the vocabulary of vio-
 9. Dichter, Strategy of Desire, 16, 20, 26. See also Gasteiger, Konsument, 86– 88.
10. Huxley, Brave New World Revisited.
11. Packard, Hidden Persuaders (German ed., Die geheimen Verführer: Der Griff nach dem 
Unbewussten in jedermann, trans. Hermann Kusterer [Düsseldorf: Econ- Verlag, 1958]). See also 
Horowitz, Anxieties of Affluence, 101– 28; Gasteiger, Konsument, 104– 10.
12. Galbraith, Affluent Society (German ed., Gesellschaft im Überfluß, trans. Rudolf Mühlfenzl 
[Munich, 1959]).
13. Riesman, Glazer, and Denney, Lonely Crowd (German ed., Die einsame Masse: Eine Un-
tersuchung der Wandlungen des amerikanischen Charakters, trans. Renate Rausch [Darmstadt, 
1956]).
14. Marcuse, Soviet Marxism; Marcuse, One- Dimensional Man; Tim B. Müller, Krieger und 
Gelehrte, 418, 421, 447– 48, 537– 38.
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lence into the discourse on consumption. In a much- discussed 1957 book, Vi-
ennese writer Karl Bednarik reported from the “war zone of the consumer 
front,” where the “man of the masses struggled for survival.”15 Der Spiegel 
thought that “Dichter’s laboratory of soul manipulation prepared the most seri-
ous assassination attempt on the Western idea of man.”16 An advertisement 
lobbyist even identified Packard’s Hidden Persuaders as a “nuclear bomb 
against advertisement.”17 Philosopher Günther Anders decried the “soft terror-
ism” of conformist popular entertainment.18 Prominent sociologist Helmut 
Schelsky referred to road traffic as “the carnage of guerrilla warfare.”19 In 
1977, a study of 330 textbooks found that advertisement was depicted as mili-
tant using expressions such as Werbefeldzug (advertising campaign), Werbe-
schlacht (advertising battle), Werbegeschosse (advertisement shells), Marken- 
Offensive (brand campaign), Überraschungsangriffe (surprise attacks), 
Massenbombardement (massed bombardment), and Dauerfeuer (sustained 
fire). The survey also concluded that more than 70 percent of schoolbooks de-
picted advertisement as manipulative.20 Beginning in the late 1960s, many 
West German leftists came to see a repressive totality rooted in diffuse Kon-
sumterror. This curious compound literally means “consumption terror,” but it 
also refers to pressure to buy. In response to critical attitudes, the advertising 
industry, substantially supported by the Axel Springer publishing house, re-
sorted to a veritable image campaign in the 1970s.21
In Cold War Germany, ideas about consumption and ideas about political 
conflict and crises were deeply intertwined, starting with the currency reform 
in 1948, which triggered the Berlin Blockade and the airlift food relief by the 
Western Allies when Germans saw military planes dropping food packages 
rather than bombs. The 17 June uprising in East Germany was preceded by the 
authorities’ promise to abolish food rationing by 1953. In this context, com-
modities and food packages again emerged as weapons of American psycho-
logical warfare. Ultimately, the products of the cultural industries became 
15. Bednarik, An der Konsumfront. Jürgen Habermas wrote a critical review of Bednarik’s 
book: see Habermas, “Konsumkritik.”
16. “Motiv- Forschung: Die Einflüsterer,” Der Spiegel 32 (7 August 1957): 42.
17. Franz Ulrich Gass, “Werbung für die Werbung— aber wie?,” absatzwirtschaft 1 (1964): 58, 
quoted in Gasteiger, Konsument, 114.
18. Günther Anders, “Der sanfte Terror: Theorie des Konformismus,” Merkur 18.1 (1964): 
209– 24.
19. Schelsky quoted in “‘Ans Steuer lass’ ich keinen anderen,” Der Spiegel 53 (27 December 
1971): 36.
20. Winfried Böttcher, Werbung im Schulbuch: Eine Schulbuchanalyse für Grundstufe und 
Sekundarstufen (Bonn, 1977), 122, quoted in Gasteiger, Konsument, 177– 78.
21. See ibid., 189.
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more important than food. Up to around 1955, East and West German officials 
still shared a certain consensus in their culturally conservative, sceptical atti-
tudes towards the products of American mass culture. In the West, this attitude 
was increasingly superseded by the fervid forging of consumption into an ef-
fective Cold War weapon accompanied by an ostentatious depoliticisation of 
consumption in the realm of rhetoric. East German officials counted seven 
million West Berlin visits per year and increasingly viewed Western consumer 
culture as threatening to the socialist youth and— not entirely without rea-
son— to be the work of American agents.22 West Berlin was carefully built up 
both as an indicator of West Germany’s successful “economic miracle” and as 
a real and metaphorical showcase in the Cold War competition. Khrushchev’s 
November 1958 Berlin ultimatum was announced against the backdrop of a 
larger programme of surpassing the West in per capita consumption of food 
and other commodities until 1961. The well- being of the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) was central to the Soviet Union’s competitive Cold War strat-
egy. Anastas Mikoyan, first deputy chair of the Council of Ministers of the 
Soviet Union, assured his East German counterparts in 1961 that their country 
was the place where the socialist system had to prove itself “right and 
superior.”23 With an eye to economic aid from the Soviet Union, Ulbricht ex-
plained to Khrushchev in January 1961 that “the economic competition be-
tween the socialist camp and the capitalist states” remained the central issue. 
Adenauer was leading the battle against the GDR “mainly with economic 
weapons.” The East German leader made it unequivocally clear that the GDR 
was increasingly falling behind its high- powered West German competitors. 
Domestic considerations had already moved the East German leadership to 
allocate more resources to consumption than was economically justifiable.24 
What Ulbricht did not stress to his Moscow allies was the fact that the East 
German government’s second wave of enforced collectivisations had decreased 
productivity. This contributed to a worsening food situation and thus to ever 
more people taking flight to the West. The Berlin Wall was erected when the 
magnetism of West Germany’s elaborately staged “economic miracle” had 
forced the East’s competitive programme onto the defensive.
Relying on heavy subsidies and tax incentives, a retail boom became a 
tangible reality in West Berlin despite the Wall and the industrial drain it trig-
gered. The governments of both East and West Berlin as well as of the United 
22. Poiger, Jazz, Rock, and Rebels, 54– 55.
23. Bruno Leuscher quoted in Wettig, Chruschtschows Berlin- Krise, 120.
24. Ulbricht to Khrushchev, 18– 19 January 1961, paraphrased and quoted in ibid.
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States and Soviet Union continued to use images of affluence and prosperity to 
bolster their political legitimacy. Large department stores played a significant 
role in these endeavours.25 In the summer of 1963, Egon Bahr outlined the fa-
mous concept “change through rapprochement” that described West Germa-
ny’s relationship with its eastern rival and became very influential in the Brandt 
government’s subsequent Ostpolitik. Bahr explicitly introduced the aim of a 
“broader spectrum of consumer goods in the East,” fostering rising demand 
among the population, as one of the central planks of this ingenious competi-
tive strategy. Commodity flow across the not- so- impermeable Iron Curtain was 
never completely hindered. The Berlin Wall was a violent but porous separa-
tion of two regimes of provision. Ultimately, more intensely articulated con-
sumer demand among populations in the entire Soviet sphere of influence 
played a definite role in its demise.
This brief sketch of historical developments highlights how entangled the 
themes of consumption and violence had become in the lives of Germans dur-
ing the Cold War. In the following chapters, divided Germany appears as a 
central battleground of system confrontation against the backdrop of affluence 
where rival economic systems clashed and competing ideologies confronted 
each other, reflecting various dimensions of political and social division. The 
West German experience emerges as in some ways distinctive (as a conse-
quence of the two German states competing against a peculiar historical back-
drop) but also as in some ways typical of affluent societies subject to broader 
developments. Crucially, the intense competition to outdo each other also 
meant that in terms of consumerism, Soviet communism increasingly ceased to 
constitute a fundamental alternative. Both sides came to share the ideal of os-
tentative nonpolitical affluence, as Khrushchev famously remarked at the 
Kitchen Debate: “When we catch you up, in passing you by, we will wave to 
you.”26 When it became clear that Khrushchev had bitten off more than he 
could chew and that the USSR and its allies had increasingly fallen behind but 
nevertheless managed to uphold the brittle equilibrium between economic and 
nuclear competition, it exacerbated the impression that the Eastern bloc “was 
becoming irrelevant as offering an alternative vision of collective well- being.”27 
The vacuum that this development left in the political imagination of the Ger-
man Left, coupled with the continued amalgamation of issues of consumption 
25. Sedlmaier, “Berlin als doppeltes Schaufenster.”
26. Khrushchev- Nixon debate, 24 July 1959, http://www3.sympatico.ca/robsab/debate.html 
(accessed 11 July 2012).
27. Grazia, Irresistible Empire, 456.
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with political and violent conflict in the Cold War context, forms a crucial 
precondition for the emergence of the radical attitudes towards issues of con-
sumption that are analysed in this book.
Against the backdrop of Nazi boycotts of shops owned by Jews during the 
1930s,28 the boycott as a form of protest was largely dormant in West Germany 
during the 1950s. When it increasingly appeared after the erection of the Berlin 
Wall, it was mostly directed against East Germany and occasionally used 
against the cultural products of individuals associated with the Nazi past. This 
constellation led to two boycotts that triggered landmark cases of constitu-
tional law: the director of the Hamburg government’s press office called for a 
boycott of Veit Harlan’s first post– World War II film, which occupied the 
courts throughout the 1950s and became known as the Lüth case; the Springer 
company’s boycott against a communist weekly for printing the East German 
television programme similarly occupied the courts throughout the 1960s and 
became known as the Blinkfüer case. Both cases went all the way up to the 
Federal Constitutional Court, which determined that boycotts were protected 
under the basic right of freedom of expression but only to the point that the 
economic pressure exerted did not stifle the targeted party’s freedom of expres-
sion. This formulation subsequently proved important when the new social 
movements embraced boycott, coupled with direct action, in the late 1960s in 
the context of protests against public transport fare increases and the Springer 
press. A variety of boycott campaigns directed against specific companies and 
also against entire countries only emerged from 1973– 74 onwards. Analysing 
such campaigns and their roots requires identifying a suitable methodological 
approach.
Method
Recent historiography has begun to look more closely at the political implica-
tions of consumption where practical everyday issues gave rise to broader con-
siderations and abstract theories; as Martin Daunton and Matthew Hilton put it, 
“The specificity of commodity purchasing often crystallizes other general po-
litical concerns.”29 Economic citizenship based on the model of a rationally 
28. On antisemitic boycotts during the 1920s and 1930s, see Hannah Ahlheim, “Deutsche, 
kauft nicht bei Juden!”: Antisemitismus und politischer Boykott in Deutschland 1924 bis 1935 
(Göttingen, 2011); Avraham Barkai, Vom Boykott zur “Entjudung”: Der wirtschaftliche Existenz-
kampf der Juden im Dritten Reich, 1933– 1943 (Frankfurt, 1988).
29. Martin Daunton and Matthew Hilton, “Material Politics: An Introduction,” in Politics of 
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consuming individual has become an essential element of the modern liberal 
state.30 Detlef Siegfried has demonstrated how consumption and politics did by 
no means exclude each other in the West German youth culture of the 1960s. 
On the contrary, the differentiation and pluralisation of consumption and life-
style options were closely linked with the articulation of critical and political 
concerns.31 For the more recent period, interdisciplinary work has examined 
boycotts, ad busting, and political consumerism.32
Matthew Hilton’s Prosperity for All shows that the organisations of con-
sumers and their diverse networks are central agents of global civil society and 
“the institutional expression of a grassroots social movement,” which he grants 
the capacity to integrate the political spectrum across ideological divides in 
favour of one- issue campaigns.33 He points out that consumer movements, es-
pecially in the developing world during the 1970s and 1980s, used “consump-
tion as the entry point to criticize the whole society,” taking account of “the 
concerns of those seemingly excluded from consumer society.”34 While his 
account of the international networks of consumer movements is indeed a valu-
able addition to scholarship, Hilton’s restriction of the new social movements 
to just the 1960s induces him to deemphasise the role of other social move-
ments that were not explicitly organised around consumption during the 1970s 
and 1980s and their legacy for more recent global protest movements. He re-
peatedly dismisses any theoretical position that mounts a more radical critique 
of consumer society as reducing consumers “to a homogenous number of self- 
gratifying mall dwellers awaiting the zombified numbness of their own inevi-
Consumption, ed. Daunton and Hilton, 2. See also Carole Shammas, “Standard of Living, Con-
sumption, and Political Economy over the Past 500 Years,” in Oxford Handbook, ed. Trentmann, 
211– 28; Lawrence B. Glickman, “Consumer Activism, Consumer Regimes, and the Consumer 
Movement: Rethinking the History of Consumer Politics in the United States,” in Oxford Hand-
book, ed. Trentmann, 399– 417; Frank Trentmann, “The Politics of Everyday Life,” in Oxford 
Handbook, ed. Trentmann, 521– 50; Trentmann and Just, Food and Conflict; Cohen, Consumers’ 
Republic; Landsman, Dictatorship and Demand; Berghoff, Konsumpolitik; Geyer, “Teuerungspro-
test, Konsumentenpolitik, und soziale Gerechtigkeit.”
30. See Brückweh, Voice of the Citizen Consumer; Soper and Trentmann, Citizenship and Con-
sumption; Bevir and Trentmann, Governance, Consumers, and Citizens; Pence, “Shopping for an 
‘Economic Miracle’”; Wildt, “Konsumbürger”; Jacobs, Pocketbook Politics.
31. Siegfried, Time Is on My Side. See also Schildt and Siegfried, Between Marx and Coca- 
Cola.
32. Heath and Potter, Rebel Sell; Micheletti, Political Virtue and Shopping; Micheletti, Følles-
dal, and Stolle, Politics, Products, and Markets.
33. Hilton, Prosperity for All, 1, 11. See also Matthew Hilton, “Consumer Activism: Rights or 
Duties?,” in Voice of the Citizen Consumer, ed. Brückweh, 99– 116.
34. Hilton, Prosperity for All, 86.
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table consumption.”35 He diagnoses an “oppositional logic of little relevance to 
liberal capitalist democracy” and, without any empirical research on the topic, 
associates radical social movements with anti- Americanism and anti- Western 
sentiments. He even claims that “the problems arising from too little” have 
“been excluded from the discussion of consumer society” as a consequence of 
the “moralistic critique of consumption,” which allegedly ignored the “de-
mands of consumers in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.” As a result, he pres-
ents the comparative testing movement and the consumer cooperative move-
ment as the true origins of an integrative perspective that addresses both 
problems of too little and of too much. With all due respect to the valuable 
work done by the groups analysed by Hilton, it seems equally problematic to 
overlook the impact that more radical positions towards issues of consumption 
have had on the emergence of global protest networks. A more impartial per-
spective will discover that radicals did not simply embrace the reductive posi-
tions against which Hilton polemicises but— rather like the organised 
consumers— wrestled with the ambivalences and contradictions arising from 
concrete problems of provision, which led to a keen awareness of the dilemmas 
of those excluded from the blessings of affluence both in developing countries 
and among the marginalised in highly industrialised societies. The ideological 
front is regrettable since Hilton’s consumer activists in developing countries 
and his critique of “an impoverished notion of choice” do point the way to 
conflicts over public goods— such as the supply of water, electricity, educa-
tion, or transport— raising questions concerning the “systems of provision that 
enable the consumer to have access to key goods and services.”36
What is needed is a method that allows for an empirical study of the 
moral, social, and political conflicts arising from systems of provision. Such 
a method can hardly succeed without addressing the relations of power and 
violence that provide the background for any system of provision. However, 
the dimension of political violence has not featured prominently in the litera-
ture on the politics of consumption despite the fact that commodity purchas-
ing has also crystallised discourses on violence. To grasp the connection be-
tween consumers and the power relations that define the conditions and 
meanings of consumption, the following analysis will utilise the concept of 
“regimes of provision.” It is a further development of the system- of- provision 
perspective employed by social scientists to highlight the vertical connection 
between consumption and production. In analogy to Ben Fine’s definition of 
35. Ibid., 243.
36. Ibid., 250, 252– 54.
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a “system of provision,”37 a regime of provision defined as the network of 
activities that attaches consumption to the power relations that make it pos-
sible and at the same time hinders other forms of consumption and produc-
tion. What a society deems consumable under what circumstances and for 
whom is a result of social and political contests and struggles that invoke 
visions or images of past, future, and ideal regimes of provision. Contentious 
claims to the fruits of production have been central to such debates. Political 
violence— proactive and reactive— often accompanied and influenced these 
processes of definition. The term regime of provision thus seeks to examine 
the arguments of those who embraced militant action as a response to either 
the inability of “the system” to ensure collective well- being or to the violence 
inherent in regimes of provision. Moreover, it makes visible a distinct set of 
imperatives upholding a cluster of systems of provision in a zone of influ-
ence of a political power and the resistance they trigger. Resistance may be 
successful in partly realising alternative regimes of provision. This means 
that there is a plurality of regimes of provision and that competing regimes 
of provision may overlap and become tangled. Depending on perspective, a 
regime of provision can be either specific (for example, housing or media 
provision in a specific area) or broad and general (pertaining to entire nations 
or even the global economy).
The term regime of consumption,38 aimed at similar connections, has 
been altered to avoid inclusion of the word consumption because ways of 
consumption are never fully determined since consumers always enjoy a cer-
tain degree of creativity and freedom in how they act— for example, whether 
to read a tabloid newspaper, to fold it into paper airplanes, or to use it as toilet 
paper— while what is contested is the regime of provision that sets the param-
eters and conditions under which goods or services are placed at the disposal 
of the consumers. The “regime of provision” perspective also supersedes that 
associated with the common German term Konsumkritik (literally, criticism of 
consumption). This term rather misleadingly suggests a critique of consump-
tion as such— a fundamental category of human existence— while in reality, 
critiques were always directed against concrete manifestations of certain re-
gimes of provision. 
In common parlance, the term Konsum acquired the sense of consumer 
37. Fine, World of Consumption, 79.
38. The term is used but not stringently defined in Grazia, Irresistible Empire, 5. See also Con-
fino and Koshar, “Régimes of Consumer Culture”; Hazel Kyrk, A Theory of Consumption (Boston, 
1923), 41. Kyrk introduces American consumer society as “a régime of individualism in consump-
tion.”
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society, defined as a concrete historical period characterised by a vastly in-
creased significance of the realm of consumption compared to previous ep-
ochs. This meant that production and earning lost significance relative to con-
sumption and spending, but— contrary to what is sometimes suggested— it by 
no means followed that work and industrial production ceased to be central 
categories of human experience. Such shifts in socioeconomic semantics led 
critics to see the rhetoric of consumption as an ideological tool that the ruling 
classes employed to control society. Critical perspectives on consumer society 
are often vehemently embraced or rejected, but as a historical phenomenon, 
they remain thoroughly understudied.39 They were prominent in Germany, but 
radical positions were also embraced by French and Italian thinkers such as 
Pier Paolo Pasolini and Henri Lefebvre; the latter has a chapter, “Terrorism and 
Everyday Life.”40 In postwar West Germany, consumer critique was usually 
associated with the Frankfurt School and was thus embedded in a more funda-
mental critique of domination in the context of “late capitalism.”
In recent research on the history of consumption, it has become fashion-
able to flatly dismiss the classical positions of consumer critique, arguing that 
these accounts were elitist, normative, and totalising, depicting consumers as 
too passive while simplifying their motives.41 This viewpoint is frequently 
based on a decontextualising interpretation of isolated quotations. In a recent 
essay on political legitimisations of consumption, Claudius Torp goes so far as 
to claim that the tradition of Konsumkritik— which he equally associates with 
conservative thinkers such as Hans Freyer and Arnold Gehlen and with the neo- 
Marxist Left from Horkheimer to Habermas— was responsible for a belated 
moralisation of consumption. He even claims that the “protest forms of the 
68ers” led to arson and hunger strikes as a consequence of a “fundamental op-
position to consumption.” Similar to Hilton’s reasoning, this allows for a whole-
sale exclusion of the New Left— trapped “in the dead end of radical refusal”— 
from the moralisation of consumption.42 It remains to be seen whether this 
39. A few pioneering works include Alexander Sedlmaier, “Konsumkritik und politische Ge-
walt in der linksalternativen Szene der siebziger Jahre,” in Das alternative Milieu, ed. Reichardt 
and Siegfried, 194– 204; Uta G. Poiger, “Imperialism and Consumption: Two Tropes in West Ger-
man Radicalism,” in Between Marx and Coca- Cola, ed. Schildt and Siegfried, 161– 72; Horowitz, 
Anxieties of Affluence; Briesen, Warenhaus, Massenkonsum, und Sozialmoral. See also Bevir and 
Trentmann, Critiques of Capital. Relatively thin on critical attitudes towards issues of consump-
tion is Michael Wildt, “‘Wohlstand für alle’: Das Spannungsfeld von Konsum und Politik in der 
Bundesrepublik,” in Konsumgesellschaft in Deutschland, ed. Haupt and Torp, 312– 13.
40. Cf. Lefebvre, Vie quotidienne; Das Alltagsleben in der modernen Welt, trans. Annegret 
Domasy [Frankfurt, 1972]; Pasolini, Freibeuterschriften.
41. E.g. Hecken, Versagen der Intellektuellen.
42. Torp, Wachstum, Sicherheit, Moral, 122– 23.
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far- reaching claim for the exclusion of the New Left from its very own project— 
the creation of international solidarity— can be supported empirically.
Juliet Schor has shown that the “critique of consumer critique” often fails 
to go into sufficient depth because the questions asked and the methods em-
ployed by critical intellectuals such as Veblen, Adorno, Horkheimer, and Gal-
braith are not obsolete just because they are no longer shared by the academic 
mainstream, especially concerning their political implications. She points out 
that an integrated perspective on the spheres of consumption and production as 
pioneered by these thinkers has been largely abandoned by a depoliticising 
mode of scholarly enquiry that treats the dimension of consumption as if it 
were sufficient in itself to access the entire spectrum of social relations.43 In a 
similar vein, Andreas Wirsching reflects on the limits of the current scholarly 
paradigm concerning the consumer society, pointing out that because of its 
utilitarian focus on “the crude sum total of accrued enjoyment,” it “is less in-
terested in the frustration of those who lack the means to attain . . . distinction, 
or the freedoms that are denied to them.” Teleological accounts that hail the 
“victorious progression” of Western consumer society run the danger of ne-
glecting social inequality.44 Wirsching’s uneasiness fails to take into account 
recent authors who have gone in this direction— for example, Matthew Hilton 
and Avner Offer45— but he is right in pointing out that a methodological ap-
proach that addresses the history of consumption as part of a more comprehen-
sive social theory still needs to be developed.
Drawing on Niklas Luhmann, sociologist Dominik Schrage proposes to 
introduce a “generalising definition of the relationship between the economic 
system and the consumer by means of the concept of structural coupling.”46 
This also seeks to overcome the perspective of Frankfurt School Konsumkritik 
because of its normative assumptions concerning the manipulative powers of 
the economic system over the consumer. However, Schrage’s solution seems to 
be throwing out the baby with the bathwater: while Luhmann demonstrates 
how large social systems like the political system, the legal system, and the 
economic system are structurally coupled, Schrage collapses this complexity 
into what appears to be a preestablished harmony between just the economic 
system and the consumer on an equal footing. Even if the problematic assump-
tion is granted that consumption or the consumers constitute a system in Luh-
43. Schor, “In Defense of Consumer Critique.”
44. Wirsching, “From Work to Consumption,” 24– 26. See also Sedlmaier, “Consumerism— cui 
bono?”
45. Offer, Challenge of Affluence.
46. Schrage, Verfügbarkeit der Dinge, 260– 62.
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mann’s sense, this assumption ignores the asymmetry of power between con-
sumers, who are individualised and difficult to organise politically, and the vast 
organisational networks and legal structures that constitute the framework for 
the functioning of the economic system. Schrage’s perspective is different. He 
assumes an all- embracing power of mass consumption permeating all forms of 
human interaction. While this undoubtedly holds true for many aspects of the 
highly industrialised societies of the second half of the twentieth century, 
Schrage’s generalising and depoliticising perspective on consumption does not 
leave much room for the politics of regimes of provision, for the contingent 
decisions that societies make— decisions that do not concern some illusionary 
withdrawal from consumption as such but rather concern what and how they 
produce and consume.
Classical social history has dealt with consumption under conditions of 
scarcity and with the dimension of violence in subsistence protests. However, 
this approach is usually applied only up to the mid- nineteenth century. For 
subsequent periods, most researchers assume a rationalisation of consumption 
and consumerism that resulted in civil and peaceful processes of commercial 
and political negotiation superseding more violent forms of intercourse.47 The 
newer research paradigm of the history of consumption, conversely, has tended 
to focus on the implications of abundance, where episodes of violence seem 
like relics of a bygone age no longer relevant to modern civil society. Under-
mining such a perspective are frequent pictures of burnt- out cars, looted dis-
play windows, and young people throwing stones in different cities of industri-
ally advanced societies. Collective violence, especially looting, is obviously 
not “a remnant of the past but part and parcel of life in contemporary societ-
ies . . . intricately tied to the very ways in which class . . . and ethnic inequities 
are structured and reproduced.”48 An integrative approach that would show 
how scarcity and abundance as well as peaceful and violent conflict comple-
mented each other and developed in parallel throughout the twentieth century 
is still in its infancy.
By going beyond the traditions of generalising critiques or affirmations of 
consumption, the present approach looks at the intellectual, social, and politi-
cal history of regimes of provision. It avoids reducing the phenomenon to vio-
lent anticonsumerism, which is only one possible relationship in the discursive 
field between consumption and violence. Addressing the destructive potential 
47. For a critical overview, see Gailus, Contentious Food Politics, 36– 43. Assuming a rational-
ization of consumption during the second half of the nineteenth century are Nonn, Verbraucherpro-
test und Parteiensystem; Blessing, “Konsumentenprotest und Arbeitskampf.”
48. Auyero, Routine Politics and Violence, 10.
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inherent in certain patterns of consumption is another. The question of cause 
and effect between regimes of provision and the accompanying debates, cri-
tiques, and attacks is assessed at different stages. In many respects, critiques of 
regimes of provision were inversions of contemporary ideological positions 
that claimed beneficial consequences of consumerism, self- interest, and mar-
ket settings. Doux commerce arguments attributed to particular historical or 
idealised regimes of provision invited criticism. Historically, critiques of capi-
talism have focused on aspects of production as well as consumption. The 
“regime of provision” perspective allows the integration of both angles. Re-
gimes of provision could appear as sources of (1) disenchantment and a per-
ception of inauthenticity of things and ways of life; (2) oppression that impairs 
freedom, autonomy, and creativity, subjects people to the rules of the market 
anonymously, arbitrarily fixes prices, and/or decides which goods and services 
are commodified; (3) poverty and inequality or social exclusion; or (4) oppor-
tunism and egoism, fostering individual interest that corrupts social cohesion 
and mutual solidarity, especially between rich and poor.49 An important dimen-
sion of regimes of provision and their critiques is that of gender equality. While 
gender is not a principal category in the present approach, due attention will be 
given to feminist impulses. This aspect became more prominent with the un-
derresearched emergence of militant feminism in the 1980s, when solidarity 
campaigns with female labourers in the developing world were among the first 
to revive radical traditions of labour dispute in a global dimension. Finally, 
critiques of regimes of provision could vary in scope from the desire of ex-
cluded groups to merely participate in a successful regime of provision without 
wanting to overthrow its fundamental principles to violent resistance to the 
commodification of ever more aspects of human life.
While recent research on consumption has acknowledged its political di-
mension largely without the aspect of violence, new research on violence has 
not exactly focused on the dimension of consumption. The decision to analyse 
militant forms of protest against regimes of provision leads to the question of a 
definition of political violence. Donald Bloxham and Robert Gerwarth suggest 
succinctly and convincingly that political violence should connote “all forms 
of violence enacted pursuant to aims of decisive socio- political control or 
change.” Their inclusion of state- sponsored violence is sensible. However, this 
approach comes with a number of normative qualifications: “the regular func-
tions of the police and justice systems and the intelligence services” are in-
cluded only insofar as “they contributed to squeezing out the possibility of 
49. This typology is a further development of one by Boltanski and Chiapello, New Spirit, 37.
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transformative, anti- systemic violence,” and organized labour violence is ex-
cluded altogether because it generally aimed “at reform within the accepted 
context of the socio- political system.”50 While this might be helpful on the 
macro level of analysing political violence for entire centuries and continents, 
it does raise questions about the limits of the regular and the accepted and runs 
the danger of putting the focus only on large- scale and exceptional events of 
violence, such as international terrorism.
At a more quotidian level, Donatella Della Porta looks at political vio-
lence within social movements. She emphasises its relative illegitimacy when 
addressing political violence “as a particular repertoire of collective action that 
involved physical force, considered at that time as illegitimate in the dominant 
culture.”51 This seems problematic since it immediately relegates the use of 
force by the authorities under the state’s monopoly of violence into a different, 
nonpolitical realm. Moreover, by assuming a fixed sense of legitimacy within 
a dominant culture, it does not do sufficient justice to the communicative inter-
action within society over what can be considered legitimate because both the 
authorities and their challengers in political and social movements have to dis-
cursively legitimise and communicate the acts of violence to which they resort. 
The monopoly on violence structures the political space and, via the legal sys-
tem of property ownership, the regimes of provision. As a result of a negotiat-
ing process about its application, the scope of political debate and/or action— 
that is, the limits of the political space— can be either restricted or extended.52 
However, on the level of different forms of violence— for it seems unproduc-
tive to speculate about violence as such— Della Porta’s definition is helpful 
because it includes violence against objects, such as attacks on property, riot-
ing, or disorder leading to damage to property.53 A definition restricting politi-
cal violence to violence against persons would hardly do justice to the theme 
of this book. It would, as is frequently the case in the literature on terrorism, 
divorce political violence from its origins in social and political struggles over 
material realities.
This aspect can be framed effectively by drawing on David Apter, for 
whom the “key to political violence is its legitimacy.” He hypothesises that 
social movements develop power if they draw “symbolic capital” (Bourdieu) 
50. Donald Bloxham and Robert Gerwarth, introduction to Political Violence, ed. Bloxham and 
Gerwarth, 2.
51. Della Porta, Social Movements, 3– 4.
52. This is indebted to the approach that conceptualises “The Political as Communicative 
Space” pioneered at the University of Bielefeld. Cf. Neithard Bulst, Ingrid Gilcher- Holtey, and 
Heinz- Gerhard Haupt, “Einleitung,” in Gewalt im politischen Raum, ed. Bulst, Gilcher- Holtey, and 
Haupt, 8– 10.
53. Della Porta, Social Movements, 3– 4.
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from their interpretation of disjunctive events.54 Assuming political violence to 
be a ubiquitous phenomenon that aims at a power shift (or at preserving a sta-
tus quo) and in doing so requires legitimisation, it appears that the legitimisa-
tion and delegitimisation of violence can in turn hardly do without reference to 
supraindividual units. An essential factor for the emergence of political vio-
lence is the transformation, mediated by political entrepreneurs, of such narra-
tives into discourses— reconstructions of reality in their own right— that have 
gained a certain degree of acceptance. Apter is not alone in highlighting the 
idea that “violence cannot be understood without the discourses that accom-
pany, limit, and expand it.”55 Political violence thus becomes a way of chal-
lenging hegemonic discourse,56 because discourses on legitimacy and legality 
are entangled, as the works of Freia Anders have shown for the conflicts be-
tween autonomists and state authorities during the 1980s and 1990s.57 Accord-
ing to Apter, political violence is not random but occurs in pursuit of a “desig-
nated and reordering purpose”— for example, justice and equality. 
Consequently, “boundary smashing goes together with boundary resetting.”58 
If such an “inversion of meaning” is sought, political violence constitutes an 
inversionary discourse bent on symbolic capital rather than a mere exchange of 
power over economic capital by armed force, although in reality, movements 
combine both elements in changing combination ratios.59 This should not be 
misunderstood as a mere apology for acts of political violence but rather as a 
pointer to the complexity and moral ambiguity of political violence, which can 
be a rational phenomenon. Confrontation can thus function as a mobilisation 
resource. Moreover, Apter reminds us that reallocations of wealth, visions of 
human betterment, and political violence have been inseparable from the evo-
lution of democracy. The English, American, and French Revolutions were all 
marked by political violence and its discourses— by translations of violent 
events into social text— not least concerning clashing regimes of provision.60
54. David E. Apter, “Symbolic Capital and Political Violence: A Discourse Approach” (unpub-
lished conference paper, Legitimationen politischer Gewalt, Universität Bielefeld, October 2009), 
38; David E. Apter, “Political Violence in Analytical Perspective,” in Legitimization of Violence, 
ed. Apter, 5– 15. The focus on legitimisation is conscious (i.e., the action or process of legitimising 
rather than the more static legitimation).
55. Bulst, Gilcher- Holtey, and Haupt, “Einleitung,” 11.
56. Apter, “Political Violence,” 8.
57. Freia Anders, “Die Zeitschrift radikal und das Strafrecht,” in Herausforderungen des staat-
lichen Gewaltmonopols, ed. Anders and Gilcher- Holtey, 221– 59; Freia Anders, “Die ‘Gewaltfrage’ 
an der Startbahn West,” in Gewalt im politischen Raum, ed. Bulst, Gilcher- Holtey, and Haupt, 
260– 88; Sedlmaier and Anders, “Limits of the Legitimate.”
58. Apter, “Political Violence,” 5.
59. Ibid., 15.
60. Ibid., 2– 22.
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In a global perspective, Apter’s approach helps to understand political 
violence as a crucial interface between political and economic development: 
“Modern developmentalism is based on the premise of unlimited growth, the 
universalization of the market, and more and more effective access to and par-
ticipation in economic, social and political institutions.” If one assumes politi-
cal development to be partly violence- driven— by wars, by the exercise of the 
domestic monopoly of power, and by challenges to the latter, which trigger 
reform— the systems of politics and economics seem “mutually linked within 
a double market.”61 Critics and challengers of regimes of provision are entre-
preneurs on this double market.
An approach inspired by Apter’s theory of inversionary discourse is in no 
position to claim, like E. P. Thompson, that protest action was based on a broad 
“popular consensus as to what were legitimate and what were illegitimate 
practices.”62 Quite the contrary, what was considered legitimate in conflicts 
over regimes of provision during the second half of the twentieth century was 
very much in flux and was hotly contested by a multitude of actors drawing on 
a plurality of intellectual traditions. Rather than backward- looking, moral 
economies were utopian in their efforts to systematically reorganise the eco-
nomic system in accordance with moral or political convictions that rejected 
the free- market ethos of capitalist economies. What remains of value in 
Thompson’s analysis of eighteenth- century crowd action is the focus on the 
notion of legitimation and the insight that his angry consumers had a far more 
complex motivation than just hunger or riotousness. Also transferable is 
Thompson’s observation that a moral economy, while not political in the sense 
of advanced forms of organisation, “nevertheless . .  . cannot be described as 
unpolitical either since it supposed . . . passionately held notions of the com-
mon weal.”63 Late- twentieth- century conflicts over moral economies gained 
their explosiveness by virtue of their position at the margins of the political, 
where questions of the limits of the legitimate and the definition of the political 
were negotiated. This also applied to the authorities, who similarly legitimised 
their repression with implicit or explicit recourse to ideologies of political 
economy.64
Javier Auyero’s scholarship on more recent phenomena of collective vio-
lence has demonstrated that looting is not best described as anarchic outbursts 
61. Ibid., 22.
62. Thompson, “Moral Economy,” 79. See also Trentmann, “Before ‘Fair Trade’”; Gailus, Con-
tentious Food Politics, 7; Bouton, Flour War.
63. Thompson, “Moral Economy,” 79.
64. Cf. ibid., 129.
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as a consequence of its relational underpinnings and the selectivity of looters’ 
actions: usually, though not always, the people carrying out riots or lootings 
are connected through social ties and selectively target particular kinds of 
stores. This can even amount to “coordinated destruction”— that is, an entire 
programme of targeted damage to objects.65 Actors using the “threat of disrup-
tion” can thus gain considerable political leverage.66
Violence is itself a type of communication; more importantly, however, 
political violence is both the result and starting point of political communica-
tion. In the case of postwar Germany, initially the only “specialists in 
violence”67 in this interaction were law enforcement officers who confronted 
student protesters and artistic or intellectual critics who consciously over-
stepped the established conventions and rules of political communication fo-
cusing on quotidian manifestations of violence. The idea of a challenge to es-
tablished authorities via civil disobedience and performative rule breaking— as 
expressed in Rudi Dutschke’s vision of a “countermilieu”— lay at the heart of 
the political strategies practiced by the “1968” movement and its successors in 
alternative, feminist, and environmentalist movements. Eventually, the field of 
participants in this interaction diversified with militant groups such as the Red 
Army Faction (RAF), Movement 2 June, the Revolutionary Cells, and later 
autonomist activists seeking to combine the role of political entrepreneurs with 
that of specialists in violence.
It is important to focus on two interrelated types of political discourse: the 
reciprocal exchange between challengers and forces of order, and the internal 
communication in both camps— for example, when security measures and 
their justifications became detached from the reality of threats emanating from 
protest movements, or when the critical thinking harboured by the latter col-
lapsed into hollow enemy images and self- referential worldviews. However, 
historians cannot label the objects of enquiry with such categories from the 
outset. The pondering and weighing of the interaction— or lack thereof— 
between competing regimes of provision must result from empirical analysis. 
This study is therefore primarily concerned with describing and explaining the 
genesis and the political consequences of theoretical frameworks and social 
practices that brought the realms of violence and consumption into contact. 
Using Quentin Skinner’s vocabulary, the task is to recover illocutionary acts: 
“We need to situate the texts [or other performative acts] we study within such 
intellectual contexts and frameworks of discourse as enable us to recognize 
65. Auyero, Routine Politics and Violence, 15, 28. Cf. Tilly, Politics of Collective Violence, 14.
66. Auyero, Routine Politics and Violence, 157.
67. Cf. Tilly, Politics of Collective Violence, 34– 41.
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what their authors were doing in writing [or performing] them.”68 According to 
Skinner, such a method based on extensive research will show that ideas were 
intertwined with claims for power. Texts (and other performative acts) position 
themselves in relation to their contemporary discourses and the status quo they 
seek to change: “We need to understand why a certain proposition has been put 
forward if we wish to understand the proposition itself.”69
As Max Weber pointed out, political or other value judgments on the part 
of the author will inevitably contribute to the complex genesis of any concep-
tual approach.70 However, the outright application or imposition of value judg-
ments on the material is hardly beneficial to the gaining of knowledge. This is 
also true for widely shared value judgments that dominate mainstream ap-
proaches to contemporary history, which often originate in contemporary dis-
course. While the remainder of this book explores the economic and political 
thought of radical leftists in considerable detail and with a certain degree of 
empathy— the English word derives from the German Einfühlungsvermögen— 
the idea is not to prove that they were right but instead to show that their think-
ing and acting were meticulously embedded in intellectual traditions, social 
structures, and political power relations and that they eventually influenced 
further developments, often indirectly and against their original motivations. 
Such an analysis transcends existing perceptions or categorisations of their 
activities and thereby adds to our knowledge of the period. The gains from this 
endeavour should be accessible to all readers irrespective of their political val-
ues or convictions.
Consequently, the economic and political thought of the individuals and 
groups analysed cannot function as an analytical tool. The conceptual frame-
work invoked here— that is, the decision to ask for connections between the 
realms of consumption and violence and the idea of capturing those connec-
tions under the concept of “regimes of provision”— has been developed inde-
pendently through reflection on the existing historiography and theoretical lit-
erature on the history of consumption and the history of political violence. It 
should be applicable to other scenarios of violence in the sphere of consump-
tion, such as Nazi violence against shops owned by Jews, the Canadian pot-
latch ban, or the Bonfires of the Vanities in the course of Girolamo Savonaro-
la’s campaign for reform.
68. Skinner, Visions of Politics, vii.
69. Ibid., 115.
70. Max Weber, “Kritische Studien auf dem Gebiet der kulturwissenschaftlichen Logik,” in 
Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre, ed. Johannes Winckelmann, 6th ed. (Tübingen, 
1985), 252– 53.
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Aims and Structure
The central hypothesis of this volume is that even in an age of affluence, mili-
tant protest and political violence can essentially be traced back to competing 
concepts of moral economy. The book addresses three guiding research ques-
tions: (1) How did regimes of provision and political protest interrelate? (2) 
How, when, and why did militant forms of protest against regimes of provision 
emerge? (3) In what ways were intellectual critique, militant practice, eco-
nomic interest, and the use of the governmental monopoly of violence inter-
locked in such developments? Notions of social solidarity and equality were 
often core values in radical critiques and protests, and they were easily en-
trapped in escalations of violence and counterviolence. We need to reconstruct 
the role of narratives of social protest and revolutionary politics adopted and 
adapted by protesters, by the intellectual commentators who offered them-
selves as their spokespersons— or as their critics— and by the government in-
stitutions they confronted. Political talk thus serves “as a window into people’s 
moral universes.”71
The volume covers the time period from the late 1950s to the late 1980s 
in an integrated manner, an approach taken by very few previous studies of 
protest politics and the Left. The book is organized into seven chapters, all of 
which treat two themes in conjunction: instances where commodities were 
symbolically destroyed by acts of political violence, and political thought re-
flecting the symbolic and manifest violence emanating from regimes of provi-
sion. The chapters are arranged to optimally explore these thematic consider-
ations, while chronological considerations are subordinate but still influence 
the internal composition of the chapters. Chapters 1– 3  depart from an exami-
nation of a relatively well- known April 1968 incident of department store arson 
in Frankfurt but go much further than the existing literature in contextualizing 
and explaining this and similar events, expanding the topic of consumption and 
violence up to the 1980s.
Chapter 1 focuses on the prehistory of the Frankfurt firebombings in the 
protest praxis of the famous Kommune I and its provocative leaflets satirizing 
public responses to a Brussels fire disaster. Due attention is given to forerun-
ners— in particular, to the artist groups Spur and Subversive Aktion, which 
played a central role in establishing the commercial sphere as a prime focus of 
protest beginning in the early 1960s. In the second half of the decade, political 
happenings at department stores were a well- established form of student pro-
71. Auyero, Routine Politics and Violence, 29.
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test. The chapter ends with the highly publicized trial of the Frankfurt arsonists 
and how they evaded the sentence, which eventually resulted in the creation of 
the RAF.
Before pursuing this development further, chapter 2 traces contemporary 
theoretical understandings of regimes of provision, drawing on a close reading 
of pertinent sources in the intellectual history of consumption- related protest, 
especially the work of Herbert Marcuse as it developed over several decades. 
Departing from a Freudian perspective on needs, Marcuse’s subsequent dif-
ferentiation of true and false needs and his theory of repressive tolerance of-
fered sufficient points of contact with other thinkers who analysed material 
progress critically and influenced the protest movement. An analysis of a the-
ory paper by members of the Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (SDS), 
“Warenhausaktionen” (Department Store Campaigns), broaches the issue of 
how these sources came to be reflected in the cognitive orientation of the activ-
ists analysed in the other chapters. A radical interpretation of Marx’s realm of 
freedom inspired many critics of capitalist regimes of provision. An analysis of 
Marcuse’s Counterrevolution and Revolt (1972) highlights a remarkable radi-
calisation of his critique that needs to be understood in the context of his ex-
change with rebellious students.
Chapter 3 then resumes the narrative of militant acts against representa-
tions of consumer society with the Tupamaros West- Berlin and their 1969 ar-
son attacks. The radical alternative milieu’s widespread indulgence in drugs 
and theft was a crucial backdrop for this development, as was the  relatively 
conciliatory approach vis- à- vis the protest movement adopted by the coalition 
government of Social Democrats and Free Democrats, which, in the eyes of the 
radicals, threatened to stifle the movement’s revolutionary impetus. The latter 
attitude increasingly manifested itself in the “politics of broken glass.” The 
chapter then embarks on a systematic analysis of the statements and writings 
of the RAF, which emerged from this context. In its desperate quest for a revo-
lutionary subject, the RAF sought to address those excluded from consumer 
society. Existing research more or less ignores this central aspect of social- 
revolutionary militancy. Drawing on Ulrike Meinhof’s theoretical writings, the 
chapter demonstrates how a notion of “consumer terror” had already been 
present in her journalistic work. However, she eventually undertook a signifi-
cant departure from the student movement’s broader theories of manipulation 
and depoliticisation in favour of an emphasis on various forms of illegal dis-
obedience as a process of moral emancipation, especially in a draft for a major 
strategy paper, “Die Massen und der Konsum” (The Masses and Consump-
tion), which was not made available to the public after the authorities confis-
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cated it from her cell. Consumer politics emerges as a central plank in the 
cognitive orientation of the first generation of the RAF. After Meinhof’s death, 
this focus receded, but Movement 2 June, a related but independent group, 
continued a militant focus on consumer society. This tradition eventually was 
revived, with different means, by the autonomist groups of the 1980s.
Chapters 4– 6 then analyse the complex nature of debates and conflicts 
over specific public commodities (public transport, media, and housing). Al-
though these chapters occasionally come back to the famous activists of Kom-
mune I and the RAF, they address critiques of regimes of provision that were 
rooted in much wider social movements. This approach not only provides an 
essential backdrop for a better understanding of the famous militants but goes 
beyond them in terms of primary source basis, analytical depth, and chrono-
logical scope. These chapters show that violence entered protest scenarios very 
quickly and largely independent of the famous provocateurs, simultaneously 
calling the protests’ legitimacy into question and challenging the measures to 
which the authorities resorted. This development initiated far- reaching legal 
debates leading to a differentiation of the concept of violence in criminal law 
as well as to discussions regarding the relationship between basic rights and 
the state’s monopoly on violence.
The politics of public transport fares between the mid- 1960s and the early 
1980s serve as the central issue of chapter 4. An analysis of the so- called Laep-
ple case— named after a rather moderate student functionary— demonstrates 
the crucial role of legal discourse in the genesis of political violence. This 
particular kind of protest, which peaked in the Red Spot Campaign in Han-
nover in 1969, has never been investigated in depth. It emerges as a remarkably 
widespread and vibrant area of everyday protest that was eventually radical-
ized by groups such as the Frankfurt Spontis— including Joschka Fischer and 
Daniel Cohn- Bendit— and the Revolutionäre Zellen  (Revolutionary Cells).
Chapter 5 examines the anti- Springer campaign, which focused on a spe-
cific critique of a regime of provision: an alleged manipulative monopoly on 
information. Emerging from the SDS campaign against one of Europe’s largest 
publishing houses, the protests initially leaned on intellectual impulses, such as 
Jörg Huffschmid’s Habermasian critique of press concentration, while some 
activists resorted to the direct action of broken glass. The protests culminated 
after the near- fatal shooting of Rudi Dutschke in April 1968, when activists 
engaged in large- scale protest rallies and blockades against Springer. The ac-
tivists’ attempt to differentiate between violence against things and violence 
against people was quickly overtaken by the intensification of political antago-
nism in the aftermath of the riots. The dimension of consumption has not fea-
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tured prominently in existing accounts of the anti- Springer campaign. More-
over, most treatments hardly go beyond Easter 1968. This volume, in contrast, 
analyses both the long- term repercussions of the legal interpretation of vio-
lence during blockades, which necessitated a reformulation of the notion of 
violence, and the revival of the campaign in the context of the peace movement 
of the early 1980s. Rather remarkably, Springer had embraced politically mo-
tivated boycotts in the media sector long before the extraparliamentary opposi-
tion seized the method and militants targeted the press baron.
Political violence arising from conflict over the public commodities of 
housing and urban space is the subject of chapter 6, which focuses on the 
Frankfurt and West Berlin squatters’ movements. A challenging search for al-
ternative lifestyles, concepts of well- being, and regimes of provision constantly 
faced the threat of being criminalised and the possibility of violent escalations. 
The chapter examines the case of the Weisbecker- Haus, named after a member 
of Movement 2 June shot by police. However, squatting was ultimately a socio-
economic phenomenon. In many respects, squatters were alternative consum-
ers who attempted to give voice to the economic, social, and cultural interests 
of consumers of housing space and urban infrastructure and to lend them po-
litical weight vis- à- vis the seemingly purely economic concerns of commercial 
entrepreneurs and their destructive powers.
The final chapter adds the global dimension and takes the narrative up to 
the late 1980s by examining political campaigns that sought to establish soli-
darity between consumers in highly industrialised countries and producers in 
developing countries. Various campaigns against international regimes of pro-
vision are treated: against the apartheid regime in South Africa; in support of 
the Palestinians’ anti- Zionist struggle; against multinational companies such as 
Nestlé and various coffee roasters; and supporting female low- wage workers 
for the textile manufacturer Adler in South Korea. These protests reached their 
peak during the 1988 meeting of the International Monetary Fund and World 
Bank in West Berlin. Complementing the treatment of the autonomists and the 
RAF’s campaigns against global governance, the chapter presents an unprece-
dented analysis of the theoretical writings of the Revolutionary Cells and their 
feminist branch, Rote Zora, which explicitly sought to operate in the grey zone 
between the social movements, consumer solidarity, and militant action.
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Chapter 1
Department Stores:  
Political Protest in the Commercial Sphere
“Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production.”
—Adam Smith (1776)1
The imaginative superelevation that Western- style consumption received in the 
context of the Cold War competition developed internal tensions and cracks as 
a result of one of its main driving forces: diversification. Youth movements 
played a crucial role in the emergence of alternatives that challenged the bipo-
lar structure of Cold War consumption debates. The economy and the market 
reacted to the rebellious attitudes of young people, took them up according to 
their logic of commercialisation, and consequently helped their expression. 
This mechanism has been acknowledged as a factor causing the Halbstarken-
krawalle (yob riots) of the late 1950s.2 These disturbances and protests often 
crystallised around places or events of cultural consumption, such as cinemas 
or concert venues, and built on the appearance of nonconformist behaviour in 
the public sphere of shopping streets and market squares.
At the time, however, a critical attitude towards consumer society was still 
the domain of worried parents and educators. Emerging from a sceptical inter-
pretation of commercialisation and its effects on the coming generation, they 
prescribed social commitment, critical thinking, and politicisation as antidotes. 
The public debate on youth was dominated by the idea of the manipulative 
powers of advertisement. This pedagogical variant of the West German Cold 
War mentality tended to merge three symptoms of the decline of modernity 
into “massification”: National Socialism, communism, and consumer society.3 
1. Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776; Chi-
cago, 1976), 2:179.
2. Lindner, Jugendprotest, 45. See also Grotum, Halbstarken.
3. Detlef Siegfried, “Vom Teenager zur Pop- Revolution: Politisierungstendenzen in der west-
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Ultimately, the metamorphosis of this critical outlook into the identification of 
consumer society with imperialism and repression that gained currency amid 
the student revolts of the second half of the 1960s became an important turning 
point in the political history of the late twentieth century.
Marxists conventionally scorned political activity in the “sphere of repro-
duction” as a backwater of revolutionary activity. Nonetheless, political activ-
ity resulted from perceptions of change in the structures of the working world 
and from frustrated efforts to gain influence in the classical sphere of produc-
tion. Beginning in the late 1960s, attempts to integrate both spheres with in-
novative means of protest flourished. In November 1970, Frankfurt activists 
began concentrating on the Opel plant at Rüsselsheim, seeking to rekindle the 
major strikes that had occurred at the Turin FIAT works in the autumn of 1969 
and at the Paris Renault factory in May 1968. During this rather unsuccessful 
episode of factory agitation, the focus of the radical rebellion went far beyond 
strictly production- related issues. The entire mode of an “alienated” everyday 
life marked by deformed need satisfaction was attacked.4 Factory activists re-
produced Adam Smith’s famous insight in their own way. An entry in a politi-
cal “factory journal” by Reimut Reiche highlighted crucial differences in life-
style that separated the activists from their desired clientele: “It is somehow 
preposterous to fulminate against all this work while most people have the 
motivation to work more without discussing the entire consumption shit that is 
so adequate to capital[ism]. Those who absolutely want a colour TV, a new car, 
or a bedroom will hardly be against overtime.”5 Reiche, who had been federal 
chair of the Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (SDS) in 1966– 67, also 
expressed the considerable distance he felt from the lifestyles and consumer 
habits of the people he sought to agitate: “I really would have ended up at a 
psychiatric hospital if, on top of it, I had to share their way of life after working 
hours, at their pubs or at home, and had to feed off the grub that they feed off!”6
The Dutch Provos had been pioneers of political campaigns with a focus 
on consumption. Seeing themselves as spearheads of a new society, they de-
clared, “Our targets are consumer society and governmental order. We aim for 
deutschen Jugendkultur 1959 bis 1968,” in Dynamische Zeiten, ed. Schildt, Siegfried, and Lam-
mers, 584– 92.
4. For brief accounts of the Frankfurt Spontis’ experiences at Opel, see Kraushaar, “Frankfurter 
Sponti- Szene,” 108– 10; Koenen, Das Rote Jahrzehnt, 319– 26.
5. Reimut Reiche, Was heißt: Proletarischer Lebenszusammenhang? (Frankfurt, 1971), in 
Frankfurter Schule, ed. Kraushaar, 2:736– 39. See also Christian Schmidt, “Wir sind die Wahnsin-
nigen,” 45– 46.
6. Quoted ibid., 43.
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the unlimited autonomy of the individual. We are anarchists.”7 In 1968, a state-
ment by the Provos was printed in a West Berlin underground almanac: “We 
live in a tasteless uniform society. . . . Our behaviour and consumption are dic-
tated or forced upon us by capitalist or communist Big Bosses. But the Pro-
vos . . . want to be the creative leisure activists of tomorrow. Get rid of Philips, 
Seven up, Lexington, DAF, Persil, Prodent. The Provotariat abhors the en-
slaved consumer.”8 This focus on provoking violent responses from authorities 
using nonviolent bait, seeking to improve public transport, critiquing real es-
tate speculation via squatting, and challenging newspaper coverage of protest 
events anticipated crucial aspects of the subsequent entanglement of critiques 
of regimes of provision and discourses on violence.
In a broader sense, the countless activists and protesters who responded to 
the structural transformations in production and distribution and to correspond-
ing changes in social stratification affecting highly developed societies mark a 
turning point in a longer development: rapid economic growth since the mid- 
nineteenth century had at least theoretically furnished the means to solve the 
social question and to provide well- being for all. This highlighted the question 
of whether certain types of property and authority created injustices that pre-
vented a more appropriate distribution and use of society’s riches, especially 
when this perspective was extended to questions of global distribution. Under-
standing the profound changes that took place in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, 
requires examining the contradictions and drawbacks brought about by the cul-
mination of growth. Critical intellectuals, laid- off workers, and members of 
disadvantaged minorities questioned politicians’ promises of ubiquitous afflu-
ence and developed a consciousness of the discomforts of consumer society. 
The new material blessings came at a price. Increased levels of consumption 
and participation in consumer markets and the modest but comfortable prop-
erty of the wage earners of postwar Western societies often went hand in hand 
with changes in the workplace requiring rather uncomfortable processes of 
adjustment, loss of autonomy, or destruction of established social structures. 
Despite the flood of consumer goods, the social distribution of property did not 
necessarily continue to widen; wealth and influence became concentrated 
among those dominating oligopolistic market structures.
This chapter does not provide an exhaustive history of the drawbacks of 
consumer society in the 1960s and 1970s. Instead, it puts the focus on mem-
bers of left- wing alternative milieus who discovered the realm of consumption 
7. Hollstein, Gegengesellschaft, 70.
8. “Aufruf an das international Provotariat,” in Dürschlag and Sander, Oberbaum Linkeck. See 
also Kießling, Postindustrielle Konsumgesellschaft, 134.
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as an object for social and political critique and as a spatial sphere for cam-
paigns. The semipublic sphere of retail came to epitomise the capitalist system 
and eventually emerged as a target of militant protest, which culminated in 
incendiary attacks on department stores in the late 1960s. However, the sig-
nificance of the department store as a target of militant protest cannot be under-
stood without appreciating how avant- garde subculture came to wrestle with 
consumer society in the preceding decade. The subsequent focus on commu-
nards and department store arsonists shows that they were integral to the merg-
ing of discourses on consumption and violence as well as that they were by no 
means the only ones embedding critiques of regimes of provision in their po-
litical thought and activism. This discussion establishes a foundation from 
which to explore the simultaneous development of philosophical critiques of 
regimes of provision, the further militarization of the campaign against con-
sumer society, and, in the second part of this book, much broader political 
campaigns, such as those against fare increases and Springer’s tabloid journal-
ism, that were closely linked with the highly publicised performative protest 
analysed in this chapter.
Spur and Subversive Aktion
The artist groups Spur and Subversive Aktion played a central role in establish-
ing the commercial sphere as a prime focus of protest. Key members— such as 
future communard Dieter Kunzelmann and future student leader Rudi 
Dutschke— had personal experience with relative poverty. A photo of 
Dutschke’s student digs shortly after the erection of the Berlin Wall, when he 
had settled in West Berlin, shows only the most Spartan furnishings. His finan-
cial situation remained precarious throughout his life.9 Kunzelmann came from 
a well- to- do bourgeois background but practiced abstention from the blessings 
of affluence when spending some time as a clochard in Paris in 1959. He sub-
sequently conceived of himself as a bohemian in the Schwabing quarter of 
Munich, where he was influenced by situationism, continuing surrealist tradi-
tions and urging the realisation of communism by revolutionising everyday 
life. In this context, the working class appeared to be in the bondage of con-
sumption and embourgeoisement.10
 9. Enzensberger, Jahre der Kommune I, 24, 77.
10. See Kunzelmann, Leisten sie keinen Widerstand!, 18– 33; Reimann, Dieter Kunzelmann, 
43– 48. For Dutschke’s ideas on embourgeoisement, see Dutschke, Jeder hat sein Leben ganz zu 
leben, 11.
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By 1961, a critique of consumer society clashed with the authority of the 
state. In their attempts to unmask the unholy role of consumption, the avant- 
garde collaboration Gruppe Spur— until February 1962 part of the Situationist 
International— became subject to judicial prosecution. Heimrad Prehm, 
Helmut Sturm, Hans Peter Zimmer, and Dieter Kunzelmann were accused of 
distributing blasphemy via their journal, which frequently included religious 
symbols in rather uninhibited social criticism. They were initially sentenced to 
five months in prison, but a higher court reduced the sentence to probation. 
Kunzelmann had referred to the realm of commerce when, for example, adver-
tising that everyone who needed a myth would be sent a Virgin Mother to sat-
isfy their sexual needs in exchange for “cash on delivery.” In the same contri-
bution, he declared that “nonrevolutionaries were fed by the noncreativity of 
huge culture department stores; . . . the dragon of civilisation is vomiting seas 
of well- wrapped goods onto . . . the manipulated consumer,” thereby turning 
“revolutionary ideas into common coffeehouse babble.”11 A manifesto was 
sent to the governments involved in the Geneva Disarmament Conference sug-
gesting that “a public atomic bomb potlatch” be turned against the “cultural 
industry.”12
After the group’s expulsion from the Situationist International, there was 
a brief sequel with the first and only issue of Der deutsche Gedanke (The Ger-
man Thought). The journal printed a German translation of an article from In-
ternationale Situationniste that argued that whenever old forms of opposition 
had been absorbed into the existing order, an irreducible dissatisfaction kept 
undermining affluent society like Marx’s “old mole.” This perspective sought 
to identify riots as indicators of dissatisfaction with consumer society. The un-
named author diagnosed a “first wave of vandalism against the machines of 
consumption” and likened it to Luddite machine breaking. Evidence for this 
argument was taken from contemporary protest events from France and Italy. 
In February 1961, Naples tram drivers had gone on strike. Angry workers who 
had no transportation home started to riot, and the protest escalated into fierce 
skirmishes with police and army units. Trams and buses were set alight, and 
shop windows and neon signs stoned. The situationist interpretation took such 
signs as consumer society’s “most symbolic and most fragile points,” and the 
11. Dieter Kunzelmann, “Kanon der Revolution” (1961), in Subversive Aktion, ed. Böckelmann 
and Nagel, 45– 46. See Gruppe Spur, SPUR- Buch; Goeschel, Anschläge und Richtlinien, 8– 26; 
Dreßen, Kunzelmann, and Siepmann, Nilpferd des höllischen Urwalds; Danzker and Dornacher, 
Gruppe SPUR.
12. Christofer Baldeney, Rodolphe Gasché, Dieter Kunzelmann, and Hans Peter Zimmer, “Ri-
tus contra Depravation,” in Subversive Aktion, ed. Böckelmann and Nagel, 54– 55.
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rioting was seen to “extend to the whole consumer society.” The fact that Lor-
raine miners had destroyed some twenty- one cars during an August 1961 strike 
tempted the author to ask hopefully, “Who can fail to see in this action . . . a 
gesture of self- defence against the central object of consumer alienation?” The 
task was to revisit the history of anarchism and utopian socialism to establish 
the decisive “lifestyle criterion” that would save oppositional groups from de-
generating into “dull propaganda societies.”13
The Munich artist group Subversive Aktion built on these foundations and 
sought to make anonymous power structures visible in artistic happenings. 
They declared in one of their first programmatic statements that the historical 
project of reducing working hours had led to the impoverishment of everyday 
life: “It stabilises the acceptance of partial fulfilment. Through the creation of 
organised leisure people, the chance to even guess true need is completely 
deadened.” This statement referred to Guy Debord’s notion of a “colonisation 
of social life,” which played a central role in his main work, La Société du 
spectacle (1967).14 The mechanism of display (that is, media and advertise-
ment) created illusions that misled people about the fact that they consumed 
only “a secondary imitation of real events.”15 Subversives Dieter Kunzelmann, 
Rodolphe Gasché, and Christopher Baldeney explicitly acknowledged Adorno 
and Marcuse as their intellectual inspirations. Most significant was probably 
the latter’s Eros and Civilization, which influenced the following sentences: 
“Contemporary society and its pressure to consume deprive man of the possi-
bility to realise life in its exceptionality. . . . The creation of artificial needs and 
their satisfaction make true participation impossible.”16 The alternative was, 
“All products must be freely available to the individual.”17 This was a provoca-
tive communist ideal of consumption according to one’s needs.
Satirical critiques of existing regimes of provision became very important 
for the group’s subsequent statements. Members were keenly aware of the dan-
ger that avant- garde art would be absorbed by the “commodity character” of 
13. “Les mauvais jours finiront,” Internationale Situationniste 7 (April 1962), German transla-
tion in Subversive Aktion, ed. Böckelmann and Nagel, 48– 53. See “Troops Battle Mob in Naples: 
68 Hurt in Transit Strike Riot,” New York Times, 9 February 1961, 1, 14.
14. “Abrechnung” (December 1962), in Subversive Aktion, ed. Böckelmann and Nagel, 76; 
Debord, Société du spectacle. On Subversive Aktion, see also Siegfried, Time Is on My Side, 477– 
83.
15. “Abrechnung” (December 1962), in Subversive Aktion, ed. Böckelmann and Nagel, 80.
16. “Parallelen” (December 1962), in ibid., 86. See Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, 100 (first 
German ed., Eros und Kultur: Ein philosophischer Beitrag zu Sigmund Freud, trans. Marianne von 
Eckardt- Jaffe [Stuttgart, 1957]).
17. “Unverbindliche Richtlinien” (December 1962), in Nilpferd des höllischen Urwalds, ed. 
Dreßen, Kunzelmann, and Siepmann, 156.
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industrialised societies: “The Parnassus of the arts is the showcase of the de-
partment store.”18 The group members contemplated various ways to disrupt 
the 1964 documenta at Kassel, where their former associates from Spur were 
exhibiting. A brainstorming session produced a list of thirty situationist provo-
cations, including the distribution of forged admission tickets; letters to the 
editors of newspapers highlighting positions that saw art as a commodity or as 
absorbing utopian and revolutionary impulses; and design parodies of adver-
tisements for breweries.19 In their artistic focus on the workings of affluent 
society, Subversive Aktion increasingly added the dimension of violence. The 
term terror found its way into Subversive Aktion pamphlets in December 1963, 
when “Repressive Aktion” addressed “the terror of industrial society.” The ac-
tivists identified the creed that “anyone who does not work shall not eat” as the 
backbone of this terror.20 The conditioning of a right to exist on the economic 
use of commodified labour pervaded the fabric of everyday life, reducing “man 
to just work and consumption.”21 When transposing these ideas of a complete 
economisation of human life to contemporary society, the immediate target 
was advertisement. Consumerism (Konsumdenken) as a quasi- religion had 
completely annihilated (ausgemerzt) any consciousness of a nonmonetary dis-
tribution of goods.22 Subsequently, the focus rested on luxury needs by intro-
ducing a critique of tourism under the label “Costa- Brava- Komplex,” a critique 
of the marketing of intellectual needs and production, and a critique of the re-
pression of sexuality. When John F. Kennedy was assassinated, a Subversive 
Aktion flyer declared that the death of the American president would be fol-
lowed by “an even more total identification with the apparatus: I will work 
even more and consume even more assiduously.”23
In January 1964, Kunzelmann anticipated later developments and put the 
emphasis on the legal court as a public stage: “We will provoke monster trials 
to publicise all our ideas. We will . . . raid a department store, take all goods and 
distribute them in the street.”24 The revolutionary impetus toward “total subver-
sion” was tied up with expectations of a quasi- totalitarian future of consumer-
ism: “We are awaiting . . . legal pressure to consume, . . . manipulation . . . dur-
18. “Unverbindliche Richtlinien 2” (December 1963), in ibid.
19. “Liste von Einfällen für eine Aktion der Subversiven Aktion auf der Kasseler Documenta,” 
in Subversive Aktion, ed. Böckelmann and Nagel, 130– 32.
20. “Repressive Aktion” (December 1963), in ibid., 102.
21. Ibid., 107.
22. Ibid., 102.
23. “Auch Du hast Kennedy erschossen!” (December 1963), in ibid., 127.
24. Dieter Kunzelmann to Frank Böckelmann, 4 January 1964, in ibid., 129.
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ing the 16 hours of ‘leisure time,’ and the . . . liquidation of the private sphere.”25 
However, a revolutionary class appeared to be a mere chimaera: while the so-
cial legislation of the nineteenth century had eliminated the revolutionary im-
petus of the classical workers’ movement, the analogous mechanism of the 
twentieth century seemed to be “reservations of the pleasure principle.” Draw-
ing on Marcuse’s Marxist interpretation of psychoanalysis, the subversives 
suspected that the reasons for the failures of past revolutions lay in psycho-
logical mechanisms.26
The Munich section of Subversive Aktion subscribed to a rather general-
ising philosophy of the commodity: all commodities were abstract, exchange-
able, and products of alienation; everything had been reduced to exchange 
value, commodity, or capital; and this had led to the supreme rule of the 
achievement principle (Leistungsprinzip). There was no attempt whatsoever to 
differentiate between what might be desirable commodification or consump-
tion and specific regimes of provision that invited criticism. Curiously, the sub-
versives seem to have taken the penetrating power of advertisement as proof of 
the “rudiments” of real needs.27 The revolutionary subject was thus the recipi-
ent of advertisement— that is, potentially everyone. One wonders whether this 
meant that the revolution had to be fought via advertisements.
Subversive Aktion delivered its somewhat exaggerated Marcusian mes-
sage at the May 1964 meeting of the Union of German Advertising Managers 
and Consultants, showering the delegates with flyers that depicted advertisers 
as “preachers of oppression” who stuffed people with products so that they 
were no longer conscious of their true needs. By making “consumption and 
work identical,” advertising veiled “the possibility of a world without work” 
and enthroned “the lie ‘consumo, ergo sum.’”28 The agitators were interrogated 
by the Verfassungsschutz (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitu-
tion) but were found not guilty in court.29
Bernd Rabehl, another member of Subversive Aktion who later became 
famous in the SDS, went a step further in amalgamating notions of the continu-
ity between colonialism, National Socialism, and West German consumer so-
ciety. In an article published in the first issue of Subversive Aktion’s journal, 
25. “Konklusionen” (early April 1964), in ibid., 133.
26. Ibid., 134. See also Marcuse, “Idee des Fortschritts,” 435.
27. Frank Böckelmann to Streffen Schulze, 17 August 1964, in Subversive Aktion, ed. Böckel-
mann and Nagel, 164, 166.
28. “Aufruf an die Seelenmasseure” (May 1964), in ibid., 147.
29. Cf. ibid., 146; Nilpferd des höllischen Urwalds, ed. Dressen, Kunzelmann, and Siepmann, 
161; Enzensberger, Jahre der Kommune I, 23.
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Anschlag, in August 1964, Rabehl maintained that Cold War imperialism had 
found a substitute for direct expansion: “It now finds its profit in the planned 
consumer.” Rabehl drew almost a caricature of the “manipulated, senseless hu-
man being who has to follow exactly the commands of industry.” Drilled by 
advertisement, consumers worked to satisfy their addiction: “This consumer 
behaviour is the new ideology of society.”30 Consumer society even appeared 
as a new form of Volksgemeinschaft (national community), with “assiduous 
work and diligent consuming” superseding “blood and soil”: “Today it is no 
longer the same race that is supposed to perform the proud bond with the pow-
erful, but the same consumer ideal.”31 Rabehl criticised the Social Democrats’ 
attempts to “sell politics as a commodity” and their ceasing to be an opposi-
tional party. His rather crude and hermetic attempt to navigate German history 
between Helmut Schelsky’s “levelled middle- class society” and Marcusian 
manipulation culminated in the coining of the drastic term Konsumfaschis-
mus.32 The old theory of “social fascism”— a political creed originating in the 
late 1920s arguing that social democracy, with its corporatist economic model, 
was a variant of fascism— had acquired a new interpretation.
Kunzelmann contributed an article to the same issue of Anschlag that fo-
cused on the commodification of sexuality: “Sexuality in a consumer society is 
doubly degenerate: its repression is to the benefit of society in such a way that 
sublimated libido becomes labour power for production, and all consumer goods 
are symbolically charged with sexuality,” so that what is beyond price— “lived 
life”— is exchanged for commodities. Contemporary society’s apparent permis-
siveness only veiled the mechanism of reified sexuality. The argument was again 
rather rigorous: the freedom of consumer society was “the total suppression of 
everything human”; all sexuality was experienced as “economic exchange”; and 
work and consumption were just vicarious satisfaction (Ersatzbefriedigung). The 
strategy of allowing sexuality to become a consumer good and thus controlling it 
seemed even more efficient than the continued suppression that the East German 
rulers were pursuing.33 The same author discovered hitchhiking as a social form 
that still resisted total commodification— a reminder of the possibility of a differ-
ent life beyond work and consumption. Kunzelmann castigated the authorities’ 
campaigns against hitchhiking, which sought to criminalise the hitchhiker: 
30. Bernd Rabehl, “Sozialimperialismus und Sozialdemokratie,” in Subversive Aktion, ed. 
Böckelmann and Nagel, 175.
31. Ibid., 176.
32. Ibid., 178. “Consumer society as perfectly internalised Fascist order” had already featured 
briefly in “Parallelen” (December 1963), in ibid., 110.
33. Dieter Kunzelmann, “Busenfrei als Symptom der Unfreiheit,” in ibid., 185– 86.
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“Nothing is allowed to be free of charge!” Historically, he put this practice in line 
with the suppression of vagabonds, highwaymen, tramps, and Gipsies; he men-
tioned concentration camps in this context.34
At a September 1964 meeting, Kunzelmann, Dutschke, and their com-
rades agreed on a programme that would address all areas of society to abolish 
“the regime of the achievement principle [Leistungsprinzip], which is particu-
larly manifest in the ‘contaminated psyche’ of people living in a consumer 
society.”35 Moreover, they decided to take this programme into the SDS, which 
they joined. They picked the eightieth German Catholic Convention in Stutt-
gart to transmit their subversive messages. Kunzelmann suggested a faked an-
nouncement that a service would take place at a department store.36 Another 
scenario that was contemplated had the agitators mounting a huge Mercedes 
star on an altar.37 A flyer that was distributed declared, “Since the true gods of 
this society are commodity and consumption, the Good Lord of the old days— if 
he wants to survive and prevent schizophrenia among the believers— has to 
arrange himself with the fetishes and become a sublime fetish of performance 
[Leistungsfetisch]. He does survive: as the absolute boom which blesses pro-
duction and protects its managed sheep from demonic communism.” Four ac-
tivists were arrested on “suspicion of blasphemy” when they were caught glu-
ing posters on church doors and windows.38
The second issue of Anschlag, with a Marcuse quote about the possibility 
of liberation for its motto, shows that Subversive Aktion was attempting a sub-
stantial analysis of consumer society. Frank Böckelmann dedicated a long ar-
ticle to the phenomenon of youth riots. It departs from the basic assumption 
that “youth is a commodity” and that impressionable and developing young 
adults were ideally suited to adapt to the accelerated cycle of production and 
consumption. However, this exposed position also predestined youth to be sen-
sitive indicators of the discomforts of “saturated society.” Turning against the 
conventional interpretation that sees surfeit at the root of youthful rebellion, 
Böckelmann argued that frustration resulted from the denial of self- realisation: 
“We do not have too much. We have nothing.” In the youth riots that kept oc-
curring throughout the developed world, he saw damage to property but no 
“senseless rage.” The almost ritual course of such events betrayed a search for 
meaning. As was the case during the Schwabing riots, violence erupted only 
34. Dieter Kunzelmann, “Tramper aller Länder . . . ,” in ibid., 189– 90.
35. “Hamburger Protokoll vom 26.– 30.9.1964,” in ibid., 225.
36. Dieter Kunzelmann to Frank Böckelmann, 22 August 1964, in ibid., 211.
37. Dieter Kunzelmann to Frank Böckelmann, 27 August 1964, in ibid., 212.
38. “Botschaft an die Lämmer des Herrn zum Katholikentag” (September 1964), in ibid., 213.
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when police intervened.39 These riots, which took place in Munich’s bohemian 
quarter in June 1962, were the immediate backdrop for such reflections. Major 
disturbances were triggered by a group of street musicians playing at a late 
hour. After police tried to arrest the musicians, the situation escalated into four 
days of street fighting involving up to forty thousand protesters. Nearly two 
hundred “troublemakers” were arrested, among them nineteen- year- old An-
dreas Baader. Sixty- eight were sentenced to either fines or short prison sen-
tences, while the one hundred forty complaints against police officers resulted 
in a single conviction.40 However, Böckelmann’s perspective was broader. He 
thought that the destructiveness of American gangs was also “a reflection of 
the economic and political terror of the world powers.” Quoting sociologist 
Ludwig von Friedeburg, Böckelmann saw theft among youth as “an illegal 
answer to pressure to consume.” It all boiled down to disenchantment with the 
lack of happiness behind the plethora of goods and social institutions that soci-
ety offered young people. The riots sprang from a desire for “spontaneous 
community” that turned the street into a place of immediate and boundless 
communication that did not fit with the socioeconomic role that “the system” 
attributed to youth. Manipulation via propaganda, fabrication of opinion, and 
advertisement worked only when “facing standardised objects  .  .  . brought 
down to a common reified denominator.” The subversive activist revelled in the 
memory of the Schwabinger Krawalle, which seemed to have escaped this 
trap: “The flooding of the streets with people . . . , the irrational breakthrough 
from prescribed leisure behaviour . . . created in all parties involved a strange 
and defiant feeling of somehow being in the right.”41
At Christmas 1964, Subversive Aktion involved customers in Munich de-
partment stores in provocative discussions and distributed leaflets in which 
customers could read, “And ‘love’ gave birth to products, packaged them in 
false dreams, and put them in shop windows so that people could no longer see 
their real wishes.”42 At the group’s April 1965 meeting, a formidable catalogue 
of questions focused on the analysis of consumer society: “Which modified 
psychological functions does consumption gain in an age in which it is the 
primary influence on life? In which form and intensity is the . . . compulsion to 
consume reflected in the individual? . . . What is the meaning of ‘luxury’ and 
‘convenience’? . . . What will supersede the ideology of the ‘struggle for exis-
39. Frank Böckelmann, “Jugendkrawalle in der saturierten Gesellschaft,” in ibid., 239– 42.
40. See Fürmetz, “Schwabinger Krawalle.”
41. Frank Böckelmann, “Jugendkrawalle in der saturierten Gesellschaft,” in Subversive Aktion, 
ed. Böckelmann and Nagel, 244– 46.
42. “Weihnachtsevangelium,” in ibid., 286.
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tence,’ which is losing its last objective foundations? What is the meaning of 
‘need,’ ‘affliction,’ and ‘destiny’ in a time of a total (‘false’) conquest of na-
ture? . . . Which social and psychological potentials of conflict exist in affluent/
consumer society, and what mechanisms of absorbing them are available?” 
The ambitious idea was to investigate the changed relationship between pro-
duction and consumption, the “dwindling of difference” between these two 
spheres, “and the reflection of this new relation in consciousness” for the peri-
ods of “feudalism and . . . early and late capitalism.”43 It is doubtful whether 
this sweeping analysis was ever realised, but the programme shows the central-
ity of the topic of affluence to the intellectual and political activities of Subver-
sive Aktion. With the expulsion of Kunzelmann in April 1965, and with the 
dissociation of Dutschke and Rabehl from the Berlin branch a month later, the 
topic of consumption— and the group’s dynamism— waned.44 However, the 
three renegades took important impulses to their future activities in Berlin.
Go- Ins at Department Stores
In 1966— similar to two years earlier in Munich— the Kurfürstendamm be-
came the scene of “go- ins” in department stores on a pre- Christmas Saturday 
with extended opening hours. Participants in walking demonstrations on 
crowded shopping streets camouflaged anti– Vietnam War leaflets in gift- 
wrapped boxes.45 This was in response to the authorities banning student dem-
onstrations from the city centre. Eighty- six people, including Dutschke, were 
arrested. Police were so baffled by this innovative form of protest that they beat 
and arrested a number of ordinary Christmas shoppers. Members of Kommune 
I received a sentence of fifty deutsche marks or five days in prison for “ob-
structing very heavy pedestrian and motorised traffic.”46
When Dutschke famously called for the creation of a “countermilieu” 
(Gegenmilieu) as a “germ of a new society” (in a text mainly on revolution in 
Latin America), the realm of consumption and more specifically department 
stores appeared as focal points of political agitation. The target group consisted 
of the employees whom Dutschke and his coauthors tried to subsume under the 
43. Ibid., 334– 35.
44. See ibid., 300– 301, 333– 34.
45. See Wolfgang Ruppert, “Um 1968— Die Repräsentation der Dinge,” in Um 1968, ed. Rup-
pert, 21– 22; Chaussy, Die drei Leben des Rudi Dutschke, 152– 54; Krebs, Ulrike Meinhof, 132.
46. “Anklageschrift vom 9. Juni 1967,” in Archiv, Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung 
(AHIS), SAK 130, 12.
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rubric “sales producers” (Verkaufsproduzenten). In August 1967, Dutschke and 
the SDS had intervened in a conflict between several department stores and the 
union Handel, Banken, und Versicherungen (Trade, Banking and Insurance) 
over a law allowing for an extension of store hours. Employees were reluctant 
to work as late as nine o’clock at night on Saturdays.47 Dutschke made much 
of the sit- in demonstrations in department stores, which he considered to be a 
“form of late- capitalist guerrilla praxis.” The revolutionary tactics were rather 
simple: “We entered the department stores en masse, distributed flyers, more 
or less obstructed the normal sales rhythm, and encountered a lot of sympathy 
on the part of the sales producers. The management was forced to temporarily 
cease profit maximisation.”48 Berlin’s most prestigious department store, 
KaDeWe, had indeed chosen to close early because sit- in discussion groups 
had been established on all floors. Foreshadowing later events, some of the 
protesters apparently lit cigarettes inside the KaDeWe. At another department 
store, a bomb threat was made.49 The chair of West Berlin’s Christian Demo-
cratic Union (CDU), Karl- Heinz Schmitz, stated, “Enough of the storm troops 
of extraparliamentary activism.” His party pressed for legal charges against 
lawyer Horst Mahler, who had been present at KaDeWe.50 Cold War– minded 
public opinion tended to identify the actions of the student movement with 
those of the socialist rulers in the capital of East Germany.51 However, Dutschke 
and his coauthors celebrated the event as a success, an example of “a tactical 
victory” by a “radical small minority” over the “superior forces of the state 
apparatus.”52
By 1968 such forms of protest were thoroughly established. In West Ber-
lin, the shopping areas around Wittenbergplatz with the KaDeWe (the largest 
department store in Continental Europe), Tauentzienstraße and Kurfürstendamm, 
served astonishingly regularly as central locations for protest meetings. The 
main reason for this concentration can be seen in the politics of media atten-
tion, as protesters sought to challenge society at its most valuable places. Retail 
47. Cf. Enzensberger, Jahre der Kommune I, 205.
48. R. Dutschke, T. Käsemann, and R. Schöller, “Vorwort,” in Der lange Marsch, ed. Dutschke, 
Käsemann, and Schöller, 20.
49. “Urteil der 6. großen Strafkammer des Landgerichts Berlin,” (506) 2 P KLs 3/67, 55/67 (13 
May 1968): 26– 27, AHIS, SAK 130, 12. See Lönnendonker, Rabehl, and Staadt, Antiautoritäre 
Revolte, 485; Lönnendonker, Fichter, and Staadt, Hochschule im Umbruch, 226.
50. Lutz Horst, “Anzeige gegen Studenten- Anwalt,” Bild, Berlin, 28 August 1967, 3; Renate 
Philipp and Lutz Horst, “Volle Kassen wie zu Weihnachten!,” Bild, Berlin, 28 August 1967,  http://
www.medienarchiv68.de/dl/203062/1003.jpg.pdf (accessed 13 March 2011).
51. “König Kunde war der Dumme,” Berliner Morgenpost, 27 August 1967.
52. Dutschke, Käsemann, and Schöller, “Vorwort,” 21.
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was a growth sector in West Germany, with volume increasing continuously: 
5.9 percent in 1966, only 0.4 percent in 1967 as a consequence of the recession, 
but recovering to 4.8 percent in 1968. Growth was even more pronounced in 
the department store business: 8.8 percent in 1966, 2.8 percent in 1967, and 
10.3 percent in 1968.53 Germany’s largest department store company increased 
its sales by 12 percent in 1967, achieving an annual turnover of 3.3 billion 
deutsche marks. Sales among the largest three companies— Karstadt, Kaufhof, 
and Helmut Horten— amounted to 8.1 billion deutsche marks in March 1968, 
when twelve new department stores were under construction throughout Ger-
many; many more expanded their sales.54 A process of concentration favoured 
the big companies vis- à- vis their small- scale competitors: while the overall 
retail trading volume of 1967 showed an increase of 175 percent compared to 
1954, Karstadt realised an increase of 432 percent in the same period.55 This 
success story now became the focus of protest. The chair of West Berlin’s As-
sociation of Merchants and Industrialists, Heinz Mohr, lamented that “the dis-
turbers of the peace [Ruhestörer] were not in the least active in the districts 
with a predominant population of workers, where the wrath of the people 
would soon put an end to their criminal trade. The disturbers of the peace rather 
go to the districts where their aim to gain attention from the mass media can be 
met more effectively.”56 In the eyes of this captain of industry, the institutions 
of parliamentary democracy and their executive organs lacked the unrelenting 
rigour he attributed to the man in the street. He saw the task of securing what 
he called freedom and law and order— that is, protecting commerce from riots 
and deflecting any damage to West Berlin’s image as a place of industry— as 
merely a police matter.
That police did not always find it easy to fulfill such hopes for clean and 
quick removals of protesters was true beyond Berlin: a London commune 
staged a Christmas 1969 protest at a department store that generated press and 
police action. According to a radical Berlin newspaper, “The department stores 
hire people dressed up as Father Christmas who give presents to the children, 
which in reality have to be paid for by the parents, fooling the child with the 
53. “Jahresrückblick 1967,” FfH Mitteilungen 9.1 (January 1968): 2; “Jahresrückblick 1968,” 
FfH Mitteilungen 10.1 (January 1969): 1. See also Banken, “Quantitative Entwicklung der bundes-
deutschen Warenhäuser.”
54. “Entwicklung bei den Warenhäusern,” FfH Mitteilungen 9.3 (March 1968): 6; “Warenhaus- 
Expansion in Berlin,” FfH Mitteilungen 10.11 (November 1969): 10.
55. “Ausmaß und Formen der Konzentration im Einzelhandel,” FfH Mitteilungen 10.2 (Febru-
ary 1969): 3.
56. Heinz Mohr, address to a reception for new members and their sponsors, 5 November 1968, 
Mitteilungen Verein Berliner Kaufleute und Industrieller 105 (November 1968): 17.
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mystical character of the object. We thus assembled a group, 10 people dressed 
up as Father Christmas. . . . And they then cleared out the toys and gave them 
to the children. After 10 minutes, Selfridges had to call the police, and the press 
was shooting pictures of policemen taking the presents from the children and 
putting them back on the shelves. Things like this are fun in the first place, and 
second, they communicate a very simple message: take what you need.”57 In 
May 1968, students in Paris also focused on the sphere of consumption when 
they occupied the Censier Annexe of the Sorbonne. They distributed flyers and 
pamphlets in shops and cafés, calling on people to squat in empty flats, and 
asked the employees of the department stores Bazar de l’Hôtel de Ville and 
Belle Jardinière to pass out food to strikers.58
Matters of consumption were usually not the main focus of debates, arti-
cles, flyers, or protest campaigns. However, such matters were important and 
were often seen in connection with other areas of concern. In Hans Magnus 
Enzensberger’s seminal October 1967 interview with SDS members Dutschke, 
Rabehl, and Christian Semler, the topic of consumption was not the main sub-
ject, but Enzensberger argued that consumption as a means of appeasement 
would not work forever. It was no coincidence that this approach had worked 
smoothly for twenty years but was now beginning to change. Rabehl pointed 
out that the ideology of security would vanish since people desired fulfilment 
over security. Dutschke then brought up “militant needs” that would turn 
against the “military complex,” and the conversation moved on to Vietnam and 
the politics of protest and resistance.59
Kommune I
Although Dutschke never moved into a commune and eventually distanced 
himself from an excessive focus on questions of lifestyle, he played an impor-
tant role in developing the concept of small communes as seedbeds of the rev-
olutionary countermilieu. Kunzelmann reports that a strategy meeting con-
ducted in the Bavarian village of Kochel in June 1966 discussed the commune 
in the context of Marcuse’s One- Dimensional Man and Fanon’s The Wretched 
of the Earth.60 Kunzelmann based the idea of a commune on a rather literal 
57. Peter Polish, “Londoner Straßen- Kommune,” Agit 883 46 (15 January 1970): 6.
58. Seidman, Imaginary Revolution, 124; Baynac, Mai retrouvé, 196, 257.
59. Hans Magnus Enzensberger, “Ein Gespräch über die Zukunft mit Rudi Dutschke, Bernd 
Rabehl, und Christian Semler,” Kursbuch 14 (August 1968): 110– 45.
60. Kunzelmann, Leisten Sie keinen Widerstand, 47– 48.
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reading of a right to resist according to natural law, which Marcuse unfolded at 
the very end of “Repressive Tolerance.”61
Kommune I was established in a shared flat in January 1967 and ostenta-
tiously turned away from the values and lifestyle of the bourgeois and Cold 
War– minded older generations. In the promotion of the commune— a form of 
living free from parents’ or landlords’ influence on its furnishings— the notion 
of a self- determined lifestyle and thus style of consumption played an impor-
tant role. The idea was to abolish private property within the group and thus 
create a counterconcept overcoming the eschatological promises of classical 
Marxism in favour of living a communist life in the here and now. Moreover, 
the commune movement was clearly inspired by its romantic visions of the 
Maoist people’s communes and the Chinese Cultural Revolution. The armed 
Red Guards banned a number of traditional products because of their religious 
connotation as well as consumer items with Western names or connections, 
such as woollen clothing, whiskey, cosmetics, jewellery, high- heeled shoes, 
mechanical toys, playing cards, and taxis.62 A long article in Der Spiegel re-
ported on the Red Guards’ repertoire of disruptive protest in November 1966, 
describing in detail how they valued “Mao quotes over neon signs.” Despite the 
brutal aspects of the Red Guards’ conduct and a regime of terror, the successes 
of modernisation policy were highlighted: “For the first time in human mem-
ory, all Chinese have a roof over their heads and clothes to wear.” The article 
described how members of the people’s communes had to yield all “private 
property down to the cooking pot to the common property of the commune. In 
return, everything was free: food, clothing, the doctor, and the hairdresser.”63 In 
1969, writer Peter Schneider arrived at a more abstract notion of the cultural 
revolution, which would abandon all relations where “the human being has 
become a commodity and the commodity has become the subject.” This still 
had very tangible consequences, as when Schneider questioned whether per-
sonal ownership of cars was still tolerable and suggested tearing down “fascist 
tenement blocks” and replacing them with “houses that are there to serve not 
the needs of renting out but the needs of being lived in.”64
61. Dieter Kunzelmann, “Notizen zur Gründung revolutionärer Kommunen in den Metropo-
len,” in Subversive Aktion, ed. Böckelmann and Nagel, 144; Herbert Marcuse, “Repressive Toler-
ance,” in Wolff, Moore, and Marcuse, Critique of Pure Tolerance, 116– 17.
62. See Giovanni Blumer, Die chinesische Kulturrevolution 1965/67 (Frankfurt, 1968); En-
zensberger, Jahre der Kommune I, 79; Slobodian, Foreign Front, 170– 99; Gilcher- Holtey, 1968, 
35– 41.
63. “Kulturrevolution: Brutal sein,” Der Spiegel 48 (21 November 1966): 114– 31.
64. Peter Schneider, “Die Phantasie im Spätkapitalismus und die Kulturrevolution,” Kursbuch 
16 (March 1969): 4.
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Kommune I pursued the semiprofessional pirating of books65 and carried 
on a flourishing mail- order trade in Mao Bibles, their own writings, texts by 
Wilhelm Reich, Horkheimer, and others as well as revolutionary stickers and 
badges. There were enthusiastic customers but also frequent complaints re-
garding issues of money.66 This went hand in hand with regular shoplifting, 
conceived as a practical demonstration against private property.67 One of Kom-
mune I’s several compilations of writings and documents from their lawsuits 
was entitled Klau mich (Steal Me). With a grabbing hand printed on the cover, 
it predated Abbie Hoffman’s Steal This Book.68 Fritz Teufel as well as two 
other members of Kommune I were sentenced to a penalty, paid from the com-
munal budget, after being caught stealing in a supermarket. He declared that he 
had committed theft not because of need but out of political conviction.69 On 
the occasion of the 1967 Easter March campaign for disarmament, a leaflet 
authored by members of Kommune I questioned whether protest against the 
Bomb could avoid addressing the question of property by dodging fares, shop-
lifting, and dining and dashing: “Whoever doesn’t dispossess the petty bour-
geois remains one himself.”70 West Berlin’s minister of the interior pressed 
criminal charges against the unknown authors of the leaflet. Meanwhile, the 
communards discussed how their radical ideas could be put into practice. Loot-
ing a grocery shop was suggested.71
What they chose proved to be more spectacular. The plan was to attack 
U.S. vice president Hubert H. Humphrey, who was visiting West Berlin, with 
red smoke bombs, staging a Provo happening after his convoy of cars had come 
to a halt. The plan was foiled when members of the secret police had the con-
spirators arrested after observing their acquisition of potentially explosive 
chemicals. In the absence of conclusive evidence of real explosives, however, 
the communards created the impression that they were harmless pranksters. In 
the ensuing media hype, the flour and sugar that police found among the chem-
icals turned into pudding and custard pie, and the event went down as the Pud-
dingattentat (Pudding Assassination). Ulrike Meinhof, at the time the editor of 
65. See Olenhusen and Gnirß, Handbuch der Raubdrucke.
66. One of many similar letters, see Mainzer Studentenzeitung to Kommune I, 24 September 
1967, AHIS, Correspondence of Kommune I (130,01). See also Kunzelmann, Leisten sie keinen 
Widerstand, 54– 56.
67. Ibid., 60– 62.
68. Langhans and Teufel, Klau mich. See Hoffman, Steal This Book.
69. Oberstaatsanwalt Kuntze, “Anklageschrift vom 9. Juni 1967,” 14, AHIS, SAK 130, 12; 
Enzensberger, Jahre der Kommune I, 107.
70. “Ostermarschierer, Ostermärtyrer,” in Leben ändern, ed. Schulenburg, 31– 32.
71. Investigator in charge of the Disciplinary Committee of FU Berlin to the chair of the Disci-
plinary Committee, Roman Herzog, 5 May 1967, AHIS, SAK 130, 07; Enzensberger, Jahre der 
Kommune I, 113– 14.
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the political magazine konkret, criticised the communards for talking about 
themselves rather than “turning the sensation they caused to Vietnam . . . , with 
the truth on Vietnam, with facts, numbers and politics.” However, she did sym-
pathise with the underlying message: “Not the destruction of vital harvests 
meaning death and starvation for millions, but protest against these acts, is 
criminal. . . . It is considered impolite to aim pudding and curd at politicians, 
but not to roll out the red carpet for politicians who have villages wiped out and 
cities bombarded. . . . Napalm yes, pudding no.”72 If only in the imagination of 
the journalists, everyday commodities lent themselves to raising awareness of 
the hardship and misery that war caused in a far corner of the world.
The Department Store Leaflets
After the Puddingattentat, the antiestablishment figures of Kommune I increas-
ingly became the focus of media attention. They held regular meetings for 
media work, in which newspaper clippings and the reactions of “the system” to 
their actions were considered. During one such session in May 1967, they fo-
cused on a series of news reports on an accidental fire in Belgium’s largest 
department store, À l’Innovation, in Brussels, leaving more than three hundred 
people dead and several hundred injured.73 A provocative fascination with ar-
son had germinated in radically minded intellectual circles. A rebellious atti-
tude sought to instigate acts of protest against the symbols of consumer society, 
which were combined with imperialism and global as well as local oppression. 
This was part of a transatlantic emergence of critiques of regimes of provision 
that became coupled with anti– Vietnam War protest. This cocktail of influ-
ences became manifest in a series of flyers Kommune I created on the occasion 
of the Brussels fire disaster; the flyers were investigated by the courts and 
widely publicised.74 The Brussels fire eventually inspired arson attacks on de-
partment stores in Frankfurt and Berlin.
72. Ulrike Meinhof, “Napalm und Pudding” (May 1967), in Meinhof, Dokumente einer Rebel-
lion, 72.
73. See Bernard Houssiau, L’incendie de l’Innovation: 22 mai 1967 (Brussels, 2007).
74. Kommune I, “Neue Demonstrationsformen in Brüssel erstmals erprobt,” Sprache im tech-
nischen Zeitalter 28 (1968): 318– 19; Kommune I, “Warum brennst du, Konsument?,” Sprache im 
technischen Zeitalter 28 (1968):  319– 20; Kommune I, “Wann brennen die Berliner Kaufhäuser?,” 
Sprache im technischen Zeitalter 28 (1968): 320. A final flyer, “Revolution in Rosé Revolution in 
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The media suggested that the Brussels fire might have been the result of 
arson by protesters against a special campaign selling American products. Ap-
parently Belgian police had found some “anti- American leaflets” by a Maoist 
group criticising the sales exhibition.75 The Springer tabloid Bild reported that 
anonymous letters had threatened department store arson. Bild quoted from the 
confiscated “communist” leaflets: “The Anti- Imperialists will not stop until 
they have cleared the country and the department store L’Innovation from the 
flag that has become a symbol of aggression and outrage.”76 A Belgian public 
prosecutor denied these rumours, but not until a week after the fire and thus a 
week after the leaflets appeared.77
Taking these cues, Kommune I cynically drew a comparison with the na-
palm bombardments in Vietnam: “With a new gimmick in the varied history of 
American advertising methods, American sales weeks were opened in Brus-
sels: . . . [T]he inhabitants of the Belgian metropolis were met with an excep-
tional spectacle: a burning department store with burning people, for the first 
time conveying this crackling Vietnam feeling (to be there and to burn along) 
in a European city.”78 Under the heading “Why Do You Burn, Consumer?” this 
leaflet shows a characteristic amalgamation of various levels of political vio-
lence, invoking the Vietnam War, Hiroshima, the shah’s regime in Iran, the 
Berlin Wall, barbed wire, and the Iron Curtain and coupling those images with 
Coca- Cola and the so- called German economic miracle. Despite the pointed 
cynicism and biting irony that characterised this document, there are also refer-
ences to the “human tragedy” in Brussels. The communards sought to unmask 
the rhetoric of affluence as a crucial resource of legitimisation in the American 
war effort. They were disgusted at how much more public sympathy the vic-
tims of a department store fire received than the victims of war in Vietnam.79
Another example of Kommune I’s particular relationship to advertising 
and commerce appeared in a convergence of advertising slogans and criticism 
of the Vietnam War: “The day is ending, time for Jonny [sic] Walker. / An 
75. “Brandkatastrophe in Brüssel: Feuer in Kaufhaus möglicherweise durch Brandstiftung,” 
Der Tagesspiegel, 23 May 1967, 1; “Wie in einem Leichenschauhaus,” BZ, 24 May 1967, http://
www.medienarchiv68.de/dl/192944/425.jpg.pdf (accessed 14 February 2011).
76. “Es brennt! Es brennt!: Aber eine Frau im Restaurant wollte unbedingt ihre Seezunge ha-
ben,” Bild, Berlin, 24 May 1967, 10. Ulrich Enzensberger claims that West Berlin’s chief fire of-
ficer had stated in an interview with Bild that communist war protesters setting fire to the KaDeWe 
was an acute possibility. However, the fire officer had talked only about fire hazards without men-
tioning any protesters. Cf. Enzensberger, Jahre der Kommune I, 141; “Feuerwehr wäre hilflos,” 
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77. See the collection of newspaper clippings in AHIS, SAK 130,14.
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American soldier killed in Vietnam costs the USA 12 million DM. / A dead 
Vietcong costs 1.6 million. / Because being particular in one’s tastes always 
costs a bit more.”80 Another Kommune I leaflet was even more outspoken: 
“When will the Berlin department stores burn? . . . Starting today, he goes to 
the clothing departments of KaDeWe, Hertie, Woolworth, Bilka, or Necker-
mann and discreetly lights a cigarette in the fitting room.” A future escalation 
of violence was anticipated: “When barracks blow up somewhere, when some-
where in a stadium the stands collapse, please don’t be surprised.” The final 
words betray the rebellious students’ limited knowledge of English: “Burn 
ware- house, burn!”81 This adapted the rallying cry of African American pro-
testers during the “ghetto riots” from Watts to Detroit in stilted English.82
Ex- situationist Kunzelmann and his fellow communards may have drawn 
on Debord’s interpretation of the August 1965 riots in the Watts neighbourhood 
of Los Angeles. Debord saw the events in Watts in accordance with his theory 
of the spectacle, transforming issues of race into issues of consumption: “The 
Los Angeles rebellion was a rebellion . . . against the world of the commodity 
in which worker- consumers are hierarchically subordinated to commodity 
standards.”83 He saw the lootings by the black protesters as attempts to break 
the spectacle of commodities to which they had been subjected all their lives 
yet denied access. The essay was distributed as a pamphlet whose front cover 
featured a photo of a burning department store in Watts.84 However, transatlan-
tic influences motivating protest in the sphere of consumption should not be 
overestimated. The German translation of sections from an influential Ameri-
can civil rights pamphlet omitted the passages on consumer boycott and selec-
tive buying.85
In many ways, the leaflets offered a cynical commentary on the coverage 
of the Brussels fire disaster in the Springer press. Teufel declared in court that 
he had been disgusted by the detail and compassion of press coverage of the 
80. Kommune I leaflet, n.d., AHIS, Korrespondenz der Kommune I, 130,01. The final sentence 
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85. Oppenheimer and Lakey, Manual for Direct Action; Anleitung zum Handeln: Taktik direk-
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Brussels disaster while reporting on the Vietnam War tended to downplay the 
conflict, depicting it as a misfortune.86 Ulrich Enzensberger points out retro-
spectively that the victims of Brussels had been used for scaremongering pro-
paganda, insinuating that left- wing protesters were to blame. However, it 
seems likely that such allegations did not originate with Springer but had al-
ready been spread in Belgium. Enzensberger also highlights that Bild printed 
information calling the arson allegation into question on the following day, but 
only in a tiny notice on the final page where it was reported that a member of 
the implicated Maoists had stated, “We have nothing to do with the fire. We 
distributed leaflets, but we do not throw bombs.”87 (For more on the radical 
left’s criticism of Springer’s journalism, see chapter 5.) On this occasion, the 
Springer tabloid BZ wrote that the Kommune I leaflets were “peppered with 
obscenities that would in all likelihood get you thrown out even of a brothel. . . . 
Whoever glorifies this catastrophe, which can possibly be traced back to arson 
by left- wing extremists, and praises it as a model for emulation belongs behind 
bars.”88 When legal proceedings were opened against the authors of the leaf-
lets, BZ went a step further and imagined a transnational terrorist network. 
Under the subheading “Disgusting,” it alleged that Kommune I enjoyed “direct 
connections with Brussels terrorists” because of the detailed descriptions the 
communards had given of the “preparations for the arson attack.”89
In reality, members of Kommune I were accused of incitement to arson. 
Illustrating his case, the chief public prosecutor stated in his indictment that on 
the occasion of the shah of Iran’s state visit, Kommune I had desired the con-
frontations with the police during which Benno Ohnesorg was shot: “This de-
velopment shows that intellectual and ideological debate has degenerated into 
intolerance and terror.” He also highlighted the fact that the communards had 
considered supporting themselves by “appropriating vacant houses, theft, and 
looting.”90 During the demonstration against the shah, Teufel had been arrested 
86. “Urteil der 6. großen Strafkammer des Landgerichts Berlin,” 13 May 1968, 28– 29, AHIS, 
SAK 130, 12.
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88. “400 Tote— für sie ein Happening,” BZ, 26 May 1967, http://www.medienarchiv68.de/
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dl/192976/441.jpg.pdf (accessed 16 February 2011).
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and charged with throwing a stone. He spent seventy days in pretrial custody, 
during which time he started a hunger strike. At the same time, police officer 
Karl- Heinz Kurras, who had shot the unarmed Ohnesorg, went free, claiming 
self- defence. When Teufel’s lawyer, Mahler, had his client’s remand in custody 
reviewed, his release was rejected on the grounds that he might flee given his 
loose living conditions that did not tie him to any possessions. The public pros-
ecutor explained the case with reference to the ten thousand deutsche marks he 
had invested in his own furnishings.91 Teufel was eventually acquitted of the 
charges. When being questioned by the presiding judge of the leaflet trial, he 
declared that the leaflets protested not only the Vietnam War but also “satura-
tion and complacency.”92 Mahler used the apparent influence of Marcuse’s 
thought— that is, a serious academic inspiration— in a failed attempt to fend off 
a forensic psychiatric and neurological examination of the defendants.93 In 
their annotated documentation of the legal proceedings, the communards high-
lighted the fact that countless anonymous commentators and passers- by in-
voked the gas chambers in response to their provocations.94
The members of Kommune I took both trials as further opportunities to 
pursue their satirical assault on the authorities. One leaflet, “Have a Nice 
Trial— Incite to Arson!,” ironically stated that since their initial call had not yet 
generated any real fires, it was now time to appeal to the masses. Mocking 
West Berlin’s Cold War city marketing, the communards wrote, “Berlin must 
become a world city again by adopting the extraordinary success of the Belgian 
Vietnam protesters.” The lower part of the leaflet provided a form that like- 
minded people could detach to declare that they, too, were inciting to arson. 
This used a legal clause adopted from their own indictment to which they 
added that matches or a petrol- infused cloth would do the job. Then came a 
multiple- choice section in which people could select from a list of targets, in-
cluding the high- rise headquarters of Springer publishing and a department 
store to which the specific name had to be added.95 Further leaflets called on 
people to buy Hong Kong– made water pistols at KaDeWe or bubble blowers at 
Woolworth and to use these items to disrupt court proceedings: “The globular 
shape and the gentle bang which these exquisite bubbles create when bursting 
91. Kommune I, Gesammelte Werke, 47.
92. Minutes of the proceeding printed in Langhans and Teufel, Klau mich, n.p.
93. Horst Mahler to Landgericht Berlin, 6. Gr. Strafkammer, 506- 55/67, 10 July 1967, 5, AHIS, 
SAK 130, 12.
94. Kommune I, Gesammelte Werke, 46.
95. Kommune I, “Macht Euch einen schönen Prozeß— ruft zur Brandstiftung auf!,” in Kom-
mune I, Quellen zur Kommuneforschung, n.p.
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will be reminiscent of the globular bombs of exquisite anarchists.”96 Despite 
these and other provocations made during the court proceedings, which earned 
the defendants several days of arrest for contempt of court, the judicial enquiry 
ended with an acquittal. The criminal division concluded that the leaflets con-
stituted incitement to arson, but the judges were unable to prove conclusively 
that the defendants actually desired an implementation.97
The defence had thus had only partial success in claiming freedom of ar-
tistic expression based on expert opinion by renowned philologists.98 Quoting 
André Breton, Raymond Queneau, and Sören Kierkegaard, Jacob Taubes, a 
professor of Jewish studies at the Freie Universität Berlin, highlighted parallels 
between the leaflets and various texts by the Parisian surrealists. Ultimately, 
the leaflets appeared to be an act of literary provocation in the spirit of “Baude-
laire’s épater le bourgeois.”99 Eberhard Lämmert, a professor of German stud-
ies, pointed out that the leaflets were clearly imitating the language of “the 
press and advertising propaganda.”100 His colleague, Peter Wapnewski, stressed 
“absurdity” as a leitmotif of the leaflets and thought that they intended to show 
that it was “inhuman to bemoan the victims of the Brussels department store 
fire while simultaneously ignoring the victims of the war in Vietnam.”101 In his 
view, the texts, “while offending our feelings of tact and style,” sought “to 
prevent, or prohibit, the burning of people.”102
A number of other expert opinion statements were ultimately not con-
sulted at court. Literary scholar Peter Szondi remained ambivalent as he called 
attention to the fact that the idea of left- wing radicals setting fire to a depart-
ment store had originally been conceived not by the communards but by jour-
nalists reporting on such rumours in Belgium. At the same time, he argued that 
one leaflet was an entirely fictitious newspaper article based on invented 
sources and evidence.103 In another passage, he paraphrased the anticapitalist 
content of Kommune I’s media critique by arguing that the leaflets “implicitly 
accused the USA of pursuing their war efforts as a consequence of the needs of 
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their industry” by depicting the U.S. government as a company with a new 
advertising idea.104 A prominent jurist and former president of the Higher Re-
gional Court Stuttgart, Richard Schmid, pointed to an article by New Yorker 
journalist Jacob Brackman in which an imaginary opponent of the Vietnam 
War fantasised about defoliating Central Park and burning down Rockefeller 
Center without anyone being as “dull- witted as to take this for incitement to 
arson.”105 Literary critic Karl Heinz Bohrer thought that “surrealist cynicism 
terrorised the nerves of the morally approachable.”106 Günter Grass diagnosed 
a “pubescent .  .  . quixotic anarchism,” placing the leaflets in the tradition of 
Georg Büchner’s Der Hessische Landbote (1834), though less profound. 
Moreover, Grass thought that advertising language, the language of the 
Springer tabloid BZ, and the language of the commune “equally showed fascist 
symptoms.” He seemed to miss the idea that the leaflets intentionally mim-
icked the characteristic style of advertisements and tabloid journalism. More to 
the point was his observation that the leaflets betrayed a “vulgar” understand-
ing of Marcuse’s One- Dimensional Man.107 Hans Werner Richter, a writer and 
founder of the renowned literary association Gruppe 47, refused to contribute 
expert opinion, branding the leaflets as merely “acting out an anarchist revolu-
tionary romanticism.” The communards only played at revolution and “dis-
credited all revolutionary endeavours  .  .  . playing into the hands of the 
reaction.”108 Theodor Adorno’s refusal was less wordy. As a consequence, he 
got involved in a brawl with protesting students while lecturing at the Freie 
Universität Berlin.109
Kommune II, another flat- sharing community with more of a focus on 
psychology and revolutionary rigour, criticised the defence strategy of portray-
ing the leaflets as mere satire and insinuated that true revolutionaries had to go 
beyond just talking about fire: “We suspect . . . that the recent capitalist hype, 
interviews, photos, brochures, etc. has spoilt you. Has money turned you into 
prostitutes? Do you again intend to grind your fag in front of the department 
store like the bourgeois brakemen?”110 Kommune II, including future Red 
Army Faction (RAF) member Jan- Carl Raspe, were in some respects ideologi-
104. Ibid., 333.
105. Richard Schmid to Schiele, 20 July 1967, AHIS, SAK 130, 12; Jacob R. Brackman, “On-
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cally more rigorous than their famous counterparts. Like them, the members of 
Kommune II opted for a “communal economy” with all private incomes going 
into a fund for communal use. The planning of consumption was also a matter 
of collective deliberation.111
Department Store Arson in Frankfurt
A few days after the leaflet trial, three future department store arsonists visited 
Kommune I. Gerd Koenen argues that the younger Andreas Baader wanted to 
challenge the intellectual leader of the commune, Kunzelmann, when acting 
out the provocative fantasy.112 Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, and two friends, Thor-
wald Proll and Horst Söhnlein, travelled to Frankfurt. The next day, Ensslin 
and Baader went to a department store, playfully tried out a few folding chairs, 
and put homemade incendiary bombs into a lounge cabinet. Fire broke out in 
two department stores— Schneider and Kaufhof— around midnight on 2– 3 
April 1968. The fire did not harm anyone but caused considerable material 
damage, in part by triggering the sprinkling system. According to the court, 
damage amounted to 282,339 deutsche marks at Schneider and 390,838 
deutsche marks at Kaufhof, all of it covered by insurance.113 Newspapers had 
initially reported that damage totalled 1.2 million deutsche marks. The Frank-
furt department stores apparently organised a “fire- watch service” for fear of 
“political acts of revenge.” They advertised a high reward for information lead-
ing to the arrest of the arsonists.114
Police followed lead and easily caught the four arsonists. A poem in the 
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style of Kommune I leaflets was found in Proll’s notebook: “When will the 
Brandenburg Gate burn? When will the Berlin department stores burn? When 
will the Hamburg warehouses burn? .  .  . Smash capitalism.”115 Investigators 
also found a piece of scrap paper on which someone had scribbled, “We set fire 
to department stores so that you stop to buy. . . . Pressure to consume terrorises 
you. We terrorise the commodity so that you are done with the terror that turns 
you into consumers.”116
SDS spokesperson Reiche was initially “shocked by . . . unjustifiable acts 
of terror.” However, the West Berlin branch of the SDS later issued a statement 
that was far more accommodating. Kommune I did not dissociate itself from 
arson as a means of political struggle, and members publicly declared their 
understanding of the arsonists. After the assassination of Martin Luther King 
Jr., the communards offered a sweeping legitimisation that pointed to the civil 
unrest in the United States: “Arson as a political means has become a daily 
necessity for blacks.”117 A flyer adopting the usual biting sarcasm explained 
that King had received the Nobel Peace Price because he refused to fight the 
“war of . . . a minority against the many rich.” With a dose of hubris, a post-
script asked if people distancing themselves from the Frankfurt department 
store arsons should not also distance themselves from Black Power.118
The Frankfurt arsonists were sentenced to three years in prison for setting 
fire to the Schneider department store, which Baader and Ensslin had admitted. 
In the case of Kaufhof, they were acquitted because of lack of evidence. Al-
though all four were sentenced to the same penalty, the extent of Proll and 
Söhnlein’s complicity was never fully clarified.119 The sentence against Proll 
was mainly based on the notes found in his possession.120 Despite some claims 
to the contrary, the court did recognise political motivation. The judges put on 
record that the defendants had come to the conclusion “that their previous en-
deavours could not meet with success given the ‘narrow- minded bluntness of a 
satisfied consumer society.’ They now wanted to set up a beacon to activate the 
masses.”121 The court accommodated Baader’s repeated references to Marcuse: 
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Ensslin and Baader had no longer considered “peaceful, nonviolent change of 
existing ‘class rule’ possible.”122 The court also dealt with the idea of a right to 
resist according to natural law, to which Baader had referred, invoking Mar-
cuse.123 The judges rejected this reasoning “for lack of effectiveness” because 
“influencing the war in Vietnam by means of domestic terror against domestic 
property” was unrealistic. Ironically, this seemed to suggest that a strike against 
the U.S. Army might be covered by natural law— a line of reasoning that the 
RAF eventually followed. The Frankfurt judges finally considered the question 
of whether the defendants’ strong belief in a right to resist might constitute a 
“mistake as to the wrongful nature of the act [Verbotsirrtum].” They again de-
nied the rationale with reference to Marcuse, for whom the “question of revo-
lutionary violence” was allegedly “solely a moral question.” Instead, they 
opted for a positivistic interpretation: “Even the political criminal, the delin-
quent of conscience [Gewissenstäter], knows that he is violating a rule of the 
state. That is to say, the concept of guilt in the applicable criminal code is not 
moral or religious, but it is ‘political’ in the sense that the offender consciously 
fails to ‘adapt’ to the applicable legal order.”124 For the most part, the defen-
dants indeed refused to cooperate with a justice system that they considered a 
mere instrument of an order they wished to overcome. In the end, the court did 
not acknowledge political conviction as the main motivation.
The general public failed to comprehend the defendants’ attempts to ex-
plain the connection between the world of consumption embodied in a depart-
ment store and the deadly routine in Vietnam.125 Ensslin stated, “The USA is 
putting the rule to the test in Vietnam so that America’s affluence can be 
preserved.”126 Witness Bernward Vesper, Ensslin’s onetime fiancé, also empha-
sised the connection between affluence and the Vietnam War: “Commodities 
take on human traits, while the dead . . . are . . . considered mere statistics.”127 
Proll authored the defendants’ closing words that dealt with the justice system 
but did not come back to the motive. Consumption was broached only with 
reference to prison conditions, where “a society that consists of nothing but 
consumption” was inverted.128
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Ties between the increasingly commercialised lifestyle laboratory of 
Kommune I and the department store arsonists remained close. In May 1968, 
Ulrich Enzensberger wrote to Baader, “We thought up a new sales sensation: 
group sex, to bring in more money.”129 Baader— in custody for the Frankfurt 
department store arson— answered that Kommune I was still appearing only in 
the cultural pages of the newspapers: “You must make the leap into advertis-
ing, Fanta etc. What kind of money would that bring in?”130 In prison, Proll 
continued to dabble in anarchic poetry. He invoked Proudhon and predicted 
commercialisation: “5 years later: the federal republic is a pedestrian zone. you 
can buy private anarchism.”131 Kommune I member Volker Gebbert wrote to 
Proll that another commune, Potskommune, was earning money from inter-
views about its consumption habits: “There is some money to be earned with 
the Left.” Kommune I had signed a contract for an arson story with a popular 
publishing house.132
After Ensslin had put the department store arson in the context of anti- 
Vietnam protest, the West Berlin chapter of the SDS issued a statement that 
turned against the argument that the Frankfurt fires had wilfully destroyed 
what society had produced. The SDS took the line that the owners of the means 
of production constantly destroyed societal wealth. The statement shared a 
radical critique of Western consumer society that highlighted planned obsoles-
cence, wasteful packaging, profit- oriented product research, and advertising. 
However, the critique went further by addressing the legal framework uphold-
ing this system: it punished the worker who stole stockings at the hosiery fac-
tory but not the managers responsible for the production of short- lived stock-
ings. The West Berlin SDS shared the defendants’ challenge to a global regime 
of provision: “Had one taken the political reasoning of the accused comrades 
seriously— the clues to the war in Vietnam and the clues to the methods of 
capitalist production and consumption— one would have had to understand 
that the genocide in Vietnam . . . is only the up- front and brutal expression of a 
society that over here is aspiring to suppress” the masses’ true desire for self- 
determination by means of a quickly revocable system of pseudo- liberties. In 
Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, Horst Söhnlein, und Thorwald Proll,” Charlie Kaputt 3 (December 1968).
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comparison to the crimes of this system, the Frankfurt arsons appeared merely 
a “helpless symbol,” a petty offence. The system had to condemn the defen-
dants so that the propertied could continue to destroy societal wealth and the 
nonpropertied would not dare to demand the wealth that an “equitable— i.e., 
communist society— could produce even today.”133
Ulrike Meinhof travelled to Frankfurt to observe the trial and visited the 
defendants in custody, thus meeting her future comrades for the first time.134 
She wrote an article condemning the arson on the grounds that the fire con-
sumed commodities. The arsonists thus acted in conformity with capitalism. 
Nevertheless, she approved of Teufel’s words alluding to Bertolt Brecht’s com-
parison between founding and robbing a bank: “It is still better to set fire to a 
department store than to run one.”135 Meinhof clearly shared a critical attitude 
towards matters of consumption, quoting Vance Packard’s The Waste Makers 
and André Gorz’s Stratégie ouvrière et néocapitalisme.136 The latter inspired 
her to interpret the blessings of affluence as “substitutional satisfaction” to 
hoodwink individuals about the conditions under which they had to work as 
producers. The former provided her with a framework in which the destruction 
of societal wealth seemed to be built into the system of capitalist accumulation. 
Was setting fire to goods in a department store so different from destroying 
freshly produced goods to prevent market congestion and falling prices? Fol-
lowing Packard, Meinhof fumed, “The industry is still trying to overcome the 
glut of the consumer goods market by ‘new models every two years’; by wast-
ing millions on research that serves less the products’ improvement than their 
saleability; by the individual rubbish bin for senseless packaging  .  .  .  ; by 
equally mendacious and costly advertising.” Planned obsolescence wasted mil-
lions “so that freezers, razors, ladies’ stockings, toys, light bulbs break much 
earlier than necessary . . . to artificially keep demand going, to realise rates of 
profit that are only reinvested into private pockets, not to satisfy social needs.” 
She would have preferred that the riches of society go into education, health 
care, public transport, silence, pure air, and sex education.137
Critical observations concerning the flood of commodities were by no 
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means limited to the Far Left. In 1968, a professional retail journal observed, 
“We are facing a bewildering host of endeavours to get rid of huge overcapaci-
ties.” Even the professionals likened their contemporary commodity market to 
a Babel as a consequence of “the incredible increase in variety and volume of 
consumer goods.” The current “hardly measurable mass of consumer goods” 
included many that no one could have imagined only half a century earlier. 
They diagnosed the pressure that overproduction exerted on the retail sector 
when a single product was offered in countless types and different packaging: 
“Often the effectiveness of an advertising campaign to which the consumer is 
constantly and pitilessly exposed via the journalistic media is decisive for the 
marketing success of this or that brand. Nowadays, the producer who . . . em-
ploys the largest possible means in an advertisement campaign has every 
chance of establishing a lead, even to the point of near monopoly.”138 The fed-
eral retail organisation Hauptgemeinschaft des Deutschen Einzelhandels used 
the term Werbeterror (advertising terror) when denouncing the aggressive and 
often semilegal marketing practices of organised promotional trips 
(Kaffeefahrten).139
While the retail specialists still strove to solve the riddle of selling the 
unprecedented abundance, Meinhof posed the question of distribution and 
identified regimes of provision that were upheld by the legal system and privi-
leged property and profit. Hence, she considered the progressive moment of 
the Frankfurt department store arson to lie in the criminal transgression of this 
order: “Those who abuse property are protected by the law. It does not protect 
those who are victims of this abuse, nor those who create the riches by work 
and consumption, but those who appropriate it legally according to the law-
making of the capitalist state.” Consumers— together with producers— featured 
as creators of societal wealth. The “surplus value” they produced was then 
misappropriated by capitalists. Meinhof claimed that “collective needs” re-
mained “flagrantly unsatisfied in the rich capitalist countries.”140
These words represented a clear departure from her views two and a half 
years earlier, when her assessment of socioeconomic negotiations had been 
much more conventional and optimistic. On the occasion of wage disputes in 
the West German metal industry in early 1966, she had criticised employers’ 
reluctance to agree to a reduction in working hours, but overall she held that 
collective bargaining was “appropriate to fit economic growth and common 
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welfare to one another”141 This position eroded during the second half of 1967 
with Ohnesorg’s shooting and the onset of the Federal Republic’s first reces-
sion. Many employers used the crisis to slash or curtail voluntary social bene-
fits, holiday pay, and Christmas allowances as well as wages above the general 
pay scale. The Industrial Union of Metalworkers (IG Metall) collected evi-
dence on these developments and published a book on business ethics. Mein-
hof castigated these measures as “securing profits at the expense of workers’ 
households.” However, she located the real problem in the period of prosperity, 
when workers and trade unions had been “cheated out of their power for a mess 
of pottage”— that is, the perks that had subsequently been taken away. She 
concluded that ethics did not exist in business, only profit and class interest. 
Affluence merely veiled class barriers. Moral protest was futile; only effective 
democratic control of business— that is, codetermination— would establish the 
economy’s real needs.142 She was developing a crucial idea: affluence clouded 
people’s ability to realise their own needs.
Meinhof added another tenet to her future philosophy in February 1968 
when criticising the fact that provocative but nonviolent student protesters 
were frequently accused of “terrorism.” She diagnosed a tendency to put “ter-
ror” from the left on a level with the historical terror from the right. However, 
she went a step further in assuming that fascism had had “the task of liquidat-
ing any chance of socialism in Germany for decades.”143 Meinhof took the next 
step in her intellectual development “from protest to resistance” after the assas-
sination attempt on Dutschke and the subsequent blockades of Springer pub-
lishing. She justified the students’ adoption of physical violence as a means of 
resistance and did not mince her words about what this violence comprised: 
throwing stones, smashing windows, setting fire to Springer delivery vans, de-
molishing editorial offices, slashing tyres, knocking over construction site 
trailers, and breaking through police lines. In an attempt to uphold the differ-
entiation between violence against things and violence against people, Mein-
hof ignored the significant amount of injury to persons over the Easter week-
end, emphasising instead that the physical damage caused by the students 
would easily be repaired, much of it by insurance companies. Her line of rea-
soning aimed at delegitimising her opponents: those who called the student 
141. Ulrike Meinhof, “Lohnkampf” (February 1966), in Meinhof, Dokumente einer Rebellion, 
60.
142. Ulrike Meinhof, “Unternehmermoral” (August 1967), in ibid., 74. See also Vorstand der 
Industriegewerkschaft Metall, Weißbuch zur Unternehmermoral (Frankfurt, 1967).
143. Ulrike Meinhof, “Gegen- Gewalt” (February 1968), in Meinhof, Dokumente einer Rebel-
lion, 78.
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protests “terror” failed to measure “bombs on Vietnam, .  .  .  terror in Persia, 
[and] torture in South Africa” with the same yardstick. Kurt Georg Kiesinger 
and Lyndon Baines Johnson were representatives of a violent system that had 
brought forth Springer and Vietnam. They lacked the political or moral legiti-
misation to either regret the fate of Dutschke and King, who had fought against 
the violence of the system, or object to the students whose “counterviolence” 
resisted the real terror and violence. She explicitly cautioned against “insensi-
ble fury replacing superior rationality” and against responding to “the para-
military police operation with paramilitary means.”144 She later threw this cau-
tion to the winds, but a characteristic element of her radical reasoning was 
already clearly discernible: with reasonably convincing arguments, she amal-
gamated very different phenomena of political violence from very different 
historical and geographical contexts into two opposing categories according to 
moral standards with the aim of delegitimising the establishment and in turn 
legitimising political resistance.
In November 1968, she displayed this widespread tendency to introduce 
moral scenarios from transcontinental contexts into her assessment of the 
Frankfurt department store arsons. She referred to American ghettos and 
pointed out that the looting “ghetto Negro” could learn that a system that de-
nied him what he desperately needed was rotten. The German people, however, 
would hardly find what they really needed in department stores, with the no-
table exception of dishwashers, which were too heavy to carry away. This jux-
taposition of the real needs of African American looters with the false needs of 
German customers was somewhat flawed since African Americans were as 
keen on television sets as their German counterparts, and German department 
stores did sell plenty of goods— including food— that could not easily be sub-
sumed under false needs. Overall, Meinhof remained sceptical regarding the 
educational effect of department store arson or looting. Her account remained 
ambivalent: she felt a tension between a “counterrevolutionary” element of do-
ing the same as the capitalist system— that is, destroying goods— and the pro-
gressive aspect of attacking this system by exploiting the symbolic value of 
violence. Ultimately, this tension mirrored the dialectics that had already char-
acterised Kommune I’s leaflets in their attempt to unmask the system by its 
own means.145
Meinhof had already adopted the title “Falsches Bewußtsein” (False Con-
144. Ulrike Meinhof, “Vom Protest zum Widerstand” (May 1968), in ibid., 81.
145. Meinhof, “Warenhausbrandstiftung,” 87– 88. Biographies of Ulrike Meinhof cover her ar-
ticle on department store arson, but beyond this, the topic of consumer society does not feature in 
the literature on the RAF.
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sciousness) in a contribution to an edited volume on marriage and emancipa-
tion. This essay started with an unidentified Marcuse quote to the effect that 
capitalism produced affluence but not happiness and freedom for all.146 Her 
assessment— which worked with meticulous statistical material on the vast 
gender discrepancies in wages for equal work— argued that emancipation was 
falsely equated with women entering salaried work. This process was only one 
necessary step, consumer sovereignty in “a world in which the value of human 
beings is measured in terms of their income.” To Meinhof’s mind, the question 
of emancipation encompassed much more far- reaching issues: whether the 
blessings of technological progress were to be employed to unburden people— 
especially women— from “the acquisition of their daily needs concerning food 
and clothing, or to provide luxury and good business to a few.”147 That the 
creation of needs for the purpose of sales increases had generated new burdens 
for the homemaker was yet another story.
On 4 November 1968, the same day that Meinhof’s department store ar-
son article was published, the television magazine Panorama aired an inter-
view in which the imprisoned Ensslin tried to justify her choice of target, seek-
ing the root of evil in the callousness of consumer society: “The people in our 
country and in America and in every West European country, they have to 
gorge themselves. They have to gorge themselves so that it does not occur to 
them to think, for example, that we have something to do with Vietnam and 
what we might have to do with it. . . . I cannot believe that the day will . . . never 
come when people will be fed up with just being full . . . when they will be fed 
up with the self- delusion of taking all the nice provisions for the meaning of 
life.” She explained that she, too, liked the things that could be bought at de-
partment stores, but if the price was human consciousness, it was too high. To 
see a frightening “loss of consciousness,” which she called “unworthy of hu-
man beings,” did not require looking as far as Vietnam; the misery was appar-
ent in her own society. She then declared that she would never resign herself to 
late capitalist society drifting towards fascism, for which she cited develop-
ments in America as evidence. She would never resign herself to what has been 
done for centuries, would never pretend that she could not do anything. Finally, 
Ensslin distanced herself from department store arson without explaining why, 
leaving open the question of whether she would embark on a different kind of 
direct action. She had already stated in court that the way the protest had been 
carried out was a mistake, but it was still nothing of which she was ashamed.148 
146. Ulrike Meinhof, “Falsches Bewußtsein,” in Emanzipation und Ehe, ed. Rotzoll, 33.
147. Ibid., 35– 36.
148. Ensslin, interview. Passages from the interview are quoted in Siepmann, Heiß und kalt, 
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Ensslin seems to have seen her act as a symbol or wake- up call that went un-
heard.
Journalist Dieter E. Zimmer, an assistant editor for Die Zeit, admitted that 
it was debatable whether the violence in “direct action” such as department 
store arson was “real” or of a symbolic character, whether it was more likely to 
reinforce or harm the capitalist system. In his opinion, a utilitarian perspective 
was more to the point: even if one fully supported the revolutionaries’ inten-
tions, one still had to admit that “there is no means of transmission that could 
make an act of this kind in any way educational or productive. . . . If one really 
seeks an effective way to forfeit the sympathies that exist in some parts of the 
population, if one does not want this revolution to happen with the people but 
against the people, then one will have to set alight as many department stores 
as possible.”149 He correctly diagnosed the acute difficulties left- wing mili-
tancy encountered in meeting its goal of mobilising the masses beyond a rela-
tively small group of like- minded or well- meaning comrades and observers. 
Conversely, he ignored the idea that many activists did not care whether they 
were popular and understood that they were fighting against the majority of the 
population in affluent societies, thinking such people to be the victims of false 
needs and complicit in a fundamentally flawed system.
The Frankfurt arson attacks constitute a significant departure in the his-
tory of left- wing protest in Germany, since the anti- authoritarian protesters had 
previously— despite some more militant rhetoric— limited themselves to 
breaking the law during protest meetings, demonstrations, and related confron-
tations with the authorities. Apart from some smashed windows and an incen-
diary device that caused minor damage at the Criminal Court Moabit during 
Kommune I’s leaflet trial, the Frankfurt department store arsons were the first 
politically motivated attacks from the Left outside this context.150 Baader and 
Ensslin’s evasion of their sentences by going underground eventually proved to 
be the beginning of their well- known radicalisation in the RAF.
Although many contemporaries perceived the Frankfurt department store ar-
sons as either mere spontaneous action or pure crime, they must be seen in the 
context of their intellectual origins, which embed them in a wider history of 
protest. By 1962, Gruppe Spur had already pointed to the manipulated con-
513. Proll later emphasised the anticonsumerist message of the department store arson. There were 
two motives: the Americans’ involvement in Vietnam, and the call to refuse consumption (Kon-
sumverweigerung). See Proll and Dubbe, Wir kamen vom anderen Stern, 7, 23, 39.
149. Zimmer, “Eine Absage als vorläufige Schlußbemerkung,” 342.
150. Hakemi and Hecken, “Warenhausbrandstifter,” 1:316.
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sumer and emphasised the depoliticising role of consumption, which group 
members saw in connection with destruction. Subversive Aktion continued 
from this basis, diagnosing alienation on two levels: (1) the absorption of artis-
tic and critical impulses into the sphere of commerce deprived human beings 
from crucial cultural and political means for an adequate exchange with their 
societal environment; (2) affluent society also colonised seemingly private 
fields of retreat such as sexuality or leisure. At least implicitly, the consumer 
already featured as a potential revolutionary subject, but for most people, afflu-
ent consumption seemed to foster identification with “the system.” Consump-
tion thus became a central tenet of ideology and was put in a tradition of to-
talitarian ideologies, an idea that also connected to Germany’s fascist past. The 
notion of terror was introduced and coupled with consumption to refer to struc-
tures of violence underlying affluent society. The subversives around Kunzel-
mann, Dutschke, and Rabehl made a decisive move in joining the SDS. They 
thus took their political programme of revolutionising everyday life on the ba-
sis of a theoretical analysis of both consumption and production as well as their 
method of performative action in the sphere of commerce into the wider stu-
dent movement. In terms of theoretical framework, Kommune I hardly went 
beyond Subversive Aktion. The May 1967 leaflets on the Brussels fire disaster 
were completely in line with earlier happenings, but the communards now 
merged a critique of regimes of provision with a collective lifestyle, the satis-
faction of personal needs with political action. What was new was the intensity 
with which they used the media and the courts to propagate and radicalise their 
position.
West German society was prepared to dedicate a high degree of public 
attention to the protesters, turning the leaflets and to a lesser degree the arsons 
into media hype. This process resulted not only from the communards’ virtuos-
ity in playing the full range of media scandals but also from the fact that they 
had really touched a nerve with their contemporary discourse of legitimisation: 
ideological justification via superior provision. Conversely, Kommune I and 
the department store arsonists shared an important aspect of the commercial 
sensationalism they criticised: the performative moment of gaining instant 
publicity by innovative means. An amalgamation of various levels of political 
violence became typical of their tactics. Both the leaflets and the Frankfurt 
arsons firmly tied symbols of war to symbols of affluence. However, despite 
the odd mention of Woolworth or Coca- Cola, among others, there was no spe-
cific targeting of American stores or products. Germany’s fascist past was in-
voked in a number of contexts, with rather variable meanings: the educators of 
the late 1950s and early 1960s warned against massification; Rabehl coined the 
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term Konsumfaschismus; Grass claimed that both Springer tabloids and Kom-
mune I showed evidence of fascist symbols; Meinhof’s concept of countervio-
lence pointed to fascist terror; and Ensslin thought that capitalism’s drift to-
wards fascism was most evident in America.
Meinhof’s treatment of the Frankfurt department store arsons and her 
subsequent contacts with the arsonists proved to be crucial steps in her theo-
retical development, as chapter 3 demonstrates. But before I analyse the armed 
rebellion against consumer society that the RAF and related groups pursued, 
the next chapter scrutinises the wider intellectual context of such positions. At 
least since 1963 and up to the court proceedings against the arsonists, evidence 
indicates that consumption- related protest was influenced by Marcuse’s writ-
ings. It is difficult to determine the exact degree of Marcuse’s or other theo-
rists’ influence because German critiques of regimes of provision had their 
own distinct roots and developed their own dynamism. The emergence of 
widespread perceptions of connections between the development of consumer 
society and destruction or violence was a historical novelty in many industri-
alised countries but especially in West Germany.
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Chapter 2
Neo- Marxist Critiques of Affluent Society:  
“Need to Break the Rules”
“If these young people detest the prevailing system of needs and its ever in-
creasing mass of goods, this is because they observe and know how much 
sacrifice, how much cruelty and stupidity contribute everyday to the repro-
duction of the system.”
—Herbert Marcuse (1967)1
The historical and intellectual developments analysed so far need to be located 
in the wider context of the pervasive conflict between competing concepts of 
universal well- being during the Cold War. The social theory of the Frankfurt 
School, especially Herbert Marcuse’s analysis of capitalism, and its influence 
on the New Left were part of this transatlantic quest for appropriate ways to 
organise or animate societies.2 The Frankfurt School’s insights into modern 
mass society were read not only as analysis but also as directions for use. How-
ever, Marcuse’s concrete influence on the protagonists of West German cri-
tiques of regimes of provision should not be taken for granted, since other in-
fluences also existed. Activists made their own observations regarding regimes 
of provision, and these observations had practical consequences for political 
action, which Marcuse would not have endorsed. While most of the existing 
literature inconclusively ponders the exact extent of Marcuse’s influence on 
the protest movement, it seems helpful to identify critiques of affluent society 
as a focal point in the mutual exchange between the philosopher, who openly 
showed his solidarity with the protest movement, and the student rebels, allow-
ing both sides to link social theory with everyday activities.
1. Herbert Marcuse, “The Question of Revolution,” New Left Review 45 (1967): 7 (German 
orig., “Ist die Idee der Revolution”).
2. See Tim B. Müller, Krieger und Gelehrte. A recent study of the transatlantic dimension of 
student protest mentions Marcuse in passing without going into any detail: see Klimke, Other Al-
liance.
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Consequently, activists found it easy to embrace Marcuse’s writings in 
which the émigré philosopher described the “preformation” of the individual 
both as a condition and a result of structural processes of commodity consump-
tion. Moreover, activists followed his belief that before entering the fight for 
freedom, revolutionaries had to liberate themselves from capitalist consumer 
culture. Consumption seemed to lead to a loss of political freedom. Marcuse’s 
eloquent opposition to this form of “manipulation” helped to lend credibility to 
the idea of “emancipating” the individual from consumer society among parts 
of the West German intelligentsia, but they were ultimately unable to impart 
this position to the wider population.3
The complex critique of regimes of provision and of affluent society 
emerging from the writings of the Frankfurt School as well as from theory 
papers by Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (SDS) activists formed a 
central part of the cognitive orientation of the activists analysed in this volume. 
This chapter thus reconstructs and contextualises contemporary critiques of 
regimes of provision, especially the work of Marcuse, one of the first Marxists 
to provide a theory of consumer society, as it developed over four decades.4 
Most existing research on the intellectual legacy of the Frankfurt School sim-
ply refers to Marcuse’s One- Dimensional Man, quickly subsuming it under 
more general notions of Marx’s concept of commodity fetishism. This is then 
taken as an important influence on the New Left,5 usually without going into 
too much detail.6 Marcuse’s later writings in particular rarely feature in exist-
ing research.7 The aim is to overcome this reduction in favour of a more com-
prehensive contextualisation of Marcuse’s critique of affluent society from 
Eros and Civilization (1955) to Counterrevolution and Revolt (1972).
3. Wolfgang Ruppert, “Zur Konsumwelt der 60er Jahre,” in Dynamische Zeiten, ed. Schildt, 
Siegfried, and Lammers, 767– 68.
4. This chapter goes beyond Philip Walsh, “Herbert Marcuse and Contemporary Social Theory: 
Beyond the Consumer Society,” in No Social Science, ed. Dahms, 235– 60; Kellner, “Critical The-
ory.” One ambitious overview of the sociology of consumption ignores Marcuse: see Schrage, 
Verfügbarkeit der Dinge.
5. Kraushaar, “Einleitung”; Kailitz, Von den Worten zu den Waffen, 91– 101.
6. E.g. Hecken, Versagen der Intellektuellen, 120– 24; Günter C. Behrmann, “Kulturrevolution: 
Zwei Monate im Sommer 1967,” in Intellektuelle Gründung der Bundesrepublik, ed. Albrecht, 
Behrmann, and Bock, 312– 86.
7. Notable exceptions are Kellner, Herbert Marcuse, 276– 319; Kellner, “Radical Politics”; Ro-
land Roth, Rebellische Subjektivität; Wheatland, Frankfurt School, 326– 34. Wheatland argues that 
after 1968, Marcuse largely reacted to the student movement rather than directing it, but this ob-
servation is solely based on Marcuse’s relations with the American Students for a Democratic 
Society.
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A Freudian Perspective on Needs
In his Marxist Freud exegesis Eros and Civilization, Marcuse referred criti-
cally to consumer society by assuming that repression resulted not only from 
the conditions of production— as in classical Marxist analysis— but also from 
the conditions of consumption.8 At this point, however, Marcuse did not yet 
assume “false” needs: “The high standard of living . . . is restrictive in a con-
crete sociological sense: the goods and services that the individuals buy control 
their needs and petrify their faculties. In exchange for the commodities that 
enrich their life, the individuals sell not only their labor but also their free 
time.” This process obscured the possibility of liberation: “People  .  .  . have 
private automobiles with which they can no longer escape into a different 
world. . . . They have dozens of newspapers and magazines which espouse the 
same ideals.” Innumerable choices diverted attention from what Marcuse con-
sidered the real issue: the lost “awareness that they could both work less and 
determine their own needs and satisfactions.”9 The ideology of consumption 
thus reproduced and justified domination, but crucially, Marcuse did not deny 
that the goods of affluent society afforded actual benefit and use value. How-
ever, a car or a TV offered an escapism that obscured the possibility of auton-
omy. A connection between consumption and violence emerged only when 
Marcuse pointed to a new quality in the discrepancy between the enhanced 
possibilities of liberation as a consequence of prosperity and continuing re-
pression: “It is with a new ease that terror is assimilated with normality, and 
destructiveness with construction.”10
On the occasion of the one hundredth anniversary of Sigmund Freud’s 
birth, Marcuse delivered a much- noted public lecture in which he distinguished 
between quantitative and qualitative progress. The former, he argued, was 
aimed at growing societal wealth and thus a primary cause of culture. It in-
creased the means to meet human needs, but thereby also expanded humans’ 
needs. According to Marcuse, the question remained open whether such “tech-
nical progress” also contributed to the perfection of humanity and society, to 
more freedom and happiness. Conversely, the second mode of progress— 
qualitative or humanitarian progress— aimed at realising freedom and morality 
and at the reduction of slavery, arbitrary rule, repression, and suffering.11 Ini-
tially, technical progress was a precondition for overcoming slavery and pov-
 8. Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, 37.
 9. Ibid., 100.
10. Ibid., 102.
11. Marcuse, “Idee des Fortschritts,” 425– 26.
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erty, but this did not mean it would always entail humanitarian progress. The 
former was thus a necessary but not sufficient condition for the latter. There 
was a possibility that questions concerning the distribution and control of soci-
etal wealth became uncoupled from technical progress— for example, in a to-
talitarian welfare state. In the history of ideas up to the French Revolution, 
thinkers such as Condorcet saw technical and humanitarian progress as work-
ing hand in hand. However, a crucial change occurred in the nineteenth cen-
tury, when Comte, Mill, and other theorists conceived of progress as indepen-
dent of qualitative norms and thus at least theoretically uncoupled the two 
levels. For Marcuse, this meant that the qualitative element of progress was 
henceforth relegated to the realm of utopia. In the allegedly value- free concept 
of progress that unfolded in industrial society, productivity— that is, increased 
production of material and intellectual goods— was elevated to the rank of 
highest value. When confronted with questions about its meaning or purpose, 
adherents of the productivity rationale usually pointed to the satisfaction of 
needs. And this is where Marcuse concentrated his critical and moral impulse 
by questioning the perpetuating satisfaction of needs that had been elevated to 
a principle: “If the concept of needs includes food, clothing, and shelter as well 
as bombs, entertainment machines, and the destruction of unsalable foodstuffs, 
then we will not run into any danger in maintaining that the concept is as insin-
cere as it is unsuitable for the definition of legitimate productivity.”12
The decisive idea is that needs and productivity ought to be linked back to 
criteria of legitimacy. Implicitly, armaments, entertainment industries, and the 
destruction of vital goods became illegitimate consumption— although Mar-
cuse did not yet use the term consumption at this point— as opposed to legiti-
mate consumption that met basic needs. Drawing on Freud, Marcuse explained 
that the mainspring of the development that brought about culture— in the 
sense of both modes of progress— was drive displacement, including restricted 
consumption. Humans denying themselves full consumption of the fruits of 
their productivity was thus a necessary precondition for perpetuating produc-
tivity, which, however, entailed alienated labour on the basis of a promise of 
future benefits or happiness. On the basis of this Hegelian- Freudian overview 
of human development, Marcuse posed a crucial question: What if drive dis-
placement and progress have fulfilled their historical function, making the con-
quest of human impotence and of material want a distinct possibility? Drawing 
on Friedrich Schiller’s letters On the Aesthetic Education of Man, Marcuse 
sought to replace progress and productivity for their own sake with an aesthetic 
12. Ibid., 427.
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and moral vision of “the highest development of intellectual and mental ca-
pacities” that went “hand in hand with the existence of material means and 
goods for the satisfaction of human needs.” He envisioned minimising modern 
social alienation— not a one- sided rejection of consumption or material prog-
ress but an attempt to overcome the Janus- faced character of the two modes of 
progress. This vision of a free society for all on the basis of technological 
progress— that is, “more or less total automation”13— became not only a cen-
tral issue of Marcuse’s future work but also a rich source of inspiration for the 
intellectual and political projects of the protest movements of the 1960s and 
1970s. The idea proved so attractive because it promised nondestructive con-
sumption in accordance with genuine needs while minimising alienated and 
heteronomous labour.
True and False Needs
While avant- gardist groups such as Subversive Aktion had already begun read-
ing Marcuse’s works of the 1950s in the early 1960s, his ideas only spread to 
wider circles with One- Dimensional Man (1964; published in German transla-
tion in 1967). The book drew on Marcuse’s long- standing preoccupation with 
the topic during the 1950s.14 At the heart of the New Left’s fascination with this 
work was the differentiation between true and false needs, the latter compris-
ing most “of the prevailing needs to relax, to have fun, to behave and consume 
in accordance with the advertisements, to love and hate what others love and 
hate.”15 This was aiming at the heteronomous character of socially generated 
needs— affluent humans were still alienated from their products— but it could 
also be read as a justification of unconventional lifestyles and protest when 
existing regimes of provision were identified with false needs. On the first page 
of One- Dimensional Man, Marcuse described a historical shift from openly 
employed authority towards subtle techniques of exercising control. Subjuga-
tion to the latter even became comfortable as a consequence of the experiences 
of joy that consumption of mass- produced goods entailed. Subsequently, a 
“comfortable, smooth, reasonable, democratic unfreedom” imparted by the 
technological apparatus prevailed.16 The goods and services that this apparatus 
13. Ibid., 435, 438, 444.
14. Tim B. Müller, Krieger und Gelehrte, 418, 448, 563.
15. Marcuse, One- Dimensional Man, 5 (German ed., Der eindimensionale Mensch: Studien zur 
Ideologie der fortgeschrittenen Industriegesellschaft [Frankfurt, 1967]).
16. Marcuse, One- Dimensional Man, 1.
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produced imposed the social system as a whole. Marcuse identified crucial 
regimes of provision that were to become focal points of protest by the new 
social movements: “mass transportation and communication, the commodities 
of lodging, food, and clothing, the irresistible output of the entertainment and 
information industry carry with them prescribed attitudes and habits, certain 
intellectual and emotional reactions which bind the consumers more or less 
pleasantly to the producers and, through the latter, to the whole.” Consumer 
goods thus seemed key to indoctrination and manipulation, promoting a “false 
consciousness.”17 Advertising, public relations, and planned obsolescence had 
been turned from wasteful and “unproductive overhead costs”18 into basic pro-
duction costs that were passed on to the consumer in both material and ideo-
logical senses.
Marcuse was addressing the repressive function of the affluent society 
that failed to tackle the real issue: reducing alienated labour, “the need for stu-
pefying work where it is no longer a real necessity.”19 This issue reverberated 
greatly with the lifestyle choices of the student protesters. In this reading, ad-
vanced industrial society was for all intents and purposes providing its mem-
bers with “a good way of life— much better than before,” but it came at the 
price of militating against qualitative change, since it created “one- dimensional 
thought and behaviour” unable to transcend established discourse,20 since it 
was subordinated to the economic demands of consumer society. In Marcuse’s 
view, all benefits of technological progress— administrative control replacing 
physical control, reduction of heavy physical work, assimilation of occupa-
tional classes, equalisation in the sphere of consumption— did not make up for 
the continued lack of autonomy, since individuals still had no effective control 
over the crucial political and social decisions that governed their daily exis-
tence: “The slaves of developed industrial civilization are sublimated slaves, 
but they are slaves.”21 Affluence became a crucial means of perpetuating this 
bondage in both capitalist and state- socialist societies: “The more the rulers are 
capable of delivering the goods of consumption, the more firmly will the un-
derlying population be tied to the various ruling bureaucracies.” Marcuse also 
addressed the transfer of this ideology to the developing world, which was to 
become so crucial for the anti- imperialist plank of the protest movements. A 
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Cold War camps— was imposed on developing countries that had to discard 
pretechnological forms in favour of “mechanized and standardized mass pro-
duction and distribution.” He foresaw an era of neocolonialism.22
Like most of Marcuse’s major works, One- Dimensional Man had an ex-
tended section dedicated to the aesthetic correlate of social and economic 
change. Here again, he diagnosed a narrowing effect on people’s conscious-
ness and implicitly suggested a politicisation and radicalisation of artistic ex-
pression. Art and intellectual culture were bound to lose their transcendent di-
mension once they became familiar goods and services by means of the massive 
reproduction that integrated them into modern everyday commercial life. Mar-
cuse was not prepared to see this process as a “democratization of culture.”23 
He captured it with the concept of “repressive desublimation.” Art was inte-
grated into both private life and the commercial sphere “from a ‘position of 
strength’ on the part of society, which can afford to grant more than before 
because its interests have become the innermost drives of its citizens, and be-
cause the joys which it grants promote social cohesion.” The loss of conscience 
that this omnipresence of formerly critical or subversive ideas entailed led to 
tolerance vis- à- vis injustice and evil; it made “for a happy consciousness which 
facilitates acceptance of the misdeeds of this society. It is the token of declin-
ing autonomy and comprehension.”24 Especially the militant offshoots of the 
protest movement would seek to regain this autonomy and blame commercial 
mechanisms for its loss.
The final chapter of One- Dimensional Man analysed why possible libera-
tion was not commonly embraced. Lifting his analysis of needs to a higher 
level of abstraction, Marcuse maintained that values ultimately had been trans-
lated into needs: first, the notion of freedom had acquired a material dimension 
by being tied to satisfaction; second, traditional values were eroded by the in-
creasingly uninhibited “development of needs on the basis of satisfaction.” The 
central values of enlightenment, such as justice, freedom, and humanity, be-
came contingent on “the satisfaction of man’s material needs, the rational or-
ganization of the realm of necessity.”25 Marcuse identified the entertainment 
industries as a crucial factor in upholding this constellation. People tolerated 
the creation of nuclear weapons and radioactive fallout, but they could not do 
without media entertainment. Just before the conclusion, he imagined a society 
without television and advertisement: “The non- functioning of television and 
22. Ibid., 43, 46– 47.
23. Ibid., 61.
24. Ibid., 72, 76.
25. Ibid., 234– 35.
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the allied media might thus begin to achieve what the inherent contradictions 
of capitalism did not achieve— the disintegration of the system.”26
Advanced industrial societies seemed caught up in an ever- accelerating 
drive on a one- way road of expansion: further “development of the productive 
forces on an enlarged scale, extension of the conquest of nature, growing satis-
faction of needs for a growing number of people, creation of new needs and 
faculties.” But these forms of productivity and progress gradually lost their lib-
erating potential as they were “organized into a totalitarian system,” in the sense 
of an all- encompassing ideology backing a highly efficient and omnipresent 
system that dominated not only the realm of the actual but also the realm of the 
possible: “At its most advanced stage, domination functions as administration, 
and in the overdeveloped areas of mass consumption, the administered life be-
comes the good life of the whole, in the defense of which the opposites unite.”27 
From this perspective, reformist change within the system seemed impossible. 
Provided one accepted this analysis and intended to contribute to a revolution-
ary collapse of the capitalist system, symbolic or direct action against the 
sources of repressive needs was not entirely implausible. However, Marcuse did 
not suggest that the sources of such repressive needs were tangible in a way a 
department store is. In many respects, One- Dimensional Man was a pessimistic 
book that emphasised the pervasive and persistent powers of a questionable 
system seemingly immune to criticism and revolutionary change.
While the analysis of affluent society in One- Dimensional Man intellec-
tually connected regimes of provision with abstract notions of repression and 
control, consumption and political violence were only implicitly correlated. 
However, Marcuse’s understanding of violence already pointed to the direction 
that would follow in his later writings in response to the protest movements. 
Violence appeared as a ubiquitous phenomenon of human existence that cul-
tural and political development had to alleviate: “Suffering, violence, and de-
struction are categories of the natural as well as human reality, of a helpless and 
heartless universe.”28 In the early 1960s, the interesting phenomenon seemed 
to be the continuation of domination despite the relative but deceptive lack of 
tangible violence. With the issue of violence taking centre stage in the course 
of the Vietnam War and various protest and liberation movements throughout 
the world, Marcuse clearly did not accept an interpretation of violence that 
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Repressive Tolerance
Marcuse’s critique of “repressive tolerance” continued ideas from One- 
Dimensional Man but went a step further by focusing on “an increasing con-
centration of power” that integrated “the particular countervailing powers by 
virtue of an increasing standard of living.” He now identified possible counter-
vailing powers, among them “the common consumer whose real interest con-
flicts with that of the producer.” However, consumers, like labourers or intel-
lectuals, had to submit “to a system against which they are powerless and 
appear unreasonable.” This system ultimately rested on its increasing but in-
complete satisfaction of needs. The practices upholding such a false regime of 
provision were not simply imposed from above but equally tolerated from be-
low: “Their removal would be that total revolution which this society so effec-
tively repels.”29
After more or less dismissing art as an effective engine of change, since 
the forces of the market swallowed up “the protest of art against the established 
reality,” Marcuse turned to a discussion of “the issue of violence and the tradi-
tional distinction between violent and non- violent action,” which he crucially 
wished to overcome. The problem was that tolerance was extended only to 
practices that served “the cohesion of the whole on the road to affluence or 
more affluence.” Marcuse used the term radically evil to characterise these 
practices and somewhat haphazardly named publicity, propaganda, aggressive 
driving, special forces, merchandizing, waste, and planned obsolescence as 
“the essence of a system which fosters tolerance as a means for perpetuating 
the struggle for existence and suppressing the alternatives.” Remarkably, some-
one seems to have felt the urge to substantiate the claim to “radical evil” with 
a more convincing example and replaced “aggressive driving” with a phrase 
addressing the “violence in Vietnam” for the German edition.30 Revolutionary 
violence sought to break “the historical continuum of injustice, cruelty, and 
silence for a brief moment, brief but explosive enough to achieve an increase in 
the scope of freedom and justice, and a better and more equitable distribution 
of misery and oppression in a new social system.” Marcuse’s goal was a just 
regime of provision. He sought to calculate the optimal way of distribution that 
would prioritise vital needs yet incur “a minimum of toil and injustice.” The 
lofty ideal was a satisfaction of needs that did “not feed on poverty, oppression, 
29. Herbert Marcuse, “Repressive Tolerance,” in Wolff, Moore, and Marcuse, Critique of Pure 
Tolerance, 93, 102.
30. Ibid., 83; Robert Paul Wolff, Barrington Moore, and Herbert Marcuse, Kritik der reinen 
Toleranz, trans. Alfred Schmidt (Frankfurt, 1966), 95.
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and exploitation.”31 Crucially, Marcuse treated questions of distribution in im-
mediate conjunction with questions of violence. Despite the systemic violence 
that he diagnosed, he denied that anyone could claim a fundamental right of 
resistance “against a constitutional government sustained by a majority.” How-
ever, according to natural justice, oppressed minorities were allowed “to use 
extralegal means if the legal ones have proved to be inadequate.” In such cases, 
extralegal resistance had the function of unmasking injustice: “They do not 
start a new chain of violence but try to break an established one.”32 Dieter Kun-
zelmann, Andreas Baader, and others invoked this passage to justify their re-
bellion.
Lecturing Rebellious Students
In May 1966, when the German translation of One- Dimensional Man was not 
yet published, Marcuse spoke at the first Vietnam Congress organised by the 
SDS at Frankfurt. In his opening passage, Marcuse acknowledged oppositional 
youth as an important factor and asserted that their rebellion resulted from 
disgust with surrounding lifestyle. The youth movement was, he declared, “the 
negation of  .  .  . the system of the ‘affluent society.’” He contrasted societal 
wealth, technological progress, and domination of nature with the unnecessary 
perpetuation of the struggle for existence both on a national and a global level. 
A fatal unity of productivity and destruction, of prosperity and misery, ap-
peared as the root of a diffuse aggressiveness that included the “commercial 
rape of nature.” His example tried to bridge the everyday experience of highly 
industrialised societies with the horrors of war in a distant country: “The same 
aggressive forces lead from death on the highways and streets to bombings, 
torture, and burnings in Vietnam.” Compared to the forty- nine thousand high-
way deaths and four million injuries from traffic accidents each year in the 
United States, casualty figures from Vietnam seemed less significant. People, 
especially members of the working class, were tied into a system of increased 
productivity and of rising standards of living that only a few minorities started 
to resist. Even among America’s underprivileged, being drafted and sent to 
Vietnam could appear like an improvement, the first step up the ladder of social 
mobility.33
31. Marcuse, “Repressive Tolerance,” 105.
32. Ibid., 116– 17.
33. Marcuse, “Vietnam” (English trans., http://germanhistorydocs.ghi- dc.org/pdf/eng/Chapter-
6Doc3Intro.pdf (accessed 12 June 2011).
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Marcuse wrote a new preface for the 1966 edition of Eros and Civilization 
in which he adopted a very political tone and referred to affluent society, the 
Vietnam War, and Auschwitz in conjunction. He asserted that the scientific 
management of instinctual needs turned merchandise into objects of the libido. 
Self- propelling productivity was seeking ever new outlets for consumption and 
destruction both domestically and globally, but at the same time it was re-
strained from “overflowing” into the regions where misery prevailed. When he 
came to the Vietnam War, he argued that “science, technology, and money” 
would first destroy and then do “the job of reconstruction in their own image.” 
In passing, he referred to “photographs that show a row of half naked corpses 
laid out for the victors in Vietnam: they resemble in all details the pictures of 
the starved, emasculated corpses of Auschwitz and Buchenwald.”34 Writing to 
Max Horkheimer in June 1967, Marcuse pointed to U.S. atrocities “outside the 
metropole” and went so far as to call contemporary America “the historic heir 
to fascism.”35
A month after the shooting of student Benno Ohnesorg by a plainclothes 
police officer on 2 June 1967, Marcuse came to the Freie Universität Berlin, 
where he gave two lectures and participated in four panel discussions organ-
ised by the SDS and the students’ union executive committee. His performance 
turned him into a media star.36 The notion of consumer society did not figure 
explicitly in Marcuse’s talk on “The Problem of Violence and the Radical Op-
position.” However, he crucially legitimised the radical opposition triggered by 
the experiences of the American civil rights movement and the Vietnam War 
with reference to a system comprising wars, productivity, destruction, and 
waste that “degrades everything, in an increasingly inhuman way, to the status 
of a commodity whose purchase and sale provide the sustenance and content 
of life.” Marcuse not only referred to “the terror employed outside the me-
tropolis” but also suggested that this system comprised both fascism and afflu-
ent society: “We find ourselves up against a system that from the beginning of 
the fascist period to the present has disavowed . . . the idea of historical prog-
ress.” He made it clear that German and American student activists were op-
posing the majority of the population and “a democratic, effectively function-
ing society that at least under normal circumstances does not operate with 
terror.” Marcuse’s position on violence was pragmatic: for the time being, the 
34. Herbert Marcuse, preface to Eros and Civilization, 3rd ed. (Boston 1966), xi– xxvi, http://
www.marcuse.org/herbert/pubs/55erosciv/ec0066pref.htm (accessed 13 June 2011).
35. Herbert Marcuse to Max Horkheimer, 17 June 1967, in Frankfurter Schule, ed. Kraushaar, 
2:262.
36. Behrmann, “Kulturrevolution,” 335– 36.
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opposition was in no position to create a “new general interest” in its projects; 
violence was thus a question of tactics and could easily backfire.37 In a London 
lecture in late July 1967, Marcuse briefly appealed to his audience to use any 
means of protest that fulfilled two conditions: it needed to be able to cope with 
the “institutionalized violence” of the authorities, and it needed to have “a 
reasonable chance of strengthening the forces of the opposition.” Specifically, 
he mentioned flexible forms of demonstration and boycott, a piece of advice 
that was heeded.38
While in Berlin, Marcuse also gave a talk that did not mention violence at 
all but held out an alluring concept stemming from Marx: the realm of free-
dom, which Marcuse wished to reanimate. In “The End of Utopia,” he de-
clared, “I believe that one of the new possibilities, which gives an indication of 
the qualitative difference between the free and the unfree society, is that of 
letting the realm of freedom appear within the realm of necessity— in labor and 
not only beyond labor.”39 In his expression of the aim of socialism at the end of 
the third volume of Das Kapital (chapter 48, section 3), Marx saw the realm of 
freedom beyond the realm of necessity.40 According to Marcuse’s interpreta-
tion, Marx saw the latter as providing the precondition— including alienated 
labour— for the former, which he conceived as allowing for artistic and schol-
arly pursuits. A basic requirement for the blossoming of the realm of freedom 
was thus a reduction in working hours. Now that this condition had at least 
partially been met, Marcuse could hold out the perspective that the obligation 
to alienated wage labour might be largely overcome with the help of technol-
ogy. He thus drew Marx’s utopian perspective on socialism much closer to 
present- day reality and suggested that the student movement might play a de-
cisive role in bridging the remaining gap.
Marcuse thus sought to undo a historical development in which Marx and 
Engels had shifted the emphasis away from questions of consumption and to-
wards gradualism and productionism, thus projecting a communist mode of 
provision into the future of socioeconomic development: “Only then can . . . 
society inscribe on its banners: From each according to his ability, to each ac-
37. Marcuse, “Problem of Violence.” Marcuse did not edit the transcription that appeared in 
Marcuse, Ende der Utopie. See also “Moral und Politik in der Überflußgesellschaft: Eine Podi-
umsdiskussion,” ibid., 83– 119.
38. Marcuse, “Liberation.”
39. Herbert Marcuse, “The End of Utopia,” trans. Jeremy Shapiro and Shierry M. Weber, http://
www.marcuse.org/herbert/pubs/60spubs/67endutopia/67EndUtopiaProbViol.htm (accessed 21 
June 2011); Marcuse, Ende der Utopie, 12.
40. Marx, Kapital, in Marx and Engels, Gesamtausgabe (MEGA), ed. International Marx En-
gels Foundation, section 2, 15: 794– 95.. See Klagge, “Marx’s Realms.”
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cording to his needs!”41 This passage from Marx’s Critique of the Gotha Pro-
gramme popularised the old socialist notion of consumption according to one’s 
needs that had been theoretically established by various French thinkers— 
Étienne- Gabriel Morelly, Gabriel Bonnot de Mably, Étienne Cabet, and Louis 
Blanc— well before Marx. However, Marx now put the focus onto the obsta-
cles preventing the realisation of such a regime of provision. In this view, the 
state was by no means only a neutral entity to secure market regulations but 
rather a concentration of the means of violence to uphold the existing power 
structures, especially the bourgeoisie’s right to appropriate the products of 
other people’s work via the commodification of labour— in other words: a re-
pressive regime of provision. In actual political practice, the conceptual linking 
of consumption to a revolutionary objective took a backseat. For the time be-
ing, Marx and his followers emphasised the idea that concentration of property 
went hand in hand with corresponding structures of authority.
The monopoly on violence in the hands of modern centralised territorial 
states has complex roots, one of which is the emergence of market societies. 
The state had to ensure the security of trade routes, commercial contracts, and 
markets. The freedom of commodity owners required a specialised apparatus 
combining means of law and violence.42 Hegel derived the monopoly on vio-
lence from the market without taking into account other forms of legitimacy 
deriving from the individual: “The different interests of producers and consum-
ers may come into conflict. . . . Police control and provision are intended to 
intervene between the individual and the universal possibility of obtaining his 
wants.”43 Hegel also observed that disproportionate accumulation of wealth 
would drive a society on a course of expansion: “It must find consumers and 
the necessary means of life amongst other peoples, who either lack the means, 
of which it has a superfluity, or have less developed industries.”44
In the summer of 1967, when Marcuse gave a short interview to one of the 
most important periodicals of the German New Left, Hans Magnus Enzens-
berger’s Kursbuch, Hegel’s commercial expansionism had apparently taken a 
violent turn. On the question of whether modern affluent society had not made 
the idea of revolution completely obsolete, Marcuse quickly came to the topic 
41. Marx, “Kritik des Gothaer Programms” (1875), in MEGA section 1, 25: 15 (English trans., 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1875/gotha/ch01.htm [accessed 14 September 
2012]).
42. This is following Fisahn, “Legitimation des Gewaltmonopols,” 13– 15.
43. G. W. F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (Berlin, 1820), section 236; G. W. 
F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. S. W. Dyde (Kitchener, 2001), 185– 86, http://socserv.mcmas-
ter.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/hegel/right.pdf (accessed 23 August 2012).
44. Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, section 246.
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of the Vietnam War, where he thought the limits of capitalism and “neocolo-
nialism” were apparent. Especially in the German version, his vocabulary was 
clearly reminiscent of the Holocaust— for example, he invoked a Vietnamese 
“Final Solution” and referred to “Sieg durch totale Verbrennung und totale 
Vergiftung” (victory by burning and poisoning everything). He emphasised 
that liberation movements in the developing world could succeed only with 
support from the metropole. Marcuse offered a rather lucid analysis of the 
eventually successful Western strategy in the Cold War: the state- socialist soci-
eties were subject to “a life and death competition” in which the social needs 
of their citizens had to be subordinated to political and military exigencies.45
By December 1968, Marcuse had gone remarkably far in taking sides 
with the New Left. In a speech for the New York radical weekly Guardian, he 
rejected the idea of a unified leftist political party but recommended that groups 
of activists protest local grievances by creating unrest and riots. He explicitly 
stated that “militant minorities” would take the lead in this endeavour. He in-
tended to steer a middle course between conventional party politics and an il-
legal underground. The fragmentation of the Left thus became a virtue, be-
cause a multitude of competing “small and highly flexible autonomous groups” 
could act simultaneously in many local contexts, creating “a kind of political 
guerrilla movement in times of peace or so- called peace.”46
Horkheimer Adorno and Galtung
Marcuse was criticised by his colleagues from the Frankfurt School, who did 
not embrace the new revolutionary movement in the same way that he did. In 
their view, his notion of universal liberation and happiness being just around 
the corner but hindered by a repressive system was ultimately a simplifica-
tion.47 Not unlike Marx’s critique of the anarchists, they emphasised their own 
approach of a more complicated development. Nevertheless, Marcuse greatly 
admired the Dialectic of Enlightenment and was clearly influenced by it.48 
Horkheimer and Adorno had put forward their critique of consumer society in 
45. Marcuse, “Question of Revolution,” 3– 7 (German orig. “Ist die Idee der Revolution”).
46. Herbert Marcuse, “On the New Left,” in The Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse, ed. 
Douglas Kellner, vol. 3, The New Left and the 1960s (London, 2005), 122– 27.
47. Max Horkheimer, “Marcuses Vereinfachung” (29 August 1967), in Frankfurter Schule, ed. 
Kraushaar, 2:285. See Walter- Busch, Geschichte der Frankfurter Schule, 218– 25.
48. Herbert Marcuse to Max Horkheimer, 31 August 1962, in Frankfurter Schule, ed. Kraus-
haar, 2:155– 56.
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the chapter, “The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception.” They 
assumed that society no longer systematically excluded the working class from 
consumption but achieved total integration via consumption, which became an 
element of social control and thus prevented subjective autonomy. Completed 
in Horkheimer and Adorno’s American exile in 1944, after several years of 
experience with American consumer society, the Dialectic of Enlightenment 
did not have a wider impact until its 1969 reissue, although pirated copies cir-
culated among students much earlier.49 Horkheimer and Adorno introduced the 
dimension of violence into the analysis of their contemporary society via the 
assumption that fascism was a derivative of capitalism, an assumption that 
originated in the 1930s. Therefore, the democracies of the Western world could 
also be seen as containing the seeds of totalitarianism, which germinated in the 
realms of consumption, advertisement, and the production of “false needs.” An 
implicit comparison between consumer society and the regime of National So-
cialism was thus established.
In 1968, Adorno observed that his contemporary society had not moved 
beyond what Marx criticised as “the anarchy of commodity production.” Al-
though the borders between material production, distribution, and consump-
tion seemed to be melting away, the social destiny of the individual remained 
as contingent as ever.50 The availability of consumer goods made class differ-
ences become less visible, but affluent society only concealed “the more visi-
ble forms of poverty” and strove “to maintain the illusion that utopia . . . had 
already been realised.”51 The chair of the German Society for Sociology had 
his doubts but did not wish to negate affluence: on the contrary, the “increasing 
satisfaction of material needs” foreshadowed the concrete possibility of a life 
without misery. Marx and Engels only criticised the utopias of their time be-
cause they thought they would hinder the realisation of “a truly humane organ-
isation of society.” Unforeseeable for them, needs had completely become “the 
function of the production apparatus . . . instead of the reverse.” Consequently, 
needs remained conditioned on profits. Certain needs were artificially “pro-
duced by the profit motive, and thus at the cost of the objective needs of the 
consumers, that is adequate housing .  .  . education and information over the 
processes that most affect them.”52 This ignorance about what most affected 
49. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialektik der Aufklärung: Philosophische Frag-
mente, in Adorno, Gesammelte Schriften, 3:141– 91.
50. Theodor W. Adorno, “Spätkapitalismus oder Industriegesellschaft?: Einleitungsvortrag 
zum 16. Deutschen Soziologentag,” in Adorno, Gesammelte Schriften, 8:367, 369.
51. Ibid., 355.
52. Ibid., 361– 62.
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the consumers was achieved “by means of the culture and consciousness indus-
tries” via the concentration and centralisation of the mass media, through 
which “it has become possible to force into line [gleichzuschalten] the con-
sciousness of countless individuals from just a few points.”53
But what was it that most affected the consumers? Adorno was a bit eva-
sive on this question. He lamented a lack of “indispensable critical ideas” and 
an incapacity “to imagine the world differently than it overwhelmingly 
appears.”54 However, at one point he stated rather clearly that the universal in-
terest was not universal employment but liberation from heteronomous work. 
While acknowledging that differentiation between true and false needs ought 
not to be signed over to bureaucratic regimentation, Adorno still thought that 
such differentiation contained a worthwhile point concerning the relations of 
violence: “Delimited to a horizon in which at any moment the Bomb can fall, 
even the most luxuriant display of consumer goods contains an element of self- 
mockery.”55 However, the concept of Gewalt had a much wider significance in 
Adorno’s political thought than just physical threat. In the chapter on the cul-
ture industry, Horkheimer and Adorno claimed that its products conveyed an 
“omnipresent power” by virtue of their being a “model of the gigantic eco-
nomic machinery, which . . . keeps everyone on their toes, . . . at work and in the 
leisure time.” Consumers are tied to the productive apparatus and its pressures 
and hierarchies even after their shifts are finished. While “power” is a correct 
translation for Gewalt in this context, it is important to bear in mind the double 
meaning of the German term, combining senses of violentia and potestas, 
which cannot easily be reduced to “force” wielded by state actors and “vio-
lence” used by nonstate actors. Horkheimer and Adorno thus arrived at the 
statement, “The power [Gewalt] of industrial society is imprinted on people 
once and for all.”56 Later generations of experts on violence have tried to restrict 
the scholarly use of the term Gewalt to the narrower sense of certain forms of 
violence,57 but the more philosophical perspective on the relationship between 
abstract powers and concrete manifestations of violence is also legitimate.
In this context, Norwegian sociologist Johan Galtung developed the no-
tion of “structural violence” to raise awareness of violence by supplementing 
the phenomenon of manifest violence with the harmful consequences of social 
53. Ibid., 367.
54. Ibid., 364.
55. Ibid., 365– 66.
56. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialektik der Aufklärung, in Adorno, Gesammelte Schriften, 
3:148; Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 100.
57. See Baumann and Schwind, Ursachen, Prävention, und Kontrolle.
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structures— that is, clusters of social institutions that prevent people from 
meeting their basic needs. Positive influences emanating from such structures 
could be accompanied by a narrowing down of ranges of action and life 
chances. In this context, Galtung explicitly mentions the consumer society’s 
rewards, drawing on Marcuse’s One- Dimensional Man. The critical notion of 
“structural violence” could be applied both to those benefiting from the re-
wards of affluent societies and to those remaining more or less systematically 
excluded. The former addressed processes of manipulation and alienation, 
while the latter pointed to the inequitable and deadly consequences of social 
arrangements, especially in the context of North- South relations. Galtung 
made a second insightful observation when considering the object side of vio-
lence. He acknowledged two senses of psychological violence in the destruc-
tion of things: “as a foreboding or threat of possible destruction of persons, 
and . . . as destruction of something very dear to persons referred to as consum-
ers or owners.”58 Both notions carry a sense of the perpetrator’s self- liberation 
from bourgeois constraints. Student protesters seeking freedom unfettered by 
property ties embraced an act of communication that signalled a rejection of 
certain values tied up with the destroyed object.59 Such destruction could be 
directed against previous acts of political communication that used certain ob-
jects or a general state of affluence to legitimise other political contents.
Neitzke and Semler on Department Store Campaigns
Members of the SDS were quite capable of arriving at their own theoretical 
conclusions concerning affluent society without immediate guidance from 
eminent philosophers. In early 1969, Peter Neitzke and Christian Semler 
sought to diversify the theory of political action involving department stores. 
Unlike Dutschke and Marcuse, the two leading members of the West Berlin 
SDS did not locate the revolutionary subject in a “countermilieu” or in margin-
alised minorities but, more conventionally, in the wage- earning masses. How-
ever, they did acknowledge the sphere of distribution as a sensible albeit sec-
ondary field of agitation.
Their text, “Warenhausaktionen” (Department Store Campaigns) identi-
fied three types of political campaigns in the distribution sector: the burning 
of commodities, the appropriation of vital goods by the masses, and the 
58. Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” 170.
59. Ibid., 187.
78    Consumption and Violence
smashing of shop windows. They flatly rejected the first in response to the 
Frankfurt department store arsons. Semler and Neitzke held that “the destruc-
tion of consumer goods” was an act of “existentialist self- liberation . . . with-
out political perspective for the masses.”60 The option of appropriation seemed 
more promising. On the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the German 
November Revolution— at a point when the SDS had already lost some of its 
ideological momentum and unity— Semler had suggested clearing out some 
department stores and handing out the spoils to passersby: “Today economic 
development has reached a point where goods can be distributed for noth-
ing. . . . That’s propaganda of the deed.”61 This was clearly nodding to anar-
chist traditions. Semler and Neitzke saw the department store as a scene of 
political propaganda that simulated the blessings of “socialist production” and 
thus anticipated a socialist future: “In itself, the department store presents the 
social formation for the free distribution of goods.”62 However, this stage of 
development had not yet been reached and remained an illusion: “The concept 
of the department store still holds the illusion of a comprehensive promise of 
happiness: to be able to partake in the world of commodities.” The contradic-
tion lay between the “realm of freedom”— Marx’s concept introduced to the 
Berlin students by Marcuse in 1967— simulated by advertisement and the 
crude realities that still severely limited the masses’ ability to fulfil their “real 
needs.” To bridge this seeming contradiction, capitalism “impels ceaseless 
and unlimited consumption.”63 This created “forced consumers” who had to 
pay for capitalism’s “particularisation of markets” in three ways. First, the 
prices of goods included the costs of advertising. Anyone who did not want to 
fall behind the cultural level that society had reached was thus obliged to sup-
port the “production of needs.” Second, planned obsolescence produced desire 
for the latest products and forced the consumer to purchase. Finally, many 
goods on the market were fundamentally superfluous, lying beyond the his-
torical growth of needs.64
The SDS theoreticians went to such lengths in analysing the department 
store as a political stage as a consequence of the events of 18 January 1969: 
following a rally commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the murder of 
Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, the showcases of the KaDeWe were 
60. Neitzke and Semler, “Warenhausaktionen,” 8– 9.
61. “APO: Nach vorn geträumt,” Der Spiegel 46 (11 November 1968): 70.
62. Neitzke and Semler, “Warenhausaktionen,” 9.
63. Ibid., 8.
64. Ibid., 9.
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systematically smashed, and management reported damages of five hundred 
thousand deutsche marks.65 This became the prototype for countless attacks 
against the windows of retail institutions. Neitzke and Semler criticised such 
tactics: “Not accompanied by propagandistic measures, the lightning operation 
against the windows of KaDeWe constitutes . . . a dangerous compromise.” The 
smashing of windows appeared to be a cross between the other two forms of 
retail protest, remaining “silent about whether destruction or theft was in-
tended.” In Neitzke and Semler’s view, “attacks against the centres of distribu-
tion” still lacked a theoretical foundation, an ideological message that could be 
conveyed to the masses. Clinging to their Marxist credentials, they wanted to 
see “the attack on the windows of a department store, which ranks highly 
among the love objects of West Berliners,” in the context of a larger economic 
and political nexus— that is, the predominance of the means of production in 
revolutionary theory. They were not impressed by their comrades’ praise for 
the smashing of windows in terms of “mobile warfare” against “rigid police 
tactics” and thus cautioned against the allure of easily demonstrating the impo-
tence of the state monopoly on violence.66 Far from shying away from the use 
of revolutionary violence, Neitzke and Semler represent the scepticism— and 
perhaps cluelessness— with which activists with a more conventional Marxist 
background tended to see the smashing of windows.
Their approach departed from a passage in the first volume of Das Kapital 
in which Marx deals with “natural needs” such as food, clothing, heating, and 
housing, highlighting the relativity of “necessary needs,” which depended on 
historical and moral factors. With a sideswipe at Marcuse’s One- Dimensional 
Man, Neitzke and Semler maintained insightfully that the “static, undialectical 
opposition of ‘false’ and ‘real’ needs has always been historically wrong.”67 
The two activists sceptically concluded “that it cannot be in the interest of so-
cialists to even create the impression that they wanted to mobilise the masses 
to stop consuming.” Any agitation or propaganda in the “sphere of consump-
tion” had to educate about the character of goods in a capitalist system. Like 
the members of Kommune I, Neitzke and Semler were inspired by the blacks 
of the ghettos of Newark and Chicago, who, in the German activists’ reading, 
realised themselves as a revolutionary class through the looting and destruction 
of white- owned shops and department stores. However, Marxists did not con-
tent themselves with storming the centres of distribution but aimed for the 
65. “Nach dem Protestmarsch klirrten die Scheiben,” Berliner Morgenpost, 19 January 1969.
66. Neitzke and Semler, “Warenhausaktionen,” 9.
67. Ibid., 8. They quote Karl Marx, Capital, trans. Ben Fowkes (London, 1976), 1:275.
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“sphere of production” with the perennial goal of inciting strikes in industrial 
factories.68
The Radical Realm of Freedom
When Semler and Neitzke published their article on department store cam-
paigns, Marcuse, too, had come back to Marx’s “realm of freedom” and had 
drawn conclusions from the experiences of the protest movement that fed back 
into his work, in many ways radicalising his political message. Most of the 
existing secondary literature has neglected the fact that Marcuse both specified 
and broadened his analysis of affluence, violence, and resistance in An Essay 
on Liberation, which emerged from his many lectures and speeches. A more 
comprehensive reconstruction of his line of argument is thus needed.
Marcuse was still operating on the familiar basis of a critical analysis of 
consumer capitalism, whose false and immoral comforts and “cruel affluence” 
had to be rejected in favour of a regime that “subordinates the development of 
productive forces and higher standards of living to the requirements of creating 
solidarity for the human species.”69 Poverty and misery were to be abolished 
and peace attained.70 Solidarity and cooperation— the liberating solidarity of 
many individuals who freely chose a collective— were central to this endeav-
our.71 Marcuse was encouraged by what he took to be a dissolution of social 
morality manifest in a collapse of work discipline, a refusal to comply with 
rules and regulations, wildcat strikes, boycotts, sabotage, and other gratuitous 
acts of noncompliance.72 The American ghetto riots seemed an indicator of 
systemic crisis, and he observed that even the United States could not indefi-
nitely deliver its goods, “guns and butter, napalm and color TV.”73 The system 
could not endlessly rely on a growing “parasitic sector of the economy” based 
on “waste, destruction, and management.”74 Marcuse’s project was still based 
on the “utopian possibilities  .  .  . inherent in the technical and technological 
forces.” With little attention to the detail of such a transformation, Marcuse 
68. Neitzke and Semler, “Warenhausaktionen,” 9.
69. Marcuse, Essay on Liberation, 6 (German ed., Versuch über die Befreiung, trans. Helmut 
Reinicke and Alfred Schmidt [Frankfurt, 1969]).
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promised that “the rational utilization of these forces on a global scale would 
terminate poverty and scarcity within a very foreseeable future.”75
Friedrich Engels had held out similar visions in his 1872 treatment of The 
Housing Question. Arguing against what he considered backward- looking 
Proudhonism, he thought that the Industrial Revolution had raised productivity 
to a level that for the first time in human history opened the possibility of dis-
tributing labour in a sensible way so that everyone could partake in abundant 
consumption and sufficient leisure to pursue science, art, and human relations 
and ultimately do away with class rule.76 In 1844, Engels had identified the 
overproduction crisis as a characteristic of capitalism, which made “the people 
starve from sheer abundance.” The remedy was a just regime of production and 
thus of provision, a planned economy that would curtail luxury only as far as 
was necessary. According to Engels, the Malthusian theory of population— 
that is, the idea that population growth was bound to outstrip food supply— 
fooled his contemporary bourgeois economists about the very real possibility 
of huge increases in productivity that would satisfy people’s needs. The capi-
talist system based on competition, its false “antithesis between production and 
consumption,” and the cynical ideology of the Malthusian trap had “turned 
man into a commodity” and “slaughtered . . . millions of men.”77 What Engels 
did not foresee was the extraordinary increase in the number and varieties of 
consumer goods that capitalist societies would produce without entertaining 
the distributive regime he desired. In many respects, Marcuse was asking why 
wealthy societies— even state- socialist ones— had never fully realised Engels’s 
vision.
To answer this question, Marcuse developed a modernised version of 
Marx’s theory of alienated labour. In 1932, Marcuse had become one of the 
first to write a comprehensive interpretation of Marx’s Economic- Philosophical 
Manuscripts (1844); in it, Marcuse reviewed Marx’s criticism of bourgeois 
political economy as “a nonhuman science of an inhuman world of things and 
commodities.”78 The young Marx had sharply diagnosed a simple relation: 
“The devaluation of the world of men is in direct proportion to the increasing 
value of the world of things.” The more the worker produced, the more power-
75. Ibid., 4.
76. Friedrich Engels, “Zur Wohnungsfrage” (1872), in MEGA, section 1, 24:16.
77. Friedrich Engels, “Umrisse zu einer Kritik der Nationalökonomie” (1844), in MEGA sec-
tion 1, 3: 486– 90 (English trans., http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/df- 
jahrbucher/outlines.htm [accessed 20 June 2011]).
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ful became “the alien world of objects.” Compared to this growing material 
world, the worker and his “inner world” became poorer: “the less belongs to 
him as his own . . . , the less he has to consume.” By putting his life into the 
object, the worker surrendered his life to the object. The capitalist system de-
prived him of the objects he produced, which meant that the worker could not 
realise himself and fell under the sway of his products, in the extreme case “to 
the point of starving to death.” Under these conditions, proper consumption 
was available only to the propertied minority, but this did not prevent Marx 
from acknowledging the real value of material goods, which were to a certain 
degree a source of freedom, but the fulfilment of human nature lay in nonalien-
ated labour. And material goods tended to remove the worker from the possi-
bility of nonalienated labour because their acquisition forced him into alien-
ated labour, which meant that freedom now occurred “in his animal 
functions— eating, drinking, procreating, or at most in his dwelling and in 
dressing- up.” In labour, the real human function, in contrast, “he no longer 
feels himself to be anything but an animal.” Wages were an immediate conse-
quence of alienated labour, and they did not hold the key to the more funda-
mental problem, increased wages remained “payment for the slave, and would 
not win either for the worker or for labor their human status and dignity.”79
In 1848, Marx and Engels observed that certain conditions were required 
for labour to “continue its slavish existence.” However, from their contempo-
rary bourgeoisie’s apparent inability to guarantee even minimum living stan-
dards, they inferred crisis.80 At least for highly developed societies, this proved 
wrong, and Marx, Engels, and their followers came to project the introduction 
of a socialist regime of production and provision into an ever more distant and 
theoretical postrevolutionary future. The situation Marcuse was facing was that 
either Marx and Engels’s analysis had been falsified by highly industrialised 
societies producing goods that finally did provide human status and dignity to 
the workers, or it had to be shown that Marx was still right, that increases in 
wages were inherently related to violence, and that the wage earners of late 
capitalism had still much more to win than material abundance.
The material level of the new society that Marcuse envisioned “could be 
79. Karl Marx, “Ökonomisch- philosophische Manuskripte (Zweite Wiedergabe)” (1844), in 
MEGA section 1, 2: 363– 75 (English trans., http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/
manuscripts/labour.htm [accessed 20 June 2011]).
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considerably lower than that of advanced capitalist productivity.”81 The root of 
the problem was the creation of false needs, which also occurred when one 
simply followed the old socialist maxim of “each according to his needs.” The 
historical development of socialism had fatefully led to a deflection from its 
original goals. This phenomenon resulted from the competitive coexistence 
with the West since the Russian Revolution and the ill- advised acceptance of 
the American standard of living as a model.82 This false policy was perhaps 
best summed up by Nikita Khrushchev’s famous 1959 formula, “Catch up and 
overtake.” Marcuse objected not to “the rapid improvement of the material 
conditions” but to “the model guiding their improvement.”83
That the allure of goods had structurally replaced more open forms of 
violent conquest was again deeply rooted in Marxist thought. Marx and Engels 
pointed out in the Communist Manifesto that cheap commodities were the 
“heavy artillery” of the bourgeoisie that battered down all Chinese walls: “It 
compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of pro-
duction; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilisation into their 
midst.”84 This proved a clear- sighted analysis given the adoption of Western 
consumer standards by state- socialist societies. Ultimately, the commodity ar-
tillery would batter down not the Chinese wall but the Berlin Wall, which 
sought to separate two regimes of provision while permitting some commodi-
ties to diffuse through.
In Marcuse’s ideal world, individuals were to be protected from the de-
structive implications of their needs— that is, aggressive competition up to the 
point of the nuclear arms race— so that they could satisfy those needs without 
hurting themselves. People had to be freed from the second nature that the “so- 
called consumer economy” had created by tying them “libidinally and aggres-
sively to the commodity form.” This dependence even held the danger of hu-
mankind’s destruction. The task was to “abolish [man’s] existence as a 
consumer consuming himself in buying and selling.”85
This did not mean that automobiles, television sets, or household gadgets 
were repressive as such. The unfortunate constellation was that people had 
become dependent on these goods for their own actualisation. People had to 
buy their own existence on the market, only to realise capital’s profits. The 
system of “voluntary servitude” was unprecedented in its “capacity to produce 
81. Marcuse, Essay on Liberation, 89.
82. Ibid., vii.
83. Ibid., 87.
84. Marx and Engels, Manifest der kommunistischen Partei, MEW, 4:466.
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84    Consumption and Violence
long- range contentment and satisfaction.” This led to the paradoxical situation 
that capitalist production relations were simultaneously responsible for servi-
tude and toil and for greater happiness and fun, but the latter obscured the fact 
that capitalism was still based on “the private appropriation of surplus value . . . 
and its realization in the corporate interest.”86 The bridging of the consumer 
gap was only illusory. Labour being increasingly based on mental, rather than 
physical energy did not change its debilitating qualities. Marcuse characterised 
the simultaneity of happiness and suffering with Hobbes’s famous description 
of the state of nature: “a civilized bellum omnium contra omnes.” Within this 
battle, Marcuse branded the “needs of the middle classes,” shared by the ma-
jority of organized labour, as counterrevolutionary. At the same time, capitalist 
culture had not yet reached every house or hut: the system had its limits and 
produced a glaring contrast between the privileged and the exploited and thus 
the radicalization of the latter.87
Ultimately, Marcuse adopted a pose that could easily be seen as patron-
izing by those whom he wanted to liberate from an atmosphere of aggressive 
and competitive toil that “compels the vast majority of the population to ‘earn’ 
their living in stupid, inhuman, and unnecessary jobs.”88 Nonnecessary con-
sumption was transgressing on the “realm of freedom.”89 Two possibilities ex-
isted: “the extension of the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom”— the 
American model of progress— or “the possible extension of the realm of free-
dom, to the realm of necessity,” as suggested by the members of the protest 
movement, who sought to determine their own necessities, values, and aspira-
tions. The simultaneity of the two possibilities expressed “the basic contradic-
tions of capitalism at the stage of competitive technical progress.” The Ameri-
can model meant that an ever- increasing number of commodities and luxuries 
had to be bought to attain “at least a modicum of freedom within the frame-
work of capitalist society.” Marcuse crucially included the defence industry in 
these luxuries. While large sectors of poverty and misery persisted, those who 
enjoyed the so- called luxuries had to pay the price of an intensified dependence 
on the ruling powers.90
If only social energies were withdrawn from weapons production, mate-
rial accumulation, and the expansion of state authority, technology could sup-
86. Ibid., 12– 13.
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port human leisure, not competitive toil.91 Marcuse envisioned an unprece-
dented type of revolution occurring at a high level of material development that 
would enable “man to conquer scarcity and poverty.”92 In a way, Marcuse 
sought to halt historical development as it had worked for centuries. Man was 
to survey what he had achieved at the cost of “hecatombs of victims” and con-
clude “that it is enough, and that it is time to enjoy what he has and what can 
be reproduced and refined with a minimum of alienated labor.” This step would 
not abandon “technical devices which alleviate and protect life” and free “hu-
man energy and time.” People were to be emancipated from the dictates of the 
commodity market: “Freedom from the rule of merchandise over man is a pre-
condition of freedom.”93
The fact that in principle, societal wealth did allow for universal liberation 
and happiness was in Marcuse’s view systematically veiled by the reduced 
consciousness of late capitalism. The constellation amounted to a veritable 
perception disorder. Competitive performances; standardised fun; symbols of 
status, prestige, and power; and advertised virility and commercialised beauty 
killed the possibility of perceiving the alternative: “freedom without 
exploitation.”94 This position was drawing on György Lukács’ History and 
Class Consciousness (1923), which translated Marx’s theory of commodity 
fetishism into a concept of reification leading to a false consciousness, a “veil” 
that prevented the true realisation of class consciousness.95 In accordance with 
Lukács’s veil of “fetishistic illusions enveloping all phenomena in capitalist 
society”96— which also informed Guy Debord’s idea of the spectacle— 
Marcuse was ever more pessimistic about the classical revolutionary agent, the 
working classes, who seemed to be satiated with consumer goods. What was 
needed was the “development of consciousness which would remove the ideo-
logical and technological veil that hides the terrible features of the affluent 
society.”97 The realisation of liberation would at least initially be the task of a 
minority.98 Because the opposition was directed against a well- functioning and 
prosperous society, it became unpopular and isolated from the masses. He 
hoped that revolutionary forces would emerge from radical politics by “active 
minorities.” This assigned the part of the revolutionary subject to “potential 
91. Marcuse, Essay on Liberation, 89– 90.
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catalysts of rebellion,” to the political campaigning of those students and mi-
norities who were not yet integrated into the general economic process and 
thus had only limited means of engaging in consumption- based upward social 
mobility.99
On the topic of violence, An Essay on Liberation made some trenchant 
epistemological observations. In established discourse, the term violence was 
not applied to the actions of the police and the military. The “bad” word was 
reserved for those who disturbed the established order, usually regardless of 
their motivations and goals.100 Once one applied the concept of violence to the 
acts of military and police, the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate 
violence became questionable. If “legitimate violence” included “wholesale 
burning, poisoning, bombing,” Marcuse argued that the actions of the radical 
opposition could hardly be characterised with the same concept. The “unlawful 
acts committed by the rebels in the ghettos, on the campuses, on the city 
streets” seemed to fall into a wholly different category from “the deeds perpe-
trated by the forces of order in Vietnam, in Bolivia, in Indonesia, in Guate-
mala.” Disrupting the business of a supermarket or the flow of traffic seemed a 
legitimate protest “against the far more efficient disruption of the business of 
life of untold numbers of human beings by the armed forces of law and order.” 
Such protest touched on a vital nerve of the existing order, which legitimised 
itself via its “functioning”— the absence of war, unrest, and economic crisis— 
and the protection of property, trade, and commerce while seeking to suppress 
the protesters’ attempts to point out the omnipresence of violence.101 Marcuse 
fully acknowledged that human associations needed enforceable law and order. 
To a degree, it was normal that society tried to protect itself against “the vic-
tims of its well- being,” but doing so had to be measured in terms of the legiti-
mate.102 And here Marcuse held the revolutionary conviction that the estab-
lished order had already invalidated its own law via the abuse of its power in 
seeking to uphold a violent and repressive society.103
The explicit analytical combination of violence and affluence made Mar-
cuse’s denunciation of consumer society more forceful: “This society is ob-
scene in producing and indecently exposing a stifling abundance of wares 
 99. Ibid., 51, 79.
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while depriving its victims abroad of the necessities of life; obscene in stuffing 
itself and its garbage cans while poisoning and burning the scarce foodstuffs in 
the fields of its aggression.”104 The Marxist concept of imperialism now fea-
tured more prominently. Rejecting one- sided tiers- mondism, Marcuse stated 
unequivocally that revolutionary change in advanced capitalist countries had to 
take the lead in a process that would create the preconditions for the liberation 
and development of the Third World.105 Marcuse nodded to Frantz Fanon in 
invoking “the wretched of the earth” fighting the “affluent monster.”106 And 
Marcuse left no doubt as to which side he supported, declaring that “working 
according to the rules and methods of democratic legality appears as surrender 
to the prevailing power structure.” The opposition was directed against the so-
cial system as a whole and could thus not remain legal and lawful.107 In some 
respects, this offered a blank cheque to those who wished to legitimise their 
illegal revolutionary acts, since practically all manifestations of the social and 
political system— violent or not— could be read as evidence of its repressive 
nature.
In December 1970, Austrian American psychoanalyst Friedrich Hacker 
asked Marcuse explicitly whether he believed that in their contemporary world 
perceptions of injustice and expectations of change would suffice to create a 
revolutionary situation with good prospects. Marcuse replied that it was diffi-
cult to tell since “the general affluence also represented true satisfaction and 
not only substitution.” He still emphasised that the ruling powers took caution 
to keep the ruled in a state of inanity and pseudo- information via the mass 
media, but the capitalists’ profit rate ultimately would fall. He unequivocally 
rejected acts that sought to trigger a revolution in a situation that was not ripe. 
Doing so would unnecessarily create martyrs. Conversely, he criticised double 
standards that tended to forget the people whom the powerful had sacrificed in 
the interests of preserving their rule while becoming overly sensitive about the 
violence of a revolutionary regime that was seriously fighting to eradicate mis-
ery and exploitation. That said, he rejected “futile acts of violence,” even those 
motivated by the highest idealism, because they only played into the hands of 
the ruling powers. He pointed to the crucial historical difference between terror 
wielded by those who already occupied power (the Jacobins, Hitler, Stalin) and 
the individual terror of the “noblest anarchists,” which evaporated.108
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Counterrevolution and Revolt
Marcuse further radicalised his position in Counterrevolution and Revolt 
(1972), which resulted from his numerous speeches and lectures. He now envi-
sioned nothing less than the revolutionary overthrow of the United States and 
its allies. The opening passage stated that the counterrevolution “in its extreme 
manifestations  .  .  . practices the horrors of the Nazi regime.”109 Brutal force 
was “about to exterminate . . . desperate resistance movements.” Marcuse cas-
tigated American society as “an institution of violence, terminating in Asia the 
genocide which began with the liquidation of the American Indians.”110 In an-
other passage, he likened the equipment of the American police to that of the 
SS. In response to the May 1970 Kent State shootings, he wrote bluntly, “Fas-
cism will not save capitalism: it is itself the terroristic organization of the capi-
talist contradictions.” Despite this rather drastic rhetoric, which ever more ex-
plicitly amalgamated Nazi Germany with the contemporary state apparatus, 
Marcuse clearly stated that Nixon’s United States was not a fascist regime. 
However, its economic and technological resources gave it an even greater 
potential for totalitarian organisation than Hitler’s Germany.111
The better part of the book, which Marcuse had discussed with his friend 
André Gorz, was still dedicated to the familiar but subversive question, “Can 
one not make a living without that stupid, exhausting, endless, labor— living 
with less waste, fewer gadgets and plastic but with more time and more 
freedom?”112 Human labour must cease to produce commodities in accordance 
with the “law of value” and instead embrace the “law of freedom” and produce 
for human needs. Without the competition with capitalist progress, socialism 
could eliminate alienated labour “while renouncing the wasteful and enslaving 
conveniences of the capitalist consumer society.” Marcuse promised a lot, an 
“environment which would no longer perpetuate violence, ugliness, ignorance, 
and brutality.” The philosopher rejoiced that consumer society might become 
capitalism’s gravedigger. He even predicted that “the first truly world- historical 
revolution”113 would still happen in the twentieth century.114 As symptoms of 
the impending collapse, he cited declining real wages, inflation, unemploy-
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ment, and the international monetary crisis after the termination of the Bretton 
Woods system.115
Marcuse now clearly assigned the part of creating a new civilisation to a 
new consciousness— encompassing moral, psychological, aesthetic, and intel-
lectual faculties— that would no longer be a matter of privilege but would con-
stitute a radically different “counter- consciousness” capable of changing prev-
alent values and aspirations. “Consumer society” was ultimately a misnomer 
because it meant a society systematically organised in the interests of those 
who controlled production. The impulses of the coming revolution would be 
precisely the needs that arose when basic needs were satisfied. They would 
transcend both “state capitalist and state socialist society.”116 Marcuse had 
clearly left the notion of a one- dimensional society behind and now addressed 
two types of needs: consumer needs and transcending needs.117 Society’s fail-
ure to realise the former would give rise to the latter.
Marcuse now treated the question of the revolutionary subject more ex-
plicitly and extensively. He conceived of an “integral idea of socialism” that 
was to function as a guide for the radical left, which had to overcome the fact 
that relatively high living standards and the existing power structure made 
people apathetic if not hostile to socialism. Those who did not belong to sup-
pressed minorities did indeed benefit from society’s richness and usually dis-
liked rebellion because it called into question the necessity and value of their 
performance and prosperity.118 The rebels seemed to “permit themselves what 
the people have to forego and repress.”119 Large parts of the working class had 
become part of bourgeois society, and the revival of radical socialism was left 
to small minority groups of middle- class origin.120 He explicitly acknowledged 
communes as cells and laboratories “for testing autonomous, nonalienated re-
lationships,” but more generally, he also mentioned those who did not vote and 
did not pay taxes, those in prisons and jails.121 Ultimately, the revolutionary 
subject remained rather diffuse— those men and women who were capable of 
tearing aside the Lukácsian veil to develop “their own needs, to build, in soli-
darity, their own world.”122 Beyond this revolutionary nucleus, there was alleg-
edly already an apolitical and spontaneous awareness that the “fetishism of the 
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commodity world is wearing thin.” Ultimately, this constellation would extend 
the potential mass base for a revolution. The experience of exploitation accom-
panied by a high standard of living— “the reality behind the façade of con-
sumer society”— now appeared as the unifying force integrating a potentially 
vast revolutionary subject.123 It was no longer the hermetic and static society of 
One- Dimensional Man but the drawbacks of consumer society that now 
seemed to promise a united front.
Marcuse was quite prepared to fend off criticism that the integration of the 
working class only referred to the sphere of consumption and thus did not 
change their proletarian status. He very consciously focused on consumption 
because it was part of humans’ social existence and thus determined conscious-
ness and influenced behaviour: “To exclude the sphere of consumption  .  .  . 
from the structural analysis offends the principle of dialectical materialism.”124 
Marcuse explained again why the revolution he envisioned had not yet taken 
place. The integration of libertarian subcultures into expanding commodity 
markets was a factor.125 More important, power itself had undergone a meta-
morphosis: “The ideology retreats from the superstructure  .  .  . and becomes 
incorporated in the goods and services of the consumer society.”126 Weber’s 
“inner- worldly asceticism” had been replaced by “Keynesianism with a 
vengeance.”127 Competitive consumption made the rule of capital extend into 
all dimensions of work and leisure. Resonant of Bourdieu and Passeron’s con-
cept of symbolic violence and its influence on people’s habitus, Marcuse un-
derlined the idea that the “steered satisfaction of material needs” reproduced 
the system’s values and ideology,128 coupled with “a political, military, and 
police apparatus of terrifying efficiency.”129 Both internal expansion of the 
market and external imperialism were responsible for “the victims of the pros-
peritas Americana.”130 Marcuse quoted an early version of the pamphlet Con-
sumption: Domestic Imperialism by radical activist David Gilbert, who had 
joined the Weather Underground in 1969.131 Explicitly referring to a present 
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“revolt against the ‘consumer society,’”132 Marcuse’s tone became ever more 
radical: the revolution was necessary because the system could survive only 
via the “global destruction of resources, of nature, of human life.”133 He now 
emphasised that the rebellion had politicised two areas of human life that had 
hitherto been deemed largely apolitical: the realm of nonmaterial needs and the 
realm of nature.134
Commenting on Delacroix’s famous painting La Liberté guidant le peu-
ple and highlighting the role of women in the coming revolution, Marcuse de-
clared, “She has a rifle in her hand— for the end of violence is still to be fought 
for.”135 He reinforced his opinion that “this society strives to impose the prin-
ciple of nonviolence on the opposition while daily perfecting its own ‘legiti-
mate’ violence.” As a result, counterviolence was “bound to cost dearly, in 
lives and liberties.” However, he also warned in no uncertain terms that action 
directed at vague, general, or intangible targets was senseless136 and even 
played into the hands of the establishment: radical mass action had to be “self- 
limiting.”137 When these lines of caution were written, the German Red Army 
Faction (RAF)— for whom Marcuse and especially Counterrevolution and Re-
volt became rather important— had already embarked on a militant offensive 
that most contemporary observers perceived as unlimited violence. However, 
the concept of self- limiting counterviolence remained a cornerstone of the po-
litical thought and internal debates of the radical left.
In 1975, Marcuse gave his opinion on the RAF’s attempt to free some of 
its members from prison by occupying the West German embassy in Stock-
holm, an endeavour that ended in disaster with the murder of two embassy 
personnel and the death of two hostage takers after the accidental detonation of 
their explosives. When a German television journalist accused Marcuse of be-
ing an “advocate of violence,” he countered that his considerations on the right 
to resist had merely sought to remind people of “one of the oldest chestnuts of 
Western civilisation.” As a Marxist, he disapproved of individual terror as a 
means of revolutionary struggle. The RAF’s Stockholm episode showed “that 
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an action . . . that was subjectively meant as a political action in the interest of 
the revolution objectively had a counterrevolutionary function.”138 Following 
the assassination of West German attorney general Siegfried Buback and the 
kidnapping of industrial leader Hanns Martin Schleyer, Marcuse again faced 
critical questions about his position on violent resistance. In an interview with 
Die Zeit, he denied that murder was a legitimate means of politics. As a result 
of the glaring disparity between the highly concentrated violence of the state 
apparatus and the weakness of terrorist groups isolated from the masses, any 
creation of insecurity or fear among the ruling class would not translate into a 
revolutionary factor. He characterised the situation in the Federal Republic as 
a “preventive counterrevolution” and argued that under these conditions, the 
provocation of violence would prove to be destructive for the Left. However, 
he did not stop at these pragmatic observations but underlined that any Marxist 
revolutionary morals had to be mirrored by the means that were embraced in 
their name: open class struggle but not insidious aggression. Marcuse sought 
the explanation for the terroristic tactics of clandestine groups like the RAF in 
the frustration these radicals experienced in the face of their isolation from the 
masses.139
Shortly before his death in July 1979, Marcuse again emphasised the sig-
nificance of a counterculture in denying the existing order its legitimacy. The 
breakup of repressive consumer society would not work via any imposed limi-
tations on consumption: “Emancipation from consumer society must become a 
vital need of the individuals.” People were to radically transform their con-
sciousness and instinctual drives, a process that would result in an “internal 
weakening of consumer society.”140
This detailed analysis of Marcuse’s thought has demonstrated that he was a 
central figure in the transatlantic emergence and development of far- reaching 
critiques of consumer society in several respects. In his critical analysis, Mar-
cuse was much more explicit than his colleagues from the Frankfurt School in 
addressing concrete and everyday manifestations of “repressive affluence.” 
Based on his reading of Grundrisse, he accentuated the more “utopian” ideas 
138. “Zu den Ereignissen in Stockholm: Interview des ARD- Magazins Monitor vom 28.4.1975,” 
diskus 25 (2 June 1975): 19, in Frankfurter Schule, ed. Kraushaar, 2:793.
139. Herbert Marcuse, “Mord darf keine Waffe der Politik sein,” Die Zeit 39 (23 September 
1977), http://www.zeit.de/1977/39/mord- darf- keine- waffe- der- politik- sein (accessed 30 May 
2011).
140. Herbert Marcuse, “Die Revolte der Lebenstriebe: Vortrag auf den 6. Frankfurter Römer-
berggesprächen über die ‘Angst des Prometheus’ vom 18. Mai 1979,” Psychologie heute 6.9 
(1979): 40– 41, in Frankfurter Schule, ed. Kraushaar, 2:835.
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both in the early works of Marx and Engels and in Das Kapital. Marcuse thus 
deemphasised a dichotomy between an early “utopian” and a late “scientific” 
Marx, reinvigorating the Marxist tradition of analysing economic relations 
with respect to concomitant relations of violence. He wrapped this impulse in 
the catchy notion of a “realm of freedom,” which he at least implicitly held out 
as the ultimate alternative to contemporary society. His vision of a possible 
reduction of the social obligation to perform alienated work— if only society 
relinquished its desire for unnecessary commodities— was highly appealing to 
the rebellious youth of his time. Crucially, Marcuse developed his later work in 
a reciprocal exchange with the emerging protest movements, which in many 
respects contributed to a radicalisation of his thought.
Much of Marcuse’s political thought remains topical several decades after 
his death, when well- being for all is still far from being realised on a global 
level and one wonders why a basic income guarantee is not more seriously 
considered as an alternative in affluent societies. The quintessence of Mar-
cuse’s critique of affluent society underlying his work as it unfolded might be 
reduced to four basic assumptions. (1) Affluent society has an inhuman, even 
fascist, downside. His concept of fascism was more rhetorical than analytical, 
allowing him increasingly to subsume various scenarios of historical and con-
temporary abuses of power. (2) Despite the fact that technological and material 
progress makes life more comfortable, it stands in the way of freedom, even if 
organised in a representative democracy. (3) The omnipresence of formerly 
critical ideas and of formerly keenly desired goods without revolutionary con-
sequences to the distributive system amounts to a loss of consciousness. This 
in turn leads to an increased tolerance vis- à- vis injustice and violence occur-
ring within and without highly developed societies. (4) A blatant mismatch 
exists between the highly concentrated violence of the state apparatus and the 
weakness of the counterviolence that the new social movements employ in an 
attempt to challenge the former.
Contrary to his colleagues from the Frankfurt School, Marcuse came to 
embrace a genuinely revolutionary perspective, actively supporting the protest 
movement, interpreting various moments of crisis as harbingers of system col-
lapse, and holding out the vision of revolutionary upheaval in the very foresee-
able future. Given his basic assumptions, it becomes clear why he accorded the 
protest movement an important role in his revolutionary worldview. Though he 
came up short of assigning it the role of a revolutionary subject, Marcuse saw 
in the diverse protest activities pioneers of and pointers to a new consciousness 
that would help to break up the system of repressive affluence and eventually 
inspire much broader sections of society. The protest impetus against the Viet-
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nam War and other contexts of neoimperialism appeared to him as concrete 
manifestations of the downsides of affluent society. Moreover, in forging new 
lifestyles and forms of living together, the protest movement also developed a 
tangible alternative to the compulsions of material progress, which had not yet 
been apparent in the rather hermetic scenario of One- Dimensional Man. Fi-
nally, he conceived of his own role as a mentor to the movement, striving po-
litically to channel its impulsive energies and seeking to avoid relapsing into 
commercial affirmation or succumbing to the revolutionary impatience of 
armed resistance.
SDS activists such as Semler and Neitzke were quite capable of arriving 
at their own conclusions concerning the cues that Marcuse’s work delivered. 
Marcuse’s work offered sufficient points of contact with other thinkers who 
analysed material progress critically and influenced the protest movement— 
Marx, Engels, and Lukács among the classics; Adorno, Horkheimer, and 
Debord among the contemporaries. To address the other side of the mutual at-
traction, the next chapter shows that the legacy of these thinkers— despite Mar-
cuse’s unmistakable warnings against actionism and individual terror— proved 




Consumer Society under Fire: 
The Militant Targeting of an Abstract Enemy
“consumption is the system’s power”
—Ulrike Meinhof (1973)1
The popular and scholarly memory of West German “terrorism” is dominated 
by the events of the “German Autumn” in 1977: the assassination of attorney 
general and former Nazi Party member Siegfried Buback; the failed kidnap-
ping and murder of banker Jürgen Ponto; the kidnapping and murder of Hanns 
Martin Schleyer, who served as president of two influential associations of 
German industrialists and had been a member of the SS from 1933 to 1945; 
and finally the hijacking of a Lufthansa airplane by the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine, which demanded the release of ten Red Army Faction 
(RAF) members detained at the high- security prison at Stuttgart- Stammheim. 
These acts were carried out by the so- called second generation of the RAF, 
whose main objective was to force the release of the imprisoned members of 
the first generation— Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, Ulrike Meinhof, Jan- 
Carl Raspe, and their associates.2
At this point, the RAF’s critical focus on issues of consumption had al-
ready receded into the background. However, it is indispensable for an under-
standing of how the young rebels around the department store arsonists be-
came such unbending enemies of the state. It is worthwhile to briefly 
1. Ulrike Meinhof, “Die Massen und der Konsum” (first half of 1973), BAK, B/362, 3369,1, 
IX/31– 44.
2. The literature on the RAF is vast but rarely based on comprehensive archival research. An 
overview is provided by Klaus Weinhauer, “Linksterrorismus der 1970er Jahre: Ein Literaturberi-
cht zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zu Italien,” in Die bleiernen Jahre, ed. Hürter, 117– 25. 
For a critical position on the mainstream of “terrorism research,” see Narr, “30 Jahre Deutscher 
Herbst.”
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recapitulate what the first generation did to trigger the vehement response from 
the authorities. The main assaults attributed to the first generation resulted ini-
tially from direct confrontations with the police: the shooting of police officer 
Norbert Schmid when he attempted to arrest RAF supporter Margrit Schiller in 
Hamburg in October 1971 and the shooting of police officer Herbert Schoner 
in a bank robbery in Kaiserslautern in December of the same year; the fatal 
wounding of Hans Eckhardt, commander of the police special task force com-
missioned to arrest the “Baader- Meinhof gang” when he arrested RAF member 
Manfred Grashof in March 1972. The RAF’s major offensive of politically 
motivated attacks unfolded in May 1972 with the bombing of a U.S. barracks 
in Frankfurt, killing soldier Paul A. Bloomquist; the bombing of a police sta-
tion in Augsburg and of the Bavarian State Criminal Investigations Agency in 
Munich, wounding five police officers; the bombing of the car of federal judge 
Wolfgang Buddenberg in Karlsruhe, injuring his wife; the bombing of the 
Hamburg branch of the Axel Springer Verlag, where despite warnings the 
building was not evacuated, leaving seventeen people wounded; and the bomb-
ing of the Heidelberg headquarters of the U.S. Army in Europe, killing soldiers 
Clyde R. Bonner, Ronald A. Woodward, and Charles L. Peck. At this point, the 
police had already shot and killed several RAF members and supporters: Petra 
Schelm, when she tried to drive through a police roadblock in July 1971; Georg 
von Rauch, when police tried to arrest him in West Berlin in December 1971; 
Thomas Weisbecker, during an attempted arrest in Augsburg in March 1972. In 
June 1972, British sales representative Ian McLeod was mistakenly killed 
when police fired through a closed bedroom door during a house search in 
Stuttgart. The RAF leaders on the run did not hold out for very long: Mahler 
was arrested in October 1970, and the other leading members were caught in 
June 1972. Holger Meins died as a result of a hunger strike in November 1974; 
Meinhof was found dead in her cell in May 1976. In the so- called Stammheim 
trial (1975– 77), Baader, Ensslin, and Raspe were sentenced to life imprison-
ment on six counts of bomb attack in coincidence with four counts of murder 
and thirty- four counts of attempted murder.
The previous chapters have shown how abstract intellectual critiques of 
regimes of provision and concrete practices of political action cross- fertilised 
each other. The Frankfurt department store arsonists, two of whom became 
leading members of the RAF, set a much- noted precedent. This chapter shows 
that issues of consumption were also central to the activists’ further trajectory. 
Their acts, especially their attempts to legitimise their violent opposition, were 
intrinsically related to issues of consumption. This chapter provides an unprec-
edented systematic analysis of the statements and writings of the first genera-
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tion of the RAF about regimes of provision, but goes further by doing the same 
for Movement 2 June and its precursors and for the autonomist groups of the 
early 1980s that continued the militant focus on consumption through different 
means. The chapter contextualises these activists’ desire to overcome the indi-
vidualism and moral deficit they saw as integral to consumer capitalism.
The fact that these groups emerged as a driving force in the militarization 
of critiques of regimes of provision must not be seen in isolation. Not only did 
interactions with the authorities play a decisive role, but a much broader radical 
milieu challenged their contemporary regimes of provision via drugs and theft 
or the politics of broken glass. The highly publicised “terrorists” were closely 
interlinked with popular protest campaigns such as the fare increase revolts, 
activism against Springer tabloid journalism, squatting, and the precursors of 
criticism of globalisation. In many respects, RAF, Movement 2 June, and the 
autonomists emerged from these movements seeking to radicalise them.
The Tupamaros’ Arson Attacks
A few days before Christmas 1969, a “Command Red Christmas” placed an 
incendiary device in a shoe box, wrapped it in red Christmas paper, and left it 
in the women’s clothes department of KaDeWe. The package was then taken to 
the lost property office, where it exploded without injuring anyone, without 
causing any major damage, and ultimately without causing much sensation.3 
The explosive matter— a mixture of sodium chlorate, sugar, and herbicide— 
did not fall under the Explosives Act.4 A similar Christmas package had been 
placed at the Europa- Center, a shopping centre with an adjacent international- 
style high- rise tower that had become a symbol of West Berlin’s and West 
Germany’s “economic miracle” and successful integration into Western con-
sumer culture.5 Radicals sent threats by phone and letter, calling on the man-
agement of West Berlin’s department stores to close their stores on the Satur-
day before Christmas: “If, despite the warning, the bosses still want to hedge 
3. See Kraushaar, Bombe im Jüdischen Gemeindehaus, 184– 85; Wolfgang Kraushaar, “Die Tu-
pamaros West- Berlin,” in RAF und der linke Terrorismus, ed. Kraushaar, 1:512– 30; Hakemi, An-
schlag und Spektakel, 131– 44.
4. KHM Nicht, “Bericht,” 10 February 1970, I- A- KI 1; KOR Paulig, “Vorsätzliche Brandstif-
tung im KaDeWe am 20.12.69; hier: Untersuchung von Beweisstücken,” I- A, AHIS, SAK 270,05– 
09.
5. KHM Sprung, “Bericht: Brandsatzlegung am 20.12.69 im Kaufhaus ‘KaDeWe’ am Witten-
bergplatz,” 20 December 1969, I- A- KJ 1, AHIS, SAK 270,05– 09. On the Europa- Center, see Sedl-
maier, “Berlin’s Europa- Center.”
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their bets with consumer terror [Konsumterror] and not with the distribution of 
goods, they will no longer have anything left to give away in the afternoon.”6 
The authors of the threat used the word Reibbach, which is of Yiddish- Hebrew 
origin, to refer to profits and thus added potentially anti semitic connotations to 
their criticism of consumer society.
Responsible for the attack on KaDeWe were the Tupamaros West- Berlin, 
which Dieter Kunzelmann, Georg von Rauch, Thomas Weisbecker, and others 
had formed in November 1969. They emerged from a group calling itself the 
Zentralrat der umherschweifenden Haschrebellen (Central Council of Vaga-
bond Hash Rebels) and became a precursor of the Bewegung 2. Juni (Move-
ment 2 June).7 The Tupamaros, who took their name from an Uruguayan urban 
guerrilla organisation, committed a series of arson attacks on various targets, 
including the Jewish Community Centre, the Berlin branch of the Israeli airline 
El Al, the Amerikahaus, and the Club 50, which was frequented by American 
soldiers.8 Thus, two and a half years after Kommune I passed out its depart-
ment store leaflets, one of their authors, Kunzelmann, was involved in this less 
well- known attempt to put the fantasy into practice. In some respects, the Tu-
pamaros’ amateurish attacks involving alarm clocks and beverage bottles were 
attempts to defeat consumer society with its own products: “To build small 
solidarity groups in all areas of life that begin to resist with means that— if they 
are not found in the street— can be purchased at any department store is an idea 
of cultural revolution.”9
In 1969, the underground publisher Nova Press issued four pamphlets: the 
first was a German translation of Peter Kropotkin’s Law and Authority, while 
the fourth was a translation of Herbert Marcuse’s lecture “On the New Left,” in 
which he had called for the formation of local and autonomous protest groups.10 
The translator was Bradley Martin, who also authored the second pamphlet, a 
sixteen- page Beatnik- inspired document that called for the dismantling of de-
partment store culture.11 The frontispiece consisted of a red linocut showing a 
man throwing a bundle of dynamite sticks, fuse burning, towards the viewer. In 
terms of content, the observations on “department store culture” were in line 
 6. Tupamaros West- Berlin, “EXTRA,” 14 December 1969, AHIS, SAK, Flugblattsammlung 
II; KK Butzin, “Bombenandrohung im KaDeWe,” 20 December 1969, I- A- KI 1, AHIS, SAK 
270,05– 09.
 7. See Langer, “Der Berliner ‘Blues’”; Reinders and Fritzsch, Bewegung 2. Juni; Carini, Fritz 
Teufel; Kraushaar, “Die Tupamaros West- Berlin,” 1:512– 30; Spies, Acid, Mao, und I Ging.
 8. Cf. Michael Baumann, Wie alles anfing, 65– 83.
 9. “Der Prozeß gegen Dieter Kunzelmann,” Rote Hilfe 1 (December 1971): 43.
10. Kropotkin, Gesetz und Autorität; Marcuse, Zur Situation der Neuen Linken.
11. Martin, Blaue Wirklichkeit.
Consumer Society under Fire    99
with Subversive Aktion’s earlier forays into the subject but were more frag-
mented and erratic. Thus, the motif persisted, and activists likely felt a constant 
need to outperform previous manifestations.
Another arson attack against the KaDeWe took place on 6 May 1971, 
when a timed incendiary device ignited the men’s clothes department, slightly 
injuring three customers and causing material damage amounting to five hun-
dred thousand deutsche marks, with the damage caused mainly by the sprinkler 
system. On the same day, an arson attack targeted an American bank in Frank-
furt. The 1971 attacks are sometimes attributed to the student movement or the 
RAF, but the arsonists were never identified or caught.12
Drugs and Theft
A crucial ingredient in the emergence of more militant forms of protest could 
not be purchased at department stores: illegal drugs. Some of the political reb-
els who committed arson attacks were keen consumers of hashish and LSD; a 
few also took to mescaline and heroin. Society criminalised this alternative 
form of consumption, and unpleasant confrontations with the authorities, such 
as police raids of notorious pubs, with the very tangible threat of punishment 
and ultimately imprisonment formed an important backdrop in the emergence 
of anti- authoritarian enemy images and the lowering of inhibitions to leave the 
realm of legality. The Hash Rebels wrote in agit 883, “The Berlin police . . . are 
conducting a manhunt on alleged smokers of hash. . . . The only response to 
state terror is counterterror!”13 Drug consumption unleashed heated discus-
sions among the radicals about whether its destructive and “counterrevolution-
ary” aspects— such as dependence on dealers and market mechanisms— 
prevailed over its “progressive” dimension of an “expansion of consciousness” 
that might create a revolutionary impetus among proletarian subcultures.14
Another important source of early and ideologically charged confronta-
tions with the police was theft. Statistics show that shoplifting was on the 
rise.15 Although this was a widespread phenomenon that crossed social and 
12. “Am Kleiderständer hing die Tasche mit der Bombe,” Hamburger Abendblatt 105 (7 May 
1971): 28. See Baader- Meinhof- Report, 16; Meiners, 100 Jahre KaDeWe, 112– 13.
13. Zentralrat der umherschweifenden Haschrebellen, “Der Chicago- Drive der Berliner Po-
lizei,” agit 883 40 (13 November 1969).
14. Cf. Klaus Weinhauer, “Der Westberliner ‘Underground’: Kneipen, Drogen und Musik,” in 
agit 883, ed. rotaprint 25, 73– 84; Stephens, Germans on Drugs.
15. Evangelische Akademie Hofgeismar, Ladendiebstahl (Hofgeismar, 1973).
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political divisions, theft became particularly significant for members of the 
left- wing alternative milieu. Some tended to justify certain forms of theft in 
crude Proudhonian moral terms, often arguing that it was permissible in thriv-
ing or large shops. An emphasis on commercial semantics transcended a radi-
cal left tradition that focused on a classical proletarian discourse of distribu-
tion. Shoplifting was part of Kommune I’s ideological programme.16 The Hash 
Rebels and their cousins, the Knastrebellen (Jail Rebels), approved of shoplift-
ing as a revolutionary act. A flyer for a November 1969 teach- in at the Tech-
nische Universität Berlin bore the title “Plea for a Just Distribution of Goods 
with the Crowbar.” It declared, “The thief crowns himself king. He makes him-
self free, independent of the exploiters.  .  .  . He is no longer directed from 
outside.”17 A substantial brochure called for organised shoplifting as a means 
of mobilisation and expansion of the mind: “When we are stealing today, we 
are only legitimately taking back what these beasts denied our fathers and 
grandfathers for millennia: they have only sold us cars, television sets, food, 
etc. in order to make even more money from us.”18 For those resorting to rou-
tine shoplifting as part of their livelihood, private store detectives and police 
became tangible enemies. According to a piece of anecdotal evidence, circu-
lated in part to discredit Joschka Fischer, he was a semiprofessional book thief 
in the late 1960s.19 Remembering his radical beginnings in the subculture of 
West Berlin in 1970, Ralf Reinders, a future member of Movement 2 June, 
explained that while the RAF was building up an armed group under the ban-
ner of Marxism- Leninism, he and his comrades were still preoccupied with 
breaking into supermarkets at night and shoplifting in the daytime.20
Conciliatory Approach
When the Tupamaros embarked on their firebombing campaign against various 
targets, authorities had already embraced an approach vis- à- vis the protest 
16. Enzensberger, Die Jahre der Kommune, 107. See above, p. 41.
17. Knastrebellen, “Plädoyer für eine gerechte Verteilung der Güter mit der Brechstange!,” Agit 
883 41 (20 November 1969): 7.
18. Reni v. Tent, “Der Antijurist: Plädoyer für eine gerechte Güterverteilung mit der Brech-
stange” (c. 1969), in Der Blues, 1:29, 31.
19. Christian Schmidt, “Wir sind die Wahnsinningen . . . ,” 60. On stealing, see Siegfried, Time 
Is on My Side, 509– 12.
20. Ralf Reinders and Ronald Fritzsch, “Von den Haschrebellen zur Bewegung 2. Juni,” in Die 
Bewegung 2. Juni: Gespräche über Haschrebellen, Lorenz- Entführung, Knast, ed. Reinders and 
Fritzch, 3rd ed., (Berlin 1999), 36– 37.
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movement that sought to deemphasise conflict and confrontation. West Ber-
lin’s minister for interior affairs, Kurt Neubauer (SPD), reflected this position 
in a November 1969 address he delivered at the invitation of the Berlin Asso-
ciation of Merchants and Industrialists. He gave the example of “citizen Mül-
ler,” who smashed a shop window “to make it clear that the shop’s owner is a 
reactionary.” While Neubauer rejected such attempts to justify “criminal acts,” 
he clearly understood the potential for a criminal act to be transformed into a 
political manifestation. He wanted to prevent “crime in its entirety being sub-
jected to ideology” that would “contribute to the dissolution of our state.” 
However, contrary to his audience, whose members always called for a strong 
state to protect their commerce from riots, he dismissed the heavy- handed use 
of executive force. He argued that in a successful campaign for solidarity and 
mobilisation of the students, Rudi Dutschke had relied on the formative experi-
ence of provocation and police baton.21 Neubauer’s stance was the West Berlin 
variant of a larger development that culminated in an agreement by the new 
social democratic– liberal coalition under Willy Brandt to offer amnesty for 
offences committed during demonstrations that did not carry penalties exceed-
ing one year in prison.22
For radicals, the state’s conciliatory approach towards the protest move-
ment constituted a challenge. If they wished to uphold a revolutionary impetus, 
they had to depict the government’s move as repressive and transcend the 
movement’s established strategy of limited and performative rule breaking.23 A 
discursive strategy of amalgamating geographically and historically diverse 
zones of grievances fit the bill.
Meinhof’s Notion of “Consumer Terror”
A far- reaching notion of Konsumterror (consumer terror) was firmly estab-
lished in Ulrike Meinhof’s political thought in the spring of 1969, when Iranian 
author Bahman Nirumand, whom Meinhof had befriended in 1967 and whose 
controversial writings had carried great weight in the student movement’s crit-
icism of the shah of Iran, faced revocation of his German residence permit. The 
threatened move renewed the wave of protest against the German authorities’ 
position vis- à- vis the Iranian regime. Meinhof pointed to West German trade 
21. Kurt Neubauer, “Der Freiheitsbegriff in der parlamentarischen Demokratie,” Mitteilungen 
Verein Berliner Kaufleute und Industrieller 109 (December 1969): 27.
22. See Dostal, 1968.
23. On performative rule breaking, see Sedlmaier and Malinowski, “‘1968.’”
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interests in Iran, to diplomatic attempts to downplay the disturbances during 
the shah’s June 1967 visit, and ultimately to the West German government’s 
fawning over a dictator of an oil- rich country who was a Cold War ally. She 
concluded, “We have grasped the connection between consumer and police 
terror . . . and the interests of German capital in the exploitation of the Persian 
people.”24 In the run- up to the Iranian royal couple’s visit to Berlin, Meinhof 
had written an open letter to Farah Diba that was distributed as a flyer. Drawing 
on Nirumand, Meinhof sarcastically contrasted the picture the Iranian empress 
had drawn of the Iranian upper echelons’ affluent life for a German glossy 
magazine with the misery and destitution most Iranians faced under a pro-
gramme of economic modernisation.25
The world of consumption played a role throughout Meinhof’s critical 
thought. The television play Bambule (Shindy), which she finished in January– 
February 1970, drawing on previous fieldwork, is a story of rebellion in a 
closed institution for adolescent girls. Together with Baader, Ensslin, and 
Thorwald Proll, who had been released on parole until the revision of their 
case, Meinhof became involved in the Heimkampagne, which sought to chal-
lenge the repressive conditions children and adolescents faced in institutions of 
care. The screenplay revolved around the personal experiences of a group of 
adolescent girls who challenge the daily regime in their West Berlin institution. 
Issues of consumption and department stores featured only marginally, but im-
agery from the commercial sphere contributed to Meinhof’s analysis of the 
political background she held responsible for the misery and violence experi-
enced by the young women, some of whom resorted to sex work. In one scene, 
a punter in a car offers twenty marks to one of the girls if she will become his 
steady girlfriend. All he gets, however, are a few minutes in the car park of 
Neckermann, one of West Germany’s major mail- order companies. Meinhof 
explained in a foreword that the authorities cared only about the fact that girls 
prostituted themselves, not that they “did not have the clothes that advertise-
ment ordered.” Gisela, one of the protagonists, finds a job arranging cups at a 
Karstadt department store. At the same time, the department store is hosting a 
police exhibition, which Meinhof introduces to metaphorically interlace con-
sumer goods and governmental authority: “In front of Gisela a puppet of a 
policeman on a stand with wheels is passing by. The puppet begins to sway and 
falls exactly in front of Gisela onto the packing table, crashes into the cups. The 
24. Ulrike Meinhof, “Alle reden vom Wetter,” in Meinhof, Dokumente einer Rebellion, 99. See 
Nirumand, Persien.
25. Ulrike Meinhof, “Offener Brief an Farah Diba,” konkret 6 (1967): 21– 22.
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puppet’s stupid gob lies among the fragments of the cups.”26 Meinhof appar-
ently became frustrated with the project during the actual production, declaring 
that her work had been turned into a consumer item.27 She later self- critically 
reflected on her own role as an intellectual and producer of texts in a system in 
which “even language is a commodity.”28 Bambule was to be shown on Ger-
man television in May 1970, but the showing was called off because Meinhof 
was already wanted for her role in Baader’s escape from prison, during which 
a library clerk was severely injured.
Broken Glass
In early 1970, the smashing of shop windows had become a frequent form of 
political protest. Following a demonstration on Berlin’s shopping boulevard 
Kurfürstendamm, the militant underground newspaper agit 883 reported 137 
broken shop windows, 7 demolished showcases, 19 injured policemen, and 24 
damaged police cars. Harking back to anarchist precursors, the ideological jus-
tifications of these riots attempted to walk the tightrope between friendly con-
sumption and hostile consumption: “When we use the term ‘bourgeoisie’ we 
don’t mean it in terms of the French individualist anarchist Emile Henry, who, 
around the turn of the century, threw a bomb into a café and in his justification 
in court claimed that each bourgeois who could afford a cup of coffee shared 
responsibility for the exploitation of the workers. Last Wednesday, however, 
only those cafés were attacked that are known to discriminate against com-
rades with long hair or Mao badges, refusing them service. . . . Other places 
that do serve comrades were of course spared.” At this point the typesetter in-
serted a comment: “This differentiation  .  .  . is nevertheless problematic be-
cause the comrades who threw stones into the upper floor of Café Kranzler 
could not know whether they would injure the manager or only a tourist having 
coffee.”29
The prototype of conflict between nonconformist consumers and the 
management of traditional cafés originated in September 1968 with the “cake 
battle” at Café Laumer in Frankfurt. A group of young people including SDS 
26. Meinhof, Bambule. On Bambule, see Colvin, Ulrike Meinhof and West German Terrorism, 
51– 75.
27. Ditfurth, Ulrike Meinhof, 265; Aust, Baader- Meinhof- Komplex, 113.
28. Meinhof, “nenee- ahab” (n.d., probably 1973), quoted in Colvin, Ulrike Meinhof and West 
German Terrorism, 169.
29. Agit 883 54 (26 March 1970): 2.
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member Paul Gerhard Hübsch had been denied service because of their “un-
kempt appearance” and unconventional behaviour.30 The manager of the café 
called the police, who manhandled some of the young people and cordoned off 
the premises with several police vans. The young people were punished for 
resisting law enforcement officers (section 113 StGB), and a Provo- inspired 
protest campaign resulted. A week later, Hübsch used the SDS delegates’ con-
ference in Frankfurt to emphasise the issue as a chance to politicise long- haired 
youth. This time, media star Fritz Teufel was served by the manager himself, 
but police observing the events were pelted with whipped cream and chocolate 
sweets. Most of the attackers were sent to prison.
By March 1970, agit 883 had identified easier targets than cafés: banks, 
motor shows, boutiques, furriers, and jeweller’s shops and beauty parlours were 
“hubs of consumer terror” that had to be attacked with stones and Molotov 
cocktails. The justification is again interesting since it introduced another level 
of critique, seeing violence as an attempt to stop the commercial co- optation of 
alternative lifestyles: “a response to industry’s attempts to commercialise cloth-
ing and lifestyles of the extraparliamentary opposition and to offer to satisfy 
comrades’ needs at brazenly high prices.” However, the activists concluded that 
only militancy would stop the process, a conclusion that was perhaps too opti-
mistic and underestimated capitalism’s flexibility: “Even during the biggest 
economic crises, it did not occur to the textile industry to offer the uniforms of 
the Rotfrontkämpferbund [the paramilitary arm of the Communist Party of Ger-
many, created in 1924] as the dernier cri.”31 Of course, in most cases, motiva-
tions and justifications for smashing shop windows were less explicit.
The RAF Seeks to Address Those  
Excluded from Consumer Society
One of the RAF’s first declarations was also printed in agit 883. The revolu-
tionary message sought to justify the forcible freeing of Baader from prison 
and was addressed to those who remained excluded from consumer society: 
“You have to communicate the act to those who don’t receive compensation for 
the exploitation they suffer by way of standards of living, consumption, saving 
with a building society, consumer credit, midrange cars.” This Marcusian fig-
ure of thought could easily be projected from a local to a global level and 
30. Siegfried, Time Is on My Side, 492; Brückner, Ulrike Marie Meinhof, 94– 97.
31. Agit 883 54 (26 March 1970): 2. See also Detlef Vierke, letter to the editors, Agit 883 41 (20 
November 1969): 2.
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formed a central argumentative framework in the RAF’s founding document: 
“You have to communicate it to those who don’t get anything from the exploi-
tation of the Third World, from Persian oil, Bolivia’s bananas, South Africa’s 
gold, who have no reason to identify themselves with the exploiters.”32 The 
amalgamation of the two levels enabled the revolutionaries to point to interna-
tional liberation movements and scenarios of Third World suffering, but they 
were mistaken about the number of people who were entirely immune to the 
temptations of better living standards and midrange cars. The RAF even con-
ceived of false or insufficient consumption as diametrically opposed to armed 
resistance that sought to overcome these conditions: “Who doesn’t die will be 
buried alive: in prisons, in foster homes, in the holes of Kreuzberg, Wedding, 
Neukölln [working- class districts of West Berlin], in the stone coffins of the 
development areas . . . , in the perfectly equipped kitchens of council flats, in 
bedroom palaces that have not yet been paid for.”33
In “The Urban Guerrilla Concept,” written in April 1971, consumption 
was central to the RAF’s ideological attack on its main enemies: the institu-
tions of state violence and the Springer corporation.34 The notion of “consum-
ing” served as a general means of dismissal— for example, in contemptuously 
referring to those on the political left who the RAF believed acted as free rid-
ers: they just consumed the RAF instead of contributing to the struggle.35 Nev-
ertheless, the RAF acknowledged its roots in the broader student movement 
and approvingly quoted one of its central political slogans: “Resist 
Konsumterror!”36 People still had to put up with hierarchical exploitation at the 
workplace despite the fact that increased productivity already created enough 
wealth to satisfy their basic needs. From this perspective, a consumer society 
that kept the real wealth back from the masses was part of a repressive system 
manifesting itself in “prisons, . . . consumption in instalments, . . . Bild and BZ, 
urban fringe tenement housing, immigrant ghettos.”37
Horst Mahler, who had been arrested in October 1970, wrote an article for 
Der Spiegel in January 1972 addressing the authorities’ strategy of ostenta-
tiously treating RAF members as mere criminals while denying them political 
status. He declared that revolutionary politics were inevitably criminal. As a 
lawyer, he presented a Marxist interpretation of the state as a managing com-
32. “Die Rote Armee aufbauen,” Agit 883 62 (1970): 6.
33. Ibid., 2.
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mittee for the interests of the propertied classes: “The state’s penal power de-
rives historically from the protection and perpetuation of the rule of propertied 
minorities over the unpropertied and exploited majority of the people.” This 
system of legality had been responsible for the “scientific and methodical ex-
termination of people,” the threat of nuclear devastation, and millions of deaths 
by starvation in the Third World. In addition to emphasizing the revolutionary 
significance of the Third World, Mahler argued that the developed world’s 
wealth was only make- believe and ignored widespread poverty among the dis-
advantaged. For Mahler, high living standards appeared as a “mess of pottage, 
for which we have sold our birthright as subjects of our societal fate.” Alluding 
to the RAF’s bank robberies, he declared that the guerrillas would take the 
means required for their struggle from those “who have acquired and monopo-
lised . . . at the expense of the people.” They would thus turn against “the rich 
and powerful and spare the unpropertied and exploited.”38
The RAF’s next major manifesto, “Serve the People: The Urban Guerrilla 
and Class Struggle,” made only marginal reference to issues of consumption. 
However, consumption as a domestic analogue of imperialist expansion was 
firmly established in the RAF’s ideological repertoire. In this perspective, “the 
system” tried to uphold the status quo by “stringing the working class along via 
formation of wealth and promises of reform.” These mechanisms created the 
illusion that the workers received their share of the common good via the 
“means of consumption” while remaining excluded from the means of produc-
tion. “The system” refused to differentiate between these different types of 
property. Similarly, the failure to differentiate between revolutionary and self- 
interested attacks on property reduced the former to mere crime. A glimmer of 
hope seemed to come not so much from intellectual critics but from those who 
refused to strive for “petty percentage and stupid consumption.”39 In late May 
1972, the RAF hoped that as people recognised the Vietnam War as a crime of 
U.S. imperialism, they would also realise that “consumption in instalments 
does not make them happy.”40
The RAF’s applauding statement on the attack on members of the Israeli 
team during the 1972 Summer Olympics in Munich was authored primarily by 
Meinhof. The militant Palestinian Black September Organisation had detained 
38. Horst Mahler, “Die revolutionäre Linke ist kriminell,” Der Spiegel 5 (24 January 1972): 
30– 31.
39. “Dem Volk dienen: Stadtguerilla und Klassenkampf,” in Rote Armee Fraktion, ed. ID- 
Verlag, 134– 36.
40. “Tonbandprotokoll von dem Teach- in der Roten Hilfe, Frankfurt: Erklärung von 31. Mai 
1972,” in ibid., 149.
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Israeli athletes and officials, initially killing two, in an attempt to obtain the 
release of Palestinian prisoners from Israel and more broadly to respond to the 
violence the Palestinian people had suffered at the hands of Israeli military 
forces. The German security forces’ failed rescue attempt at NATO’s Fürsten-
feldbruck air base turned the event into a disaster for both sides, with the re-
maining nine hostages, one German policeman, and five of the eight members 
of Black September killed.
The RAF’s document is primarily known for its fatuous construction of a 
connection between “the fascism of developed imperialism”— of which the 
Federal Republic of Germany was a part— and “Israel’s Nazi fascism.”41 The 
equation of German “nationalist extermination policies” with “Israeli extermi-
nation policies”42 shows a conflation of the RAF’s theoretical premises based 
on a concept of fascism that subsumed all forms of governmental authority and 
an understanding of National Socialism as merely a transient manifestation of 
a more comprehensive imperialist system.43 The RAF considered Black Sep-
tember’s Munich hostage taking to be “antifascist” and “anti- authoritarian,” 
part of a worldwide anti- imperialist strategy. The RAF’s third major declara-
tion was written after its main cadres had been arrested and imprisoned, with 
Meinhof suffering the harsh conditions of “isolated” internment in the “dead 
wing” of Cologne’s Ossendorf prison. The whole tone is more ideological than 
previous statements, more ready to amalgamate even the most disparate con-
texts in an ambitious— and at times hazardous— effort to justify the group’s 
continued attempts to wage “guerrilla warfare” from inside prison walls. Even 
more than before, the RAF was drawing on Manichaean worldviews.44 Despite 
their feverish activities, the interned cadres of the RAF misjudged their posi-
tion of weakness, which they sought to overcome with a far- reaching claim of 
leadership that depicted themselves as a revolutionary vanguard even relative 
to their comrades still at large.
Under the heading “Oil and Road Casualties” the Black September state-
ment tried to bridge two revolutionary scenarios: global imperialism in the 
Third World and its reflection in the everyday life of highly industrialised so-
cieties. Not unlike Marcuse, the RAF pointed to automobile production result-
ing in 170,000 road casualties in West Germany over ten years; in 1972, the 
41. “Die Aktion des »Schwarzen September« in München: Zur Strategie des antiimperialist-
ischen Kampfes, November 1972,” in ibid., 159. On Nazi analogies in RAF statements, see Holger 
J. Schmidt, Antizionismus, Israelkritik, und “Judenknax,” 58– 59.
42. “Aktion des »Schwarzen September«,” 171.
43. See Bergstermann, “Von ‘Isolationsfolter’ und ‘Vernichtungshaft.’”
44. See Biermann, “‘Metropolenguerilla’ contra ‘Schweinesystem.’”
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United States was expected to suffer 56,000 road casualties, with 20,000 more 
in West Germany, “for the benefit of . . . the oil and automobile corporations” 
that realised their profits at the expense of the Third World.45 These numbers 
seemed to dwarf the number of casualties that resulted from the actions of the 
RAF and Black September.
The RAF was desperately looking for the cracks in the shiny surface of 
consumer society. The group had to find a way to instil fear that the “vicious 
circle of consumption— the anarchy of capitalist production . . . only for the 
market, not for the people’s needs— might meet the limits of people’s psycho-
logical flexibility.” Optimistically, the activists thought that “loyalty on the ba-
sis of nothing but . . . ‘consumer shit’” had already started to crumble.46 Look-
ing for the revolutionary subject, the document tried to go beyond Marx by 
pointing out that in modern affluent society, the powerful had a much more 
comprehensive grasp on the workers’ life than just depriving them of surplus 
value: “Their physical exploitation at the factory has been supervened by the 
exploitation of their feelings, thoughts, wishes, and utopias  . . . by the despo-
tism of the capitalist in all areas of life via mass consumption and mass media.” 
Exploitation was thus not limited to the sphere of production but extended to 
the sphere of consumption: “With the introduction of the 8- hour day, the sys-
tem’s 24- hour day of ruling the worker has started its triumphant advance— 
with the creation of mass purchasing power and high income groups, the sys-
tem has started its triumphant advance over plans, needs, alternatives, fantasy, 
spontaneity.”47 In many respects, this was a radical reading of the conditions 
that Alain Touraine had labelled “postindustrial society.” Touraine also high-
lighted that all levels of social life, including education, consumption, and in-
formation, had been turned into productive resources and thus into objects of 
political design. In Meinhof’s view, this constellation had corrupted people to 
such a degree that they had lost any class consciousness, becoming ready “to 
tacitly accept every crime of the system” in return “for a car, a few rags, a life 
insurance policy, and a mortgage.” They were hardly able to imagine or desire 
anything beyond “a car, a holiday trip, a tiled bathroom.” Marx, Lenin, Luxem-
burg, and Mao had simply not known these conditions since they were not 
facing the readers of Springer tabloids, television viewers, motorists, mail- 
order commerce, and “quality of life.” In a worldview that saw capitalism’s 
quest for profit as the mainspring of political manifestations, consumer society 
45. “Aktion des »Schwarzen September«,” 156.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid., 166. See Touraine, Auf dem Weg zur postindustriellen Gesellschaft, 104.
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appeared as analogous to fascism: “not openly fascist, but via the market.”48 
On a list of factors hindering liberation, “consumption” and “the media” ranked 
first.49 This approach ultimately placed a morally justified and ascetic path of 
revolutionary violence in diametrical opposition to a highway of opportunism 
paved with material goods.50
Meinhof’s emphasis on consumer society and a revolutionary subject in 
the metropole met with criticism from Mahler, who confronted it with his own 
belief in the revolutionary masses in the Third World. His Arbeiteraristokratie-
papier (Worker Aristocracy Paper) featured a detailed discussion of Lenin’s 
theory of imperialism, unfolding a concept of embourgeoisement that sought 
to explain the lack of revolutionary impetus among West German workers. Not 
entirely unlike Meinhof’s approach, his reasoning was also based on an analy-
sis of regimes of provision. Mahler thought that affluent societies were charac-
terised by what might be called an inverted Malthusian trap: “As producers of 
material goods, human beings become superfluous on the whole. The value of 
products falls in relative and absolute terms. The volume of affluence . . . in-
creases by geometrical progression. Fewer workers in material production re-
produce a constantly growing number of unproductive consumers.”51 This led 
to his crucial point: a significant proportion of the “unproductively consumed 
revenues” were sucked away from the Third World, where poverty and the 
“dirty work” concentrated, the real mainspring of embourgeoisement.52 On a 
global scale, the polarisation of society that the classics of socialism had pre-
dicted had become a reality, while in the highly industrialised societies, it had 
been damped down and even turned into its opposite.53
The difference between Meinhof and Mahler was one of setting priorities. 
Meinhof sought to establish revolutionary consumers: those who remained at 
the margins of consumer society. Refusing to write off the masses in the metro-
pole as a revolutionary subject, she thought that the process of embourgeoise-
ment that Mahler described still excluded crucial parts of the population of 
industrialised societies. Mahler had already developed his concept of the 
worker aristocracy in a long statement delivered at the opening of his trial in 
West Berlin in October 1972. While emphasising the liberation movements of 
48. “Aktion des »Schwarzen September«,” 166. See also Fetscher and Rohrmoser, Ideologien 
und Strategien, 56– 57.
49. “Aktion des »Schwarzen September«,” 167.
50. See Fetscher and Rohrmoser, Ideologien und Strategien, 58.
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the developing countries, he also highlighted immigrant workers and fringe 
groups in the industrialised countries as possible revolutionary agents. He was 
thus not so far removed from the position Meinhof came to adopt.54
Meinhof: “Die Massen und der Konsum”
During the first half of 1973, the contradictions of affluent society were Mein-
hof’s key concept for overcoming the RAF’s isolation from the masses. She 
sought to understand the mechanism of embourgeoisement rather than resign-
ing herself to its inevitability. She thought that “consumer society, i.e. privi-
leged repression”55 had to be an integral part of revolutionary theory and prac-
tice because “consumption is the system’s power,” and without “consumption 
the system’s sway over the people will collapse.” Why, Meinhof asked, could 
the system so ill afford unemployment? Her answer was that the unemployed 
did not consume and thus highlighted a crucial gap in legitimisation. She 
clearly stated that it was impossible to abolish consumption, which was not 
evil per se; the task was to crack its mechanism, its capitalist application.56 
Meinhof put the emphasis on the destructive side of capitalist consumption: “It 
is important that a part of the wages paid to the worker so that he can reproduce 
himself, is again taken away from him via consumer shit. He thinks he is repro-
ducing himself and will only notice years later that he is exploited not only at 
the factory but on top of it in his reproduction. Obsolescence, psychological 
destruction through television, compensatory satisfaction of needs.”57 Target-
ing consumers’ increasing individualisation,58 Meinhof recognised that revolu-
tionary analysis remained in its infancy concerning this topic. So far, it had 
54. Horst Mahler, “Erklärung zum Prozeßbeginn am 9.10.1972,” in Bewaffneter Kampf, 184– 
97. On the conflict between Mahler and Meinhof, see Mahler, um die reihen zu schliessen; Bern-
hard Gierds, “Das Konzept Stadtguerilla: Meinhof, Mahler, und ihre strategischen Differenzen,” in 
RAF und der linke Terrorismus, ed. Kraushaar, 1:248– 61. Gierds reconstructs the differences be-
tween Meinhof and Mahler on a rather narrow basis of primary sources. His argument is that the 
controversy resulted from Mahler focusing his political views on a revolutionary subject— that is, 
the people of the Third World— while as a consequence of the deprivations she suffered during the 
early phase of her confinement, Meinhof allegedly only tolerated self- referentiality, especially the 
imagined identification with Auschwitz, as a legitimate political framework. Gierds denies Mein-
hof any further theoretical linkage.
55. Ulrike Meinhof, “irgendwie komm ich nicht damit klar . . . ,” late 1972/early 1973, BAK, 
B/362, 3370,1, XV/21.
56. Ulrike Meinhof, “Konsum,” late 1972/early 1973, 1, BAK, B/362, 3370,2, XVI/169– 70.
57. Ulrike Meinhof, “Theorie und Praxis,” late 1972/early 1973, BAK, B/362, 3370,2, XVI/109.
58. Ulrike Meinhof, handwritten notes on the futility of life in consumer society, late 1972/early 
1973, BAK, B/362, 3370,2, XVI/184.
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produced only a few cues, among which she jotted down “the destruction of 
retail markets by the department store companies, generally the department 
store companies.”59 To address this lack of insight, Meinhof produced a 
fourteen- page typewritten paper, “Die Massen und der Konsum” (The Masses 
and Consumption) that was probably meant to become a collective strategy 
paper. However, she withdrew it after criticism from her comrades. This and 
many other documents were confiscated by the authorities on 16 July 1973, 
during the first major search of the RAF inmates’ cells.60
The paper departed from what Meinhof considered the central problem of 
the New Left and of the RAF: they were isolated from the masses. She resorted 
to Marxism to tackle this problem and tried to identify the masses’ most impor-
tant interests.61 Opinion polls suggested stable prices and secure jobs, but she 
wanted to go further. Asking “What occupies people?,” she wrote a lighthearted 
and impressionistic overview of the year, with each month represented by 
some consumption- related small talk: “They say that the whole thing is rubbish 
and that prices are particularly high in December and the entire Christmas rush 
is actually only there for business and department stores and that it is rather 
stupid to join in, but what can you do— is what they say and they go shopping.”62 
The topic of consumption seemed omnipresent: “Children like nothing better 
than watching commercials. . . . Everyone talks about consumption. Day and 
night, morning, noon, evening. . . . Consumption, consumption, consumption.” 
Meinhof was not prepared to simply dismiss this as false needs. If the masses 
wanted the goods, a Marxist was in no position to blame them for it. She asked 
rather self- critically, “We say: advertisement. Advertisement is an exterior 
cause. . . . What is the interior cause of consumption? . . . What is the contradic-
tion in consumption?”63
Meinhof was touching on a crucial point: clinging to manipulationist the-
ories, militant protest had targeted exterior manifestations of consumer society 
and had lost sight of the question of why people embraced its products. She 
now openly acknowledged that increased consumption had fostered equality 
between people: “C&A, Karstadt, Neckermann, Quelle, Kaufhof, Hertie— 
they all offer the same clothes, everyone buys them there. Workers, employees, 
59. Ulrike Meinhof, “Zu der Kritik an dem Paper,” 1972/first half of 1973, BAK, B/362, 
3370,1, XV/5– 7.
60. Ulrike Meinhof, “Die Massen und der Konsum,” first half of 1973, BAK, B/362, 3369,1, 
IX/31– 44. Thanks to Kerstin Schenke at Bundesarchiv, who helped me to locate these documents 
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pupils, apprentices, students, intellectuals.” The problem was that this equality 
had not reduced competition; quite the contrary, consumption added fuel to 
competition as people aspired to property.64 Meinhof’s understanding of con-
sumption was ambivalent. She acknowledged it as a real need that could not be 
theorised away; however, she also set out to highlight the drawbacks and limi-
tations of capitalist affluence, adopting a tone reminiscent of conservative de-
spair of civilisation: “Millions of women go to the factory to get ahold of con-
sumption. Parents neglect their children. Morality has disappeared.”65
Like most of her contemporaries, Meinhof was not prepared to view all 
humans as consumers in one way or another. To her mind, consumption was a 
new phenomenon of the twentieth century: “In the past, there was no consump-
tion. There was food, clothing, and a roof over one’s head. . . . And thousands 
died of starvation.” People who lived today still remembered these conditions 
and noticed that conditions were better than in the past.66 They enjoyed the 
reduction in working hours, but one constant remained: exploitation through 
the absorption of surplus value. What had changed was that people could buy 
infinitely more in return for more intensified work; their wages sufficed for 
more than food, shelter, and clothing; they had more time; and they no longer 
went to the Workers Educational Association. The workers of the nineteenth 
century dreamt of sufficient vital goods, while today people dreamt of unnec-
essary goods.
Meinhof interlaced two types of critiques of regimes of provision. When 
analysing the existing conditions, she stuck to a classical critique of consumer 
society, to which she attributed a depoliticising power: “People no longer go to 
the . . . Socialists, to Marx, Engels, Bebel, Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg. . . . 
Instead they only think of consuming.”67 In a preliminary note that tied in with 
the Black September statement, she emphasised that in the old days, the alter-
natives had been socialism and utopia. Along with the worker’s external mis-
ery, utopia had been eradicated, so that today’s alternatives were “job change, 
Mallorca, colour television, car.”68 Meinhof assumed a deeper motivation be-
low material interest: “It is not consumption that the masses desire, think about 
day and night, risk their lives for, fight, make each other’s lives miserable, 
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of freedom.”69 Adopting Marx’s expression and following Marcuse, she main-
tained a more profound goal for human endeavour. Realising that the reduction 
in working hours had not produced the realm of freedom that Marx had imag-
ined, Meinhof argued that workers were in fact facing a twenty- four- hour day, 
the analysis of which held a “wholly unexplored dimension.”70 Consumption 
meant in fact more work and diverted people from real, noncommodified lei-
sure. Capitalist consumer society had conquered Marx’s realm of freedom by 
annexing it to the realm of necessity.
When trying to find a revolutionary subject that would break this mecha-
nism and help to establish a true realm of freedom, Meinhof resorted to the 
second, more optimistic and forward- looking critique of regimes of provision. 
Certain consumers could, for all intents and purposes, become revolutionary 
subjects: “Police prevent the masses from doing what is otherwise a matter of 
course for them: going to the department store . . . and simply getting what they 
need.” According to this view, the regime of provision was ultimately upheld 
not by people’s moral convictions but only by state violence that separated the 
people from the goods and drove “them into the forced labour of the factory, 
under the despotism of capital.”71 She saw widespread shoplifting as a mani-
festation of revolution: “The revolution has already broken out! The masses 
have already consciously emancipated themselves.  .  .  . They are stealing!”72 
People had two options: “The legal path to consumption went via the factory, 
the office, the exploitation, the university .  .  .  , the abominable, exploitative, 
repressive path.” The other option was theft: “Most people . . . do both: they 
earn money and steal; . . . they give themselves into the grip of consumption by 
toiling busily . . . ; on the other hand they swipe something here and there.”73 
To her mind, the system had already started to disintegrate over its own concept 
of property.74
Meinhof was not the first to treat shoplifting in conjunction with the RAF. 
Her intricate filing system for newspaper clippings— the comprehensive clas-
69. Ulrike Meinhof, “Die Massen und der Konsum,” first half of 1973, BAK, B/362, 3369,1, 
IX/31– 44.
70. Ulrike Meinhof, “noch was zu münchen paper und der Kritik daran,” quoted in Fetscher and 
Rohrmoser, Ideologien und Strategien, 79.
71. Ulrike Meinhof, “Die Massen und der Konsum,” first half of 1973, BAK, B/362, 3369,1, 
IX/31– 44. Marx had also emphasised that, in essence, labour under capitalism always remained 
forced labour (Kapital, MEGA section 2, 15: 793– 95).
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sification listed rubrics on mail- order trade, department stores, retail, and 
consumption— contained articles from a series on “plant security” from the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, among them “Fire, Bombs, Theft— Dangers 
That Department Stores Are Facing”  and another reporting that the number of 
shoplifters caught had doubled between 1967 and 1970 and that they were 
causing damage of at least seventy- five million deutsche marks per year.75
In her attempt to come to grips with the problem of embourgeoisement, 
Meinhof sought to augment classical Marxist class analysis with a “class anal-
ysis of the consumers.” The classics of socialism had simply not known or 
foreseen the conditions of affluent society. Drawing on Marx, she introduced 
two parts of consumption: “1) The first part is the part that is absolutely essen-
tial to life— food, clothing, shelter. 2) The second part is the part that is not 
absolutely essential to life. The indulgences. The car. The fun. The television. 
A treat for the eye. The furniture and wallpaper.”76 She thought that students, 
apprentices, women, pupils, and foreign workers— those who were furthest 
removed from the second part of consumption (nonvital goods)— would take 
the lead in the first phase of the revolution.77 The second part of consumption 
was ultimately the central battleground of the revolutionary struggle in the 
metropole. While clearly focusing on sections or margins of society, she still 
resorted to the delusive notion of revolutionary “masses.” This obscured her 
attempt at differentiation.
While assuming a revolutionary impetus in the desires of the margin-
alised, Meinhof also called on people to rid themselves of their consumerist 
chains. Since most people no longer had cows or vegetable gardens, they had 
become completely dependent on wage labour. The proletariat allegedly had 
nothing to lose but their chains; however, those chains were also difficult to 
untangle: “the consumer shit, . . . the private microcosm inside the living holes, 
the balancing acts on the ladders of prestige, the careers of anxiety, the reified 
hopes, . . . the holiday plans, the debt.” The first revolutionary step was to free 
oneself from these chains.78 This pointed to those who had already arrived at a 
certain level of critical consciousness vis- à- vis consumption, those who were 
75. Ulrike Meinhof, “zeitungsausschnittarchiv ulrike— kategorien ,” BAK, B/362, 3369,1, 
VII/1 including Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, clippings, 1972 or 1973, “Feuer, Bomben, 
Diebstahl— Gefahren, die im Kaufhaus drohen,” and “Zahl der Ladendiebe steigt weiter.”
76. Ulrike Meinhof, “Die Massen und der Konsum,” first half of 1973, BAK, B/362, 3369,1, 
IX/31– 44.
77. Ibid., 12.
78. Ulrike Meinhof, “über: ‘nichts mehr zu verlieren haben,’” AHIS, KOK 07/002.
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ready to say “consumer shit.” Meinhof apparently hoped for an alliance be-
tween the masses, who longed for freedom but sought to realise it via con-
sumption, and critical individuals who had already started to debunk the myth 
of consumerism.79
An alliance between critical intellectuals and people suffering from the 
psychological strain of affluent society was not mere fiction but had found 
expression in the international antipsychiatry movement. One group that was 
part of that movement was the Informationszentrum Rote Volksuniversität 
(IZRU, Information Centre of the Red People’s University), which had been 
founded by former members of the Socialist Patients’ Collective (SPK) in July 
1971. The SPK had emerged when patients in the psychiatric outpatient depart-
ment at Heidelberg University Hospital protested the dismissal of their attend-
ing doctor, reformer Wolfgang Huber. In the midst of the conflict with the 
clinic management, the SPK came under suspicion of supporting the RAF. 
Huber and others were convicted of participation in a criminal organisation. A 
number of former SPK members subsequently joined the RAF.80 Huber be-
lieved that the only effective way to combat mental illness was by abolishing 
the “morbid commercial- patriarchal society.”81 The imprisoned RAF cadres 
took an interest in the IZRU’s theoretical endeavours.82 In a brochure that 
Meinhof kept in her files, the IZRU established explicit connections among 
addictive disorders, reified labour, the culture industries, and social democ-
racy: “Bourgeois inwardness is the profitable sales market for the entire rub-
bish of the consumer goods industry, .  .  .  entertainment and pharmaceutical 
industry. . . . Food has also become such a crutch in this so- called affluent so-
ciety, namely a narcotic, a means of distraction and occupation: the human 
being as wage labourer is dispossessed of any self- determined productive ac-
tivity . . . and is supposed to replace this deprivation with excessive consump-
79. Ulrike Meinhof, handwritten notes on freedom and consumption, BAK, B/362, 3370,2, 
XVI/165.
80. Explanations for why SPK members joined the RAF vary. Dieter Spazier and Jörg Bopp see 
it as a consequence of criminalisation, while the study commissioned by the Interior Ministry— 
authored by the wife of the clinic manager responsible for Huber’s dismissal— assumes from the 
outset that the SPK constituted a “preliminary stage of developed terrorism.” See Dieter Spazier 
and Jörg Bopp, Grenzübergänge: Psychotherapie als kollektive Praxis (Frankfurt, 1975); Wanda 
von Baeyer- Katte, “Das Sozialistische Patientenkollektiv in Heidelberg (SPK),” in Baeyer- Katte, 
Claessens, and Feger, Gruppenprozesse, 184– 316; Kornelia Brink, “Psychiatrie und Politik: Zum 
Sozialistischen Patientenkollektiv in Heidelberg,” in Terrorismus in der Bundesrepublik, ed. Wein-
hauer, Requate, and Haupt, 134– 53.
81. SPK, Aus der Krankheit.
82. Gudrun Ensslin, “Von Kroetz stammt das Gleichnis,” AHIS, KOK 07,002.
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tion activity . . . . Consequently, many people are constantly eating, . . . booz-
ing, even if they don’t want to— obesity!”83
Meinhof suggested that statements by her and her comrades had clumsily 
revolved around the idea of analysing consumers for the previous five years. 
She thus pointed back to 1968. Just as in her konkret article on the Frankfurt 
department store arson, she now invoked black looters in America who were 
allegedly as much in need of the revolutionary theory she was hoping to forge 
as those marginalised by affluent society in the Federal Republic of Germany 
or Japan. She apparently thought that the protest movements that had emerged 
globally since 1968 constituted the first phase of an anti- imperialist revolution. 
She maintained that this “revolution” had broken out not only because produc-
ers were separated from their products but also because consumers were sepa-
rated from consumption.84 She thus addressed not only the people who re-
mained excluded from the blessings of affluent society but also the idea that 
desirable consumption constantly moved beyond reach, thus alienating people 
from the consumption at their disposal.
Meinhof thought that her revolutionary theory of the consumer held an 
educational message. Guerrillas would demonstrate to people how to over-
come the relations of violence separating them from the desired consumption 
and ultimately from the realm of freedom. To this end, she envisioned a rather 
opaque plan for a major propagandistic action: “It is possible and easily imag-
inable to make open [offen machen] for two to three days all department stores 
in the F[ederal] r[epublic] with a single action of a few men without the police 
intervening.”85 It remains unclear how this endeavour might have worked, but 
she apparently intended to teach the masses how to loot and to ignite mass 
disturbances. In her preliminary notes, she jotted down, “Storm the department 
stores.”86 Meinhof believed that the masses would thus join the revolutionary 
struggle and even come to understand Marxism- Leninism. Similar to her 
konkret column on the Frankfurt department store arsons, she wanted to avoid 
having bombs destroy goods and endanger people. However, she considered 
the possibility that the authorities would place bombs in department stores and 
blame the damage on the RAF. At the same time, she had some clear- sighted 
visions of future themes and practices of political expression in the sphere of 
83. “Politische Gefangenschaft,” Rote Volksuniversität! 10 (15 March 1973), BAK, B/362, 
3369,1, VII/11.
84. Ulrike Meinhof, “Die Massen und der Konsum,” first half of 1973, BAK, B/362, 3369,1, 
IX/31– 44.
85. Ibid., 11.
86. Ulrike Meinhof, “Konsum,” late 1972/early 1973, 4, BAK, B/362, 3370,2, XVI/169– 70.
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consumption, pointing to squatting and to what today would be called subver-
tising: “Advertisement will be put into the service of the revolution. . . . With 
modest means one can alter nearly every placard, every advertisement. . . . The 
price is crossed out. The weapon . . . stuck on. The speech bubble declares the 
theory of liberation.”87 She also thought that questions of housing would be-
come acute, pointing out that “countless squatters live illegally.”88 What had 
started as an ambitious attempt to integrate several critiques of capitalist re-
gimes of provision petered out in the final pages when Meinhof, rather than 
cracking the contradictions of consumption, simply held out the hope of help 
from the People’s Republic of China.
It is easy to see why this document encountered criticism from her com-
rades: it mixed harsh self- criticism with vague action plans and appeared to 
switch from direct action back to propaganda of the deed. At the same time, 
Meinhof’s complicated attempts at differentiation while evoking the masses 
were not intuitively clear, especially since other members of the RAF had al-
ready abandoned the project of mobilising the protest movements. At some 
point, Meinhof explicitly withdrew her paper. Exercising self- criticism, she 
apologetically pointed to the harsh detention conditions she had suffered at 
Ossendorf.
An important theoretical backdrop for the RAF’s emphasis on consumer 
society in 1973 was Marcuse’s Counterrevolution and Revolt. A document 
confiscated from the cells of RAF inmates in mid- July shows Ensslin suggest-
ing to the prisoners several texts, among them Counterrevolution and Revolt, a 
“concrete job for the continuation of the campaign.”89 Ensslin made it clear 
that the RAF wanted to go beyond Marcuse, regarding him as an inspiration, 
not a blueprint.90 Apparently, part of the criticism of the Black September 
statement had been that Marcuse’s treatment of the topic was superior to Mein-
hof’s. For her part, Meinhof was flabbergasted that Counterrevolution and Re-
volt unfolded arguments that she thought resembled her own. In a seven- page 
handwritten paper, she embarked on a detailed comparison of quotes from the 
Black September statement with quotes from Counterrevolution and Revolt. 
She emphasised that both texts focused on how consumer society dominated 
the entire human being, including the psyche. Moreover, both texts seemed to 
87. Ulrike Meinhof, “Die Massen und der Konsum,” first half of 1973, BAK, B/362, 3369,1, 
IX/31– 44.
88. Ulrike Meinhof, “Theorie und Praxis,” late 1972/early 1973, BAK, B/362, 3370,2, XVI/112.
89. Gudrun Ensslin, “an die anwälte und gefangenen,” AHIS, KOK 007,002.
90. Gudrun Ensslin, note, 7 July 1973, quoted in Fetscher and Rohrmoser, Ideologien und 
Strategien, 57, 331.
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look for a new type of class analysis and a new language that might break the 
system’s hold over a false consciousness.91 The internal debates over the Black 
September statement had thus led to “Die Massen und der Konsum,” with the 
latter representing an attempt to specify and improve the former. Meinhof ulti-
mately thought that her argument was reinforced by Counterrevolution and 
Revolt and by Marx’s Grundrisse, which were new to her, and she set out to 
integrate the passages highlighted by Marcuse into her position.92
“Die Massen und der Konsum” and other documents confiscated during 
various searches of the RAF inmates’ cells were available to the members of an 
expert committee, which the federal Ministry of the Interior established in 
1978, not least to legitimize its position in the fight against terrorism via schol-
arly expertise. Between 1981 and 1984, this committee published five volumes 
on the sociological and ideological contexts of terrorism in West Germany, 
which, although the Interior Ministry tightly controlled the scholars, remain 
the most scholarly treatment of the topic to this day. The expert committee’s 
interpretation proved enormously influential, and hundreds of other studies 
have relied on the volumes. Frankfurt political scientist Iring Fetscher and his 
assistants, Herfried Münkler and Hannelore Ludwig, coauthors of the first vol-
ume, offer an analysis of certain aspects of “Die Massen und der Konsum.”93 
Subsequent scholarship on the RAF has completely ignored the document.
An unprejudiced assessment of Meinhof’s intellectual position requires a 
critical examination of the official interpretation published five years after her 
death. Fetscher, Münkler, and Ludwig accuse Meinhof of shrinking Marx’s 
class analysis to the level of mere incomes and consumption, culpably neglect-
ing the sphere of production. They discard her emphasis on the sphere of con-
sumption as naive, declaring that Konsumkritik— which they neither define nor 
contextualise— could be adopted only by individuals, never by the masses, 
who could at most be critical consumers. While this idea could still pass as a 
more or less accurate assessment of the leverage of Konsumkritik in terms of 
early 1980s realpolitik, it went further by mounting an apodictic claim that the 
economic realm could never be effectively moralised or politicised from the 
91. Ulrike Meinhof, “Der Imperialismus ist ein Herrschaftssystem,” BAK, B/362, 3369,1, 
III/37– 43.
92. Ulrike Meinhof, handwritten notes, BAK, B/362, 3369,1, IV/31 (reverse side); Ulrike 
Meinhof, “nochmal zu münchenpaper,” BAK, B/362,, 3370, XV/11. Meinhof learned about the 
Grundrisse from Martin Nicolaus, Konkurrenz und Mehrwert: Zur Klassentheorie bei Marx (Ber-
lin, 1970). Ulrike Meinhof, handwritten notes, BAK, B/362, 3370, I/3.16– 20. Raspe left a mar-
ginal note on Mahler’s Arbeiteraristokratiepapier that pointed to the “Grundrisse on consump-
tion,” BAK, B/362, 3371, 11/9.
93. Fetscher and Rohrmoser, Ideologien und Strategien, 78– 82.
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consumer’s end. Rather keen to establish contradictions and idiosyncrasies in 
Meinhof’s writings, Fetscher, Münkler, and Ludwig see in her “new” emphasis 
on consumption a “brusque ideological volte- face.” However, their heavy- 
handed criticism of Meinhof’s argument hardly does justice to the line of rea-
soning adopted in her paper. Irrespective of one’s political or moral judgment 
of the RAF, a clear line of continuity exists in the group’s major documents: 
affluence had allowed the state to conquer the consciousness of the masses, but 
this apparent satisfaction was incomplete and had started to crumble. Since the 
June 1970 statement, “Build the Red Army!,” an important if unrealistic plank 
in the RAF’s programme had been to mobilise the downtrodden within affluent 
society. Meinhof’s ambition in the first half of 1973 was to explain how capi-
talism had prevented the polarisation of classes that Marx had predicted. More-
over, she was unwilling to relegate revolutionary struggle to the Third World 
alone. But this did not mean she was unaware of the crucial role the means of 
production played in any Marxist thinking or did not agree with the principle 
of solidarity with various revolutionary movements in the developing world. 
The authors of the study commissioned by the Interior Ministry seem to be 
saying that her approach was ultimately like a nineteenth- century revolution-
ary setting his hopes on the Lumpenproletariat, “an amorphous agglomeration 
of low- income sections of the population,” which was unstructured and locked 
in internal competition and consequently would never be capable of acting.94 
However, in Marx’s days, the Lumpenproletariat lacked the crucial function 
for the economic system that the integrated consumer had in the demand- 
driven Keynesian economics of late capitalism. And the sections of society 
Meinhof had in mind— students, apprentices, women, foreign workers— were 
indeed crucially involved in social movements, which, while not toppling cap-
italism, eventually did exert considerable political pressure.
When treating Meinhof’s fascination with shoplifting, Fetscher and his 
assistants deny her even the remotest claim to any Marxist credentials since she 
apparently did not understand that “individual maximisation of economic ben-
efits” by illegal means only replicated capitalist morals. The socialist revolu-
tion as Marx had conceived it was far different from the competition over lim-
ited goods by nonpeaceful means. Fetscher, a leading scholar of Marxism, 
pointed out gleefully that Marx had produced a theory of value creation and a 
theory of distribution, while Meinhof reduced the whole theory to just the lat-
ter. Curiously, Fetscher himself had once looked for the revolutionary subject 
in the realm of consumption. In his address to a 1968 summer school on Marx 
94. Ibid., 82.
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and Revolution he approvingly quoted Marcuse and emphasised: “The attitude 
of the passive consumer (whose buying motive is determined by the psychol-
ogy of competition) and that of the active revolutionary are diametrically op-
posed to each other. How should the latter take the place of the former?”95 
Thirteen years later, Fetscher and his coauthors took the differences between 
Meinhof and Mahler— one taking consumption as an indicator of the masses’ 
captivation by the system, the other taking consumption as evidence of their 
willingness to revolt— as a blatant example of “the internal inconsistency of 
the ‘RAF’ ideology.”96 Despite the emerging personal tensions among the im-
prisoned RAF members, they still conceived of themselves as a collective 
based on relentless openness and mutual criticism in strategy debates, which 
they conducted via their intricate system of circulars delivered by their defence 
lawyers. Mahler’s emphasis on crime being rooted in society made him in fact 
share Meinhof’s affirmation of theft: “Nowadays, anyone who does not steal 
from imperialist monopoly capital is either too stupid or too craven for it.”97 
Mahler differed from Meinhof in demanding improvements to the prisoners’ 
living conditions with television, cigarettes, and coffee; in the larger picture, 
they disputed the strategic implications of a shared theory of affluence that 
stifled revolutionary consciousness. The question was how and where to over-
come the problem. While mobilising a reserve army of shoplifters was cer-
tainly rather unrealistic, Meinhof was in good company with other revolution-
ary theorists who had prematurely interpreted their contemporary social 
upheaval as the first stirrings of imminent revolution. To suggest that Meinhof 
was imagining a postrevolutionary society where people simply stole from the 
supermarkets is misconstruing the theoretical endeavours of someone who des-
perately sought to challenge the state’s monopoly on violence by mobilising 
those who broke the law of the propertied classes.
Meinhof was seeking to mobilise an existing social movement, which, in 
the wake of the student movement, had continued to expound the problems of 
everyday life in affluent society.  Shoplifting justified by crude Proudhonian 
terms was a widespread practice in the emerging alternative milieu. Meinhof 
likely read about a shoplifting action by the occupants of a self- managed and 
collective housing project for homeless young people established in an aban-
95. Iring Fetscher, “Von der Produktion des revolutionären Subjekts durch die Selbstverwand-
lung der Individuen,” in Bloch, Marcuse, Habermas, Fischer, Künzli, Fetscher, Marković, Tadić, 
and Fromm, Marx und die Revolution, 70.
96. Ibid., 81– 82.
97. Horst Mahler, notes, 1973, AHIS, KOK 03,002.
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doned building in the Kreuzberg didtrict of Berlin in March 1973.98 In many 
cities— particularly in Italy but also in Germany— fare dodging, rent strikes, 
and “proletarian shopping” had become signs of a developing counterculture 
based on different moral values and lifestyles. Subsequent chapters analyse 
this wider context.
According to Fetscher, Münkler, and Ludwig, Meinhof realised the weak-
nesses of her emphasis on consumption and shifted the argument away from 
distribution back to production.99 It would be more accurate to acknowledge 
that she tried to analyse how the two phenomena were connected. A speech 
written primarily by Meinhof but possibly coauthored by other RAF members 
was delivered by Astrid Proll, the younger sister of Thorwald Proll, at her trial 
in early October 1973. This text focused on automation and took up ideas from 
“Die Massen und der Konsum,” again emphasising property crime as an indi-
cator of economic crisis: “The people are stealing at department stores in large 
quantities . . . , exchange values in the billions are annually carried off from the 
department stores.”100 The speech began with a tirade that Meinhof might have 
been directing at her posthumous critics: “What the opportunistic rats, the 
pseudorevolutionaries, the desk Marxists, the Marx aesthetes, the revisionists 
have been doing for 100 years is turning Marxism into a commodity. . . . The 
revolution is not a commodity.”101 Drawing on Marx, she interpreted automa-
tion as driving a process that hollowed out the exchange value of mass- 
produced goods.102 She interpreted people’s propensity for theft as an intuitive 
realisation of this devaluation. The nature of the productive process made the 
claim of the “moneybags” to ownership of goods anachronistic and obsolete. 
The people no longer accepted the distribution of the gross national product on 
the basis of “wages, interests, and rents” and the “separation of wage labour 
and capital.”103 She pointed to American statistics showing that people stole ten 
billion dollars per year in office supplies and faked receipts and expense claims. 
Closer to home, people demanded free rides on public transport. The idea was 
to let the entire system collapse. As before, she clearly stated that consumption 
was not per se bad: “There is no reason at all to rant about consumption. It is, 
 98. “Mit Säcken ins Warenhaus— Die Lebensmittel rausgeholt,” Wir wollen alles 4 (May 
1973): 12. A copy of this issue was confiscated in Raspe’s cell at Ossendorf Prison on 16 July 
1973. BAK, B/362, 3372,2. See below.
 99. Fetscher and Rohrmoser, Ideologien und Strategien, 83, 220.
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however, messed up, a product of the development of the means of production. 
It replaces natural needs with historically created needs, as Marx says. The 
consumer shit is not only ‘shit.’”104
Drawing on Marx’s Grundrisse— on the same passage that Marcuse cited 
on the third page of Counterrevolution and Revolt— Meinhof continued to fo-
cus on the impact of machines. Not unlike Marcuse, she saw the technological 
potential 115 years after Grundrisse as a possible source of egalitarian libera-
tion. She interpreted the historical development of the twentieth century as a 
process of capital reappropriating the surplus value that automation had pro-
duced, partially divorcing it from labour and eventually diverting it from the 
realisation of real needs. In terms of revolutionary strategy, Meinhof by no 
means ignored the developing countries. She focused on sabotaging the “logis-
tics of imperialism,” the networks, such as oil pipelines, in the hands of multi-
nationals, which linked developed and developing societies. Invoking the no-
tion of “structural violence,” with reference to Johan Galtung, she envisioned 
an offensive against the supply networks of Western Europe going beyond the 
RAF’s previous attacks against the U.S. Army. This was in line with her earlier 
endeavours to somehow disrupt capitalism’s economic resources of legitimisa-
tion. If attacks disrupted the supply of oil or electricity, she could conceivably-
hope for repercussions on prices and the security of supply, which might shift 
the political balance in favour of the dissatisfied and eventually revolutionary 
consumers she sought.105
Meinhof also interpreted the crimes of National Socialism as resting on 
the production of consumer goods, on surplus products that went beyond basic 
needs: “Without cars, radios, and planes, they would not have succeeded in 
gassing six million Jews, destroying the organisation of the German workers’ 
movement, and starting the second imperialist world war.”106 To her mind, the 
Nazis’ extermination policies were in line with the general principles of capi-
talism, implying a clear continuity between Auschwitz and “the genocide of 
the Vietnamese people”: “Transformation of living labour into things, reify 
life, life time into things, turn into a thing, make dead, by quantification, di-
vide, fragment, make interchangeable, turn into a commodity. . . . Everything 
104. Ibid., 16.
105. Ulrike Meinhof, “noch was zu münchen- paper und der kritik daran,” AHIS, KOK 07,006; 
“Imperialismustitel,” BAK, B 362, 3369, 1, III/30– 31. Meinhof referred to Dieter Senghaas, ed., 
Imperialismus und strukturelle Gewalt: Analysen über abhängige Reproduktion (Frankfurt, 1972). 
On structural violence, see also Jan- Carl Raspe, handwritten notes, 3 December 1972, BAK, 
B/362, 3371, 10b/25.5.5; Fetscher and Rohrmoser, Ideologien und Strategien, 118– 19.
106. Ulrike Meinhof, “Widerspruchspapier” delivered by Proll at her trial, 2 October 1973, 15, 
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into commodity, into money, into illusion of reality, to turn reality into illusion, 
into paper, without use value, into nothing: .  .  .  that was Auschwitz— that is 
Auschwitz.”107 In this worldview, Keynesianism was the system’s trick to cap-
italise its surplus product even in times of crisis, and fascism was the means to 
put it through to the masses. She seemed convinced that this mechanism was 
now finally at the end of its tether: “The crumbling away of exchange value 
cannot be undone with consumerism.” However, she also had her doubts about 
“whether they will manage yet another time, this time with computers, helicop-
ters, and transmission systems without any crackling in the line. . . . With the 
B52s alone they won’t manage. The Vietnamese people have proved it.”108 
Within these parameters, Meinhof was eager to see continuities with the Na-
tional Socialist past: the Olympic Games of 1936 and 1972, consumption, and 
“the old and the new fascism” all belonged together. She went so far as to assert 
a line of continuity between Auschwitz, Vietnam, and the German authorities’ 
disastrous attempt to free the Israeli hostages at Fürstenfeldbruck. She even 
used the term verjuden, with its highly antisemitic connotations, to character-
ise what she saw as the system’s effort to buy out the people with people’s 
shares and asset formation.109
Meinhof explained her position in a historical argument: the anti semitism 
of the Nazis went much further than the reactionary anticapitalism of the de-
clining petty bourgeoisie, who mistook Jews involved in trade and commerce 
as the cause of the petty bourgeoisie’s historically necessary plight. Instead of 
abolishing the real cause, the Nazis sought “to abolish” the Jews, as if they re-
ally were what they only represented: “the money— the money system— the 
system.” She maintained forcefully, “Fascism turned the historical, the human 
solution of the contradiction— which would have been civil war— revolution— 
dictatorship of the proletariat— communism— into the antihistorical, inhuman 
final solution: Maidanek, [sic] Treblinka, Sobibor, Belczek, Bergen- Belsen, 
Auschwitz.”110 Meinhof then quoted at length from Karl Marx’s On the Jewish 
Question, in which he asserted that human emancipation was hindered by eco-
nomic inequality: “Emancipation from huckstering and money. . . would be the 
107. Ibid., 24.
108. Ibid., 16.
109. Meinhof, “noch was zu münchen- paper und der kritik daran,” AHIS, KOK 07,006.
110. Meinhof, “NS- Faschismus”: 13– 14, AHIS, KOK 07,006. An unsigned and undated docu-
ment of preliminary notes for a text on “revolution and fascism” shows that some of the main argu-
ments from “Die Massen und der Konsum” regarding shoplifting persisted well into the second 
half of 1973 and were increasingly tied up with considerations of Nazi Germany. The document 
contains a reference to a newspaper from August 1973. It was confiscated 7– 8 February 1974. 
“Vorbemerkung zu dem paper: Revolution und Faschismus,” 20– 21, BAK, B/362, 3309,2 273– 74.
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self- emancipation of our time. . . . The Jew is perpetually created by civil soci-
ety from its own entrails.”111
The RAF’s Consumer Politics
At first, it might appear that Meinhof was alone in the RAF in emphasising 
matters of consumption, and indeed, evidence indicates that the topic was con-
troversial among the RAF prisoners.112 A published compilation of clandestine 
circulars exchanged between RAF inmates between 1973 and 1977 does not 
show consumption as a topic of overriding importance; the correspondence 
was primarily concerned with a collective search for options of political activ-
ity under the conditions of imprisonment.113 However, a closer analysis of the 
internal discussions shows a good deal of common ground concerning con-
sumer politics as part of the imperialist system and thus of guerrilla politics.
In early 1973, Ensslin apparently thought along similar lines as Meinhof, 
asking, “What can the vital correspondence with the masses (the consumer) 
look like”?114 She pointed out that konsumentenpolitik was a form of domestic 
imperialism that assigned the role of the subject of the profits, while humans 
were reduced to the object. Within this relation, consumers were subject to 
reification and commodification, leaving them with a status somewhere in be-
tween physical object, animal, and human being. Under “consumer politics,” 
Ensslin subsumed the global politics of money and resources, which were do-
mestically executed by the double standards of “Social Democratic masks”: 
“This culmination of history— made by the globally organised . . . bourgeoisie— 
explains literally everything. Their values are the commodity and the mar-
ket.  .  .  . Human beings the international currency.” Invoking Marx, she con-
curred with Meinhof in interpreting the “workers’ aristocracy” as potentially 
the final trump in the bourgeoisie’s hand. This meant the revolutionary prole-
tariat of the capitalist metropole had a chance: “The 3. world’s claim to leader-
ship is no longer the final word of the revolution.”115 Conceiving of consump-
tion as an integral part of self- alienation, she decried “this entire dirty universe 
111. Karl Marx, “Zur Judenfrage” (1843– 44), in MEW, 1:372– 74 (English trans., http://www.
marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/jewish- question/index.htm [accessed 5 July 2011]).
112. E.g., Ulrike Meinhof, “Zu der Kritik an dem Paper,” 1972/first half of 1973, BAK, B/362, 
3370,1, XV/5– 7.
113. Bakker Schut, das info.
114. Gudrun Ensslin, handwritten note, early 1973, BAK, B/362, 3367,1, II/27/158– 59.
115. Gudrun Ensslin, “Reden wir von uns,” early 1973, AHIS, KOK 07,002, printed in das info, 
ed. Bakker Schut, 15– 16.
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of property + consumption.”116 Ensslin believed that the RAF would serve as 
an example that would get the masses to understand how the relationship to-
wards consumption becomes the relationship towards oneself.117 However, she 
also defamed her desired audience: “As long as there are only consumers, there 
is nothing to publish.”118 What counted were deeds, not words.
Referring to Marcuse, Ensslin brought everything into a simple equation: 
“technological progress = growing societal wealth = higher servitude.” From 
this equation she concluded the existence of an “objective revolutionary situa-
tion in consumer society.” She perceptively diagnosed the ambivalent nature of 
this struggle: the fight within consumer society and the fight against it.119 Iden-
tifying reification as the main issue of the armed struggle, she thought that 
television’s “fiction of freedom” was a major factor in the battle for conscious-
ness. During the first historical step of the materialisation of human existence— 
shelter, food, clothing, and so forth— the antagonism between capital and la-
bour could seemingly disappear, which brought Social Democracy to the peak 
of its bourgeois power. The Social Democrats then drummed into people the 
idea that the state and the status quo were the only way to obtain “quality of 
life.”120 Bourgeois society was highly flexible in terms of ideology. It could 
remove all taboos except that on violence.121 Only the second historical step of 
materialisation brought reification— “the disease of the system”— fully to 
light. The system was unable to shed this disease; the only alternative was the 
proletarian revolution. Ensslin then asked whether this had not been what 
Meinhof meant in her “consumption paper.”122 In what appear to be explicit 
comments on “Die Massen und der Konsum,” Ensslin reflected on the prole-
tariat’s relationship with consumption, which had completely shaped the pro-
letariat’s relationship with itself. Like Meinhof, Ensslin took the phenomenon 
of theft to indicate the limits of mass consumption’s integrative powers. Capi-
tal had no answer other than state violence in the form of police and judiciary 
on the domestic level and genocide on a global scale.123 According to Ensslin, 
116. Gudrun Ensslin, “metropolenbrut,” 12 August 1974, in ibid., 136.
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Marxism seemed stuck in “dumb materialism” for the past century. She cham-
pioned Mao Zedong’s emphasis on the peasant, which “preserved the country-
side” and did “not fetishise the city.” In her opinion, this policy encapsulated 
the final stage of historical development: it unfolded the “realm of freedom” 
during the dictatorship of the proletariat, thus making sure that the idea did not 
die.124 With their idealising gaze on Maoist China and the Cultural Revolution, 
which seemed to promise a nonbureaucratic, non- party- led revolution in every-
day life, Ensslin and Meinhof were not alone among the radical left of the early 
1970s.
For Jan- Carl Raspe, like Meinhof, imprisoned at Ossendorf, consumption 
was not the most prominent topic, but it featured importantly in some passages 
of his comprehensive diary- like reflections on issues of ideology and everyday 
politics. On the day before the early Bundestag elections in November 1972, 
which in some respects had turned into a referendum on Brandt’s Ostpolitik, 
Raspe observed that consumer politics constituted the main ideological chal-
lenge to the states of the eastern bloc. His recommendation on how to fend off 
this threat harked back to Mao’s China, the early Soviet Union, and the early 
German Democratic Republic: “The revolutionary answer would be the cul-
tural revolution, . . . the revolution in the superstructure, in the domain of ideol-
ogy, which would debunk consumer shit etc.”125 The question was whether the 
socialist countries’ economies had not already been so completely directed to 
the production of consumer goods that an economic about- face was impossi-
ble. Concerning the socialist countries’ ability to transform themselves, Raspe 
seems to have been more optimistic than Marcuse.
This assessment apparently leaned on the compilation work Civilizace na 
rozcestí (Civilisation at the Crossroads) by Czech philosopher Radovan Richta. 
This large- scale project involving sixty interdisciplinary scholars attempted to 
analyse the social and human implications of scientific and technological de-
velopment. In the context of attempts at restructuring the Czechoslovak econ-
omy, the aim was responsiveness to market- based consumer demand within the 
planned economy. The reformers drew on unorthodox western Marxists such 
as Marcuse and Erich Fromm. The impulses emanating from this project ulti-
mately contributed to the establishment of a “communist mass consumer soci-
ety” in Czechoslovakia during the 1970s.126 Raspe focused on Richta’s argu-
where she agreed that the masses “really drag off millions from department store and factory every 
day” (“Der Imperialismus bildet eine Einheit,” BAK, B/362, 3367,1, II/27/169).
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ments concerning the relationship between consumption and consciousness: 
“If R.R. is right, the passive acceptance of the cycle of consumption is only 
possible because capital is forced to dispossess consciousness via its agents— 
the state including its institutions as well as advertisement.” According to 
Raspe, this acceptance neutralised any desire for communism despite capital-
ism’s recurring crises. In this context, he, like his comrades, assumed a dupli-
cation of exploitation in the sphere of consumption and a deeply rooted desire 
of the masses for freedom and equality. He interpreted fascism as a symptom 
of failed integration through mass production and mass consumption. Echoing 
Meinhof, he stated, “Business will run only if the masses consume.”127 Arguing 
that the system mobilised the masses via consumption, Raspe clearly thought 
along Marcusian lines. He was convinced that material security was an abso-
lute precondition for the functioning of capitalist society. Compared to earlier 
forms of political ideology, there was an important novelty: “The values have 
acquired a material guise + identification loses its ideal character, gains mate-
rial character. It will thus be much more difficult to break it away.”128 Accord-
ing to Raspe’s anti- imperialist outlook, the masses of the developing countries 
that suffered in the interest of capital appeared to be the price for “progress + 
peace + consumer freedom here.”129 He attributed the “politicisation” that he 
observed “not among the masses, but among large parts” of the population to 
people becoming fed up “with the surrogates of consumption, absolute privati-
sation etc., which the ruling class have offered as gratification for the strict 
anti- communism of the masses since the 50s and 60s.”130
When it came to determining the RAF’s defence strategy at the Stammheim 
trial, which began in May 1975, Baader apparently made the decision not to 
focus on consumption. His key concept was “the war”: “You cannot explain the 
war via your needs, but you must be able to comprehend and explain the pro-
cesses that determine the war, from which it (+ those for whom it [sic] fights) 
derive.” Only a long- lasting war would bring forth a new society, new values, 
and new humans.131 Baader ultimately equated the RAF and “the war” with the 
revolutionary subject. Purpose and legitimisation— which featured in Mein-
Plains, 1969). See also Stefan Bollinger, “Der ‘Richta- Report’— Vergessene marxistische Alterna-
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hof’s papers on consumption— took a backseat. However, Baader still shared 
some of the RAF’s perennial convictions in assuming a “complex structure” 
consisting of “production process, consumption, mass communication” that 
inhibited the “mobilisation of the masses.”132 At one point, Baader lamented 
that political consciousness was a “pitfall of commodity society— the pitfall 
consisting of alienated production and alienated consumption.” From this per-
spective, the state’s measures against the militant prisoners, which they called 
“isolation torture,” appeared to constitute the system’s attempt to forestall any 
noncommodified identity.133 Ensslin similarly embraced revolutionary vio-
lence as a “productive force.” Armed politics appeared to be the only possible 
competition for “state monopoly capitalism.”134
In 1975, Meinhof also seems to have come around to a position that put 
the notion of struggle— “guerrilla/conflict/liberation”— at the ideological cen-
tre. But she was still looking for criteria to define this state. It was no longer 
“theft” but “renunciation of property,”135 which she now used to define revolu-
tionaries who subordinated their entire personalities to the goals of the collec-
tive. The RAF inmates thus qualified as guerrillas without property— the dia-
metrical opposite of affluent consumers. At one point, Meinhof wrote to her 
lawyer, Eberhard Becker, “If anything the pigs are ready to pack our cells with 
consumer shit rather than integrate us into the jails.”136
The 195- page statement that Baader, Ensslin, Meinhof, and Raspe read at 
the Stammheim trial on 13 January 1976 again shows an analysis of affluent 
society as a central plank in the RAF’s attempts to justify its acts. For them, the 
Old Left, including trade unions and the SPD, were not up to the task of draw-
ing the right conclusions from German history since they had succumbed to the 
consumption and privileges that a highly industrialised society offered.137 The 
RAF ideologues thought that West German mass consumption had emerged 
only in the mid- 1950s and hence only added a “material basis” to anti-
communism— the original mainspring of the colonisation of the masses’ con-
sciousness by U.S. imperialism. Mass consumption itself did not explain the 
132. Ibid., 219.
133. “andreas am 18.6.,” in texte, 90.
134. Gudrun Ensslin quoted in Alfred Klaus, “Bericht vom 15.1.1976 über die Auswertung des 
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135. Ulrike Meinhof, “an hamburg,” 7 October 1975, in das info, ed. Bakker Schut, 222.
136. Ulrike Meinhof to Eberhard Becker, 1973, BAK, B/362, 3370,1, XI/26.
137. Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, Ulrike Meinhof, and Jan- Carl Raspe, “Erklärung zur 
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masses’ negative attitude towards socialism. The RAF cadres believed that 
consumption served as a pointer to imperialist contexts.138 The vast quantities 
of commodities that the Marshall Plan furnished— not least with the intention 
of undermining the appeal of communist parties— served “as vehicles for the 
transport of U.S. imperialist ideology.” Quoting Marshall Plan administrator 
Richard M. Bissell, whose later career at the CIA made him a plausible target, 
the defendants tried to show that at least initially, the Marshall Plan was far less 
generous than was often assumed. In this interpretation, a purposeful expan-
sion of Europe’s capacity to consume was adopted only from 1949 onwards, 
when the United States realised the full economic potential of a constellation 
that addressed overproduction within the United States and channelled profits 
towards American companies. The aim was to deliver not food but the indus-
trial reconstruction of Europe in accordance with U.S. interests. Had the Mar-
shall Plan simply supported the interests of European consumers, it would have 
been a losing deal, a mere shifting of capacity to consume from the United 
States to Europe. The concerted expansion of European consumption capaci-
ties, however, generated profits while forestalling communism and letting the 
United States appear to be a benefactor. West Germany was the bridgehead in 
this endeavour.139
In this context, the “Korea boom”— the boost of the West German econ-
omy as a result of the increased demand in armaments induced by the Korean 
War in 1950— exemplified West Germany’s integration into the “imperialist 
cycle” as well as the connections among armaments, war, and economic up-
swing. The Korean War ultimately appeared to be a “precondition for the ef-
fectiveness of the anticommunist offensive in consumer culture.”140 West Ger-
man industry’s subsequent export orientation was then, at least in its initial 
phase, interpreted along the lines of a classical theory of social imperialism: 
the expansion of consumption capacities via increasing real wages was 
achieved by shifting capitalism’s contradictions to the periphery, a process that 
resulted in a “harmonious development” of class relations within West Germa-
ny.141
The document referred to the United States as “the centre of transnational 
corporations,” highlighting American development schemes: John F. Kenne-
dy’s Alliance for Progress and Walt Rostow’s takeoff model. The former aimed 
to establish economic cooperation between the United States and South Amer-
138. Ibid., 21.
139. Ibid., 37– 38.
140. Ibid., 42.
141. Ibid., 45.
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ica against the backdrop of the Cuban Revolution, seeking to prevent Latin 
American collaboration with the Soviet Union and rhetorically coupling mate-
rial progress with freedom. In The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non- 
Communist Manifesto (1960), Rostow envisioned an age of high mass con-
sumption as the ultimate goal of industrial modernisation, thus defining the 
American norm as integral to the economic progress of all developing societ-
ies. Rostow was again a somewhat plausible illustration for the RAF’s world-
view: a staunch anticommunist involved in the development of the Marshall 
Plan and a main figure in the Vietnam War as national security adviser to both 
Kennedy and Lyndon Baines Johnson. The defendants at Stammheim only 
mentioned these schemes, going into little detail, and castigated their “dema-
gogic function” when highlighting the millions of people who, according to 
statistics by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, suf-
fered from malnutrition.142 These huge figures implicitly were also meant to 
dwarf the four cases of murder and the fifty- four cases of attempted murder of 
which the RAF leaders were accused.
Baader, Ensslin, Meinhof, and Raspe argued that capital tried to force all 
countries into “imperialist accumulation” and embraced propaganda to create 
the corresponding “ideological climate”— for example, via “fascist Hollywood 
hero series.” Leaning on an article in Der Spiegel, the Stammheim defendants 
explained that American TV series— Kojak, Columbo, Bonanza, and Kung 
Fu— reached five hundred million viewers in ninety- five countries. They 
quoted a UNESCO study showing that “television with its universal language 
had proved to be an efficient instrument for the spreading of the ideology of 
consumption.” For the analysts of “soft power” avant la lettre, the ideology of 
consumption was made for “objects resigning themselves to their repression.”143 
The category of consumption as an abject indicator of imperialist power struc-
tures was firmly established in the RAF leaders’ thinking. It was no longer a 
question of proving this connection, but of applying it to diverse contexts: “bu-
reaucracies gobbling up national income . . . , luxury consumption, equipment, 
prestige objects, imperialist systems of communication and the corresponding 
programmes of brainwashing, the police apparatus, and first and foremost ar-
maments purchased from imperialist corporations.”144 The reformist impulses 
within the Warsaw Pact appeared as an “attempt at reconstructing the global 
142. Ibid., 96.
143. Ibid., 102; “Fernsehen: Sauce in Serie,” Der Spiegel 48 (24 November 1975): 178– 81; 
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market  .  .  . to arrive at a convergence of the systems via consumerist 
strategies.”145 Ostpolitik— a “social democratic project of neocolonialism”— 
appeared to be a new variant of a much older constellation that put the pressure 
on the Soviet Union. According to the RAF, imperialism’s “destructive poten-
tial” had encircled the Soviet Union and thus forced a specific “model of ac-
cumulation” upon it: the “development of heavy industries and consumer 
goods industries, surplus production to be utilised in armaments, thus surplus 
destruction with the consequence of aggravating shortages in consumption.”146
In her final writings, composed just weeks before her death, Meinhof still 
located the RAF’s struggle in a framework of the “manipulation of the masses” 
consisting of “a postfascist state, consumer culture, chauvinism of the metro-
pole, . . . the media, psychological warfare, social democracy.”147 She accused 
the Legal Left of merely marketing and consuming the memory of anti– 
Vietnam War activism.148 This construction swallowed the masses’ revolution-
ary impetus, turning mere indignation into a blunt weapon that necessitated 
armed struggle. Historically, she located a fateful convergence in New Deal 
Taylorism, which she understood as a method of splitting the proletariat: eco-
nomic struggle was shifted into the sphere of the state, social policy preempted 
class struggle with a depoliticising effect, and finally consumer culture— that 
is, mass production of consumer goods via assembly line production— entailed 
high wages at the price of an intensification of work.149
The RAF’s treatment of the Western Cold War strategy and of market- 
oriented policies since the New Deal is an interesting example of inversionary 
discourse: the radicals addressed many of the crucial tactics and strategies that 
policymakers in Washington and Bonn embraced, but from an anti- imperialist 
worldview, the successes of the Marshall Plan and Keynesianism appeared to 
be negatives since they contributed to the stabilisation of the system. There was 
agreement that stabilisation had occurred, but one side welcomed it and used it 
to legitimise its position in the postwar world order, while the other side em-
barked on a historical inquiry into the origins of the hated system of a depoliti-
cising materialism, which it sought to delegitimise.
In marked contrast to the scholarly literature, a few contemporary observ-
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ers highlighted the RAF’s far- reaching critique of consumer society and its 
corresponding culture revolutionary plank. East German dissident Wolf Bier-
mann, who in 1969 had donated ten thousand deutsche marks to Horst Mahler 
for the legal defence of West Berlin students, stated in July 1972, “Lenin said 
that the first shot must only be fired when the revolution starts. The commu-
nists from the Baader- Meinhof- Group risk their lives for the contrary position: 
that is to say, they want to prove that if at long last the first shot does not go off, 
the revolution will be slumbered and gorged away.”150 Social psychologist Pe-
ter Brückner went into more detail after he had been temporarily suspended 
from his university professorship under the terms of the 1972 Radikalenerlaß, 
which banned people deemed to be political radicals from public service posi-
tions. Brückner argued that the social- revolutionary revolt of the early 1970s 
implied a focus on the segments of society not integrated into the capitalist 
relations of work and consumption. This went hand in hand with radical resis-
tance against this destructive integration.151 What was often criticised as a con-
tradictory approach of trying to cater to both the privileged and the poverty- 
stricken was in fact an ambitious attempt to call the allegedly universal benefits 
of economic affluence into question and thus address the entire spectrum of the 
working population as potential opponents and victims of the capitalist system. 
Brückner points to contemporary phenomena such as increases in property of-
fences, squatting, citizens’ initiatives, and “revolts against pressure to perform 
and consumption.”152
The RAF’s early 1976 writings represent an end point to its critical focus 
on issues of consumption. January 1976 was the last time that the RAF’s at-
tempts to legitimise its position vis- à- vis the authorities and the public fo-
cused so explicitly on consumption. A quantitative analysis of the most com-
prehensive published compilation of RAF statements, Rote Armee Fraktion: 
Texte und Materialien zur Geschichte der RAF, provides a clear message: the 
term Konsum and its derivatives appear on 40 of the 379 pages covering the 
time between “Build the Red Army!” (June 1970) and Germany’s reunifica-
tion in October 1990. Only three of these references come from after Mein-
hof’s death in May 1976. In December 1984, RAF prisoner Brigitte Mohnhaupt 
came back to the historical analysis given in the January 1976 statement: con-
sumption was as a strategy to undermine the socialist states and the working 
150. Rote Hilfe, Dokumentation: Vorbereitung der RAF- Prozesse durch Presse, Polizei, und 
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class,153 and a 1986 declaration used the term Konsumterror to address a total-
ity of social control.154 With Meinhof’s departure from the scene, the most 
agile mind that had chosen to focus on issues of consumption no longer deliv-
ered impulses in this direction. Moreover, the culmination of the conflict be-
tween the RAF and the state during the German Autumn overshadowed the 
first generation’s project of a wide- ranging intellectual analysis as a backbone 
of their revolutionary endeavour. The second generation’s attempts to free the 
imprisoned cadres left a legacy of self- referentiality, and the successors did 
not attain the same intellectual scope.
Movement 2 June
The tradition of an explicit militant focus on issues of consumption was con-
tinued by Movement 2 June, which took its name from the day Benno Ohnes-
org died.155 This group was allied with the RAF but developed its own, more 
anarchist, ideology, at times criticising the tactics of its prominent comrades. 
The February 1975 kidnapping of the Christian Democratic Union’s candidate 
for mayor of West Berlin, Peter Lorenz, by Movement 2 June was not per-
ceived in the context of resisting regimes of provision, since the militants de-
manded the release of several imprisoned comrades, including Horst Mahler. 
However, in seeking to justify the kidnapping, Movement 2 June drew on is-
sues of distribution and moral economy. In a leaflet with a print run of thirty 
thousand, the activists explained how the paperwork that Lorenz carried 
showed him to be indifferent to price increases for public utilities. More spe-
cifically, he had no time for the distress calls of a mother of a child with Down 
syndrome who was in financial trouble while Lorenz earned in excess of 
twenty thousand deutsche marks per month. Adopting a Robin Hood pose, the 
kidnappers sent seven hundred deutsche marks they found on Lorenz to the 
woman. They wanted to redirect a party donation of ten thousand deutsche 
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marks from building tycoon Karsten Klingbeil to an aid organisation for dis-
abled people. The kidnappers stressed that Lorenz “buys up houses and land in 
urban renewal areas to demolish the old buildings and build apartment houses 
that no one can afford, or concrete blocks like Märkisches Viertel or Steglitzer 
Kreisel, where he was involved as a notary.” Then they asked, “How many 
shifts does a worker have to knock off to reach Peter Lorenz’s standard of 
living?”156
The authorities gave in to the militants’ demands and set the prisoners 
free, although Mahler refused to be exchanged. The kidnappers were eventu-
ally arrested. During their pretrial confinement in the summer of 1978, former 
member of Kommune I Fritz Teufel, Ralf Reinders, Gerald Klöpper, and Ron-
ald Fritzsch gave an interview to the journal Stern. When asked what personal 
and political experiences had led them to go underground and join the urban 
guerrillas, they included issues of consumption: “Family, school, factory, of-
fice, business, university, jail, concrete blocks, the entirely ordinary terrorist 
insanity of capitalist everyday life that drove youths onto the barricades all 
over the world, experimenting with new forms of struggle and of living to-
gether. The wish to lead an autonomous life. Not to be a dress- up doll, a little 
cog, a robot, a manipulated consumer idiot in a social as- if nature controlled by 
profit- seeking interests.”157
During their lengthy trial, members of Movement 2 June explained their 
ideological outlook. They considered violence an intrinsic feature of capital-
ism. Not unlike Meinhof, their historical perspective harked back to the New 
Deal, “the system that turned one’s own workers as consumers into a selling 
market.”158 Movement 2 June, openly declaring itself anarchist, believed that 
the principles of the ruling class would inevitably lead to the destruction of the 
planet. Despite apparent similarities with the RAF’s concept of violence, 
Movement 2 June differed in its outlook towards people representing the hated 
system. Reinders claimed that Movement 2 June saw Lorenz, who had been 
released after five days of confinement in a basement, not only as an enemy but 
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also as a human being, and he had been treated accordingly.159 Reinders be-
lieved that attacking the state or its representatives was insufficient. Resistance 
had to enter the realm of political economy and had to involve an alliance be-
tween militant groups and social movements: “First, we will squat in houses 
and keep them, and then entire districts. . . . We will first occupy the factories 
and then manage them ourselves. . . . We will scrap nuclear power plants just 
like all medium- range missiles and any other dreck.” Reinders acknowledged 
the Polish Solidarity movement as an explicit example. The task was to prevent 
isolation from social movements. The authorities must not be allowed to sever 
the bond between the forces of counterviolence and nonviolence. These 
thoughts clearly originated from a critical analysis of the RAF’s fate.160
However, the two militant groups had many parallels in their goal of a 
better world. Movement 2 June thought that two conditions had to be met so 
that human beings could find self- realisation: a just distribution of the goods 
and the abandonment of any manipulation of needs. This implied a positive 
image of human nature: “Man realises himself in creative, autonomous, thus 
non- alienated work and not in hanging around.”161 Reinders— again, not unlike 
the members of the RAF— gave an overview of Germany’s postwar history. 
Capitalism had steadily gained strength relative to socialism. His outlook on 
the so- called economic miracle was decidedly negative: “a system that drilled 
people in Konsumterror, that always went along with debt and made sure that 
not only fathers but mothers had to go to work as well.” According to Reinders, 
humans were subject to comprehensive compulsion: anyone who resisted was 
deprived of work or even prosecuted. In addition, the media led a veritable 
“war against the minds,” hammering into people “how important consumption 
was, how futile resistance would be, and how everything that did not conform 
to the beat- up capitalist norm posed a danger to the monthly instalments.”162 
Movement 2 June interpreted the contemporary economic situation as state 
monopoly capitalism, raising prices to the detriment of consumers, who had to 
resort to shoplifting.163 In times of crisis, the state had to support the corpora-
tions, to the detriment of the social infrastructure: “The interests of the entire 
society have to take a backseat to the interests of the capitalists. Fewer doctors, 
fewer teachers, bad hospitals and schools, expensive public transport, bad resi-
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dential and recreational spaces are the consequence.”164 Soaring unemploy-
ment figures meant that critiques of Konsumterror were receding into the back-
ground.165 The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the International Monetary 
Fund, the Trilateral Commission, and other such institutions seemed to uphold 
peace in their division of the Third World, but in reality, they fostered “wars of 
steel, cars, textiles, and currency.”166
During their trial, the members of Movement 2 June split into three fac-
tions: those who wanted to continue as before, those who joined the RAF, and 
those who embraced a concept of resistance harking back to the traditions of 
subversive action. When writing on the crisis of the Left in 1979, Teufel, one 
of the main advocates of the third approach, still used notions of consumption 
when invoking a radical identity. Adopting the tone of cowboy- and- Indian 
westerns, he addressed his “red sisters and brothers,” praised “collective free-
dom and collective happiness,” and associated them with intangible values: 
“Our love and solidarity, our fantasy, our courage, our patience, our determina-
tion, our cleverness, our tenderness, our ability to criticise and self- criticise, 
our hope is stronger than everything that palefaces can buy for money.”167 In 
1980, when he coined the term Spaßguerrilla (fun guerrilla), Teufel was still 
adhering to the old commune concept of gaining publicity via the calculated 
breaking of rules.168
This approach met with criticism from comrades who saw in this strategy 
and in the kidnapping of Lorenz only “short- lived victories” and “consumable 
rituals.”169 They wanted to dissolve Movement 2 June and join the RAF. This 
debate led to reflections on their history. A discussion paper by the imprisoned 
members clung to the established strategy and identified the protest movement, 
the first to embrace socialist ideas “after twelve years of Nazi terror and 20 
years of Cold War agitation,” as the root of the struggle. Glorifying “proletar-
ian youth” who took up militant resistance in the early 1970s, they character-
ised their fight as opposing three types of evil: heteronomy and oppression; 
indifference to genocide and imperialism; and finally “the insane capitalist 
consumer apparatus distorting human needs into the grimace of alien profit.”170 
164. Ibid., 721.
165. “Die Unbeugsamen von der Spree,” 121– 22.
166. “Schlusswortmarathon im Lorenz- Prozess,” 878.
167. Fritz Teufel, “Indianer weinen nicht— sie kämpfen,” in Klaut sie!, ed. Roth and Teufel, 
http://www.bewegung.in/mate_indianer.html (accessed 24 February 2011).
168. AG Spass muss sein!, Spassguerilla.
169. “Auflösungspapier 2. Juni,” 2 June 1980, http://www.bewegung.in/mate_aufloesung.html 
(accessed 24 February 2011).
170. Reinders, Viehmann, and Fritzsch, “Zu der angeblichen Auflösung.”
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Those who wanted to continue Movement 2 June favoured social- revolutionary 
goals over a “fetish” of violence. Drawing on Régis Debray’s A Critique of 
Arms, written in the context of South American guerrilla movements, members 
of this camp identified a distinct trajectory of decline of armed revolutionary 
struggle, beginning with the separation of “the violent method from its eco-
nomic and social areas of application” and ending with “left- wing terrorism” 
that remained aloof from the people.171
On 13 October 1980, Ralf Reinders, Roland Fritzsch, Till Meyer, Gerald 
Klöpper, and Andreas Vogel received prison sentences of between ten and fif-
teen years for the kidnapping of Lorenz. Teufel was acquitted on the kidnap-
ping charge but was sentenced to five years in prison for membership in a 
criminal organisation.172 Simultaneously, police experts had to “defuse” what 
appeared to be high- risk explosive devices at KaDeWe and Deutsche Oper 
Berlin. However, each package turned out to contain just an alarm clock, a 
bottle of water, and some Negerküsse (a candy similar to a chocolate marsh-
mallow), which, a note suggested, should be given to the children of the explo-
sives expert.173 Movement 2 June had pioneered the distribution of Negerküsse 
when trying to calm down customers during the robbery of two West Berlin 
banks in the summer of 1975.174 The candy subsequently became an oft- 
repeated symbol for a limited and “human” use of militant means. A confes-
sion about the fake bombs was printed in the journal radikal, explaining that 
Deutsche Oper was not only “a place for pseudo- educated consumers of cul-
ture” but also the stage for the Iranian shah’s 1967 visit, during which Ohnes-
org had been shot. The hoax at KaDeWe was meant to make it clear that “Mrs 
and Mr Clean cannot buy their junk goods completely undisturbed” while 
Movement 2 June comrades were sentenced “to languish in high- security 
areas.”175 An article printed in the same issue of radikal took a similar line, 
criticising the myth of armed struggle, which created hierarchies within the 
radical left. The author emphasised forms of everyday resistance and emblem-
atically praised an unnamed cheese thief at a Karstadt department store.
171. Ibid. Cf. Debray, Critique des armes.
172. Meyer, Staatsfeind, 416.
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Taktik” (13 October 1980), radikal 83 (1980): 5.
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The Autonomists
An emphasis on the everyday dimension of resistance, a subjective concept of 
the politics of the first person, and a refusal of hierarchies are characteristic of 
the Autonomen, a social movement that emerged in West Germany in the early 
1980s, chiefly in the context of the squatter movement.176 It is difficult to as-
cribe an unambiguous political or social ideology or a stringent theory to the 
only loosely federated autonomist groups. They acted not only in many local 
initiatives and campaigns but also as militant wings of the antinuclear move-
ment and the peace movement. The variety of topics they addressed went along 
with a range of legal and illegal practices of protest, from conventional demon-
strations to property damage and sabotage. Their ritualised militant confronta-
tion of the authorities frequently ran the danger of becoming an end in itself. 
Their eclectic theories combined elements of neo- Marxism, poststructuralism, 
and anarchism.177 As a matter of principle, they conducted their debates anony-
mously, often using colourful pseudonyms. The authorities heavily criminal-
ised their publications, such as the journal radikal, which declared its explicit 
sympathy with Movement 2 June.178
Radikal dedicated its December 1980 issue to the topic of consumption. 
A number of long letters to the editors discussed the significance of consump-
tion in the alternative milieu, thus outlining what might be called autonomist 
critiques of regimes of provision. The main focus was on negative effects of 
consumption, which resulted in the “repression of real needs,” turning “people 
into emotional cripples” and thus enabling the ruling classes “to prevent any 
resistance at the outset without openly employing any violence.”179 One author 
identified a new consumerism among the members of the Left, which he inter-
preted as a response to the more ascetic lifestyles of the 1970s. He observed 
insightfully that the professionally established adherents of the student move-
ment formed the potential for a new market segment. To this observer, the term 
Konsumterror still identified an important issue— the “dictatorship of the com-
modity,” which was “more effective than any other form of authority”— but it 
was discredited through dogmatic use. He called on the Left to undertake an 
“appraisal of its own needs” to regain the capacity to act politically: “A Left 
176. Anders, “Wohnraum,” in Das alternative Milieu, ed. Reichardt and Siegfried, 473– 98.
177. See Haunss, Identität in Bewegung; Schwarzmeier, Die Autonomen zwischen Subkultur; 
Schultze and Gross, Die Autonomen; Geronimo, Feuer und Flamme.
178. Freia Anders, “Die radikal und das Strafrecht,” in Herausforderungen des staatlichen Ge-
waltmonopols, ed. Anders and Gilcher- Holtey, 221– 59.
179. “Konsum als Droge,” radikal 85 (December 1980): 13.
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that seriously wants to fight the system of the jail and of the commodity must 
start very seriously to crack its own imprisonment in the net of consumerism 
and closely connected careerism.”180
Another contribution represented a shift away from issues of violence by 
putting the focus on individual change in left- wing lifestyles. Based on Erich 
Fromm’s best- selling book, To Have or to Be?, the author diagnosed an “alter-
native ideology” characterised by a search for a “recovery of intensity and use 
value.”181 This ideology argued for the replacement of the “grim greed for 
commodity- sensual stupefaction” with “self- awareness and self- liberation,” 
which, however, still appeared in the form of commodities, resulting in an al-
ternative “consumer ethos of the simple but nevertheless discerning . . . life.” 
At the same time, the author detected the downside of such a breakthrough: 
increased commercial exploitation of alternative lifestyles. These consider-
ations were explicitly inspired by Marcuse’s notion of “repressive desublima-
tion” and Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s concept of “deterritorialisation.”182 
The analysis led to a pessimistic but prophetic vision of the future: “What will 
remain is the part of alternative life, with which the anxiously inhibited masses 
can almost cope: the alternative consumer ethos.”183
While this author offered no suggestions for how to deal with the di-
lemma, a statement by a group calling itself the Smoking Bulldoozers [sic] of 
Alaska forcefully rejected the alternative movement’s consumer ethos. The 
Bulldoozers did not want to consume differently; they wanted to liberate desire 
from the capitalist economics of exchange value, which in their view caught 
any liberating impulses in a “net of consumption.” They sought to confront this 
inevitability with a concrete utopia of the here and now and a radicalised poli-
tics of the first person that uncoupled itself from the long- term objective of 
liberation: “We no longer prepare for our liberation or the world revolution . . . , 
we simply play . . . getting ourselves the hi- fi system we have always been keen 
on . . . , setting fire to Karstadt, not to protest against the murdering in El Sal-
vador; no, the winter is too cold for us, and this way it will get a little bit 
warmer on Ku[rfürsten]damm .  .  . and all of a sudden even the level of use 
value is left behind.”184 This was meant to be a radical departure from the alter-
180. Ulli, “Links vom Konsum?,” radikal 85 (December 1980): 13.
181. Harry Ticker, “Von Wilden, Kindern, alternativen Konsumenten,” radikal 85 (December 
1980): 14– 15.
182. See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophre-
nia, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis, 1987).
183. Ticker, “Von Wilden,” 15.
184. Rauchende Bulldoozer Alaskas, “Unterm Pflaster liegt der Asphalt,” radikal 85 (Decem-
ber 1980): 17.
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native milieu and its ideals of 1968. In September 1982, an autonomist group 
reappropriating the name Movement 2 June attempted an arson attack on a 
supermarket in Berlin’s Kreuzberg district. The incendiary device in a washing 
powder container did not go off. A statement of responsibility put shopping 
centres and supermarkets in the context of urban renewal and the hunger strikes 
of imprisoned comrades: “Supermarkets . . . will burn as long as they exist.”185
With an increased commercialisation of the public sphere as part of a 
boom in shopping centres and pedestrian zones, retail and business associations 
sought to ban undesirable elements— punks, hippies, homeless people— from 
shopping streets and enclosed malls. This effort was backed by rules of conduct 
for patrons that were enforced by private security agencies and ultimately by 
the police. The “undesirables” did not always go along with the new rules, and 
the realm of commerce became a contested terrain, raising far- reaching ques-
tions about the legal status of public streets and the semipublic sphere of retail. 
In November 1982, a meeting of punks protesting the new regime in the com-
mercial centre of Wuppertal ended with a massive police operation using batons 
and mace, countered by paint bombs, a campfire, and a quest for “job security 
among the glaziers.”186 A week before Christmas of that year, a group calling 
itself Revolutionärer Morgen (Revolutionary Morning) attacked Wuppertal’s 
“centres of consumption”— that is, department stores and large clothing 
shops— with butyric acid, an action that the perpetrators conceded was not  par-
ticularly successful because they did not use enough of the unpleasant- smelling 
chemical. However, they declared that they wanted to attack “organised inhu-
manity,” which resulted in people “missing out on their real needs, and basi-
cally only existing to secure the affluence of a few by working and consuming 
for them— by allowing them to determine our entire life.”187 The alternative 
daily paper taz dedicated an entire page to “Troublemakers in the Pre- Christmas 
Period,” reporting on attempts to disrupt commerce at KaDeWe by involving 
shop assistants in endless sales conversation, on violent encounters between 
punks and police in Hannover’s inner city, and on demonstrations in a Bochum 
department store. In some cases, police officers in riot gear shielded shop win-
dows and conducted security checks at entry points.188 Such activities had al-
185. Bewegung 2. Juni, “Erklärung zum Brandanschlag auf REAL in 36,” radikal 109 (October 
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(January 1983): 26.
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ready become an annual routine: at Christmas the preceding year, the 
Kurfürstendamm had been the scene of collective action, including the burning 
of Christmas trees, smashed windows, traffic blockades, and organised shop-
lifting. Activists were asked to send Christmas packages to prisons.189
Fourteen years and nine months after the Frankfurt department store ar-
sons, an incendiary device ignited the men’s clothes department of the Wert-
heim department store on the Kurfürstendamm. A statement of responsibility 
by a group calling itself the Hungernden Psychopathen (Starving Psychopaths) 
was printed in radikal. There were clear parallels with the events of April 1968: 
the device had been planted without warning but had been timed to go off dur-
ing the night, avoiding injury to people but causing considerable material dam-
age. The authors of the statement articulated a rather strong but diffuse discon-
tent with affluent society: “We meant to crack down on the ‘hunky- dory 
atmosphere’ right in the prestige heart of the pigs. . . . Just at the time of the 
annual Christmas junk, we’ve decided on a department store at the largest and 
most grotesque consumer racecourse of the Wild West city to add some flam-
ing authority to our permanent puking feeling.” The protest also included 
smashed windows at banks and supermarkets.190 Parallels ended when it came 
to publicity: department store arson barely received notice in newspapers in 
1982, perhaps because of fear of copycat arsonists. Only a fortnight later, a 
similar attack occurred in Munich, where an incendiary device was set off at 
the Hertie department store shortly before closing time, causing material dam-
age amounting to ten thousand deutsche marks. Rather arbitrarily putting the 
attack in the context of a struggle to prevent computers and data surveillance 
from taking over society, radikal commented that the attack was inappropri-
ately timed during business hours, but nevertheless, no one was hurt.191 A state-
ment of responsibility appeared in the journal’s next issue, stressing that the 
attack was meant to demonstrate that resistance was possible even in staunchly 
right- wing Bavaria. However, the belated justification seems primarily to have 
been intended to fend off criticism. While agreeing with much of the RAF 
programme, the perpetrators denied that they were just fellow travellers since 
they avoided injury to human beings. The explanation that they had set the fire 
on a staircase to avoid hurting anyone was dubious unless they counted on the 
189. “Festausschuß der Aktionseinheit “Spaßgerilja” und “Autonome Gruppen,” “Weihnacht 
’81,’” radikal 100 (January 1982): 3.
190. die hungernden Psychophaten, “Äktschen: Brennende Weihnacht,” radikal 112 (January 
1983): 6; Erregte Straßenarbeiter, “Äktschen: Klirrende Weihnacht,” radikal 112 (January 1983): 
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191. “München: Flammende Grüße,” radikal 112 (January 1983): 29.
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sprinkler system to extinguish the fire.192 The perpetrators of the 1982– 83 de-
partment store attacks  were never caught.
Awareness of radical practices targeting the commercial sphere was more 
pronounced among retail organisations in the early 1980s than in the late 
1960s, when the relevant professional journals more or less ignored it.193 A 
commentator fulminated that “a subculture of those who refuse to work and 
pay their rent is forming, and they, with the assistance of governmental funding 
and the occasional illicit employment, squat in houses, loot shops, devastate 
streets . . . and blithely and parasitically survive without contributing anything 
useful to the economy.” However, the author also acknowledged that even the 
Young Socialists of the SPD had opted for the socialisation of the department 
store corporations and for a transition to socialist forms of production.194 An-
other outraged commentary by a retail functionary reported on “directions for 
shoplifting by leftist troublemakers” in an autonomist journal: “Perhaps we 
can soon learn from these columns how to build Molotov cocktails, how to . . . 
set fire to department stores, how to organise demonstrations in the main shop-
ping streets, including the smashing of windows and showcases and subse-
quent looting to buy drugs?”195 Unbeknownst to the indignant tradesman, all of 
these radical practices were indeed debated in autonomist journals.
In the spring of 1983, a collective shoplifting spree took place in Berlin’s 
Kreuzberg district. People in black leather jackets took groceries from super-
markets and, posing as modern- day Robin Hoods, distributed the goods to 
passersby.196 In November 1983, radikal reported on a multipronged attack on 
KaDeWe: protesters dispersed butyric acid in the food hall, poured waste oil 
over toy tanks, and destroyed clothes with sulphuric acid.197 In March 1984, an 
arson attack targeted the West Berlin branch office of IKEA, causing material 
damage of ten thousand deutsche marks. The act protested the Swedish retail-
er’s “pseudo- leftist image” and its use of cheap prison labour in the production 
of its furniture.198
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The people analysed in this chapter did not belong to the very poor. They did 
not seek to fulfil their own needs but liked to think of themselves as acting on 
behalf of the downtrodden, the excluded, and the oppressed. They took an ac-
tive part in social groups that had begun to move forward to new conditions of 
life. Beneficiaries of West Germany’s affluence and  members of a broad pro-
test movement that rather successfully claimed cultural and political influence, 
members of left- wing intellectual circles  powerfully sought to reassert moral 
values developed against the backdrop of the horrors of World War II and Cold 
War confrontation. However, they found their path to the society and the re-
gimes of provision they imagined blocked. Their desires and ambitions were 
not completely implausible under the circumstances, given the breadth and 
impetus of the protest movement, and given the scenarios of a “realm of free-
dom” and communist society drawn up by eminent thinkers.
The concurrence of militant forms of protest and theoretical critiques of 
regimes of provision analysed in this chapter led activists to embrace ever more 
abstract and comprehensive notions of consumption and of consumer society. 
Especially for the RAF, the latter became an abstract political enemy that com-
bined social evils on many levels. The idea was to overcome consumer soci-
ety— or even consumption— as such, not simply to consume differently. The 
regime of provision they targeted was capitalist consumer society in its en-
tirety, including its global repercussions. The intellectual coupling of issues of 
consumption with affluent society’s inherent structures of violence— as pio-
neered by the broader protest movement— became a matter of course that no 
longer required explicit justification.
This chapter’s close reading of hitherto neglected documents and theo-
retical fragments such as Meinhof’s “Die Massen und der Konsum” and 
Raspe’s observation that consumer society gave a material quality to idealistic 
bourgeois values has established an idea previously overlooked by the existing 
literature: issues of consumption and critiques of regimes of provision were 
vital to the theoretical framework of the RAF’s first generation. A central goal 
in the RAF’s actions was overcoming the moral deficits its members saw as 
integral to consumer capitalism: alienation, exploitation, and destruction. Si-
multaneously, they perceived their peer group (the New Left) and the hoped- 
for revolutionary subject (“the masses”) as mired in the mechanisms of con-
sumer society and thus forced to reproduce the counterrevolutionary values of 
material progress and personal freedom. The antidote they prescribed was the 
Wallau, near Frankfurt, causing material damage in excess of seventy million deutsche marks was 
also caused by arson, but this cannot be verified.
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collective enterprise and discipline of system- transcending armed resistance. 
In a position of relative weakness, especially when imprisoned, the cadres of 
the RAF increasingly hoped that the marginalised, those who remained ex-
cluded from consumer society, would come to the activists’ revolutionary res-
cue by acting out their real needs. However, these hopes were frustrated by the 
reluctance of the vast majority of their contemporaries to pose the question of 
violence against a regime that seemed much less terrible than its predeces-
sor.199 From this perspective, the oft- cited disunity and inconsistency within 
the RAF seems less pronounced, since a good deal of common ground and 
continuity existed in the imprisoned cadres’ ambitious project of a militant 
neo- Marxist critique of capitalist consumer society. Differences occurred over 
questions of priorities and tactics. Meinhof’s attempt to differentiate between 
external and internal incitements to consume— that is, advertisements or pres-
sure to buy as opposed to genuine desires for freedom and equality— marks a 
significant departure from the student movement’s broader theories of manipu-
lation or depoliticisation and is not as naive as her official critics contended. 
Her emphasis on theft and other forms of illegal disobedience as a process of 
moral emancipation aimed to reestablish a connection with the neoanarchist 
subculture of the early 1970s and with the militant parts of the social move-
ments. In many respects, the RAF’s critique of capitalist regimes of provision 
helped to integrate their heterogeneous ideological portfolio, which, next to 
these neoanarchist influences, contained elements of communism, especially 
Maoism; the neo- Marxism of the Frankfurt School; the anti- imperialism of a 
proletarian internationalism; antifascism; and the concept of a revolutionary 
avant- garde in the urban guerrillas’ armed struggle. A critical analysis of con-
sumer society promised to actualise these ideologies, some of which had their 
roots in the past and in developing societies. Concrete pointers to issues of 
consumption helped to communicate abstract and at times contradictory ideas, 
especially with regard to the discursive strategy of amalgamating geographi-
cally and historically diverse grievances and forms of political violence in an 
attempt to legitimise the desperate revolutionary struggle.
After Ulrike Meinhof’s death, a related focus on issues of consumption 
was embraced by Movement 2 June and the emerging autonomist movement, 
which walked a  tightrope between solidarity with and criticism of the RAF 
and conceived of self- empowerment as bridging the gap between genuine 
needs and political resistance. They embarked on a battle against the commer-
cial adaptation of alternative subcultures and the commodity character of life-
199. These considerations are inspired by Dahrendorf, “Politics of Frustration.”
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styles. Causing material damage by triggering the sprinkler systems in large 
stores with rather limited incendiary devices became a repeated strategy for 
throwing spanners into the works of capitalist consumer society. Arson attacks 
on department stores occurred in the context of the squatters’ movement— 
December 1980 in Göttingen and July 1982 in Berlin— and as part of the pro-
tests against the meeting of the International Monetary Fund in West Berlin in 




Public Transport:  
Protest against Fare Increases
“The students who sat or stood on the tram tracks to thus blockade the tram 
traffic used violence to coerce the tram drivers to stop their vehicles.”
—Federal Court of Justice (1969)1
While the previous chapters focus on radical and militant challenges to com-
prehensive and abstract regimes of provision that culminated in a veritable re-
volt against capitalist consumer society, this chapter demonstrates that political 
violence also arose from more specific conflict over public commodities. The 
activists constantly faced the threat not only that their actions would be crimi-
nalised but also that violent escalations would occur. Civil disobedience and 
performative rule breaking frequently resulted in court cases where activists 
found themselves accused of violence— for example, when they blockaded a 
tramway to protest fare increases they deemed irreconcilable with basic social 
justice. In the contemporary legal discourse, the offence of coercion— even if 
limited or symbolic— implied violence.2 This principle was established by the 
Federal Court of Justice’s 1969 Laepple verdict, which is the obvious starting 
point for this chapter because it established a legal framework that was crucial 
for many subsequent confrontations arising from the use of blockades as a 
means of protest.
Protests against public transport fare increases peaked with Hannover’s 
spectacular 1969 Red Spot campaign, when protests caused the collapse of the 
1. Bundesgerichtshof, “Entscheidung vom 8.8.1969— 2 StR 171/69” (Laepple- Urteil), BGHSt 
23,46.
2. Freia Anders and Ingrid Gilcher- Holtey, “Prolog,” in Herausforderungen des staatlichen Ge-
waltmonopols, ed. Anders and Gilcher- Holtey, 11. On coercion, see Otto Backes and Peter 
Reichenbach, “Demonstrationsfreiheit und Gewalt: Die Gefährdung politischer Grundrechte 
durch das Strafrecht,” in Internationales Handbuch, ed. Heitmeyer and Hagan, 1339– 60.
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city’s entire public transport system and eventually forced the transport com-
pany and the municipality to rescind the increases. However, the issue was 
much more prevalent, affecting many West German cities from 1966 to the 
early 1980s. Specific groups radicalised the protests by introducing more mili-
tant means, which reduced the issue’s mass appeal. The Spontis— groups of 
political activists that sought to continue the traditions of the 1968 movement 
by invoking the spontaneity of the masses— gained particular momentum in 
Frankfurt, where their most prominent members, Joschka Fischer and Daniel 
Cohn- Bendit, invested the fare increase issue with high revolutionary hopes. 
The second important radicalising impulse came when the Revolutionäre Zel-
len (RZ) joined the fight against fare increases. The revolutionary cells were a 
decentralised network that emerged in the early 1970s in parallel with the RAF 
and Movement 2 June. The RZ sought to combine anti- imperialist and social- 
revolutionary motives, frequently leading to ideological divisions among indi-
vidual cells. Quantitatively, their more limited actions clearly outstripped those 
of the RAF and of Movement 2 June. According to the federal prosecutor’s 
office, the RZ confessed to 186 militant attacks between 1973 and 1993. In 
marked contrast to the RAF, and despite their involvement in some attacks that 
did claim human lives, members of the RZ repeatedly professed to their op-
position to killing people.3 The authorities rarely arrested RZ members be-
cause they did not go underground but combined clandestine illegal actions 
with legal political work within social movements.
The Laepple Case
The intellectual coupling of sit- in protest with violence entered German legal 
history in the verdict against Klaus Laepple, who was charged with “mental 
coercion” (geistige Nötigung) in October 1966. Laepple, a member of the 
Christian Democratic Union, was far from a revolutionary radical.4 He saw 
himself as a moderniser and displayed a knack for exploiting the student move-
ment’s potential for commercial purposes: “To students he opened up sources 
of supply at reduced prices, from furniture to franchised filling stations. . . . A 
Volkswagen was raffled off to raise the turnout for elections for the . . . student 
parliament. [He] justified the scope of this catalogue of consumer goods with 
3. “Anklage gegen ein Mitglied der ‘Revolutionären Zellen (RZ),’” 12 November 2000, http://
www.generalbundesanwalt.de/txt/showpress.php?newsid=23 (accessed 18 July 2011).
4. “Demonstrativer Dreikampf,” Die Zeit 9 (27 February 1970); Olaf Bartz, “Konservative Stu-
denten.”
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the jargon of a mail- order business: ‘We must attach importance to the service 
section to animate student self- administration.’”5 As chair of the integrative 
Arbeitskreis Kölner Hochschulen, he had taken responsibility for a demonstra-
tion against fare increases of up to 52 percent by the Cologne public transport 
services (KVG). While the demonstration initially proceeded peacefully, in-
cluding the removal of sit- in blockades by the police, confrontations in its af-
termath culminated in the use of mounted police and water cannon against 
protesters.6
The KVG took civil action against Laepple.7 Laepple was initially sen-
tenced to reimburse the KVG for two- fifths of the damage caused by the 
blockade— roughly eighty- nine thousand deutsche marks— because of his “il-
legal and culpable interference” with a business enterprise. This penalty cov-
ered loss of income but not any physical damage. The Cologne District Court 
ruled that Laepple’s conduct had not been covered by his office since it went 
beyond the realm of university politics.8 However, the resulting criminal case 
went all the way up to the Federal Court of Justice, which in 1969 rescinded 
Laepple’s earlier acquittal on the charge of “mental coercion” while clearing 
him on the charge of breach of the public peace: “The students who sat or stood 
on the tram tracks to thus blockade the tram traffic used violence to coerce the 
tram drivers to stop their vehicles. . . . An acknowledgment of a right to dem-
onstrate . . . would come down to the legalisation of a terror exercised by mili-
tant minorities, which is absolutely incompatible with a . . . constitution based 
on the principles of democracy and liberty.”9 What had started as a consumer 
protest was quickly bound up with the question of violence, and chief judge 
Paulheinz Baldus, who had been a high- ranking jurist during the Nazi period, 
freely invoked the notion of terror in the reasons given for the judgment. This 
wide concept of violence with respect to coercion established a precedent for a 
number of controversial rulings against sit- in blockades in the context of the 
peace movement and antinuclear protests of the 1970s and 1980s.10 The Fed-
eral Constitutional Court did not rescind this interpretation until 1995.11
 5. Eva Schmidt- Häuer, “Der ‘Provo’ von der CDU,” Die Zeit 1 (6 January 1967): 2.
 6. Ferdinand Ranft, “‘Schreien sie ruhig nach Demokratie . . .’: Studentenführer Laepple und 
die Grenzen des Demonstrationsrechts,” Die Zeit 43 (25 October 1968).
 7. Eva Schmidt- Häuer, “Der ‘Provo’ von der CDU,” Die Zeit 1 (6 January 1967): 3.
 8. “Zahlen soll er,” Die Zeit 14 (7 April 1967).
 9. Bundesgerichtshof, “Entscheidung vom 8.8.1969— 2 StR 171/69” (Laepple- Urteil), BGHSt 
23, 46. See also Zeidler, Merten, and Vogel, Recht auf Demonstration.
10. See Jürgen Baumann and Schwind, Ursachen, Prävention, und Kontrolle, 1:39.
11. See Freia Anders, “Die Gewaltfrage an der Startbahn West,” in Gewalt im politischen Raum, 
ed. Bulst, Gilcher- Holtey, and Haupt, 285.
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However, there were a number of contemporary critics. Richard Schmid, 
a prominent jurist and the former president of Stuttgart’s Higher Regional 
Court, pointed out in 1969 that what he considered an erroneously wide con-
cept of violence was based on the double meaning of the German word Gewalt, 
combining senses of violentia and potestas. Schmid called the verdict’s refer-
ence to terror “embarrassing”: “The abuse of the word bespeaks the fact that 
the criminal division [of the Federal Court of Justice], like many other citizens, 
. . . is reluctant to acknowledge the particularity of the student movement, es-
pecially of its methods. This results in the iniquitous equation with fascist, 
nationalist, or racist movements.” Schmid’s analysis of the protesters’ use of 
“violence” was equally lucid: these acts showed only “extrinsic characteristics 
of violence” but were “conceived as symbols of violence that are deemed to 
have a political impact.”12 Klaus Tiedemann, professor of criminal law at 
Gießen University, criticised the “artificially systematic” construction of the 
Laepple verdict: “This expansion of the penal concept of violence . . . with its 
persistent inclusion of so- called passive violence is ultimately based on politi-
cal considerations of crime prevention. However, for the concept of violence, 
these are unambiguously excluded by the wording of the law: the concept of 
violence is and will remain tied to the exertion of physical force. The mere sit-
ting or standing in front of a door, on tramway tracks, etc. does not comply 
with such requirements as to the deployment of kinetic energy; rather, it is 
mere stasis and perhaps action, but not violence.”13 Massive criticism of con-
temporary jurisprudence, and particularly of the Laepple verdict, was articu-
lated by the Frankfurt Higher Regional Court under President Curt Staff, who 
argued that in the final analysis, courts were guided by a concept of order de-
rived from “late absolutism.” According to staff, from this followed the idea 
that one must not infer violent intentions and hostility to the law (rechtsfeindli-
che Tendenzen) from acts of violence that occurred in the course of a demon-
stration. Otherwise, citizens might refrain from exercising their constitutional 
rights.14
12. Richard Schmid, “Was dürfen Demonstranten? Das Laepple- Urteil des Bundesgerichts-
hofs: ein Fehlurteil,” Die Zeit 38 (19 September 1969). On Schmid, see Hans- Ernst Böttcher, 
“Richard Schmid (1899– 1986): Recht für die Menschen, nicht für den Staat,” in Streitbare Juris-
ten, ed. Kritische Justiz, 487– 95.
13. Klaus Tiedemann, “Bemerkungen zur Rechtsprechung in den sogenannten Demonstrations-
prozessen,” Juristenzeitung 24 (1969): 720.
14. “OLG Frankfurt,” Kritische Justiz 3 (1970): 103; Dostal, 1968, 200– 202.
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Red Spot Campaign
At the same time that these debates about the Laepple verdict were taking 
place, much larger campaigns against fare increases were under way. Between 
1968 and 1975, a coalition of action groups that eventually became known as 
the Aktion Roter Punkt (Red Spot Campaign) organised protest campaigns 
against public transport fare increases in several West German cities. The most 
well known of these protests took place in 1969 in Hannover, where they were 
more comprehensive and successful than elsewhere. Despite their scope and 
significance for the development of left- wing protest, the conflicts over fare 
increases remain scarcely documented and hardly touched by historiography.15
In most cases, actions against fare increases were not limited to radical 
activists but enjoyed support from wider circles of society, including trade 
unions and youth associations. In January 1968, riots and damage to property 
resulted from such protests in Bremen. As in Cologne, young people— chiefly 
apprentices and pupils— demonstrating against fare increases were quickly as-
sociated with terror. Only a few days after the start of the protests, Bremen’s 
head of government, Hans Koschnick (SPD), said, “However much I support 
the right to free speech, forms of terror have been exerted here that we will now 
combat by the strictest means. I support firmer intervention of the police.” 
Demonstrators faced six hundred policemen and four water cannons while four 
public prosecutors prepared what a news report hyperbolically called “sum-
mary courts” (Schnellgerichtsverfahren) to deal with “radical elements” 
charged with damaging buses or throwing firecrackers and stones against 
trams.16 Prosecutors in Bremen did not immediately resort to the “mental coer-
cion” precedent from the Laepple case but preferred to pursue suspects on the 
basis of other elements of the offence, such as dangerous disruption of traffic 
(Gefährlicher Eingriff in den Straßenverkehr, section 315 b, d StGB). This ap-
15. Historiographical attention to the topic has so far been limited to regional perspectives: see 
Berlit, Notstandskampagne und Rote- Punkt- Aktion, 125– 43; Mechler, “Hannover und die APO”; 
Michelers, Draufhauen, Draufhauen, Nachsetzen! A comprehensive compilation of primary 
sources pertains to Freiburg: Archiv soziale Bewegungen & Stadtarchiv Freiburg, gleich wird’s 
grün. See also Kesten and Schröder, “Proteste gegen Fahrpreiserhöhungen.” For an autobiograph-
ical account, see Matthias Sesselmann, Von der APO zum Opa: Autobiographie und Gedanken 
eines 68ers (Erzhausen, 1987), 19– 24.
16. “Auch am Donnerstag Krawalle in Bremen: Lehrlinge und Schüler demonstrieren gegen 
Fahrpreiserhöhung,” Badische Zeitung, 19 January 1968, 5, in gleich wird’s grün, ed. Archiv so-
ziale Bewegungen & Stadtarchiv Freiburg, document 11109. See also “Bremen: Wie man meis-
tert,” Der Spiegel 5 (29 January 1968): 34; “‘Die Polizei muß psychologisch umrüsten’: Spiegel- 
Interview mit dem Bremer Regierungschef Bürgermeister Hans Koschnick,” Der Spiegel 5 (29 
January 1968): 36.
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proach allowed for an accelerated procedure (beschleunigtes Verfahren) that 
assumed the facts of the case to be simple and the punishment to be minor and 
thus provided for a depoliticised handling of protests that did not raise funda-
mental questions of violence.
In other cases, jurists showed a remarkable degree of independence. The 
question of how far Landfriedensbruch (breach of the public peace) could be 
imputed to all participants of a gathering that turned violent remained conten-
tious. Law professor and Free Democratic Party politician Jürgen Baumann 
protested efforts to hold “passive” participants accountable and demanded that 
only individual offences by “active” participants should be punished.17 A Bre-
men district court judge went a step further, acquitting an apprentice who had 
been accused of disruption of traffic and coercion on the grounds that “it is 
really a matter of general public interest to openly discuss unjustified— or even 
supposedly unjustified— fare increases by a monopoly company like the 
Bremer Straßenbahn AG and to force a review of these increases by appropri-
ate means.”18
The Bremen demonstrations and sit- ins ultimately had at least partial suc-
cess in effecting a review and reduction of the fare increases. A month after 
these protests, Rudi Dutschke gave an address to the International Vietnam 
Congress in Berlin in which he invoked the protesting pupils of Bremen in the 
same breath as “action committees for the expropriation of Springer” and revo-
lutionary movements in Greece, Vietnam, and Spain: “The Bremen students 
have demonstrated how the politicisation of immediate needs of daily life . . . 
can unfold a subversive explosive force.”19 The politics of daily life became a 
source of hope for the radical left.
Press reports about violence and conflicts with authorities as well as about 
the relative success of the Bremen protest activities, were instrumental in the 
transfer of this specific form of protest to other German cities. In early Febru-
ary, young people’s protests against fare increases in Kiel and Bochum entailed 
blockades, clashes with police, and stink bombs.20 Only weeks after the events 
in Bremen, flyers protested similar fare increases 570 kilometres further south 
in Freiburg. Some of these incidents put the question of public transport fares 
in the more general context of public spending by, for example, questioning 
17. Jürgen Baumann, “Schutz des Gemeinschaftsfriedens”; Dostal, 1968, 174– 75.
18. “Demonstranten: Volle Touren,” Der Spiegel 19 (6 May 1968): 49; “AG Bremen,” Kritische 
Justiz 1 (1968): 79– 80.
19. Dutschke, “Geschichtlichen Bedingungen,” 122– 23.
20. “Neue Krawalle und Stinkbomben: Mehrere Rädelsführer gestellt,” Die Welt 30 (5 February 
1968): 3, http://www.medienarchiv68.de/dl/206585/2743.jpg.pdf (accessed 5 June 2010).
152    Consumption and Violence
military expenditures or the maintenance of a local civil defence shelter. The 
seemingly peaceful university town in southwest Germany saw massive con-
flicts between demonstrators blockading traffic and hundreds of police offi-
cers. Water cannons were used for the first time in Baden- Württemberg when 
trying to clear streets and dissolve demonstrations. The police followed a rather 
uncompromising strategy: “With several riot squads [Greiftrupps], ringleaders 
should be extracted from the crowd and hauled away in prisoner transport wag-
ons standing by.”21 During the protest, water cannons damaged high street 
shops and targeted people in shopping arcades.22 A theology student was in-
jured on the university campus when police hit him over the head with a baton, 
breaking his glasses and injuring his eye and causing heavy bleeding and un-
consciousness. The extent of his injury was eventually disputed, with an offi-
cial and “objective” document signed by the mayor and district president dis-
missing reports that the student had suffered a detached retina and juxtaposing 
the incident with charges against demonstrators who had allegedly hurt a po-
liceman’s eye by throwing acid against a water cannon.23 The next day, Baden- 
Württemberg’s prime minister, Hans Filbinger (CDU) – who had to resign in 
1978 when it was discovered that as a military judge for the German navy 
during World War II he had been responsible for several death sentences – en-
dorsed the police’s conduct; the General Students’ Committee (AStA) retorted 
by likening the circumstances to the events of 2 June 1967 in Berlin.24
At this point the conflict had shifted to a journalistic debate on law and 
order, with the adversaries holding each other responsible for the emergence of 
violence, while the original criticism of fare increases had taken a backseat. 
However, the arguments that students printed on flyers and voiced at public 
21. Minutes of a meeting between municipality and police to protect public order, 8 February 
1968, in gleich wird’s grün, ed. Archiv soziale Bewegungen & Stadtarchiv Freiburg, document 
8955.
22. Winfried F. recollecting excessive use of water cannons against passersby in Freiburg’s city 
centre, 13 February 1968, in gleich wird’s grün, ed. Archiv soziale Bewegungen & Stadtarchiv 
Freiburg, document 2147; letter of an electric shop to the mayor’s office, 12 February 1968, in 
gleich wird’s grün, ed. Archiv soziale Bewegungen & Stadtarchiv Freiburg, document 9091; AStA 
Freiburg, “Freiburger Extrablatt” (flyer), 15 February 1968, in gleich wird’s grün, ed. Archiv so-
ziale Bewegungen & Stadtarchiv Freiburg, document 1684: 3.
23. “Der ungeklärte Zwischenfall: Schwerer Vorwurf des Allgemeinen Studentenausschusses 
gegen die schlagenden Polizisten in der Alten Universität,” Badische Zeitung, 12 February 1968, 
in gleich wird’s grün, ed. Archiv soziale Bewegungen & Stadtarchiv Freiburg, document 11363; 
draft for an official poster, “Der ungeklärte Zwischenfall,” 12 February 1968, in gleich wird’s grün, 
ed. Archiv soziale Bewegungen & Stadtarchiv Freiburg, document 9005.
24. AStA Freiburg, “Freiburger Extrablatt” (flyer), 15 February 1968, in gleich wird’s grün, ed. 
Archiv soziale Bewegungen & Stadtarchiv Freiburg, document 1684, p. 1.
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meetings were still noteworthy. They stressed the public nature of transport 
services and highlighted their essential function of relieving the inner city from 
traffic congestion: “A motorist and his car need 30 to 50 times as much space 
as the same person riding the tram.”25 Dismissing purely financial concepts of 
public transport fares, they saw cheap fares as good public policy. Public trans-
port did not have to cover its costs. Freiburg’s AStA chair also noted that the 
municipality had neglected to protest the inclusion of public utilities in the new 
value- added tax system.26
The value- added tax was a partial trigger for the wave of protests against 
public transport fare increases. On 1 January 1968, the Federal Republic of 
Germany introduced a new value- added tax in keeping with a European Com-
munity mandate to establish a general, multistage, but noncumulative turnover 
tax. This major tax reform led to some consumer price increases because it al-
lowed producers and traders to reclaim the value- added tax they paid either 
from the tax office or from their customers. The complicated and fraud- prone 
new system proved a cash cow and simplified production and commerce by 
replacing the old cumulative turnover tax, but it left the end consumer with the 
value- added bill. Many retailers used the new tax system to inflate prices— for 
example, by adding the value- added tax without subtracting the old turnover 
tax. Some public transport services also did so.27
The new tax was only one aspect of protesters’ socioeconomic arguments, 
which highlighted other crucial questions of distribution. The municipality 
built roads and car parks without charging users additional fees, but the costs 
of public transport had to be borne by its users. Even the authorities’ rigorous 
attempts to clear the inner city of blockades and demonstrations seemed driven 
by interests bound up with commercial consumption and powerful economic 
interests. An AStA flyer in the style of a newspaper quoted a report from the 
region’s subscription newspaper, Badische Zeitung, in which tradespeople la-
mented significant decreases in business: “A large department store . . . esti-
mated the damage already caused by the demonstrations at 100,000 to 120,000 
25. Ibid., 2.
26. Minutes of a public meeting of the municipal council at the Historic Merchant Hall at 
Freiburg’s Münsterplatz, 15 February 1968, in ibid., document 9379, p. 61.
27. See Werner Sporbeck, Die neue Umsatzsteuer (Mehrwertsteuer) in ihrer Auswirkung auf 
die Gemeinden (Göttingen, 1969); “Mehrwertsteuer: Geburt eines Goldesels,” Handelsblatt, 28 
December 2006, http://www.handelsblatt.com/mehrwertsteuer- geburt- eines- goldesels;1197920 
(accessed 26 March 2010); “‘Nehmen’s halt ein Taxi’: SPIEGEL- Interview mit Bundesfinanzmin-
ister Franz- Josef Strauß über die Mehrwertsteuer,” Der Spiegel 3 (15 January 1968): 26– 27; 
“Mehr wertsteuer: ganz entsetzlich,” Der Spiegel 2 (8 January 1968): 25.
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marks.” The students also pointed out that the police had started to clear the 
streets by force the day after a representative of the large department store had 
met with the mayor to press for a quick termination of the demonstrations.28
While at this point student protesters were still far from militantly chal-
lenging the state, a somewhat exaggerated account of students “storming” the 
Freiburg District Court to free their detained comrades in arms— a rather ste-
reotypical image of revolutionary activity— was spread by the mayor and was 
picked up by the Berlin tabloid press and the Observer.29 The protesters, on the 
other hand, believed that authorities were following a strategy of criminalisa-
tion. A flyer quoting article 20 of the Federal Republic’s basic law— “All state 
authority is derived from the people”— argued, “Deploying water cannons and 
police cordons insinuates that the demonstrators are in the wrong. ‘Ringlead-
ers’ were . . . arrested and detained overnight. . . . But there are no ringleaders: 
the demonstration continued without them, even grew. . . . This is how they try 
to destroy the political concerns of the demonstration.”30 Only “disruption of 
public order” (Ordnungsstörung) appeared to give the protests the weight nec-
essary to force the municipal authorities to at least reconsider the issue of fare 
increases.31
When Mayor Eugen Keidel (SPD) convened the municipal council to de-
bate the issue of fare increases again, he delineated what he considered the le-
gitimate realm of the political: “The reestablishment of order in Freiburg is a 
matter of the primacy of the political— more precisely, national political 
[staatspolitischen]— solution over the solution of violence. . . . In a democracy, 
the use of the police . . . can only be the very last resort— i.e., if political mea-
sures and all political will were unable to convince an undemocratic minority 
of the constitutional legality [Rechtsstaatlichkeit] of the political procedure.” 
The mayor seemed rather certain about who was democratic and who was not. 
He did not differentiate between legality and legitimacy, reserving the right to 
use force against those who remained unconvinced by the established political 
28. AStA Freiburg, “Freiburger Extrablatt” (flyer), 15 February 1968, in gleich wird’s grün, ed. 
Archiv soziale Bewegungen & Stadtarchiv Freiburg, document 1684, p. 2.
29. Draft of an official placard, “Der ungeklärte Zwischenfall,” 12 February 1968, in gleich 
wird’s grün, ed. Archiv soziale Bewegungen & Stadtarchiv Freiburg, document 9005; “Tumult vor 
dem Amtsgericht,” Bild- Zeitung, Berlin, 8 February 1968, in gleich wird’s grün, ed. Archiv soziale 
Bewegungen & Stadtarchiv Freiburg, document 11296; “Crisis Near as Student Revolt Rocks 
Bonn,” Observer, 11 February 1968, 7.
30. Aktionsgemeinschaft gegen die Fahrpreiserhöhung, “Was ist los in Freiburg?” (flyer), 8 
February 1968, in gleich wird’s grün, ed. Archiv soziale Bewegungen & Stadtarchiv Freiburg, 
document 1694.
31. AStA Freiburg, “Freiburger Extrablatt” (flyer), 15 February 1968, in ibid. document 1684, 
p. 3.
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process. Keidel also reflected on the precedent that the events in Bremen had 
created, but he claimed that Freiburg was facing a much more difficult finan-
cial situation than the “rich port and trading centre” as a consequence of its 
growth, its lack of industry, and the reduction in subsidies from the Land for 
student tickets, among other factors. The council, whose meeting was broad-
cast over loudspeakers in the town hall square, decided to stick to the fare in-
creases with only minor social concessions and an additional weekly ticket.32 
Demonstrations and protests did not flare up again. The Sozialistischer 
Deutscher Studentenbund (SDS) distributed flyers advertising its Berlin Viet-
nam conference.33
In Hannover in 1969, the anti- fare- increase coalition had more success, 
eventually forcing the private transport services company to rescind the in-
creases.34 Here as well, the physical confrontation started when police tried to 
dissolve sit- in blockades with batons and water cannons. A much- criticised 
police operation took place 10 June 1968, when authorities confronted a far- 
reaching challenge to the legitimacy of their conduct: they were associated 
with Nazi Germany. A well- publicised picture showed demonstrators dismiss-
ing withdrawing police with the Nazi salute.35 “Polizei, SA, SS,” became a fa-
vourite chant, often intoned under clouds of tear gas, which was used because 
water cannons were deemed too dangerous because of overhead power lines. 
Hannover’s chief of police characterised the tear gas as a “mild means” of re-
storing order.36 The atmosphere became especially tense when protesters tried 
to remove officers’ gas masks and when the activists were encircled by hun-
dreds of police officers. Police, facing between two thousand and five thousand 
demonstrators, had orders to use their batons only in cases of emergency and 
their firearms only in cases of extreme emergency. However, the former were 
used frequently, and the protesters and those arrested suffered many injuries. 
The contrast between uniformed and armed policemen wearing gas masks and 
32. Minutes of a public meeting of the municipal council at the Historic Merchant Hall at 
Freiburg’s Münsterplatz, 15 February 1968, in ibid., document 9379, appendix 3.
33. Schulze [probably police officer], report on student demonstration against planned fare in-
creases, 16 February 1968, in gleich wird’s grün, ed. Archiv soziale Bewegungen & Stadtarchiv 
Freiburg, document 9058; SDS Freiburg, “Informationen zum Vietnam- Kongress 17./18. Februar 
in Berlin,” in gleich wird’s grün, ed. Archiv soziale Bewegungen & Stadtarchiv Freiburg, docu-
ment 9059.
34. See Berlit, Notstandskampagne und Rote- Punkt- Aktion, 125– 43.
35. Printed in ibid., 134; “Schöne Anarchie,” Der Spiegel 26 (23 June 1969): 72; Mechler, 
“Hannover und die APO,” 140.
36. Chief of police Fritz Kiehne quoted in “Schöne Anarchie,” Der Spiegel 26 (23 June 1969): 
72.
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plainclothes demonstrators was stark and did not facilitate communication.37 
The situation was not improved when Mayor Otto Barche (SPD) justified the 
use of water cannon as necessary in the “fight against anarchism.”38 The emer-
gence of violent confrontation apparently attracted additional protesters who 
were outraged about police brutality.39 Police subsequently took a much more 
cautious line in the face of protesters’ growing solidarity, which called into 
question the strategy of singling out ringleaders.40
Student protests in Hannover forged a wider alliance with other citizens 
who sympathised with criticism of the fare increases. The consumerist plat-
form played a role in this success. Der Spiegel reported that the “housewives 
with their shopping bags” standing in front of department stores were not 
afraid of the students who demonstrated in front of them; some women even 
joined in. The protests had the potential to appeal to a majority. The basic line 
of reasoning was simple: the Überlandwerke und Straßenbahnen Hannover AG 
(ÜSTRA) had raised fares three times in five years, while service was on the 
decline and the dividends on the stock corporation’s annual profit of 1.6 mil-
lion deutsche marks remained unchanged at 6 percent. Some protesters sug-
gested that ÜSTRA should be transferred to community property or given tax- 
exempt status.
The protests were accompanied by the remarkable creation of a success-
ful alternative regime of provision. The red spot came to symbolize a well- 
organised system of hitching lifts in private cars that replaced the paralysed 
public transport system, especially after ÜSTRA completely ceased operations 
on 12 June 1968. Thousands of motorists displayed the red spot behind their 
windscreens, while those in need of rides held up spots at converted tramway 
stops. Eventually, even the municipal government, assisted by several newspa-
pers, printed and distributed large numbers of cards bearing the red spot, thus 
trying to capture the grassroots campaign. During this “extraordinary week of 
fraternity,” there were numerous instances when local shop owners supported 
protesters by offering them free goods. A spokesman for the German Commu-
nist Party, which supported the campaign but gained only marginal influence, 
pointed out that the tramway tracks belonged to the citizens of Hannover. The 
SDS proclaimed that “automobiles were no longer private property but had 
become socially useful means of transport” and raised the possibility of free 
37. Berlit, Notstandskampagne und Rote- Punkt- Aktion, 130.
38. Bernd Michels, “ÜSTRA Blockade: Hauch von Anarchie,” konkret 14 (30 June 1969): 7.
39. Ibid.
40. Mechler, “Hannover und die APO,” 141.
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fares.41 A flyer proclaiming “Beautiful anarchy!” stressed that “this spontane-
ously organised solidarity is something entirely different from the profit- 
oriented system to which transport and the rest of the economic system are 
subject.”42 The blockades of tramways became more efficient and less prone to 
expose individuals to the charge of coercion: when the city council issued a 
first nonbinding and not very far- reaching compromise proposal on 14 June 
1969, protesters simply filled the tracks with concrete overnight.43
After eleven days of blockades, protesters celebrated a remarkable suc-
cess: the political authorities gave in and lowered the fares to a uniform tariff 
of fifty pfennigs.44 Basically the government had bought out the public trans-
port company with state subsidies. Moreover, Preußenelektra, ÜSTRA’s ma-
jority shareholder, renounced an already approved but much- disputed dividend 
payout of 1.4 million deutsche marks.45 Fear of violent escalation was central 
to the government’s crisis management. Lower Saxony’s interior minister, 
Richard Lehners (SPD), said that “permanent street battles” would have been 
needed to dissolve the blockades: “It would be easy to fill the hospitals, but I 
cannot give a firing order, not me.”46 When the transport company complained 
about the lenient police operation, authorities responded with the sober state-
ment that the “operation of the streetcar and bus services with defensible means 
of policing seems impossible.”47
However, this success also took the wind out of the Hannover mass move-
ment’s sails. The SDS failed in its attempts to continue the protests with the 
ultimate goal of free public transport or to transfer the protest potential to other 
issues. Commentators such as Klaus Rainer Röhl argued that student activists’ 
far- reaching demands amounted to “anarchism” and “revolutionary impa-
tience” and were alienating the working class; nevertheless, he hoped to pre-
serve the protest’s wide social support, which clearly transcended small groups 
of student radicals.48 Appalled by an incident in which workers had burned red 
flags waved by members of the SDS, Uwe Nettelbeck went a step further, con-
41. “Schöne Anarchie,” Der Spiegel 26 (23 June 1969): 72– 74.
42. “Wir lassen uns nicht für dumm verkaufen!,” flyer quoted in Berlit, Notstandskampagne 
und Rote- Punkt- Aktion, 137. See also Bernd Michels, “ÜSTRA Blockade: Hauch von Anarchie,” 
konkret 14 (30 June 1969): 6– 8.
43. Mechler, “Hannover und die APO,” 143– 44.
44. Bernd Michels, “ÜSTRA Blockade: Hauch von Anarchie,” konkret 14 (30 June 1969): 6– 8.
45. Mechler, “Hannover und die APO,” 144.
46. Lehners quoted in “Schöne Anarchie,” Der Spiegel 26 (23 June 1969): 74.
47. “Stellungnahme der Polizeidirektion zu Vorwürfen der Üstra,” Autumn 1969, quoted in 
Berlit, Notstandskampagne und Rote- Punkt- Aktion, 134.
48. Klaus Rainer Röhl, “Roter Punkt und rote Fahnen,” konkret 14 (30 June 1969): 5.
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demning the entire campaign as “social- fascist attempts at solidarity with the 
character of the Volksgemeinschaft.” He mocked the “defeat of Hannover”: the 
next fare increase was certain to come. The “dubious popular front” that 
stretched all the way to Springer’s tabloid Bild had proved incapable of trans-
muting social demands into political mobilisation. Other campaigns of the pro-
test movement— such as the anti- Springer campaign— originated from late 
capitalism’s crisis of legitimacy, while the outcome of the Hannover protest 
provided the welfare state with an opportunity to veil its illegitimacy by grant-
ing social comforts, a result facilitated by the fact that part of the protest move-
ment aspired only to individual and private freedom.49 Without expressing it in 
such terms, Nettelbeck had lucidly diagnosed that protest in the name of the 
consumer was problematic if one simultaneously saw smooth consumption as 
stabilising the system via veiling its lack of legitimacy. Consequently, he em-
braced forms of protest that went against the contemporary consumer and as-
pired to revolutionary solutions. But anti- fare- increase protests had by no 
means completely exhausted themselves in the summer of 1969, and they were 
in many respects more political than Nettelbeck conceded.
ÜSTRA was municipalised in 1970, and as Nettelbeck had predicted, the 
next fare increase came in March of that year without triggering significant 
protests. This time the police occupied strategic tramway intersections from 
the outset, and the authorities had cleverly chosen to implement fare increases 
during the winter.50 Perhaps the protest’s most significant success was the 
transfer of the protest pattern— blockade and red spot— to other cities. Only 
days after the resolution of the Hannover protests, the Baden- Württemberg 
government decided to end similar protests in Heidelberg by instituting state 
subsidies that rendered the disputed fare increases unnecessary.51 Such posi-
tions offered an obvious contrast to that taken a year earlier in Freiburg.
A commentary in the newly founded independent Marxist journal Rote 
Presse Korrespondenz emphasised that the legitimisation for police operations 
had been tarnished.52 However, tramway campaigns must not be misunder-
stood as attacking the consumption sector as such: “The success of tramway 
blockades in several cities suggests the dangerous conclusion that it was finally 
the right moment to initiate the definite destruction of consumer terror 
49. Uwe Nettelbeck, “Notabene Hannover,” konkret 15 (14 July 1969): 3.
50. Mechler, “Hannover und die APO,” 146.
51. Bernd Michels, “ÜSTRA Blockade: Hauch von Anarchie,” konkret 14 (30 June 1969): 8.
52. “Rote- Punkt- Aktion in Heidelberg,” Rote Presse: Korrespondenz der Studenten- , Schüler- , 
und Arbeiterbewegung 31 (19 September 1969): 13.
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[Konsumterror].”53 The authors of this piece were convinced that such a per-
spective would “overestimate the consumption sector” as a field of class strug-
gle and unduly neglect the sphere of production. Would bakeries be occupied 
only because the prices for rolls went up, and would protesters then take bak-
ing into their own hands, as they had done with the improvised public transport 
system? They saw the political relevance of the anti- fare- increase protests not 
so much in the effective reduction of fares and more in clearly illustrating that 
the state employed its means of violence not on the side of consumers and 
workers but on that of the producers and employers. Faithful to Marx’s theory 
of the state, the revolutionaries sought to expose “the state as a service enter-
prise for capital” and “to transfer the proletarian’s state of consciousness from 
being fixated on the sphere of consumption to class consciousness.” Within this 
framework, they clearly saw and welcomed political agitation against fare in-
creases, which were easy to legitimise since they took place where people col-
lectively confronted the increases— on the streets— as well as easy to commu-
nicate, since everyone had an interest in cheaper fares. A tramway had nothing 
luxurious about it, and it was immediately clear that its chief purpose was to 
get people to work.54 However, the important aspect of the protests was the 
blockades, since they posed the question of power. Without blockades, the red 
spot campaign would have degenerated into a mere service enterprise.55
What remained across Germany was a clear sense that users of public 
transport could make a difference when resorting to rigorous means. In 1971, 
a song by the rock band Ton Steine Scherben became a hymn for the fare dodg-
ers. “Mensch Meier” raised the scenario of the Berlin public transport services 
burning. On the album cover, the band called on people to dodge fares, point-
ing to the military spending of public money: “For the price of the Starfighters 
of the . . . armed forces, we Berliners could ride for free for an entire year.”56 A 
year later, a flyer signed with the pen name Leo Jogiches, a founding member 
of the Spartacus League, called for free fares and broadened the issue to in-
clude a payment strike on public services. The question of collective public 
consumption was broached in neo- Proudhonian terms with reference to arma-
ments and prestige building projects: “We pay with our taxpayers’ money for 
the Berlin Transportation Company (BVG). . . . They are allowed to destroy our 




56. Ton Steine Scherben, Mensch Meier/Nulltarif.
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organised theft through organised resistance!”57 After the demise of the SDS, 
leadership in protests against fare increases shifted to communist groups such 
as the German Communist Party or the Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterju-
gend.58 The Hamburg Proletarische Front organised fare- dodging campaigns, 
justifying them with an analysis of the proletarian daily grind: “One is redevel-
oped away from the inner city to the suburbs, has to commute an hour to get to 
the factory, and the heftiest increases are  .  .  . for long journeys.  .  .  . 1 hour 
journey there; 2 hours work for one’s wages, 7 hours work for the big shots, 
therefore more than a quarter of an hour per day for the ticket alone.”59 The 
equation of journey time and labour time by a proletarian group is significant, 
given the general shift of focus away from production- related protest and to-
wards issues of consumption. More generally, fare dodging became a wide-
spread and publicly acknowledged phenomenon during the early 1970s. Re-
peat offenders faced criminal proceedings and ultimately imprisonment.60
The Frankfurt Spontis
A massive presence of state violence accompanied the protests against fare 
increases that flared up around the country. The most prominent such episode 
was the 1974 protests against the Frankfurt public transport association involv-
ing the Spontis, including Joschka Fischer and Daniel Cohn- Bendit.61 Cohn- 
Bendit summarized how consumer protest was quickly confronted with force 
and violence: “When the fight against the fare increases took place in Frankfurt 
in 1974, the tramways were blockaded. The cops took positions all over the 
city centre, and after a week it was impossible to even conduct a demonstra-
tion, 500 people were arrested, and everyone got scared.”62 A high school stu-
dent was knocked over by a water cannon and seriously injured.63 The incident 
led to complaints about disproportionate violence and arbitrary justice.64 Con-
57. L. Jogiches, “I. März: Fahrpreiserhöhung? OHNE UNS!” (flyer), 29 February 1972, Archiv 
Grünes Gedächtnis, Berlin.
58. Bundesministerium des Innern, Verfassungsschutz, 30.
59. “Schwarzfahren = Geld sparen,” Wir wollen alles 10 (November 1973): 16.
60. “Wer uns beschiebt: In Bussen und Bahnen fahren immer mehr Leute schwarz,” Der Spiegel 
42 (9 October 1972): 65– 66.
61. See Schütte, Revolte und Verweigerung; Kraushaar, “Frankfurter Sponti- Szene.”
62. Cohn- Bendit, Der große Basar, 65.
63. “Gegen Fahrpreiserhöhung und Polizeiterror— Nulltarif,” Wir wollen alles, insert: Häuser-
ratszeitung, in Carlo Sponti 18– 19 (1974): 2.
64. See RK [Revolutionärer Kampf]- Redaktionskollektiv der WWA, “Chronik: Kampf um die 
Strassenbahntarife in Frankfurt,” Carlo Sponti 18– 19 (1974): 3; “6 Monate für nicht stattgefun-
denen Landfriedensbruch,” Rote Robe 1 (28 February 1975): 32– 34.
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versely, systematic sabotage of ticket vending machines and violence against 
ticket inspectors had become well- established practices.
The “spontaneist” Frankfurt Revolutionärer Kampf (Revolutionary 
Struggle) was a latecomer to the issue of fare- increase protests, embarking on 
its vigorous protest campaign against the Frankfurter Verkehrsverbund after 
the group’s commitment to a related political issue, the Häuserkampf involv-
ing the politics of housing and squatting, had more or less ground to a halt. 
Beginning in May 1974, supporters agitated in factories and urban areas try-
ing to drum up support for a boycott of the trams and demanding free fares 
and paid travel time to and from work, a demand that exceeded those of earlier 
fare- increase protests.
The Spontis’ involvement in the conflict over fare increases contributed 
to a radicalisation that intensified beyond what had happened in Hannover and 
Bremen. From their experience with the Häuserkampf and strikes, the Spontis 
had concluded that protests that did not employ violent means were bound to 
be ineffective. The state’s structural violence had to be resisted: “If the gov-
ernment wants to enforce fare increases with a linked transport system and 
police, this is violence, violence against the interests of the working popula-
tion. . . . Anyone who wants to protest the fare increases will also have to say 
how to take practical action against them, will have to counter the magistrate’s 
violence with the violence of those affected.”65 From this perspective, the is-
sue of fare increases was immediately coupled with violence and “police ter-
ror” (Polizeiterror).66 On 21 May 1974, ten days after the first demonstration 
against the increases, agitation intensified, and flyers called for improvised 
collective insurance schemes to pay fines for fare dodging and resistance 
against ticket inspectors.67 When the disputed network fares were introduced 
despite the protests on 26 May, barricades went up on tramway tracks. The 
activists frequently clashed with the police: “Water cannons were constantly 
driving in front of the trams to prevent them from being brought to a standstill 
that would have enabled passengers, passersby, and demonstrators to jointly 
discuss the fare increases. Police squads were guarding stops. . . . Using ba-
tons, tear gas, and water cannons, police tried to clear the Zeil [one of Ger-
many’s busiest shopping streets]. Numerous injured . . . and arrests were the 
city’s response to demands for a retraction of the fare increases. . . . [T]ear gas 
was sprayed into demonstrators’ eyes at close range, helicopters pursued indi-
65. “Gegen Fahrpreiserhöhung und Polizeiterror— Nulltarif,” Wir wollen alles, insert: Häuser-
ratszeitung, in Carlo Sponti 18– 19 (1974): 2.
66. Häuserrat Frankfurt, Wohnungskampf in Frankfurt.
67. Revolutionärer Kampf and Redaktionskolletiv Wir wollen alles, “Chronik: Kampf um die 
Strassenbahntarife in Frankfurt,” Carlo Sponti 18– 19 (1974): 3– 4.
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viduals right to their front door, and gave detailed instructions by radio, lead-
ing to arrests.”68
The red spot concept was only introduced belatedly, after hostilities were 
already under way. After initially denouncing red spot campaigns as a failure 
given the moderate outcome of Hannover, the Spontis admitted a mistake. 
However, the tactic failed to draw in wider circles of the population and had 
only moderate success.69 Unlike Hannover in 1969 and unlike the Spontis’ 
earlier successes on housing issues, mass support was not forthcoming. The 
Frankfurt fare increase campaign remained more isolated than its predecessors 
in other cities, a phenomenon that may have resulted in part from press cover-
age, especially in Bild, that called the demonstrators “terrorist groups” who 
beat up workers.70 The trade unions withdrew their support. Representatives of 
department stores called on the authorities to bring the “troublemakers of the 
Zeil” to justice, citing jobs that might be lost as sales declined.71 In addition, 
the Spontis’ “military” position was considerably weakened by large- scale in-
vestments in police riot gear.72
Individual forms of fare boycott remained after the campaign’s end. One 
activist described how to exploit a glitch in new ticket machines: a certain se-
quence of inserting coins and pushing buttons produced not only a ticket but 
also a return of money. It was suggested that money obtained in this way should 
not be used for personal ends but should instead go into an account to cover the 
legal expenses incurred by the anti- fare- increase campaign, to buy provisions 
for striking workers, or to support comrades in Chile.73
Looking back, the police emphasised that “whether squatting or now 
tramway fares, it is always the same people. They always look for new occa-
sions to ‘unmask the system,’ as they say.” Opposing “the system” was indeed 
an integrative moment in the protest milieu, and issues of consumption became 
more prominent as they allowed for a concrete localisation of grievances as-
sumed to be caused by a more complex socioeconomic system. In addition, 
consumer protest that developed spontaneously could then be seized opportu-
nistically by groups interested in fostering revolutionary potential. Frankfurt 
police assumed the existence of “a small hard core of 500 to 800 activists” with 
68. “Zu den Ereignissen in Frankfurt,” ID 37 (1974): 4.
69. Revolutionärer Kampf and Redaktionskolletiv Wir wollen alles, “Chronik: Kampf um die 
Strassenbahntarife in Frankfurt,” Carlo Sponti 18– 19 (1974): 3– 4.
70. “Wer hat die besseren Argumente,” Carlo Sponti 18– 19 (1974): 7.
71. Ibid., 3.
72. Cf. Christian Schmidt, “Wir sind die Wahnsinningen . . . ,” 82.
73. “FVV- Automatenenteignungsaktion: Das Fahrgeld kommt vom Volk und kehrt zum Volk 
zurück!,” ID- Nachrichtendienst 49 (23 August 1974): 3– 4.
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another 1,000 “sympathisers” joining protest activities. Moreover, the police 
reflections on riots over fare increases offer one of the rare sources providing 
any information regarding the social makeup of the protest groups. Of the 325 
activists arrested during the “fare riots,” 118 were university students (mostly 
in the humanities), 35 high school students, 40 employees, 42 factory workers, 
5 apprentices, 2 U.S. soldiers, 2 judicial trainees, 1 director, 1 post office clerk, 
2 graduate economists, 3 trainee teachers, 1 tutor, and 1 graduate educational-
ist. (Occupations for the remainder of those arrested were not specified.) The 
average age was estimated at “just under or above 20.”74 Thus, fewer than half 
of those arrested (44 percent) were students.
When protests reignited in June 1975 when the Frankfurter Verkehrsver-
bund proposed another round of fare increases, more militant forms of protest 
emerged, but once again, no real mass support was forthcoming. Police took 
massive action against the endorsement of criminal acts (Aufforderung zu straf-
baren Handlungen), mainly arresting the authors of flyers “suggesting fare 
dodging as a form of protest against daylight robbery.”75 With the successive 
setbacks in factory agitation and protests against squatting and fare increases, 
the Sponti movement started to disintegrate, especially since debates about ter-
rorism came to overshadow other matters.
Revolutionary Cells
The Revolutionary Cells joined the campaign against fare increases via clan-
destine direct action. Their interventions against concrete regimes of provision 
took place in the context of various protest movements. In some respects, they 
pioneered organisational patterns that autonomists later adopted. During the 
protests against fare increases in West Berlin, revolutionary cells printed and 
distributed large numbers of counterfeit multijourney tickets— 120,000, ac-
cording to their own claims. The revolutionary ruse lay in an attempt to lead 
“some ten thousand people to do something illegal”: that way “many workers, 
housewives who vote for CDU and SPD have consciously ridden on counter-
feit tickets distributed by an illegal revolutionary organisation.”76 In Frankfurt, 
74. Gerhard Ziegler, “Demonstranten in Frankfurt: ‘Immer dieselben,’” Die Zeit 27 (28 June 
1974).
75. “Aktionen gegen die Fahrpreiserhöhung,” ID 84 (1975): 4.
76. “Falsche Karten flambierte Automaten Fahrpreiskampf (1975),” in Früechte des Zorns, ed. 
ID- Archiv im IISG Amsterdam, http://www.nadir.org/nadir/archiv/PolitischeStroemungen/
Stadtguerilla+RAF/rz/fruechte_des_zorns/zorn_1_11.html#12 (accessed 19 April 2010); “Die 
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the RZ’s method of choice was arson attacks against newly installed ticket 
machines, which a statement called “cash- hungry robots.” Accompanying fly-
ers offered instructions on simple ways of sabotaging the ticket machines.77 
Ticket machines in Cologne and Munich were also sabotaged. Violence against 
objects was seen as an attempt to develop a feasible form of protest beyond 
“words and slogans” with which people would identify: “This campaign was 
supposed to take up the discrepancy between general protest against the fares 
and complete perplexity regarding the forms of combat to be used.”78 In Sep-
tember 1976, a revolutionary cell firebombed the Frankfurt transport services’ 
central register of fare dodgers.79 Nine months later, this tactic was repeated in 
Berlin. The RZ assured their clientele that, despite news reports to the contrary, 
all evidence on fare dodgers had been destroyed.80 To combat the image of 
wanton destruction, the group declared, “It is not our intention to senselessly 
destroy the Berlin Transportation Company. Buses and trains should travel un-
impeded, but for free!!!!”81
In late January 1978, more attacks against ticket machines occurred in 
Frankfurt.82 A new dimension arose two months later when a revolutionary cell 
responded to the doubling of the Frankfurt fare dodging penalty to forty 
deutsche marks by attacking the private property of ticket inspectors: a FIAT 
automobile was “flambéed with petrol,” and a small explosive device damaged 
another inspector’s front door. The statement of responsibility announced that 
these actions had occurred in support of low- income fare dodgers who could 
not afford to purchase tickets. The statement also attacked the emerging system 
of control and surveillance that went hand in hand with “the ever- more- brazen 
theft from our household budgets: the economic miracle of the parasites of the 
system.” The Apparat was leaning on “total computer survey, reintroduction of 
‘Revolutionäre Zelle’ verteilte 100.000 Fahrkarten in Berlin,” Info Hamburger undogmatischer 
Gruppen 3 (5 August 1975): 3; “Schwarz fährt am billigsten!,” Info Hamburger undogmatischer 
Gruppen 6 (17 December 1975): 15, IISG, ID- 4157, ZK 46635.
77. See “Zerstörung von Fahrkartenautomaten des Frankfurter Verkehrsverbundes am 
8.1.1977,” BAK, Bundesministerium der Justiz (BMJ), Hauptgebiet (HG) 4, B 141/62511, 4030 
E- 40/77.
78. ID- Archiv im IISG Amsterdam, Früechte des Zorns.
79. “Brandanschlag auf die Schwarzfahrerkartei des Frankfurter Verkehrsverbundes (Septem-
ber 76),” in ibid. According to another source, the arson attack took place on 8 December 1976. See 
“Schwarzfahrerkartei vernichtet,” Revolutionärer Zorn 3 (1977): 18.
80. “Brandanschlag auf die Schwarzfahrerkartei Berlin (Juni 77),” in Früechte des Zorns, ed. 
ID- Archiv im IISG Amsterdam. See also “Hurra, die Schwarzfahrerkartei ist abgebrannt!,” ID 184 
(2 July 1977).
81. “Zur Aktion gegen auf [sic] die Berliner Verkehrsgesellschaft (August 77),” in Früechte des 
Zorns, ed. ID- Archiv im IISG Amsterdam.
82. “Wir haben den FVV . . . ,” ID 215 (4 February 1978).
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the Nazi block warden system (today this is called Community Beat Manager 
[Kontaktbereichsbeamter]), daily traffic controls, stepping- up the personnel of 
government and private cops, plant security, store detectives, tramway ticket 
inspectors, and private surveillance companies.” The statement closed by 
threatening physical harm to ticket inspectors if they did not quit their jobs.83 
On 10 November 1978, the RZ attacked the homes of two ticket inspectors in 
Frankfurt with small- scale explosive devices and butyric acid.84
In the early 1980s, the RZ’s activities in favour of free public transport 
shifted to the Ruhr. In February 1984, the Verkehrsverbund Rhein- Ruhr in 
Gelsenkirchen decreed that reduced fares for unemployed and handicapped 
people were no longer valid during rush hour. A revolutionary cell placed what 
it called a “tiny bomb” at the transport authority’s headquarters, stressing that 
it had deliberately been positioned to avoid harm to people and adjacent shops. 
The action was meant as “an encouragement for the hundreds and thousands 
who daily dodge the fare.”85 A more prominent campaign involved the distribu-
tion of counterfeit tickets in all of the Ruhr’s major cities as part of a wider 
March 1981 protest against fare increases that included the Green Party and 
involved flyers, demonstrations, graffiti, and minor sabotage of ticket ma-
chines. The RZ then embarked on a more fundamental critique of consumer 
society. A statement signed by the Revolutionary Cells and their feminist 
branch, Rote Zora, invoked a decadelong movement for free public transport, 
taking the 1969 Red Spot Campaign in Hannover as a starting point, ignoring 
earlier protests in Cologne, Bremen, Freiburg, and other cities. The statement 
addressed the deeply ingrained principle of performance (Leistung) as the cen-
tral obstacle to the movement’s demands: “Performance costs something. 
Where something is provided, you have to cough up. It is essential to protect 
this maxim of performance society even at the cost of a transport policy that 
pinpoints the intrinsic link between capitalist progress and destruction.” Indi-
vidual automobile traffic and its discomforts for both its users and the wider 
community— including traffic deaths— emerged as the crucial problem that the 
RZ activists sought to address through their acts of civil disobedience: “The 
Moloch automobile receives homage until any kind of alternative becomes un-
83. “Aktionen gegen auf [sic] Fahrscheinkontrolleure, Frankfurt (März 78),” in Früechte des 
Zorns, ed. ID- Archiv im IISG Amsterdam. French autonomists also launched attacks on ticket 
machines in 1978. See Dieter Paas, “Frankreich: Der integrierte Linksradikalismus,” in Angriff auf 
das Herz des Staates, ed. Hess, 253.
84. Revolutionäre Zelle, “Nulltarif wär doch das Beste, gelle!” (flyer), listed in Fetscher and 
Rohrmoser, Ideologien und Strategien, 271.
85. “Aktion gegen den Verkehrsverbund Rhein- Ruhr, Gelsenkirchen (Februar 84),” in Früechte 
des Zorns, ed. ID- Archiv im IISG Amsterdam.
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thinkable and the car becomes an indispensable part of life. The ‘day- to- day’ 
side effects: 15,000 traffic deaths each year and 500,000 injured, devastated 
cities planned around traffic . . . ; instead of the freedom that an owner of a car 
is promised, total dependence. Instead of comfort and living standards, stifling 
chaos in the jungle of the streets where the bourgeois ideology ‘all against all’ 
triumphs.”86
After 1975, no more red spot campaigns of any significance took place. 
The RZ’s actions originated in the context of popular protest, but attempts to 
revive a broader movement failed. Some modest attempts to revive the concept 
of the red spot as a symbol for hitchhikers occurred in the context of the emer-
gence of ride- sharing agencies (Mitfahrzentralen) that conceived of themselves 
as an environmentally friendly variation of private transport.87 These enter-
prises became increasingly commercialised and divorced from issues of social 
protest. However, in 1984, a gender- related issue entered politics in West Ber-
lin and other German cities when activists responded to sexual violence against 
women by demanding that women receive nighttime taxi rides for the cost of 
public transport tickets. This argument was the inverse of and less controversial 
than the protests against fare increases: the existence of violence was taken as 
a reason for lowering specific fares. Some of those involved in the debates 
conceived of this violence as essentially nonpolitical, but feminists saw the is-
sue as a platform for making the issue of violence against women— and of their 
reduced mobility— a subject of political debate.88 The issue of female security 
at night was quickly taken up by journalists, city councils, and parliaments; 
after a period of pilot projects, public subsidies for nighttime taxi rides for 
women became a reality in many cities.89
When analysing the development of protests against fare increases from the 
Cologne blockades in 1966 to the campaigns of the early 1980s, certain conti-
nuities are obvious: from the beginning, this form of consumer protest was 
quickly confronted with questions of violence on several levels. The issue of 
violence immediately became and remained the focal point of public discourse 
86. “Verteilung gefälschter Fahrkarten, Ruhrgebiet (März 81),” ibid.
87. Advertisement in taz, 29 November 1979, 11. A plastic sticker showing a red spot was of-
fered at a price of seventy pfennigs.
88. See Anagan 5 (1985): 22– 23.
89. JunsozialistInnen Frankfurt, eds., Sicher durch die Nacht: Ein Frauen- Nachttaxi für Frank-
furt (Frankfurt, [1988]), IISG Amsterdam, ID- 1352i, Bro 1849/5; Landeshauptstadt Hannover, 
Referat für Gleichstellungsfragen- Frauenbüro, ed., Bewertung des Modells Taxi- Service der ÜS-
TRA Hannover: Ein Beitrag zur Mobilitätssteigerung von Frauen (Hannover, 1987), ID- 1352i, 
Bro 713/1 fol.
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on the legitimacy of such protest. Violence was an outcome of the discursive 
and physical interaction between protesters and government authorities. The 
former usually saw their own agenda as genuinely or initially peaceful, while 
debates about violence developed eventually, often overshadowing the original 
issues of protest. However, discontinuities are also evident. In the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, it was more or less a one- issue movement, loosely embedded 
in the wider student movement, that discursively related to other political ques-
tions and attracted relatively diverse social support. Developments in Frankfurt 
in 1974 marked the beginning of a process of radicalisation in which the issue 
of public transport fares increasingly became subordinated to wider issues of 
revolutionary politics. Authorities became increasingly successful in nipping 
in the bud any protest following the blockade- and- red- spot pattern. Conversely, 
social support for the protests became to at least some degree more specific and 
more “professional,” with small groups of activists such as the Spontis or the 
Revolutionäre Zellen trying to sharpen the issue and harness it to much more 
far- reaching revolutionary goals. Critiques of capitalism and regimes of provi-
sion became more fundamental. The discursive space between consumer pro-
tests and debates on violence became ever narrower, no longer affording con-
siderable room for communication and political manoeuvring that could still 
be observed in the Hannover and Freiburg protests of the late 1960s. Despite 
the fact that the violence in relation to fare increases was mainly symbolic vio-
lence against objects, it stifled the original issue of consumer protest and made 
it less attractive for citizens reluctant to pose fundamental questions about 
definitions and legitimisations of violence and force. This construction was 
different when sexual violence was conceived as essentially nonpolitical, in-




The Media: The Anti- Springer Campaign
“Journalism is about one thing: sales— news a commodity; information a 
consumer product. Whatever isn’t suitable for consumption is bound to 
make them sick.”
—Red Army Faction (1971)1
The Red Spot Campaign in Hannover took place against the backdrop of a 
much- publicised debate over the student movement’s position on violence. Af-
ter the attempt on Rudi Dutschke’s life on 11 April 1968, activists engaged in 
large- scale protest rallies and blockades against Springer publishing, which 
they blamed for inciting violence against the students and their leaders. This 
was the culmination of the anti- Springer campaign that the extraparliamentary 
opposition had initiated in 1967, formally inaugurating it in October of that 
year.2 Interpretations and accusations of violence were part and parcel of the 
confrontation long before the first windowpanes were smashed. A central point 
of contention emerged on the issue of whether violence against objects differed 
fundamentally from violence against people— as many protesters claimed— or 
whether the former was a mere precursor of the latter. In the aftermath of Eas-
ter 1968, the legal interpretation of violence during blockades again proved 
controversial, ultimately reinforcing the wide concept of violence that the 
Laepple verdict established. The militant campaign against Springer also chal-
lenged the apparent coincidence of interests between government and media 
tycoon.
1. “Das Konzept Stadtguerilla,” in Rote Armee Fraktion, ed. ID- Verlag, 43.
2. Staadt, Voigt, and Wolle, Feind- Bild Springer. This book contains a detailed chapter on the 
anti- Springer campaign and describes the East German authorities’ perceptions of and statements 
against the publishing corporation. The book focuses primarily on the East- West dimension. See 
also Bauß, Studentenbewegung, 71– 111; Hilwig, “Revolt against the Establishment”; Kruip, 
“Welt”- “Bild” des Axel Springer Verlags; Kraushaar, “1968 und Massenmedien”; Oy, Gemein-
schaft der Lüge, 122– 33; Schmidtke, “‘1968’ und die Massenmedien”; Hodenberg, Konsens und 
Krise; Schwarz, Axel Springer, 426– 33; Seitenbecher, Deutschen “Cäsar” bezwingen.
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The anti- Springer campaign focused on a specific critique of a regime of 
provision: an alleged manipulative monopoly on information services. The 
consumers of Springer’s tinged news were seen as victims of manipulation and 
as pawns in upholding established power structures. This was sometimes al-
leged in rather crude terms but could also be embedded in an eloquent Haber-
masian critique of commercial journalism. Attacks targeted not only Springer’s 
right- wing political orientation but its papers’ swift denunciations of those who 
questioned the West German “economic miracle,” with its privileging of con-
sumer and conformist values.3 The campaign foregrounded the idea that infor-
mation was purchasable and marked a milestone in the tradition of left- wing 
media critiques. However, Springer used political boycotts in the media sector 
long before the protesters embraced this means of political communication, 
and anti- Springer activism experienced an important revival in the context of 
the peace movement of the early 1980s.
SDS against Springer
A precursor to the anti- Springer campaign occurred at the end of 1963 when a 
police patrol prevented Dieter Kunzelmann from painting a provocative slogan 
on the not- yet- finished Springer headquarters, a high- rise not coincidentally 
built right next to the Berlin Wall. The message was “Ulbricht’s KZ [concentra-
tion camp] and Springer’s BZ [tabloid paper]— both serve the same purpose.” 
The message was aimed at Springer’s vitriolic coverage of the German Demo-
cratic Republic (GDR).4
In the late 1960s, another former member of Subversive Aktion became 
one of the trailblazers of the campaign undertaken by the Sozialistischer 
Deutscher Studentenbund (SDS). In an interview with Der Spiegel, Dutschke 
described the “society of waste” as one of the main obstacles to the realisation 
of a “Garden of Eden” because “the excesses of consumption typical of profit-
 and authority- oriented social orders— wars . . . , armaments, useless adminis-
tration and bureaucracy, underutilised industrial capacities, advertising— add 
up to a systematic destruction of capital.”5 In the same interview, he called for 
the “expropriation of Springer” and passive resistance to the delivery of 
3. Peter J. Humphreys, Media and Media Policy in West Germany: The Press and Broadcasting 
since 1945, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1994), 95.
4. Böckelmann and Nagel, Subversive Aktion, 128.
5. “‘Wir fordern die Enteignung Axel Springers’: Spiegel- Gespräch mit dem Berliner FU- 
Studenten Rudi Dutschke (SDS),” Der Spiegel 29 (10 July 1967): 30– 33.
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Springer newspapers. However, he clearly stated that he did not think much of 
throwing tomatoes, smoke bombs, or stones, tactics he considered “absurd” 
and “helpless.” He explicitly denied any need for “terrorist violence against 
people” in the developed countries but stated, “Violence is constituens of au-
thority and we need to respond to it with demonstrative and provocative coun-
terviolence from our side.”6 By the time of Herbert Marcuse’s visit to Berlin, 
Dutschke saw the campaign as a way to make visible another form of violence: 
that of the highly industrialised metropole against the Third World.7
An important backdrop for this critical focus on Springer was Benno 
Ohnesorg’s shooting by a plainclothes police officer on 2 June 1967. Students 
saw their role in the protests— both against the state visit of Shah Reza Pahlavi 
and against Ohnesorg’s death— grossly misrepresented by Springer publica-
tions. At the Freie Universität Berlin, a committee was established to analyse 
the demagogic coverage, one example of which occurred when Bild reported 
on 3 June, “Until now there has only been terror to the east of the Berlin Wall. 
Yesterday malicious and stupid muddleheads attempted for the first time to 
carry terror to the free section of the city.” This was printed underneath a pic-
ture showing a bleeding police officer. Bild reported Ohnesorg’s death but 
failed to mention that he had been shot, let alone by a police officer, giving a 
skull fracture as the cause of death: “A young man . . . fell victim to riots that 
young hooligans had staged. . . . We have something against SA methods. Ger-
mans neither want a brown nor a red SA.”8 The same issue reported on glamor-
ous Empress Farah Pahlavi’s attendance at a fashion show, pairing that article 
with an advertisement touting that  the Europa- Center “is where Berlin is 
shopping— this is where the world is meeting.”9 Springer’s Berlin tabloid, BZ, 
commented, “Anyone who produces terror must put up with hardship.”10 The 
article stressed that the rioting students lived off taxpayers’ money without 
having contributed to the remarkable postwar boom that had brought prosper-
ity to West Germany. It emphatically declared that the city of Berlin belonged 
only to those who contributed to this feat, and not to those bound to disturb the 
harmony of the Wirtschaftswunder, which Springer journalists wanted to safe-
guard.
 6. Ibid., 33.
 7. Dutschke, “Zum Verhältnis.”
 8. “Blutige Krawalle: 1 Toter,” Bild, Berlin, 3 June 1967, 1, http://www.medienarchiv68.de/
dl/193050/478.jpg.pdf (accessed 12 June 2010).
 9. “Sonderschau für Farah: Berliner Chic ist wundervoll,” Bild, Berlin, 3 June 1967,  3, http://
www.medienarchiv68.de/dl/193058/482.jpg.pdf (accessed 13 June 2010).
10. “Das ist Terror!,” BZ, 3 June 1967, 3, http://www.medienarchiv68.de/dl/193086/496.jpg.
pdf (accessed 25 August 2010). See Kruip, “Welt”- “Bild” des Axel Springer Verlags, 225.
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In September 1967, the SDS decided on an action programme against 
Springer. A central focus was “analysis and general education about the sys-
tematic destruction of societal riches via consumer terror, planned obsoles-
cence, and development of unproductive industries.”11 When a number of op-
position groups formally inaugurated the campaign in October, the issue of 
consumption still featured prominently. The campaign sought to address a 
“press structure geared towards private profit maximisation and consumer ad-
vertisement leaning towards concentration.”12 The campaign eventually was 
supported by Springer’s competitors, Gerd Bucerius and Rudolf Augstein, 
founders and part- owners of the influential weeklies Die Zeit and Der Spiegel, 
respectively.13
The SDS agitated for a boycott of Springer, targeting the stall operated by 
the Springer- owned publisher Ullstein at the 1967 Frankfurt Book Fair, an ef-
fort that led to police involvement. An early success that generated media at-
tention was a boycott resolution “against the monopoly of Axel Springer” 
signed by seventy- one members of the renowned literary association Gruppe 
47 and seven major publishers.14 Protest was commodified with badges read-
ing “Expropriate Springer,” twenty- one thousand of which were sold before 
the end of 1967.15 Long before the violent events of Easter 1968, the anti- 
Springer campaign was compared to terror— for example, in a defence of 
Springer published in the company’s Die Welt and written by Austrian Ameri-
can author and publisher Hans Habe, who denied Springer’s critics any intel-
lectual merit and likened the student protesters to a “terror organisation that 
uses violence” to prevent the sale of newspapers.16
11. “Resolution der 22. Delegiertenkonferenz des SDS zum Kampf gegen Manipulation und für 
die Demokratisierung der Öffentlichkeit vom September 1967,” in APO, ed. Otto, 256.
12. “Vereinbarung einer APO- Kampagne gegen den Springer- Konzern (Oktober 1967),” in 
ibid., 257.
13. Dahrendorf, Liberal und unabhängig, 188.
14. “Gruppe 47: Dichter, Dichter,” Der Spiegel 43 (16 October 1967): 178– 82; “Buchmesse: 
Heiß gekocht,” Der Spiegel 44 (23 October 1967): 197– 99; “Die Bücher interessieren sie nicht,” 
Hamburger Abendblatt, 17 October 1967, 10; “Gegen das Monopol von Axel Springer,” in Vater-
land, Muttersprache: Deutsche Schriftsteller und ihr Staat seit 1945, ed. Michael Krüger, Susanne 
Schüssler, Winfried Stephan, and Klaus Wagenbach (Berlin: Wagenbach, 1979), 251. In response 
to the resolution, see Marcel Hepp, “Boykotthetze und Bürgerkriegskonzept,” Bayernkurier, 21 
October 1967. See Gilcher- Holtey, “APO und der Zerfall.”
15. Carl Guggomos, “Wie man Springer ‘enteignet,’” konkret 13.12 (1967): 13.
16. Hans Habe, “Die Parforcejagd auf Axel Springer: Ein offener Brief an den Verleger,” Die 
Welt, 27 December 1967, 6.
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Broken Glass
Several weeks after these lines were printed, “direct action” against shop win-
dows of Berliner Morgenpost branch offices first took place. The attacks oc-
curred on the night of 1 February 1968 after a political event at the Technical 
University Berlin that included the screening of a film by Holger Meins and 
others that showed how to make Molotov cocktails and ended with a still of 
Springer’s headquarters.17 The attacks on the Morgenpost did not feature in-
cendiary devices, but cobblestones were used. Dutschke and composer Hans 
Werner Henze apparently were among those throwing stones, although their 
involvement was not publicised at the time.18
West Berlin’s minister of justice, Hans Günter Hoppe (FDP), commented 
on the broken glass: “These are fascist methods. It started once before in Ger-
many with smashed shop windows.”19 Bild printed a cartoon that depicted an 
SDS member smashing a Berliner Morgenpost window in 1968 next to two 
storm troopers breaking the window of a Jewish shop in 1938. Accompanying 
commentary made generous use of the terms terror and anarchist.20 The anal-
ogy between seven smashed windows and the November pogrom clearly ne-
glected obvious differences in the scope of the events and the power relations 
that produced them, but it was embraced well beyond Springer newspapers. 
Adolf Arndt, a prominent lawyer and a member of the Bundestag from the 
Social Democratic Party— wrote a letter to Axel Springer in which Arndt de-
scribed how the recent incident reminded him of “Hitler’s brown SA pounding 
the shop windows of Jewish department stores to pieces.”21
A spokesperson for the students countered, “If these arguments are true, 
then the Jews smashed the windows of the Völkischer Beobachter [the Nazi 
17. Thomas Giefer, “Wie ein Satz, den man hinwirft und der Wirklichkeit wird,” in Starbuck, 
ed. Gerd Conradt, 78– 80; Volker Pantenburg, “Die rote Fahne. Deutsche Film- und Fernsehaka-
demie 1966– 1968,” in 1968, ed. Klimke and Scharloth, 203– 4. Cobblestones, Springer newspa-
pers, and the sound of breaking glass feature in Harun Farocki’s film Ihre Zeitungen, made in May 
1968, as well as in Unsere Steine, by Ulrich Knaudt. See Farocki, “Ihre Zeitungen.”
18. Dutschke, Aufrecht gehen, 199; Ditfurth, Ulrike Meinhof, 230; Schneider, Rebellion und 
Wahn, 246– 47.
19. “Einer rief: Es gibt 21 Filialen,” Die Welt 29 (3 February 1968): 3; Bernd Nellessen, “Das 
ist kein Jux mehr— das ist Terror: Zu den Vorgängen in Westberlin,” Die Welt 29 (3 February 
1968): 3.
20. “Terror- Aktion gegen Zeitungs- Filialen,” Bild, Berlin, 3 February 1968, 3, http://www.me-
dienarchiv68.de/dl/204642/1791.jpg.pdf (accessed 13 July 2010).
21. “Unruhen: Gebrochenes Rückgrat,” Der Spiegel 7 (12 February 1968): 33; Arndt’s letter to 
Springer is printed in “Empörung und Abscheu,” BZ, 6 February 1968, 2.
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Party newspaper].”22 However, the Springer press continued publishing refer-
ences to the Nazi past, as when Bild asked, “What is done against those who, 
in flyers and meetings, request that other people’s property be taken away or 
even destroyed? . . . In the late 1920s, early 1930s, it started just like this. . . . 
The end was dictatorship, war, the destruction of Germany and Europe.” This 
commentary concluded by declaring that these developments were especially 
dangerous in West Berlin, “where nobody can distinguish who is a western 
demonstrator and who is an agitator sent across from the east.”23 The Nazi past 
had become a ubiquitous context for debates about the protests, with some 
commentators noting that such demonstrations would not have occurred under 
Hitler and calling for the forcible cutting of demonstrators’ hair or them to be 
thrown over the wall into East Berlin.24
Helmut Gollwitzer, a professor of Protestant theology at the Freie Univer-
sität Berlin and a friend of Dutschke, and Jacob Taubes, a professor of Jewish 
studies there who had delivered his expertise on Kommune I’s department 
store arson flyers, warned against comparing student action with Nazi terror on 
the grounds that doing so prevented an evenhanded appraisal of the students’ 
concerns. However, the smashed Springer windows and the subsequent dis-
course on violence constituted a turning point in the anti- Springer campaign. 
Other prominent intellectuals started to withdraw their support. The Repub-
likanischer Club, one of the intellectual centres of the extraparliamentary op-
position and cosponsor of the anti- Springer campaign, condemned the smash-
ing of windows as delegitimising the awareness campaign.25
Jörg Huffschmid’s Habermasian critique of Springer
The chair of the Republikanischer Club, economist Jörg Huffschmid, an as-
sistant professor at the Institute for Market Concentration Research of the Freie 
Universität Berlin, tried to integrate the critique of the Springer group into a 
wider theory of political economy. The notion of a depoliticised consumer so-
ciety played a central role in this analysis: “The profit seeking of private enter-
prise in a late capitalist society can  .  .  . only be realised through extensive 
22. “Warnung vor falschen Analogieschlüssen,” Stern, 3 March 1968, 22, in APO, ed. Otto, 
262.
23. “Enteignet Deutschland   .  .  .  ,” Bild, Berlin, 5 February 1968, 1, http://www.medienar-
chiv68.de/dl/204662/1801.jpg.pdf (accessed 9 June 2010).
24. Siegfried, “‘Don’t Trust Anyone Older Than 30?,’” 743.
25. “Maßnahmen gegen Übergriffe,” Telegraf 23.30 (6 February 1968): 2.
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waste, which can only be obscured through the almost total manipulation of 
consumer society.”26 Huffschmid drew on Paul A. Baran and Paul M. Sweezy’s 
Marxist work on monopoly capital,27 focusing on advertising, consumption, 
and mass culture as crucial components of the capitalist system. Like Ulrike 
Meinhof, Huffschmid was influenced by André Gorz, whom Huffschmid fol-
lowed in assuming a large- scale economically driven “production of needs.” 
Consequently, the articulation of needs in the marketplace was no longer an 
expression of the subjective freedom of individuals but had become an expres-
sion of the dominance of an economically powerful minority.28 This argument 
was supposed to counter legitimisations of Springer’s economic success by 
virtue of the fact that it resulted from the purchasing decisions of millions of 
sovereign consumers. Axel Springer himself had resorted to a theory of con-
sumer democracy: “Each day, each month, a kind of democratic vote happens 
at the newspaper kiosks and at the front doors in Germany about whether the 
readers want to buy these newspapers.”29 The anti- Springer campaign doubted 
whether any fair— let alone democratic— competition existed in the news mar-
ket given the dangers of market concentration and manipulation.
According to Huffschmid, advertising was vital to journalism, an issue 
that extended far beyond the anti- Springer campaign. The Bundestag had es-
tablished two expert committees to examine media problems. The Michel 
Commission, named after its chair, Elmar Michel, a former assistant secretary 
of state at the Ministry of Economics, investigated charges of collusion be-
tween broadcasting and daily press. The Günther Commission, chaired by Eb-
erhard Günther, president of the Federal Cartel Authority, was a fact- finding 
commission on press concentration.30 Huffschmid was drawing in part on the 
material published by these commissions.
The Federal Constitutional Court ruled in 1967 that freedom of the press 
protected the advertising sections of newspapers, pointing out advertisements 
were necessary for a paper’s economic independence. In addition, the judges 
26. Jörg Huffschmid, “Politische Ökonomie des Springer- Konzerns: Wirtschaftliche Dynamik 
und gesellschaftliche Bedingungen privater Pressemacht in der Bundesrepublik,” in Imperium 
Springer, ed. Jansen and Klönne, 53. See also Jörg Huffschmid, “Ökonomische Macht und Presse-
freiheit,” in Auferstehung der Gewalt, ed. Grossmann and Negt, 32– 41.
27. Paul A. Baran and Paul M. Sweezy, Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the American Eco-
nomic and Social Order (New York, 1966).
28. Huffschmid, “Politische Ökonomie,” 63.
29. Axel Springer quoted in Otto Köhler, “Springers Sprecher nicht,” Der Spiegel 1 (1968): 37.
30. See Fritz Sänger, “Deutsche Presse am Wegkreuz,” Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte 3 
(1968): 155– 57; Dussel, Deutsche Tagespresse, 234– 35.
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gave advertisements the same status as news.31 This decision had implications 
for the question of journalistic freedom vis- à- vis economic interests consti-
tuted by large- volume advertising. That newspapers depended on advertise-
ment income, which again figured importantly in processes of economic con-
centration, had already been established by contemporary journalism studies. 
That this constellation was responsible for dying newspapers and a decrease in 
the diversity of opinions expressed was controversial. However, lower- 
circulation papers had difficulty competing with the big players, who were 
more attractive for advertisers.32 Huffschmid explained that only a small per-
centage of profits derived from the journalistic product, while most came from 
advertisements, on which capital was relying to realise its profits. According to 
Huffschmid, 81 percent of West Germany’s advertising expenditures went to 
magazines and newspapers, turning those periodicals into a hypercommodity 
responsible for the smooth flow of the commodity cycle.33
In Huffschmid’s analysis, the rise of advertising since the eighteenth cen-
tury had turned the “critical reader into a consumer, the society of ‘critically 
reflecting private people’ into a consumer society.” This contention drew heav-
ily on Jürgen Habermas’s analysis of the pernicious effects of commercialisa-
tion on the public sphere. Habermas pointed out that the public sphere had 
become a platform for advertising during the nineteenth century. The chair of 
the Republikanischer Club paraphrased the Frankfurt social philosopher: “The 
private newspaper in a commercial society thus mutates from an organ of the 
critical public opinion of private individuals— especially against the authority 
of the state— into an organ of manipulating ‘public relations’ in the service of 
trade and industry vis- à- vis . . . the consumer.”34 Huffschmid assumed that con-
sumption had a stabilising function in postwar West Germany and that it was 
manifested in the “permanent demand to consume that appears in different 
ways in both the editorial and advertising sections of the West German press.”35 
Such an analysis applied not merely to Springer but to any press in a developed 
31. BVerfG, “Entscheidung vom 4 April 1967— 1 BvR 414/64” (Südkurier- Urteil), BVErfG 
21, 271. See Eicke, Werbelawine, 121– 22.
32. See Reinhart Ricker, Anzeigenwesen und Pressefreiheit (Munich, 1973), 82. Huffschmid, 
like Habermas, was drawing on one of the founders of both journalism as an academic discipline 
and nonmarket economics: see Karl Bücher, Die Entstehung der Volkswirtschaft (1883), chapter 5, 
“Die Anfänge des Zeitungswesens.” For examples of companies using advertisement volume to 
pressure editorial staff, see Eicke, Werbelawine, 126– 37.
33. Huffschmid, “Politische Ökonomie,” 65.
34. Ibid., 66, 69. See Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An 
Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger (1962; Munich, 1989), espe-
cially chapters 18, 20.
35. Huffschmid, “Politische Ökonomie,” 70.
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economy. From this perspective, those disrupting the functioning of West Ger-
many’s depoliticised consumer society were bound to appear as enemies of the 
Springer press: “This press consistently responds even to such groups appear-
ing so harmless and apolitical as the Gammler [dropouts] with a vocabulary 
borrowed from fascist jargon . . . : an attitude such as that of the Gammler, who 
refuse the obligation to constantly work for new consumer goods, does indeed 
call into question the foundations of the existing order.”36 For Huffschmid, 
consumer society was a degenerate and manipulated society that was ready to 
accept the “mutual affirmation of ideology and business,” the latter selling its 
own interests as those of society as a whole.37
Easter 1968
Critiques of Springer’s tabloid journalism gained considerably more public im-
pact with the assassination attempt on Dutschke. The SDS issued a manifesto 
that reinforced the issue of consumption: “Every critique is being deadened or 
presented as the man in the street’s sorrows for his own consumption.” The 
second in a list of five demands for a “democratic public” read, “Abolition of 
consumption propaganda, which is to be replaced by proper consumer 
information.”38 More publicity was generated when fourteen famous intellec-
tuals signed a statement demanding a public debate about Springer’s market 
power and criticising the “alliance of unscrupulous mass- consumption journal-
ism and revived nationalistic ideology.”39
Hands- on protest targeted the commodity side of the Springer empire. Its 
tangible production and distribution network provided ubiquitous points of 
protest and direct action— blockades of access roads and sabotage (setting de-
livery vans on fire) to prevent the delivery of the tabloid papers. Photographs 
of burning newspaper vans became iconic and served as proof of the demon-
36. Ibid., 71. Gammler were members of youth subcultures of the 1960s and 1970s who refused 
bourgeois values, especially the idea of an agreeable outward appearance and the benefits of gain-
ful employment. See Gotthardt, Abkehr von der Wohlstandsgesellschaft; Siegfried, Time Is on My 
Side, 399– 416. For examples of Springer tabloids denouncing members of youth and protest cul-
tures in drastic terms, see Republikanischer Club, Springer enteignen?, 26– 28.
37. Huffschmid, “Politische Ökonomie,” 78.
38. “Grundsatzerklärung des SDS zur Kampagne für die Enteignung des Springer- Konzerns,” 
in Hochschule im Umbruch, ed. Lönnendonker, Fichter, and Staadt, 5:295– 96.
39. Theodor Adorno, Hans Paul Bahrdt, Heinrich Böll, Peter Brückner, Ludwig von Friede-
burg, Walter Jens, Eugen Kogon, Golo Mann, Alexander Mitscherlich, Hans Dieter Müller, Hein-
rich Popitz, Helge Pross, Helmut Ridder, and Hans- Günther Zmarzlik, “Die Erklärung der Vier-
zehn,” Die Zeit 16 (19 April 1969), in Frankfurter Schule, ed. Kraushaar, 2:363.
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strators’ violence. The protests only delayed delivery, as police throughout 
Germany safeguarded the distribution of the papers. In this struggle, the issue 
of violence quickly took centre stage. Confrontations between protesters and 
police at Easter 1968 involved twenty- one thousand policemen across the Fed-
eral Republic. Two protesters were severely injured when delivery vans sped 
through a crowd, and a photojournalist and a student died as a result of the 
skirmishes in Munich, with police and demonstrators accusing each other of 
responsibility for the deaths.40 The countless confrontations between demon-
strators and police were more intense and physical than most previous demon-
strations, marking a new dimension in the protest movement’s tangible experi-
ence of violence. The extraparliamentary opposition— often displaying a 
devil- may- care faith in the righteousness of their cause— realised that the 
emergence of demonstration violence amounted to a criminalisation of their 
tactics.41 Two weeks after the Easter disturbances, Interior Minister Ernst 
Benda stated in a Bundestag debate that prosecutions had been initiated in 827 
cases.42
Numerous eyewitness accounts testified to the disproportionate use of po-
lice force. Der Spiegel reported that Huffschmid had been “torn away from the 
crowd without reason, dragged by the hair by several policemen to be kicked 
and beaten.”43 Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger called for “a strengthening of 
the means for protecting the state” against “militant leftist extremist powers, 
who have openly set about to destroy our parliamentary democratic order.”44 
Kiesinger’s statement was delivered after large- scale protests had begun but 
before the two fatalities in Munich, and it seemed to corroborate the wide-
spread fears of emergency laws. Many commentators on both sides tried to 
compare the events with those in the late years of the Weimar Republic or Nazi 
Germany. SDS members tried to legitimise stones thrown by demonstrators 
with reference to Springer’s structural violence: “A tendentious headline in 
Bild is more violence than a stone against the head of a policeman.”45 Bild al-
leged that an SDS member had suggested that “Berlin must burn like the slums 
40. See “Todesopfer: Gewisse Scheu,” Der Spiegel 18 (29 April 1968): 74– 77; Hemler, “Von 
Kurt Faltlhauser zu Rolf Pohle,” 231– 33.
41. “Vorbemerkung der Herausgeber,” in Auferstehung der Gewalt, ed. Grossmann and Negt, 5.
42. Görtemaker, Kleine Geschicte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 204.
43. “‘Vor dem Knüppel sind alle gleich’: Die Unruhen in Berlin,” Der Spiegel 18 (29 April 
1968): 36.
44. Kiesinger, “Warnung an Gewalttäter” (13 April 1968), quoted in Thomas, Protest Move-
ments, 177.
45. “‘Gefahr für uns alle’: Studenten gegen Springer,” Der Spiegel 19 (6 May 1968): 42.
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in . . . American cities.”46 Ulrike Meinhof made a statement that subsequently 
was frequently repeated: “When fire is set to a lorry with Springer newspapers, 
that is arson. When all Springer cars burn, that is a political action.” Police ac-
cused her of using her car to blockade Springer.47 Protesters in Rome tried to 
show their solidarity with German students by attacking the offices of Porsche 
and Mercedes with Molotov cocktails.48
Violence against Things, Yes; against People, No
Springer and SDS charged each other with instigating violence. The latter’s 
theoreticians came up with a fragile differentiation: “Violence against things, 
yes; against people, no.”49 This strategy was supported by Helmut Gollwitzer, 
who participated in a public debate in the main lecture theatre of  Technische 
Universität Berlin. Many participants stressed that the attacks on Springer’s 
distribution network had a symbolic and demonstrative character. Ralf Dahren-
dorf thought they were less political than parliamentary debates on the ques-
tion of press concentration and should therefore be discontinued, while former 
chair of the General Students’ Committee (AStA), Knut Nevermann, charged 
that the protesters had no concrete vision for the expropriation of Springer or, 
more broadly, for what an economic system based on the principles of “council 
democracy” should entail.50 Several panels discussed whether the use of vio-
lence was legitimate under certain conditions, a question that had the potential 
to split the extraparliamentary opposition, since some groups, especially those 
affiliated with the peace movement, thought that such methods would ulti-
mately serve the opposing side. The Campaign for Democracy and Disarma-
ment distanced itself: “It is of course counterproductive to throw stones into 
Springer’s show windows. This does not persuade anyone but provides Springer 
with ammunition.”51 Despite this criticism, the Berlin students’ union execu-
46. “Zeitungswagen in Flammen,” Bild, Berlin, 13 April 1968, 5, http://www.medienarchiv68.
de/dl/204954/1947.jpg.pdf (accessed 14 June 2010).
47. “Gesellschaft/Meinhof/Baader: Löwe los,” Der Spiegel 9 (22 February 1971), http://www.
spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d- 43334628.html (accessed 14 June 2010).
48. “Verlorenes Wochenende,” Der Spiegel 17 (22 April 1968): 25– 27; “Polizei/Gefahren-
abwehr: Gesunde Vernunft,” Der Spiegel 17 (22 April 1968): 30– 33.
49. “Verlorenes Wochenende,” Der Spiegel 17 (22 April 1968): 27.
50. “Änderungen durch vollendete Tatsachen?: Diskussion in der TU über Autobahnblockade, 
Gewalt und eine Reform der Demokratie,” Der Tagesspiegel 6871 (17 April 1968): 6.
51. “Flugblatt des zentralen Ausschusses der KfDA zu den Osterunruhen 1968,” in APO, ed. 
Otto, 273.
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tive committees used the concept of counterviolence as well as notions of 
structural violence to legitimise the anti- Springer campaign. Violence against 
objects was appropriate as a last resort of communication and articulation of 
dissent when all other means had been exhausted, as a final reply against the 
authorities’ means of repression— that is, “truncheons and water cannons.” The 
rationale was to demonstrate that state violence would interfere with the articu-
lation of any dissent outside the conventional channels: “Our violence against 
things, which are the means of Springer’s smear campaign and the means of 
the police, is counterviolence against the oppression to which everyone is sub-
ject and that only manifests itself against us in the streets.”52
Defending the SDS strategy against critical questions from Spiegel report-
ers, the two chairs of the SDS, Karl Dietrich Wolff and his brother, Frank 
Wolff,  made three points that recurred in left- wing justifications of violence 
against objects. They questioned the congruency of legitimacy and legality by 
pointing out that they disputed an authoritarian interpretation of legality, claim-
ing a fundamental right of resistance against the brutal police force, which 
otherwise could simply batter demonstrators and prevent any political action 
outside established channels. Second, they criticised ill- directed violence such 
as “friendly fire”— that is, cobblestones thrown from the back of a crowd of 
demonstrators, hitting those in the front, or an individual who randomly slashed 
car tyres in a fight “against all owners of cars.” This was a reference to Michael 
“Bommi” Baumann, later among the founders of Movement 2 June, who had 
been arrested for vandalising cars over the Easter weekend. Third, they ques-
tioned the notion of nonviolence, pointing to court decisions that designated 
peaceful sit- in demonstrations as violence (cases following the Laepple 
verdict).53
There were many dissenting voices. A statement from a conservative stu-
dent organisation rejected any differentiation between violence against things 
and violence against people, arguing such a distinction would elevate violence 
to a means of politics and lead to a general acceptance of violence.54 Ten days 
after the Dutschke shooting, the conservative Deutsche Studenten- Union was 
52. AStA TU, AStA FU, and AStA Kirchliche Hochschule, “Warum Gewalt?,” in ibid. See also 
Haug von Kuenheim, “Scherben und vertane Chancen: Studentische Selbstkritik— 
Demonstrationspause oder neue Aktionen?,” Die Zeit 17 (26 April 1968).
53. “‘Ohne uns wäre es viel schlimmer gekommen’: Spiegel- Gespräch mit den SDS- 
Vorsitzenden Karl Dietrich Wolff und Frank Wolff,” Der Spiegel 17 (22 April 1968): 36– 43. See 
also Karl Dietrich and Frank Wolff, “Zu den Oster- Aktionen,” Neue Kritik 47 (April 1968): 3– 6.
54. Vereinigte Arbeitsgemeinschaften an der FU, “Entscheidung gegen revolutionäre Gewalt,” 
Der Tagesspiegel 6871 (17 April 1968): 6.
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founded on the platform of nonviolence, with Klaus Laepple as its chair.55 A 
commentary in Die Welt invoked the possibility of “anarchy,” referring to “a 
small group of anarchist- revolutionary terrorists” and declaring, “No one wants 
clashes between police and demonstrators, none of us want violence. For us, 
violence is never, ever a means of politics. Only the radical wing of an organ-
isation of the extreme left wants violence to produce martyrs later on.”56 Al-
though these two comments were rather different in tone, they again contain 
three basic points that both liberal and conservative critiques of provocative 
and symbolic violence would make: violence was not an integral part of any 
political system and consequently could be banned or blamed on criminal or 
extremist minorities; no fundamental differentiation between different forms 
or levels of violence existed; and theoretical arguments for violence would lead 
to actual violence.
Many commentators displayed a readiness to compare the events to Nazi 
terror or the Socialist Unity Party (SED) regime in the GDR: according to the 
author of one letter to the editors of Berliner Morgenpost, “Behind these ac-
tivities the ‘SED’ is obviously emerging. . . . All these events are reminiscent 
of Kristallnacht. Back then the Jews were robbed of their property; today it is 
the Springer concern that is threatened.”57 In an expert opinion for the court 
proceedings against medical student Gerhard Paar, who was eventually sen-
tenced to one year in prison for sedition and violation of the public peace dur-
ing the blockade of a Springer print shop, psychologist Peter Brückner diag-
nosed a “pogrom atmosphere” in the early months of 1968, when angry crowds 
attacked students in a number of instances.58
Oskar Negt, at the time assistant to Habermas, observed that anything that 
defied the normal or ran counter to the expectations created by everyday norms 
was perceived as terror, riot, and violence. Regardless of intention, any break-
ing of rules was “magnified to a human rights injury and to a system- 
threatening  .  .  . relapse to barbarism, anarchism, and fascism. Already their 
55. “DSU: Ruf von rechts,” Der Spiegel 18 (29 April 1968): 73– 74.
56. Werner Titzrath, “Wem beugt sich der Staat?,” Die Welt 89 (16 April 1968): 2.
57. “Es sind keine Studenten,” Berliner Morgenpost, 23 April 1968, 2. Also drawing compari-
sons with Weimar were Georg Schröder, “Die Standfestigkeit wird geprüft,” Die Welt 90 (17 April 
1968): 2 (letter to the editors saying that “synagogues will soon burn again!”); Walter Barkey, “Wie 
damals,” Die Welt 90 (17 April 1968): 2.
58. Peter Brückner, “Springerpresse und Volksverhetzung,” Kritische Justiz 1.4 (1969): 339– 
54; “Ein Jahr Gefängnis,” Hamburger Abendblatt, 5– 6 October 1968, 2, http://www.medienar-
chiv1968.de/dl/220294/5588.jpg.pdf (accessed 13 October 2010). See also Heinz Grossmann, 
“Der Pogrom und der einzelne,” in Auferstehung der Gewalt, ed. Grossmann and Negt, 7– 12.
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form of publicity turned the students into terrorists who could be fought with 
legitimate counterterror.”59 Negt argued that the spontaneous blockades of 
Springer newspapers marked the first time in postwar German history that so-
ciety’s suppressed potential for violence had been repoliticised. And he went a 
step further, positing that an admission of violence constituted an admission of 
a deficit in legitimacy for any society.60 Those who even mentioned this latent 
potential for violence or tried to make it visible were then suspected originat-
ing this violence.
Introducing a typology of violence, Negt differentiated between the rarely 
occurring revolutionary or emancipatory violence and the preponderant and 
futile destruction of human beings and goods in imperialist wars. Alluding to 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment, Negt claimed that insti-
tutions that originally derived from revolutionary force but were no longer 
committed to it turned enlightenment into mass betrayal.61 Politicians and the 
public could easily talk about “nuclear death rates” or, like Chancellor 
Kiesinger, ally themselves with the violence of the National Socialist state 
while being utterly outraged about left- wing demonstrators who, like Bau-
mann, slashed tyres. Consequently, Negt sought to elucidate the difference be-
tween progressive and reactionary violence. The destruction of a Vietnamese 
village by American soldiers could not reasonably be reduced to the same ab-
stract denominator “act of violence” as “the burning and looting of American 
department stores by a minority held in the proletarian misery of the nineteenth 
century by economic force and racist terror while immediately and sensually 
experiencing the contradictions of ‘affluent society,’ discriminatory privileges 
and mindless waste.” From this perspective, French workers and students who 
damaged cars by using them to build barricades were “returning some human 
use value to commodities” that had “assumed a life of their own in becoming 
part of the reified violence [sachliche Gewalt] exercised over people.”62 Vio-
lence against things was thus not directed primarily at objects but at the reified 
social relations they embodied. The campaigns against Springer were similarly 
directed not at the person of a successful entrepreneur but at the reified vio-
59. Oskar Negt, “Rechtsordnung, Öffentlichkeit, und Gewalt,” in Auferstehung der Gewalt, ed. 
Grossmann and Negt, 182.
60. Ibid., 168.
61. Ibid., 184. See Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, “Kulturindustrie— Aufklärung 
als Massenbetrug,” in Dialektik der Aufklärung: Philosophische Fragmente (Frankfurt, 1969): 
128– 76.
62. Negt, “Rechtsordnung, Öffentlichkeit, und Gewalt,” 178– 79.
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lence that a communications network of this size commanded. The violence of 
the students was thus the spontaneous and manifest expression of resistance 
against such power structures.63
Aftermath
A rather curious amalgamation of matters of consumption and political vio-
lence, corroborating at least some of Negt’s considerations, appeared in an 
apparently fabricated report on the front page of Springer’s most important 
tabloid, Bild, on the Tuesday after Easter 1968, exactly two weeks after the 
Frankfurt department store arson attacks. Under the headline “Furniture Shop 
Set on Fire,” the paper alleged that the SDS had committed an “attack on pri-
vate property” against a furniture shop in the Ruhr city of Gladbeck. A large 
photograph showed the proprietor standing amid the debris of his burnt- out 
shop and holding an object on which someone had spray- painted the word 
Bild, which the caption explained was “a kind of symbol for the private prop-
erty they hated.” This was seamlessly juxtaposed with information on the al-
leged “military precision” with which the Springer blockade had been planned. 
Further down, the article alleged that “free choice was no longer going to be a 
matter of the buyer of a newspaper but of the red student council.”64 However, 
the fire in the furniture shop had been an accident, and the incident bore no 
connection to the student protests, as another Springer newspaper, the Ham-
burger Abendblatt, reported a few days later in a very brief piece on the final 
page.65 On the Wednesday after Easter, Springer’s Berlin tabloid, BZ, head-
lined, “No- Protest Zone around the Ku[rfürsten]damm: Heavy Economic 
Damage Due to the Constant Riots.” According to the brief article, the guild of 
the proprietors of restaurants and inns had made demands to this effect in talks 
with the West Berlin government.66
Trade unions kept their distance from the anti- Springer campaign, a 
marked contrast to their support for protests against fare increases. The latter 
63. Ibid., 180– 81.
64. “Möbelhaus in Brand gesteckt,” Bild, Berlin, 16 April 1968, http://www.medienarchiv68.
de/dl/205009/1972.jpg.pdf (accessed 4 June 2010).
65. “Möbelhausbrand nicht von Demonstranten gelegt,” Hamburger Abendblatt, 19 April 1968, 
http://www.medienarchiv68.de/dl/219912/5403.jpg.pdf (accessed 4 June 2010); “Weint euch aus,” 
Der Spiegel 17 (22 April 1968): 49.
66. “Bannmeile um den Kudamm: Schwere wirtschaftliche Schäden durch die ständigen 
Krawalle,” BZ 92.90 (17 April 1968), http://www.medienarchiv68.de/dl/205141/2027.jpg.pdf (ac-
cessed 5 June 2010).
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seemed to attract a broad spectrum of oppositional groups that could identify 
with resisting higher living expenses. Laepple’s role is illuminating in this con-
text. He believed that student leaders had duties resembling those of trade 
unionist leaders— that is, catering to the material needs of fellow students and 
keeping to the political confines of university reform.67 The anti- Springer cam-
paign was more complicated: criticism was directed towards a regime of provi-
sion in which many of the radical protesters’ potential allies happily partici-
pated, and educating them about their “false” consumption proved difficult. 
Not only the debates about violence but also the lack of identification with an 
intellectual and abstract critique explain the trade unions’ reluctance to em-
brace the anti- Springer campaign. They emphasised that the protests would 
lead to loss of earnings and possibly jobs, an issue that had not arisen in con-
nection with the transport companies.68
In May 1968, only weeks after the assassination attempt on Dutschke, the 
Günther Commission declared that constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the 
press was threatened by the degree of control Axel Springer had achieved over 
the publishing industry. Springer preempted any official steps towards decar-
telisation by divesting itself of the journals Bravo, Eltern, Jasmin, Kicker, Das 
Neue Blatt, and Twen, none of which had been at the forefront of criticism.69
After Easter 1968, Springer quickly ceased to be a major issue in the pro-
test movement, largely because on 30 March, the national SDS announced that 
the anti- Springer campaign had failed.70 After the unexpected Easter flare- up, 
discourse shifted towards debates on the disputed emergency laws and issues 
of violence.71 Countless supporters and observers distanced themselves from 
the campaign, signalling to SDS organisers that the Springer issue had failed to 
bring about the desired mobilisation of the masses. However, critical publica-
tions kept appearing. The final major collection of essays of the anti- Springer 
campaign was again initiated by the Republikanischer Club and was edited by 
Peter Brokmeier. This volume went beyond the criticism of monopoly concen-
tration by focusing on the press as a whole as advertising that defined informa-
tion as a commodity. Sociology student Heiner Schäfer contributed an article 
that built on Huffschmid’s approach in analysing how Springer journalism 
67. “DSU: Ruf von rechts,” Der Spiegel 18 (29 April 1968): 74.
68. “Studenten- Solidarisierung: Geschlossene Gesellschaft,” Der Spiegel 18 (29 April 1968): 
68– 70.
69. “Springer- Verkauf: Um Gottes willen,” Der Spiegel 27 (1 July 1968): 52– 59. See also Hum-
phreys, Media and Media Policy, 99– 101.
70. Staadt, Voigt, and Wolle, Feind- Bild Springer, 146.
71. See Lönnendonker, Fichter, and Staadt, Hochschule im Umbruch, 5:69– 88.
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sought to echo the consumer interests of the lower classes. Reader surveys 
elicited their alleged needs, while editorial articles pretended to acknowledge 
these interests and held out an “ethos of social mobility” to foster consump-
tion. The “social climber” would continue to subscribe to this ethos even if 
“objectively social and material gratification did not  .  .  . pay for his hard 
labour.”72 Schäfer focused on the youth magazines Bravo and Twen, which 
Springer had already sold by the time the volume appeared. Drawing on reader 
surveys, Schäfer described how Springer saw Twen readers as “consumption 
pioneers” who “fulfil their rebellious behaviour in extravagant consumption,” 
thus resulting in the profit- driven creation of “false consciousness.”73
Origins of Political Boycotts in the Media Sector
The oft- voiced accusation that the anti- Springer campaign was connected to 
East German propaganda was not entirely far- fetched: East German writers 
had produced their own critical literature about the Springer trust.74 In 1963, a 
book by Franz Knipping (originally a doctoral dissertation) had described 
Springer as a dangerous propagandist for nuclear weapons.75 In 1966, Walter 
Ulbricht gave a speech at the twentieth anniversary of the founding of the SED 
in which he demanded that the Springer group stop its Cold War agitation. Ac-
cording to Ulbricht, Springer was one of many factors  hindering a confedera-
tion of East and West Germany. He also mentioned the manipulation of West 
German workers by consumption and promised increased goods for East Ger-
72. Heiner Schäfer, “Schichten- und gruppenspezifische Manipulation in der Massenpresse,” in 
Kapitalismus und Pressefreiheit, ed. Brokmeier, 63– 67. See also Heiner Schäfer, “Die BILD- 
Zeitung: Eine Ordnungsmacht im Spätkapitalismus,” in Auferstehung der Gewalt, ed. Grossmann 
and Negt, 19– 29.
73. On the idea of young rebels as pioneer consumers, see Sedlmaier and Malinowski, “‘1968’ 
as a Catalyst.”
74. See Kraushaar, Achtundsechzig, 158– 60; Jürgs, Verleger, 255; Staadt, Voigt, and Wolle, 
Feind- Bild Springer, 43– 75. It is problematic to assume an East German campaign or long- term 
strategy against Springer, as Staadt, Voigt, and Wolle tend to do. It rather seems to be a continuous 
monitoring— with occasional interventions— of one of the most important symbols of the competi-
tion between the two German states supplemented by propaganda journalism that caricatured 
capitalism, using Springer as an exemplary case.
75. Staadt, Voigt, and Wolle, Feind- Bild Springer, 76; Knipping, Jeder vierte zahlt an Axel 
Cäsar; Verband der Deutschen Journalisten, Hetzer, Fälscher, Meinungsmacher. Kraushaar as-
sumes that the basic ideas of the SDS anti- Springer campaign originated with the SED. See Wolf-
gang Kraushaar, “Kleinkrieg gegen einen Großverleger,” in RAF und der linke Terrorismus, ed. 
Kraushaar, 2:1115.
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man citizens.76 A five- part East German TV series, Ich— Axel Cäsar Springer, 
was meant to revive the issue of press concentration. However, records from 
the East German Ministry for State Security show that the Central Committee 
established a task group to support the existing West German anti- Springer 
campaign only in late October 1967.77 Some overlap in anti- Springer activities 
subsequently occurred, but student leaders were careful to preserve their inde-
pendence.78 Springer, however, was always eager to demonstrate the existence 
of an East German anti- Springer campaign that had allegedly engendered pro-
test in the West. The publishing house assembled meticulous documentation of 
the supposed path that anti- Springer slogans had taken from the SED anniver-
sary commemoration to adoption by West German students and the liberal 
press. This collection of press clippings was regularly updated and was sent out 
to a number of business and political leaders in August 1967.79
Ironically, Springer himself had unleashed charges of distortion of com-
petition and monopoly in the early 1960s, when several publishers attempted 
to establish commercial television programming. At the time, Springer argued 
that the advertisement business of state- run broadcasting companies consti-
tuted undue competition for the advertisement business of private publishers.80 
Springer headlines invoked “television terror” and “television dictatorship” in 
their reporting on public channels whose “television monopoly” allegedly dis-
advantaged the public.81 In December 1966, Axel Springer declared that only 
advertising guaranteed the “freedom and independence” of Die Welt.82 While 
his attempts to gain a foothold in broadcasting did not succeed— commercial 
television was not introduced in Germany until 1984— the debate about media 
concentration increasingly turned against Springer, though it did not challenge 
the economic roots of his commercial success.
Even more remarkable is the fact that the tactic of a politically motivated 
boycott flanked by economic pressure had been embraced by Springer long 
before any students resorted to this strategy. After the erection of the Berlin 
76. Staadt, Voigt, and Wolle, Feind- Bild Springer, 89.
77. Kruip, “Welt”- “Bild” des Axel Springer Verlags,  226.
78. Staadt, Voigt, and Wolle, Feind- Bild Springer, 132– 33.
79. Kruip, “Welt”- “Bild” des Axel Springer Verlags,  226; Verlagshaus Axel Springer, These.
80. See Seitenbecher, Deutschen “Cäsar” bezwingen, 13– 21; “Springer: ‘Bild’ im Bild-
schirm?,” Der Spiegel 6 (3 February 1965): 40– 53; Bernd Jansen, “Öffentliche Aufgabe und 
wirtschaftliche Interessen der privaten Presse,” in Kapitalismus und Pressefreiheit, ed. Brokmeier, 
172– 93. Meinhof criticised the project: see “Springer- Fernsehen,” konkret 4 (1965), in Meinhof, 
Dokumente einer Rebellion, 51.
81. “Springer: ‘Bild’ im Bildschirm?,” Der Spiegel 6 (3 February 1965): 41.
82. Springer, Deutsche Presse, quoted in ibid., 23.
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Wall, Springer newspapers intensified their massive campaign against the re-
gime in East Berlin. They had already stopped printing the GDR’s radio and 
television programme in 1960, and in a circular letter to newspaper wholesal-
ers dated 2 September 1961, Springer threatened to stop doing business with 
them if they continued to distribute journals that printed the eastern TV sched-
ules.83 The Hamburg communist weekly Blinkfüer obtained an injunction from 
the Hamburg Regional Court— later upheld by the Higher Regional Court— 
that forbade the Springer group from threatening wholesalers. Simultaneously, 
Blinkfüer filed a claim for damages resulting from Springer’s threats. The 
courts found Springer had flexed its economic muscle for political reasons and 
thus had unlawfully encroached on a business enterprise. Springer appealed to 
the Federal Court of Justice (BGH), which issued a ruling that was exceedingly 
advantageous for the publishing giant. The 1963 decision held that restraint of 
competition as enshrined in antitrust law did not apply because Springer’s pub-
lications and Blinkfüer appealed to different audiences. The BGH found that 
Springer had only pursued a civic concern— that is, an expression of opinion— 
rather than attempting to impose his will in commercial intercourse. Conse-
quently, the judges found, Springer’s conduct was covered by freedom of opin-
ion. This ruling immediately provoked criticism and a constitutional complaint, 
with its detractors urging the judges to take into account Springer’s economic 
power and the fact that freedom of opinion also applied to Blinkfüer. The deci-
sion was not announced until May 1969, by which time Springer newspapers 
had resumed printing the East German television programme, Blinkfüer had 
gone bankrupt, and the protesters had a concrete example of what Springer 
could do with its economic might protected by the law. The Constitutional 
Court reversed the BGH’s judgement, maintaining that although calls for boy-
cott were indeed covered by freedom of expression, even among those with 
economic power, such calls were not protected by the law if they were accom-
panied by economic pressure, which, the judges decreed, was not conducive to 
the free competition of opinion.84
Such differences in legal opinion were an important backdrop to the anti- 
Springer campaign. As with the legal debates about blockading public trans-
port, lower courts tended to be much more amenable to the protesters’ argu-
83. Schulz, “Blinkfüer”; Hans Dieter Müller, Springer- Konzern, 238– 45; Kurt Groenewold, 
“Das Urteil des Bundesgerichtshofes in der Blinkfüer- Affäre: Ein Kommentar,” in Kapitalismus 
und Pressefreiheit, ed. Brokmeier, 142– 56.
84. Bundesverfassungsgericht, “Entscheidung vom 26.2.1969— 1 BvR 619/63” (Blinkfüer- 
Urteil), BVerfGE 25,256, 1969; Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, 2nd ed. (Durham, 1997), 372– 75.
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ments than did the appeals courts. Some lower courts acknowledged the 
blockades as demonstrations and thus as constitutionally protected forms of 
protest and found that “the call for state authority” must not be the last resort 
in the conflict with the students; instead, they urged a “democratically in-
formed concept of order.”85 According to the Frankfurt District Court, the fact 
that the blockade of newspaper deliveries leaving a print shop affected the 
rights of a third party did not necessarily mean that the event was “nonpeace-
ful” in nature. The court pointed to the 1958 Lüth verdict, in which the Federal 
Constitutional Court had upheld the right of the director of the Hamburg gov-
ernment’s press office, Erich Lüth, to call for a boycott of Veit Harlan’s first 
post– World War II film. The film director, who had made several antisemitic 
films during the Nazi period— most notoriously Jud Süß— had been granted an 
injunction against Lüth in the lower courts. The Constitutional Court, however, 
had reinforced freedom of expression in what became a landmark decision, 
stressing the primacy of constitutional basic rights in all other realms of the 
law. In analogy to the Lüth decision, the Frankfurt judges of 1968 demanded 
that conflicting interests protected by the law be weighed against each other. 
The attempt to prevent the delivery of Bild for one day by means of a blockade 
that highlighted threats to freedom of information was an eminently public 
matter, to which the right of unhindered road traffic had to be subordinated. 
Accordingly, they judged the economic damage resulting from the prevention 
of delivery to be a limited interference with commercial activities— not unlike 
the effects of a strike— and thus considered it acceptable.86
Some jurists introduced the concept of “social adequacy” to the discus-
sions about coercion by blockade to ascertain the “degree of unlawfulness” of 
an act of coercion. Hans Janknecht,87 at the time a member of the criminal law 
commission of the German Association of Judges and later the general state 
prosecutor in Bremen, considered it “still socially adequate if students, for lack 
of other options, fought against a press conglomerate’s long- lasting and tar-
geted hate and smear campaign . . . by preventing the delivery of newspapers 
85. Dostal, 1968, 156– 57; “AG Esslingen,” Juristenzeitung 23 (1968): 799– 800; “AG Frank-
furt,” Juristenzeitung 23 (1968): 200– 205.
86. Dostal, 1968, 160– 61; “AG Frankfurt,” Juristenzeitung 23 (1968): 204– 5; Bundesverfas-
sungericht,  “Entscheidung vom 15.1.1958— 1 BvR 400/51” (Lüth- Urteil), BVerfGE 7, 198, 1958; 
Henne and Riedlinger, Lüth- Urteil; Nipperdey, “Boykott und freie Meinungsäußerung”; Dieter 
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for a day, blocking the gates of the print shop, or setting fire to delivery vans. 
If compensation between libel and personal injury is acceptable, damage to 
property opposite incitement of the people cannot be condemned as socially 
inadequate.” Janknecht not only invoked section 130 (Volksverhetzung) of the 
Criminal Code in favour of the student protesters but was even prepared to in-
clude burning delivery vans in the legal balancing act. For Janknecht, the divid-
ing line between legal and illegal was that between demonstration of a cause 
and the factual enforcement of this cause. If the latter was the case, he consid-
ered it coercion.88
The Legal Interpretation of Violence during Blockades
The Easter 1968 Springer blockades produced a controversial sequel in civil 
law, posing the question of accountability for damage inflicted by demonstra-
tions. The Springer group sued SDS members for compensation since most 
insurance policies excluded damage caused by riots and civil commotion.89 
Horst Mahler and Günter Amendt were each sentenced to pay around seventy 
thousand deutsche marks. As in the Laepple case, the amount was determined 
by loss of earnings— in this instance, as a consequence of the delayed delivery 
of newspapers.
The BGH confirmed these rulings in May 1972, rejecting the defendants’ 
argument that they were exerting a right to resist. In Mahler’s case, the civil 
court of appeal transferred criminal terms such as abettor and instigator to 
civil law. The judges again extended the notion of violence to a remarkable 
degree, asserting that the “use of any kind of violence in the battle of political 
opinions was incompatible with the free democratic order of the Federal Re-
public. Thus the violence committed in the course of the demonstration does 
not even matter essentially because the gathering of people in front of the 
claimants’ premises associated with the demonstration already constituted an 
88. Janknecht, “Verfassungs- und strafrechtliche Fragen zu ‘Sitzstreiks,’” 37.
89. See “Demonstrations- Schäden: Innere Unruhe,” Der Spiegel 18 (29 April 1968): 68. Ac-
cording to this article, German insurance policies generally excluded damage caused by riots and 
civil commotion, a practice that traced back to a Nazi order that declared such unrest nonexistent 
in Germany. While this somewhat simplifies a complicated development in insurance law, it is true 
that civil commotion insurance was discontinued by the Nazi authorities in 1934. However, this 
action did not create a legal obstacle to commercial insurance against damage by civil commotion. 
The Federal Insurance Supervisory Office visited the issue in response to the student protests in 
1968 and upheld the conventional— but not categorical— exclusion of insurance liability in such 
cases because they were incalculable. See Karsten Friedrich, Der Rechtsbegriff der Versicherung 
und die Praxis des Versicherungsaufsichtsamts (Frankfurt, 1974), 90– 91.
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obstruction of the claimants’ business by violence of which the defendant . . . 
approved.” This approval made it irrelevant whether the defendant himself had 
caused the physical damage. This ruling reinforced the same basic interpreta-
tion as the Laepple verdict: obstructing or blockading something constituted 
violence. The BGH rejected all contrary rulings by courts of lower instance 
and similar opinions in the specialist literature in favour of limiting demonstra-
tors’ right to blockade traffic or impede the delivery of newspapers. The judges 
stated explicitly that their ruling did not abridge the right to demonstrate by 
confronting the individual demonstrator with “unreasonable risks,” as the ap-
peal had argued. The judges also assumed that the blockade ultimately 
amounted to “illegal censorship” of the press and that “permissibility of a lim-
ited use of violence” held “the danger of constantly increasing violence that 
would ultimately challenge the legal order as such.”90 Heinz Düx, a judge on 
the Frankfurt Higher Regional Court, criticised the sentence against Mahler on 
the grounds that it “destroyed a livelihood” and was governed by the “political 
agenda of the administrators of justice, namely .  .  . hierarchically structured 
relations of power.” In this context, he did not consider the exertion of violence 
per se contrary to the law.91
Mahler had neither thrown stones nor handled fire. He had been one of the 
first to enter Springer’s headquarters after the police cordon had been broken, 
for which he received a suspended criminal sentence of ten months plus the 
civil claim of seventy thousand deutsche marks. During the criminal case, Axel 
Springer was summoned as a witness and questioned by Mahler’s defence law-
yer, Otto Schily.92 Mahler evaded his sentence by escaping to a military train-
ing camp in Jordan along with other members of the RAF.93 During the night 
of 7– 8 March 1970, a few days after Springer’s first appearance in court, Mo-
lotov cocktails were hurled at the private home of Malte- Till Kogge, editor in 
chief of BZ, causing only minimal damage.94 The Sozialistische Büro in Of-
fenbach raised the money for Amendt, who was accused of blockading a 
90. “Entscheidung des BGH vom 30.5.1972— BGH VI ZR 139/70”; “Oberlandesgericht: 
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Springer print shop in Frankfurt. Throughout the following decade, authorities 
continued the legal practice of holding individual ringleaders responsible for 
the damage inflicted by large blockades and demonstrations and presenting 
them with claims for indemnification that were clearly beyond the financial 
reach of the average demonstrator.95 The strategy ended only in 1984, when the 
Federal Court of Justice stipulated that only demonstrators who had “actively” 
participated in “acts of violence” could be held accountable.96
The question of culpability for violence during the anti- Springer cam-
paign gained an additional dimension when part- time Kommune I member 
Peter Urbach was exposed as an agent of the Office for the Protection of the 
Constitution (Verfassungsschutz). He had supplied Molotov cocktails that 
were used to set alight delivery vans at Springer’s Berlin headquarters as well 
as explosives and support in other contexts, although the extent of these activi-
ties has been disputed. His involvement raises interesting questions about the 
role of agents provocateurs in escalations of violence. Some observers have 
suggested that Urbach and possibly other still- unexposed secret service agents 
were responsible for the escalation of violence at the demonstrations. How-
ever, this explanation does not account for the development of simultaneous 
violent protests in multiple German cities.97 Writer and contemporary activist 
Peter- Paul Zahl saw the perpetuation of the Urbach story as a retrospective 
strategy of exculpation by former radical activist: “If one is a little bit honest 
and takes a look at the period between 2 June 67 and the summer of 68 . . . , 
then there really was the sort of thinking articulated by Meinhof: ‘From moral 
protest to armed resistance,’”98
Contemporary comments and developments show that the differentiation 
between violence against things and violence against people was not suitable 
for dissociating oneself from violence. Quite the contrary, it identified 
objects— and thus the realm of consumption— as parts of much wider power 
structures that could be made visible by attacking these objects. This basic pat-
tern for both concrete action and its theoretical legitimisation was developed 
further in various contexts over the coming decades.
95. “Schadensersatz- Prozesse gegen Demonstranten: Ruiniert fürs ganze Leben. Ein Zeit- 
Gespräch mit Bundesjustizminister Jürgen Schmude,” Die Zeit 13 (26 March 1982), http://www.
zeit.de/1982/13/Ruiniert- fuers- ganze- Leben (accessed 7 June 2010).
96. BGH, “Entscheidung vom 24.1.1984,” 1226– 36.
97. See Siegward Lönnendonker and Bernd Rabehl, “Immer Ärger mit Peter,” taz- Berlin, 9 
September 1983, 20; Markus Mohr, “‘S- Bahn- Peter’: Eine Textcollage zur Familien- und Krimi-
nalgeschichte der Westberliner APO,” in Spitzel, ed. Mohr and Viehmann, 123– 34.
98. Peter- Paul Zahl, “Wenn Du richtig raus willst, mußt Du entweder Rockstar, Fußballstar 
oder Dichter werden,” taz, 26 February 1982, quoted in Mohr, “‘S- Bahn- Peter,’” 132.
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Militants against Springer
In November 1969, agit 883 called Axel Springer an “exemplary fascist” who 
used a single act by an individual— in this case, the failed bomb attack against 
the West Berlin Jewish Community Centre on 9 November 1969— to criminal-
ise and discredit the entire Left with the charge of violent antisemitism.99 The 
attack was highly controversial among the members of the radical left. While 
this commentary, although critical, tended to ignore the moral and political 
implications of an allegedly “anti- Zionist” attack on a German Jewish institu-
tion on the anniversary of the 1938 pogrom, it was right in pointing out that it 
had been a long- term rhetorical strategy of the Springer newspapers to equate 
the actions of student protesters with Nazi crimes. However, Agit 883 recipro-
cated in kind, thus continuing what had become a tradition in the heated ex-
change between protesters and Springer journalists: charging each other with 
fascism. The cover picture of Agit 883 showed an alarm clock at four minutes 
to twelve with the dial showing images of people whom the makers of the an-
archist newspaper considered to be fascists: next to Axel Springer were the 
chief of staff of the Bundesluftwaffe, Johannes Steinhoff, who had been a 
fighter ace in World War II; and industrialist Friedrich Flick, who had been 
convicted of war crimes at the Nuremberg Trials and been sentenced to seven 
years in  prison. The caption under this collage read, “The bomb continues to 
tick  . . .”100
Georg von Rauch, a founding member of the Tupamaros West- Berlin, also 
propagated the “destruction” of Springer in “Es lebe das Commando Schwarze 
Presse” (Long Live Operation Black Press), a document he wrote while impris-
oned after beating up a journalist from the glossy magazine Quick (not a 
Springer publication, but similar in style). He embraced the “anarchist destruc-
tion” of the Springer conglomerate in conjunction with the “self- organisation of 
our black press.” He judged the SDS anti- Springer campaign ineffective since it 
merely involved analysis and political education. The revolutionary task was the 
“exemplary busting of a large corporation” like Springer using means that 
 99. “Eine Fußnote vom Genossen Lenin,” Agit 883 41 (20 November 1969): 4; “Wie die 
Presse eine Bombe schärft,” Agit 883 41 (20 November 1969): 2.
100. Agit 883 41 (20 November 1969): 1. See Kraushaar, Bombe, 73– 78. Kraushaar mistakenly 
attributes the cover to issue 42 of Agit 883. His interpretation is a bit one- sided as he emphasises 
the antisemitic components of the radical left- wing discourse on the failed bomb attack against the 
Jewish Community Centre but fails to acknowledge the Nazi past of some of the individuals Agit 
883 was attacking. He thus misses the reciprocal character of the opposing accusations of fascism 
and the Radical Left’s rhetorical strategy of associating Springer with figures who had documented 
Nazi pasts.
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would materially hurt it. At the same time, he wanted to build up channels of 
communication with Yasser Arafat’s Fatah and the Black Panthers.101
In May 1972, the Red Armee Fraktion (RAF) bombed Springer’s Ham-
burg high- rise headquarters as part of its spring offensive. The attack on 
Springer was labelled Kommando 2. Juni and left thirty- six people injured, two 
of them severely. Despite the damage, which amounted to 336,000 deutsche 
marks, all of the Springer papers were published the following day, though 
some had reduced print runs.102 The statement of responsibility attempted to 
shift the blame by accusing Springer of failing to evacuate the premises after 
receiving a warning about the bomb. The statement did not mention issues of 
consumption but focused on what the RAF saw as Springer’s political agitation 
against communism, the Left, and Third World liberation movements, espe-
cially in Palestine.103 However, the RAF referred very explicitly to Springer in 
two earlier statements.
“The Urban Guerrilla Concept” mentioned Springer twelve times and 
Bild four times. It started out confronting left- wing “comrades” who denounced 
the RAF as “anarchist” and simultaneously distanced themselves from the ter-
rorists. The RAF’s answer was curt: this notion of anarchism was no different 
from Springer journalism.104 When trying to explain their use of weapons in 
the freeing of Andreas Baader, the fugitive radicals wrestled with the “bru-
talised” image the Springer press painted of them.105 They praised the student 
movement for focusing on repression, with the “Springer campaign” as the 
first of six examples.106 The followers of Carlos Marighella and Mao Zedong 
101. Georg von Rauch, “Es lebe das Commando Schwarze Presse,” quoted in Kraushaar, 
“Kleinkrieg gegen einen Großverleger,” 2:1099– 1100.
102. ID- Verlag, Rote Armee Fraktion, 21; Kraushaar, “Kleinkrieg gegen einen Großverleger,” 
2:1075– 1116. Kraushaar’s article provides a lengthy account of various attacks on Springer prem-
ises. His use of the terms “war” and “bomb war” (Bombenkrieg) to characterise the RAF attack is 
problematic. Kraushaar tends to avoid a close analysis of the RAF’s efforts to legitimise its bomb-
ings and thus misses the rather complicated interplay between different levels of discourse on vio-
lence that drove the process of escalation. Instead, he embraces a monocausal explanation of ideas 
that somehow inevitably led to terrorism.
103. “Erklärung vom 20. Mai 1972 zum Sprengstoff- Anschlag auf das Springer- Hochhaus,” in 
Rote Armee Fraktion, ed. ID- Verlag, 147. Andreas Elter puts the RAF in the context of Islamic 
terrorism and diagnoses a “symbiosis” between RAF and Springer, which assured each other’s 
success. This leads to the question why Springer was so successful before the RAF and after its 
demise. Elter attempts to draw a direct link between symbolic and physical violence with reference 
to Holger Meins’s Molotov cocktail film, which does not do justice to a much more complex de-
velopment. See Elter, Propaganda der Tat, 103– 6.
104. “Konzept Stadtguerilla,” 27.
105. Ibid., 30.
106. Ibid., 34– 35.
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claimed both the anti- Springer campaign and the Frankfurt squatters’ move-
ment as direct precursors of their urban guerrilla concept, maintaining that it 
was “correct to link the distribution of socialist propaganda in factories with 
the act of preventing the distribution of Bild.”107 By recycling any awareness of 
the “perfidy of German life” into renewed perfidy, the Springer Corporation 
even appeared to be a successful competitor in the long- term project of unify-
ing the working class.108 Together with public television channels and the Bay-
ernkurier, the Springer Corporation featured as representative of a “fascist 
mode of exercising power.”109 The armed fighters of the RAF rejected the proj-
ect of a left- wing counterpublic, which they considered to be too much in its 
infancy and at the mercy of an all- powerful opponent led by Springer: “There 
are no means of publication that are not controlled by capital, via advertising 
sales, as a result of the ambitions of the writers who want to write their way 
into the establishment, via the broadcasting councils, and via concentration on 
the press market. . . . Journalism is about one thing: sales— news a commodity; 
information a consumer product. Whatever isn’t suitable for consumption is 
bound to make them sick.”110
A year later— about a month before the attack on Springer’s Hamburg 
headquarters— “Serve the People” made ample reference to the anti- Springer 
campaign, with the critical focus on information as consumption receding. 
Early in the document, the RAF denounced the critics who likened the group’s 
methods to ordinary crime as operating on the same level as “Bild and BZ.”111 
Bild and the Second German Television channel (ZDF) were portrayed as turn-
ing information on poverty and misery into “fascism material” by criminalis-
ing the downtrodden.112 The analysis was more compact and subsumed the 
student movement after 1968 under broader attacks “against capitalist owner-
ship,” which found a “point of friction in capitalist profiteering.”113 Anticapital-
ism now served as the key umbrella concept. The manifesto dedicated an entire 
page to “the Springer Press,” quoting approvingly from two unidentified and 
unreferenced passages from the 1968 anti- Springer campaign. The document 
107. Ibid., 36, 41. See Marcio M. Alves, Konrad Detrez, and Carlos Marighella, Zerschlagt die 
Wohlstandsinseln der Dritten Welt: Mit dem Handbuch der Guerilleros von Sao Paulo (1969; Rein-
bek, 1971).
108. “Konzept Stadtguerilla,” 37.
109. Ibid., 45.
110. Ibid., 43.
111. “Dem Volk dienen: Stadtguerilla und Klassenkampf,” in Rote Armee Fraktion, ed. ID- 
Verlag, 115.
112. Ibid., 131.
113. Ibid., 132– 33.
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concluded that Springer forestalled the emergence of class consciousness by 
seemingly catering to the discontent of the masses, a strategy the RAF saw as 
analogous to that used by the Nazis in 1933. That Springer and Bild were “fas-
cist” had become an unquestioned stereotype.114
In highlighting this attribute, the RAF found itself in good company, 
pointedly noting one fellow critic in particular: in January 1972, one of Ger-
many’s foremost postwar writers, Heinrich Böll, had caused a political scandal 
by apparently siding with the RAF in the intellectual struggle against Springer. 
Writing in Der Spiegel, Böll sought to keep his critical distance from the ideas 
and methods of the militant rebels while putting their deeds into the perspec-
tive of German history and the principles of the rule of law. The RAF gleefully 
quoted the famous writer’s verdict on Springer’s journalistic treatment of the 
RAF’s December 1971 bank robbery during which a policeman had been 
killed: “This is no longer crypto- fascist . . . , this is naked fascism. Incitement, 
lies, dreck. This form of demagogy would not even be justified if the conjec-
tures of the . . . police were to turn out true. . . . The headline ‘Baader- Meinhof 
Gang Continue to Murder’ is a call for lynch law.”115
Böll was not the first eminent writer to describe Springer as fascist. Günter 
Grass had already referred to “truly fascist methods” and “opinion terror” in 
September 1967, when Springer newspapers had published a forged letter in 
which writer Arnold Zweig had allegedly denounced the GDR.116 Before the 
RAF’s major May 1972 offensive, Böll interpreted the group’s struggle as an 
attempt to alienate West Germans from their affluence: “I consider it psycho-
logically hopeless to talk the petty bourgeoisie, workers, employees, civil ser-
vants . . . out of their relative affluence, given their frightful experience of two 
cases of complete inflation.” While he was perfectly right in this assessment of 
the vast majority of West Germans’ consumerist preferences, his criticism of 
people’s tendency to aim for an uncompromising and complete dissociation of 
the categories “criminal” and “political” is equally noteworthy.117
From then on, Böll was branded as a fellow traveller (Sympathisant) of 
the terrorists; the national television news service, Tagesschau, called him an 
“advocate of anarchist gangsters.”118 In his defence, Böll blamed Springer 
journalism for its role in escalating violence during the student movement, cit-
114. Ibid., 135– 36.
115. Heinrich Böll, “‘Will Ulrike Gnade oder freies Geleit?,’” Der Spiegel 3 (10 January 1972): 
55. See Grützbach, Heinrich Böll; Kepplinger, Hachenberg, and Frühauf, “Struktur und Funktion.”
116. See Staadt, Voigt, and Wolle, Feind- Bild Springer, 117– 19.
117. Böll, “‘Will Ulrike Gnade oder freies Geleit?,’” 55– 56.
118. Ulrich Frank- Planitz, “Letzte Parole, verhaftet oder tot,” in Heinrich Böll, ed. Grützbach, 
85.
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ing the shootings of Ohnesorg and Dutschke.119 Böll continued his critical fo-
cus on Springer’s verbal violence in his 1974 novel, Die verlorene Ehre der 
Katharina Blum oder: Wie Gewalt entstehen und wohin sie führen kann (The 
Lost Honour of Katharina Blum; or, How Violence Develops and Where It Can 
Lead).120 Böll was not the only prominent intellectual who sought to do some 
moral justice to the RAF despite condemning its use of violence. Journalist 
Sebastian Haffner was courageous enough to point out even after the RAF’s 
spring offensive that Springer journalism bore some responsibility for the es-
calation of violence: “No one has planted the seeds of violence as keenly as 
Springer journalism has.”121
Till Meyer, a member of Movement 2 June, echoed Böll and Haffner. He 
saw Springer’s hate campaign against the student movement— “branding them 
as murderers, bandits, criminals par excellence”— at the root of much wider 
patterns of perception. He made this point while defending himself in court on 
charges of attempted murder for firing a shot shortly before his arrest. He as-
serted that killing a human being was absolutely contrary to all his political 
activism and convictions, which arose from a “humane value system”; how-
ever, the court and the Springer press met this value system— and, more 
broadly, any political motivation— with “total negation.”122
Immediately after the May 1972 offensive, the RAF added another facet 
to its focus on Springer’s consumer journalism. Turning to the “comrades” in 
the K- Gruppen (avant- gardist small- scale communist organisations emanating 
from the dissolution of the SDS), they objected to the argument that the attack 
on Springer had not had the desired effect on workers, who already knew “that 
every day Bild was lying through its teeth.” The RAF countered by charging 
those comrades with a commodity approach to political communication: “To 
them the problem of communication [Vermittlung] presents itself like the Bild 
headline to the Springer journalist, as a problem of saleability and competition— 
the political content as a commodity, the masses as a market. . . . They consume 
what they pretend to fight.”123 The alternative to this consumption trap was 
armed resistance.
119. Heinrich Böll, “Man muß zu weit gehen, um herauszufinden, wie weit man gehen kann,” 
Süddeutsche Zeitung, 29– 30 January 1972, in ibid., 127– 33.
120. Heinrich Böll, The Lost Honour of Katharina Blum; or, How Violence Develops and 
Where It Can Lead, trans. Leila Vennewitz (London, 1974). See Nigel Harris, “‘Die verlorene Ehre 
der Katharina Blum’: The Problem of Violence,” in Narrative Fiction, ed. Butler, 198– 218.
121. Sebastian Haffner, “Blutiges Spiel,” Stern, 4 June 1972, 114, quoted in Kraushaar, 
“Kleinkrieg gegen einen Großverleger,” 2:1104.
122. Till Meyer, “Erklärung vor dem Schwurgericht,” Rote Hilfe Hamburg, January 1973, 23.
123. “Tonbandprotokoll von dem Teach- in der Roten Hilfe, Frankfurt: Erklärung von 31. Mai 
1972,” in Rote Armee Fraktion, ed. ID- Verlag, 149.
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The RAF’s applauding statement on the Black September organisation 
was the last time it extensively referred to Springer. This document used the 
enemy image of Springer in two respects: in the construction of an alleged 
fascist continuity, and in the context of recurring polemics against the New 
Left being taken in by Springer journalism.124 Hence they accused their erst-
while comrades— especially Oskar Negt— of opportunism, a petit bourgeois 
mentality, and, most important, loss of anti- imperialist consciousness.125 In the 
spirit of fascist continuity, the RAF strung together Bild headlines on German 
Olympic medals, the 1972 Munich Massacre, and an allusion to Goebbels’s 
famous speech on total war.126
Although subsequent statements did not mention Springer so directly, the 
problem of media concentration remained high on the RAF’s anti- corporate 
agenda, as is demonstrated by a compilation of newspaper clippings and statis-
tical data on West German media companies that the RAF prisoners kept in 
their files at Stuttgart’s Stammheim Prison.127
Axel Springer, who had never been a Nazi but who employed several 
former high- ranking party members, was not personally targeted, although 
speculation about this possibility was rife, and he took ample safety precau-
tions. He was heavily guarded at all times, and when travelling by car he was 
always escorted by at least two other vehicles. Paul Karl Schmidt, alias Paul 
Carell, whom Springer put in charge of his elaborate personal security, had 
been a high- ranking Nazi propagandist at Ribbentrop’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.128 In August 1973, an arson attack on a stately guest house privately 
owned by Springer on the North Sea island of Sylt caused considerable dam-
age but no injuries, and no culprit was ever identified.129 Seventeen months 
later, Axel Springer’s chalet in the Swiss Alps met a similar fate. In 2006, 
Swiss writer Daniel de Roulet confessed to having taken part in the arson in the 
mistaken belief that Springer had been a Nazi.130
124. “Die Aktion des »Schwarzen September« in München: Zur Strategie des antiimperialist-
ischen Kampfes, November 1972,” in ibid., 152.
125. Ibid., 159.
126. Ibid., 167.
127. “Die Umsatzstärksten BRD- Medienkonzerne 1974,” in file “Wirtschaft, Kapital, Ökono-
mie,” Stammheim Nachlass, AHIS RAF- Sep/001.
128. Kraushaar, “Kleinkrieg gegen einen Großverleger,” 2:1107– 08. See Wigbert Benz, Paul 
Carell: Ribbentrops Pressechef Paul Karl Schmidt vor und nach 1945 (Berlin, 2005); Christian 
Plöger, Von Ribbentrop zu Springer: Zu Leben und Wirken von Paul Karl Schmidt alias Paul Carell 
(Marburg, 2009).
129. Kraushaar, “Kleinkrieg gegen einen Großverleger,” 2:1109.
130. Ibid., 1109– 10; Daniel de Roulet, Ein Sonntag in den Bergen: Ein Bericht (Zürich, 2006). 
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Apart from these clandestine attacks on Springer’s properties, no major 
street protest activities emerged during the remainder of the 1970s. Springer, 
however, remained an archenemy of the radical Left. A flyer from the early 
squatters’ movement in Hamburg listed three main targets of political attack, 
with Springer preceding both the Hamburg government and the hated trade- 
union- owned housing society, Neue Heimat.131 More important for popularis-
ing critiques of the media mogul was undercover journalist Günter Wallraff. 
who worked as an editor for Bild for four months in 1977 and subsequently 
published three widely read book- length indictments of the dubious practices 
he encountered.132 In 1981, literary eminences Grass, Wolf Biermann, and 
Uwe Johnson joined an “Anti- Springer- Forum” that declared, “We don’t work 
for Springer newspapers.”133
The Revival of Anti- Springer Activism in the  
Context of the Peace Movement
A blockade of Springer premises took place in October 1983 during large- scale 
protests across Europe against the implementation of the NATO double- track 
decision. An “action week” of the peace movement in Hamburg, including 
blockades of the American barracks at Bremerhaven, was supplemented by 
protesters blockading Springer’s Hamburg headquarters and the Rothfos coffee 
company.134 Action against the latter was not directly related to the issue of 
NATO weapons but sought to address “the blood in El Salvadorian coffee.”135 
The blockade of coffee deliveries remained a small- scale event without distur-
bances, but on 22 October, after a peace demonstration with several hundred 
thousand participants, an evening demonstration of several thousand organised 
by the Grün- Alternative- Liste (GAL), Hamburg’s branch of the Green Party, in 
conjunction with some twenty smaller organisations, including autonomist 
je zuvor Einblicke in die Anti- Springer- Psychologie eines Brandstifters zu bekommen.” However, 
he does not really reflect on the methodological problems posed by Roulet’s confession, which 
was written thirty years after the arson, which itself occurred almost three years after the RAF’s 
attack on Springer.
131. Wir greifen an: Springer, Senat, Neue Heimat: Besetzung Ekhofstr. 39 (Hamburg, 1973), 
IISG Amsterdam, ID- Bro744/13 fol.
132. See Wallraff, Aufmacher; Wallraff, Zeugen der Anklage; Wallraff, BILD- Handbuch.
133. Seitenbecher, Deutschen “Cäsar” bezwingen, 100; Kruip, “Welt”- “Bild” des Axel 
Springer Verlags, 261.
134. “Perschau fordert: keine Blockaden,” Hamburger Abendblatt, 7 October 1983, 4; 
“Springer- Blockade— Ein Exempel,” Arbeiterkampf 239 (31 October 1983): 14– 17.
135. “Blockade bei Rothfos: Kaffeepause,” taz- Hamburg, 19 October 1983, 16.
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groups, set out to prevent the delivery of the Sunday issue of Bild. During the 
confrontation between demonstrators and police, shop windows were smashed, 
barricades were built, and the police were attacked with cobblestones, bottles, 
incendiary devices, and iron bars. An office furniture store was looted, and 
private cars were set afire. The police cleared the way for the Sunday newspa-
pers using water cannons, truncheons, and plainclothes officers mingling with 
the demonstrators. Both police and demonstrators suffered injuries.136 The 
Springer Company organised a cold buffet for police commanders.137
Attacks inflicting some damage on the private homes of three Berliner 
Morgenpost journalists, including chief editor Johannes Otto, during the run- up 
to the Hamburg blockade remained isolated and did not figure prominently in 
the ensuing debates. A letter claiming responsibility for the attacks on the jour-
nalists’ homes invoked the concept of Gleichschaltung (forcible coordination in 
Nazi Germany) and lamented Springer’s political partiality in launching “char-
acter assassination, denunciation, and smear campaigns” against anything with 
even the remotest appearance of originating on the political left.138 These small- 
scale attacks on private homes resembled earlier Revolutionäre Zellen (RZ) 
campaigns. Another incident in November 1982 in which four young people set 
fire to newspaper delivery vans also attracted little media attention.139
An analysis of the organisation of the 1983 blockade campaign reveals that 
memories of 1968 and especially the issue of violence figured prominently. The 
idea of including Springer in blockade activities originated with the German 
Communist Party (DKP), which then lamented that the GAL hijacked the con-
cept, apparently to add variation to the protest forms of the peace movement and 
to revive the spirit of extraparliamentary protest.140 The DKP and the trade 
136. “Blockadeplenum: Gemeinsam zur Kaserne,” taz- Hamburg, 19 October 1983, 16; “Sam-
Stag war BamStag,” taz- Hamburg, 24 October 1983, 16; “Siebentausend waren dabei. Vor 
Springer: Größte Blockade des Herbstes,” taz, 24 October 1983, 3; “Erst Frieden, dann Krawall,” 
Hamburger Abendblatt, 24 October 1983, 1; “Die Schlacht in der Neustadt,” Hamburger Abendb-
latt, 24 October 1983, 3; “Die Springerblockade am 22.10.: Radikalisierung der Friedensbewe-
gung oder Abenteuer?,” taz, 27 October 1983, 8; “Hamburg: Springer- Blockade,” radikal 8.122 
(November 1988): 36.
137. “Nachschlag,” taz- Hamburg, 25 October 1983, 16.
138. “Berlin: Anschlag auf ‘MoPo’- Chefredakteur,” taz, 4 October 1983, 5; “AL verurteilt An-
schlag: Sprengstoffanschlag auf ‘Morgenpost’- Chef,” taz- Berlin, 4 October 1983, 15; “Bekenner-
brief eingegangen: ‘Bewußtseinsmäßig gleichgeschaltet,’” taz- Berlin, 5 October 1983, 16; “An-
schläge: Berliner Morgenpost,” radikal 8.122 (November 1983): 4.
139. “Prozeß vor dem Jugendgericht: Springer- LKW’s brennen, der Staatsschutz errötet,” taz- 
Hamburg, 31 October 1983, 15.
140. “GAL- Vorstoß zu Herbstaktion: Blockiert Springer!,” taz- Hamburg, 26 September 1983, 
16; “Springer Blockade: DKP attackiert GAL— Schlepptau oder Spaltung?,” taz- Hamburg, 3 Oc-
tober 1983, 16; “Aufruf der Hamburger GAL und des Komitees zur Verteidigung der Pressefrei-
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unions subsequently kept their distance from the Springer blockade, as they had 
fifteen years earlier.141 The organisers of the ensuing Blockadeplenum (plenary 
meeting on blockades) foresaw violence chiefly in the context of the campaign 
against Springer. Blockading American barracks was seen as a clear- cut in-
stance of civil resistance likely to encounter politically restrained police mea-
sures. However, the scenario of Easter 1968 and the expectation that police and 
the drivers of delivery vans would use extreme measures to break the blockade 
as a result of the “high economic significance of the newspaper deliveries,” led 
the protesters to aim for more moderate goals— that is, to retard rather than 
prevent delivery of the papers. Members of the organising committee and the 
competing wings of the GAL differed about whether to use improvised barri-
cades and sabotage or a classic sit- in blockade “without damage to private prop-
erty.” The issue of nonviolence emerged as a central bone of contention, high-
lighting a rift in the protest movement. Organisers agreed, however, that they 
wanted to prevent fatalities and avoid fire and occupation as means of protest.
The political goal was to highlight “ideological preparations for war.”142 
From this perspective, Springer newspapers produced enemy images and en-
gaged in warmongering (Kriegshetze). Moreover, they tried to discredit the 
peace movement as “Moscow’s fifth column” while glorifying various military 
campaigns around the world and the militarisation of domestic society via re-
cruits’ swearing- in ceremonies or military flying displays: “Thus the real wars 
in the ‘Third World’— waged in the service of the moral concepts of the ‘Free 
West’ and the freedom of capital development— become everyday occur-
rences, delivered to your home.”143 The leftist newspaper taz printed a photo 
montage using Joe Rosenthal’s Pulitzer Prize– winning World War II photo-
graph Raising the Flag on Iwo Jima with the American flag replaced by a copy 
of Bild.144 The appointment of Peter Boehnisch, editor in chief of Bild in 1968, 
heit: Springer- Blockade Samstag,” taz- Berlin, 18 October 1983, 1– 2; “Fünfzehn Jahre nach 
1968— Wie einst im Mai?,” taz, 19 October 1983, 3.
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as spokesperson for the federal government demonstrated the close ties be-
tween Helmut Kohl’s government and Axel Springer.145 The revival of the anti- 
Springer campaign was supported by Wallraff, who called Springer’s newspa-
pers “journalistic missile bases” and pointed out that more than three hundred 
thousand Germans had signed calls to boycott Springer.146
In comparison with the original Springer blockade fifteen years earlier, 
press commentary on the more localised events in Hamburg was less shrill and 
sensational. Opinion was also less divided: the vast majority of observers 
seemed agreed in their outright condemnation of violence and in their support 
of the abstract principle of peace. An interesting political division emerged 
from discussions of violence at peace demonstrations. Those who were ada-
mant that no use of any internal violence (other than by state authorities) could 
be tolerated were most inclined to consider the deployment of external military 
means of violence (that is, midrange nuclear missiles) a legitimate measure.147 
Conversely, those who seemed most sceptical about the legitimacy of nuclear 
armament were more prone to consider the application of limited and directed 
violence— that is, forms of civil disobedience— as means of domestic political 
communication. This arrangement informed a prominent argument in strate-
gies of legitimisation: “What is a blockade (or a stone) compared to an atomic 
bomb?” Opponents attempted to remove this stance from the political stage— 
for example, a CDU member of the Hamburg parliament declared that anyone 
engaging in civil disobedience “departed from the community of the 
democrats.”148
Attempts to theorise violence did not figure prominently in the main-
stream political discourse of the early 1980s. In fact, the actual motives of the 
militant protesters were often unclear, and they were now generically called 
Chaoten, a derogatory term deriving from “chaos” that might be translated as 
“lunatic fringe.” Issues of press concentration or the role of Springer publish-
ing in consumer society featured little in the public debate. Some political 
controversy arose over the merger of the publishing houses Springer and Burda 
earlier that year, which the Cartel Authority had limited to Burda acquiring 
24.9  percent of Springer’s limited liability capital,149 but this aspect seems not 
145. GAL, Vorbereitungsgruppe Springer- Blockade, Blockadeplenum, Friedenskoordination, 
“Springer macht’s möglich: Der Krieg wird vorbereitet auch in unseren Köpfen!,” taz- Hamburg, 5 
October 1983, 15.
146. Günter Wallraff, “Publizistische Raketenstützpunkte,” taz- Hamburg, 22 October 1983, 23.
147. See, for example, “Perschau warnt vor der Gefahr von links,” Hamburger Abendblatt, 26 
October 1983, 3.
148. “‘GAL soll sich von Gewalt distanzieren,’” Hamburger Abendblatt, 24 November 1983, 7.
149. “Springer- Burda- Fusion: Ministerium will neues Gutachten,” taz, 5 January 1983, 2; 
“Burda darf nur 24,9 Prozent übernehmen,” taz, 7 January 1983, 2.
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to have had a major impact on protest activities, which were dominated by the 
politics of the peace movement. Overall, the second campaign was less intel-
lectual than its precursor. Both anti- Springer campaigns enjoyed rather limited 
success in terms of direct impact on their foe and its commercial success. De-
spite some temporary declines in profits during the 1970s, Springer’s tabloids 
continued to dominate the market. When deeming these campaigns successful, 
oppositional groups praised the raising of awareness, which helped to mobilise 
protest movements and to provoke reactions by the authorities that could be 
turned against them politically, not least concerning the issue of violence.
The latter can be seen in the context of two overlapping points of contro-
versy emerging in the aftermath of the 1983 Springer blockade. The first in-
volved the GAL’s position on violence.150 The party was blamed for the emer-
gence of violence and in this respect found itself in a similar position as the 
SDS fifteen years earlier. However, the GAL faced a trickier situation, since its 
agenda was not openly revolutionary, like that of the SDS. Since June 1982, the 
GAL held eight seats in the Hamburg parliament, where the party’s loyalty to 
a peaceful political process was constantly questioned. Party leaders faced a 
difficult balancing act between trying to unite the protest movement, including 
militant and autonomist groups, and defending their democratic credentials 
against criticism from the established parties. The established parties also in-
creasingly constructed the autonomists, generally seen as advocating violence, 
as politically taboo.151 In November 1983, Hamburg’s minister of the interior, 
Alfons Pawelczyk (SPD), explicitly presented the Greens with a demand that 
would come to haunt them: “To distance themselves from every form of vio-
lence. The monopoly on violence lies solely with the state.”152
Police and the domestic secret service (Verfassungsschutz), which was 
increasingly concerned with political demonstrations, assumed that more than 
one thousand of the six thousand participants in the evening demonstration 
were “perpetrators of violence” (Gewalttäter) and that four hundred of them 
had acted spontaneously, whilst the others had travelled to the event with the 
intention of inciting violence. Five protesters faced charges of severe violation 
of the public peace (schwerer Landfriedensbruch), which could result in up to 
ten years in jail. The Hamburger Abendblatt emphasised that these people did 
not have jobs but lived on state benefits. Since the GAL had officially regis-
tered the demonstration, the question of responsibility assumed not only po-
litical and moral dimensions but also a tangible legal dimension in terms of 
150. “Welche Rolle spielte die GAL,” taz, 7 January 1983, 4.
151. “Pawelczyk legt jetzt Beweise auf den Tisch,” Hamburger Abendblatt, 26 October 1983, 
3; “Pawelczyk zur Springerblockade: Mit gebotener Härte,” taz- Hamburg, 26 October 1983, 16.
152. “‘GAL soll sich von Gewalt distanzieren,’” Hamburger Abendblatt, 24 November 1983, 7.
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liability for damage. The manager of the looted furniture store told the Ham-
burger Abendblatt that the business was considering sending a bill of fifteen 
thousand deutsche marks to the GAL to cover the damage; cleanup might add 
another eighty- five hundred deutsche marks to the total.153 A political demon-
stration was thus turned into a question of consumption— in this case, 
destruction— and its costs. The journal of the Kommunistischer Bund (KB), 
one of the most important K- Gruppen, which supported the GAL, ironically 
called the latter an “umbrella organisation for Hamburg’s looters.”154
The second important debate— partly driven by the GAL as a counterof-
fensive against these charges and perhaps to legitimise their role in the 
demonstration— involved the plainclothes police force. There were complaints 
about the brutality of these officers; because they were undercover, it was ex-
tremely difficult to control their conduct and to identify or prosecute them if 
they exceeded their authority. The KB argued that plainclothes police officers 
had acted with “terrorist brutality” in beating up demonstrators. The under-
cover officers were supposed to concentrate on demonstrators considered to be 
violent, giving them wide leeway in defining who met this criterion. The strat-
egy also put pressure on protesters and critics to distance themselves from vio-
lent means and to acknowledge the state monopoly on violence.155 The GAL 
alleged in the Hamburg parliament that plainclothes officers had thrown stones, 
acting as agents provocateurs, and then beating up innocent demonstrators.156 
The Hamburger Abendblatt, conversely, reported proudly that all of the offi-
cers were “trained in jiu- jitsu or karate. Many of them have the black master 
belt.”157
To its critics, Springer appeared to be an ideological affirmation of affluence 
and of West Germany’s postwar “economic miracle.” Theoretical analysis 
sought to unmask tabloid journalism and its control of the advertisement mar-
ket as a hypercommodity serving as a necessary lubricant of the capitalist sys-
tem. The concrete protests— especially those at Easter 1968 after the assassina-
tion attempt on Dutschke— blamed Springer for inciting violence against the 
students and their leaders, focusing on newspapers as tangible commodities 
153. “Die Grünen und die Gewalt in der Innenstadt: Die Polizei erhebt schwere Vorwürfe,” 
Hamburger Abendblatt, 25 October 1983, 3.
154. “Springer- Blockade— Ein Exempel,” Arbeiterkampf 239 (31 October 1983): 14.
155. “Beispiel Hamburg: Zivilbanden bei der Springerblockade,” Arbeiterkampf 240 (28 No-
vember 1983): 17; “Polizei: Wie eine Klette,” Der Spiegel 51 (19 December 1983): 36– 38.
156. “Mahnwache: Mißhandlungen nach Springer- Blockade,” taz, 2 November 1984, 4; “‘GAL 
soll sich von Gewalt distanzieren,’” Hamburger Abendblatt, 24 November 1983, 7.
157. “Zwischen Frieden und Krawall,” Hamburger Abendblatt, 24 October 1983, 4.
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and seeking to hobble their distribution network by blockading print shops and 
delivery vans. The critical emphasis on Konsumjournalismus (consumer jour-
nalism) was shared by prominent intellectuals such as Böll and Grass. Ulti-
mately, the campaign neither seriously jeopardised its archenemy’s dominance 
of the newspaper market nor substantially changed tabloid journalism.
The notion of manipulation was central to the anti- Springer campaign and 
its critique of press concentration. Much recent scholarship has moved away 
from simple notions of manipulation concerning the products of so- called cul-
tural industries. Scholars have argued that consumers should not be reduced to 
passive victims of manipulation, and many contemporary activists embraced 
ideas from Walter Benjamin’s “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Re-
production” and later from the works of the Birmingham Centre for Contem-
porary Cultural Studies to establish the possibility of a politicised subversion 
of the cultural industries.158 While these intellectual developments probably 
diminished the attraction of manipulationist positions in the larger discourse of 
cultural politics on the left, they did not really lessen the pertinence of critiques 
of media concentration and its political repercussions. Critiques of Springer’s 
press empire emerged just as naturally as they did in the case of other press 
barons such as Hugenberg, Murdoch, and Berlusconi. The anti- Springer cam-
paign went beyond crude manipulationism by embracing its own alternative or 
countercultural forms of media manipulation. An understanding of media ma-
nipulation as a communicative technique of favouring particular interests that 
can be used by any political persuasion will do more justice to the anti- Springer 
campaign’s origins in Springer’s manifest media manipulation (as, for exam-
ple, in the Blinkfüer case) and in contemporary legal practice vis- à- vis boycotts 
and blockades.
More than any other issue of the student movement, the anti- Springer 
blockades made demands on legal scholars, lawyers’ associations, and courts, 
which had to take a stand on questions that were far more complicated and 
controversial than they sometimes seem in retrospective accounts that simply 
dismiss the protests as violent. Before the student protests, almost no jurispru-
dential literature dealt with the relation between offences inflicted by crowds 
and the basic rights of freedom of opinion and freedom of speech. Contempo-
rary jurisprudential comments critical of the Laepple verdict’s wide concept of 
violence gradually influenced the legal opinions offered in commentaries, text-
books, and subsequent judgments.159 The interpretation of relevant norms like 
158. See Siegfried, Time Is On My Side, 17, 146– 65, 662– 65.
159. Dostal, 1968, 148, 172.
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Auflauf (section 116 StGB, the remaining together of a crowd after the authori-
ties thrice bid it disperse), Landfriedensbruch (section 125 StGB, breach of the 
public peace), or Nötigung (section 240 StGB, coercion) posed dogmatic ques-
tions and necessitated a notable reformulation of the legal notion of violence.160 
Consumer protest was so crucial to the controversial debates on how to treat 
new forms and ways of protest under existing criminal law because it touched 
on two potentially conflicting pillars of the law: the protection of private prop-
erty and commerce, on the one hand, and the safeguarding of civil and political 
rights, on the other. Liberal- minded jurists considered the wording of the para-
graphs Auflauf and Landfriedensbruch no longer timely in the context of the 
Basic Law— the Strafgesetzbuch, originated in 1870— for infringing too heav-
ily on the right of assembly. While some merely wanted to change the scope of 
discretion, others believed that these norms ran counter to the Basic Law. Quite 
a few lawyers considered the protests to be new aspects of political life. In their 
opinion, criminal penalties would have to break new theoretical ground. New 
forms of protest such as sit- ins or blockades needed new legal categories. A 
number of lawyers considered the sit- in an exemplar of nonviolent resistance 
that should not under any circumstances be judged as Landfriedensbruch.161
In the long term, these dissenting opinions triggered a shift in legal con-
ception that conceded a higher priority to freedom of assembly vis- à- vis state 
authority by no longer automatically assessing crowds and gatherings outside 
registered demonstrations as punishable threats to public life.162 However, 
from the late 1960s to the mid- 1990s, the higher courts stuck to a more restric-
tive interpretation, often overruling courts of original jurisdiction.163 From this 
perspective, the BGH’s Laepple verdict was a compromise in that it assumed 
the mental violence of Nötigung while denying the physical violence of Land-
friedensbruch.
160. See Andreas Roth, Kollektive Gewalt, 204– 6; Drescher, Genese und Hintergründe.
161. Dostal, 1968, 190.




Urban Space: The Squatting Movement
“Everybody shall have the right to adequate housing.”
—The Constitution of Berlin1
In Zurich, a building that used to be a department store became the focal point 
of a conflict that marked the beginning of Switzerland’s 1968 protests. Young 
people demanded the establishment of an autonomous young people’s social 
centre in an edifice that the Globus Company had erected while rebuilding its 
headquarters , expensive retail space in the centre of Zurich that protesters 
wanted for nonprofit use. In the street fighting that ensued after a 29 June dem-
onstration, bricks from the construction site for Switzerland’s first shopping 
mall— the subterranean Shopville, connected to Zurich’s main train station— 
were hurled at the police, who later faced accusations that they had used dis-
proportionate force against the demonstrators. Several interim solutions did 
not settle the issue of free space for leftist young people, some of whom were 
homeless. In February 1971, protests again focused on Shopville, now com-
pleted, where protesters conducted daily teach- ins, using its grounds in lieu of 
the desired social centre. When the municipal government prohibited gather-
ings at the shopping centre, sixteen young people were arrested by officers in 
riot gear; tear gas was used for the first time in Switzerland.2 While 1968 pro-
tests in Germany involved direct action against manifestations of consumer 
society, the Swiss case offers a good example for another constellation that 
involved matters of consumption in debates regarding political violence. Der-
1. “The Constitution of Berlin,” www.berlin.de/rbmskzl/verfassung/en_index.html (accessed 
29 November 2010).
2. Regula Howald, Die Angst der Mächtigen vor der Autonomie: Aufgezeigt am Beispiel Zürich 
(Horgen, 1981), 22– 34. See also Katharina Bühler, Aufruhr und Landfriedensbruch im schweizeri-
schen Strafrecht: Eine Analyse der Literatur und Rechtsprechung zu den Massedelikten, unter 
besonderer Berücksichtigung der Urteile zum Zürcher “Globuskrawall” (Zürich, 1976); Lindner, 
Jugendprotest, 326– 30; Angelika Linke and Joachim Scharloth, Der Zürcher Sommer 1968: 
Zwischen Krawall, Utopie und Bürgersinn (Zürich, 2008).
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elict buildings and urban space became contested areas, pitting young protest-
ers against commercial interests backed by law enforcement.
In West Germany, students, homeless people, and foreign workers took to 
squatting in Frankfurt’s Westend in the autumn of 1970. In West Berlin, the 
early squats, the Georg- von- Rauch- Haus (December 1971) and the Tommy- 
Weisbecker- Haus (March 1973), were named after two members of Movement 
2 June who had been killed in shootouts with the police. A comparative analy-
sis of the squatting movements in Frankfurt and West Berlin demonstrates that 
squatters could be both alternative consumers and radical activists and that 
they faced criminalisation by the authorities, at the same time some activists 
opted to use militant tactics to further their cause.
In the summer of 1980, West Berlin’s squatters articulated a set of objec-
tions against their contemporary regimes of provision: “communes, workers’ 
collectives, and communication do not prosper in concrete cells; neither does 
resistance against unlimited consumption. Consumption is a substitute for in-
terpersonal relationships; it is designed by those who make money from it. 
Consumption makes people dependent on even more consumption; draws bat-
tle lines between owners and consumers. more and more is being produced; 
wars are incited to conquer new markets.”3 The term Konsum (consumption) 
clearly carried negative connotations, being associated with social barriers, 
prison cells, and even wars, while Konsumenten (consumers) were conceived 
as victims who could, however, resist. Since this statement was an aside in the 
internal communication of squatters focused on the more concrete aspects of 
their political struggle, it does not say much more about the origins, back-
ground, and implications of their anticonsumerist attitudes. Three years after 
these lines were written, West Berlin’s squatters had been either evicted or 
transferred into legal tenancy agreements; the movement had come to an end 
without significantly altering the mechanisms of the housing market, let alone 
of consumer society more generally.
At the beginning of the twenty- first century, estimates suggested a world-
wide population of one billion squatters— that is, people dwelling in buildings 
without legal entitlement to use them.4 Irrespective of the empirical accuracy 
of this figure, should we assume that all these people share some sort of discon-
tent with consumer society or, to put it more neutrally, that they can serve as an 
indicator or pointer to the limits or shortcomings of consumerist housing mar-
kets? How does the phenomenon of squatting fit into our understanding of 
3. Besetzer- Rat Info 2 (July 1980), Papiertiger: archiv und bibliothek der sozialen bewegungen, 
folder “Häuser 1978/Jan.– Aug. 1980.”
4. Neuwirth, Shadow Cities.
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history? It would be wrong to dismiss the socioeconomic phenomenon of 
squatting and the resistance to consumer society that accompanied it, as an 
aberration, as a mere footnote in German history, as nothing more than a po-
litical provocation by violent revolutionaries, or as simply a result of the un-
willingness of nonconformist youths to work for their consumptive needs.
Social scientists have offered a number of— perhaps complementary— 
interpretations for the occurrence and escalation of violence during the squat-
ters’ conflicts. Some emphasise the generational experience of youth facing a 
gloomy future,5 while others put the onus on police tactics, and escalations are 
seen as a result of policy intransigence.6 A third view points out that percep-
tions of the conflict were increasingly depoliticised by conceiving the issue as 
a police matter rather than a political problem,7 resulting in “inversionary dis-
courses” on violence and the emergence of a militant movement, the Au-
tonomen.8 This chapter’s combination of a historical analysis of discourses on 
violence in the context of the squatters’ movement with discourses on con-
sumption integrates these approaches.
Squatting as a Socioeconomic Phenomenon
Conflict over housing issues took place in many European cities throughout 
the 1970s and 1980s. An intensification and politicisation of social protest par-
alleled slowing growth as a result of the 1973– 74 recession. Social unrest thus 
needs to be contextualised with the follow- up costs of mass production and 
mass consumption. The restructuring measures embraced by politics and busi-
ness in an effort to respond to economic challenges contributed to the further 
exclusion of certain social groups that had difficulty obtaining access to soci-
ety’s economic wealth. Social movements responded to the destruction of en-
vironments, cities, and quality of life.9 The idea that the ruling political econ-
omy bred destruction became central to ideological justifications of protest. 
Urban conflicts— primarily acute housing shortages— made the destruction of 
housing space for economic motives a contested reality. Young people and mi-
5. Brandt, Büsser, and Rucht, Aufbruch in eine andere Gesellschaft, 203.
6. Lindner, Jugendprotest, 336– 38; Karapin, Protest Politics, 76, 93, 109.
7. Manrique, Marginalisierung und Militanz, 101.
8. Freia Anders, “Wohnraum, Freiraum, Widerstand: Die Formierung der Autonomen in den 
Konflikten um Hausbesetzungen Anfang der achtziger Jahre,” in Alternative Milieu, ed. Reichardt 
and Siegfried, 473– 98.
9. Margit Mayer, “Städtische soziale Bewegungen,” in Sozialen Bewegungen, ed. Roland Roth 
and Rucht, 299.
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grants resorted to the self- help initiative of squatting: the unauthorised occupa-
tion of abandoned buildings.10
Social scientists have shown that Zurich, Frankfurt, and other cities were 
subject to “Fordist” paradigms of urban development: the planned separation 
of districts dedicated to living, consumption, industry, and services.11 In the 
context of educational expansion and continued economic growth, large num-
bers of students and immigrant worker families moved into inner cities, where 
accommodations were affordable if a bit run- down. In many places, the in-
creased need for housing contrasted sharply with calculated vacancies and de-
molition to make way for shopping centres, office blocks, or traffic junctions, 
while politicians tried to shift the demand for housing to newly built quarters 
on the periphery.
In several respects, squatting appeared to be a provocative alternative to 
consumer society. Young people’s flat- sharing communities were located in 
unrenovated old buildings designated for demolition. These were often short- 
term lets furnished with orange crates and mattresses on the floor and relying 
on multicultural provisions from local grocery shops run by immigrant fami-
lies. Such makeshift accommodations became symbols of youthful autonomy, 
and squatting sought to defend this lifestyle. These pioneers of “autonomous 
lifestyles” rarely referred to theoreticians such as Herbert Marcuse but did em-
bark on a quest for social relations that would allow for the articulation of au-
thentic needs. The concrete swaths cut into the texture of old cities appeared to 
be attacks on the youth cultures settling in the brittle walls. Activists confronted 
a dubious system in which the state protected owners’ right to destroy their 
property profitably.12 Real estate speculators came to epitomize the ruthless 
capitalist, reviving anticapitalist stereotypes. The squatter movement also 
faced charges of antisemitism, since a number of the disputed buildings were 
owned by Jews, among them Frankfurt real estate speculator Ignatz Bubis.13 A 
brochure published by Göttingen squatters contained a cartoon that sought to 
10. The literature on squatting is still in its infancy: see Stracke, Stadtzerstörung und Stadt-
teilkampf; Laurisch, Kein Abriss; Nitsche, Häuserkämpfe; Bodenschatz, Heise, and Korfmacher, 
Schluß mit der Zerstörung?; Sonnewald and Raabe- Zimmermann, “Berliner Linie”; Koopmans, 
Democracy from Below, 170– 78; Karapin, Protest Politics, 61– 116. Squatting is also treated in 
some studies on youth protest: see Lindner, Jugendprotest, 260– 74, 331– 413; Manrique, Margin-
alisierung und Militanz, 72– 77, 115– 25. See also studies on the Autonomen: Schwarzmeier, Die 
Autonomen zwischen Subkultur, 239– 69; Anders, “Wohnraum,” 473– 98.
11. Peter Birke, “Vom ‘Fünffingerplan’ bis zur ‘Bambule’: Stadtpolitik und Häuserkämpfe in 
bundesdeutschen Großstädten von 1968 bis heute” (unpublished manuscript, 2010), 5.
12. Laurisch, Kein Abriss, 113.
13. Koenen, Das Rote Jahrzehnt, 341– 42. See also Hargens, Müll, die Stadt, und der Tod, 54– 
65.
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address the basic interconnection between consumption and destruction by 
showing a corpulent speculator with bowler hat, bow tie, and a packet of money 
who was squeezing old buildings and letting the yield drop into his mouth 
while simultaneously defecating newly built structures.14
The counterconcept of squatting included a distinct emphasis on advertis-
ing the cause, resulting in some structural similarities with the commercial 
system it criticised: “With the attractive renovation and imaginative graffiti and 
banners, they converted these buildings into . . . advertisement attractions for 
the ‘idea of squatting’ and for self- help, for a better life in flat- sharing com-
munities, for the motto, We take what we need.”15 The activists felt a militant 
hatred for “inhuman” modern estates and their backers that was manifest in a 
widespread graffito, “Schade, dass Beton nicht brennt” (Too bad concrete 
doesn’t burn), that eventually became the title of a documentary film on Berlin 
squatters in the early 1980s.16
The legal system faced the challenge of balancing the economic, social, 
and cultural interests of ordinary consumers of housing space and urban infra-
structure against the economic interests of real estate entrepreneurs, calcula-
tions that touched on constitutional law. The squatters could legitimise their 
claims with reference to West Germany’s Basic Law, article 14, section 2: 
“Property entails obligations. Its use shall also serve the public good.” West 
Berlin’s Constitution went even further: according to article 28, section 1, “Ev-
eryone shall have the right to adequate housing.” The state of Berlin committed 
to promoting “the creation and maintenance of adequate housing, particularly 
for people on a low income, as well as private ownership of housing.”17
The appropriation of neglected living space practically withdrawn from 
the common weal was located in an area of tension between legitimacy and 
legality that became a question of legal interpretation. Unlike the law in Great 
Britain, German law did not allow for the acquisition of real property via 
squatting.18 A minority opinion among criminal judges and lawyers, however, 
came close to accepting squatters’ arguments by arguing that squatting should 
be exempt from punishment. Critically, they referred to a “process destroying 
living space” and to ”great profiteering.”19 Most lawyers, however, clung to a 
14. Wut im Bauch!, 4, IISG Amsterdam, ID 653, Bro 689/4 FOL.
15. Der lange Marsch 4 (May 1973): 8.
16. Laurisch, Kein Abriss,65; Novemberfilm Kollektiv, Schade.
17. “Constitution of Berlin.” See also Johann Wilhelm Gerlach, “Recht auf Wohnraum und 
Hausbesetzung,” Der Spiegel 19 (4 May 1981): 56– 57.
18. Schall, “Hausbesetzungen im Lichte.” On legal responses in the Netherlands, Great Britain, 
and Switzerland, see Blankenburg, “Thesen zur Hausbesetzerbewegung.”
19. Küchenhoff, “Zur Strafbarkeit”; Fabricius- Brand, “Instandbesetzung.”
210    Consumption and Violence
more conventional interpretation of property. The socialist newspaper Links 
quoted a Freiburg district court judge who had authorised the eviction of a 
squat on the grounds that the “economic interest of the building and real estate 
limited liability company has to be valued over the interest of the inhabitants.”20 
In the early 1980s, a prevailing opinion among jurists maintained that squat-
ting was to be punished as a breach of the domestic peace under section 123 
of the criminal code (StGB). Authoritative commentaries pointed out that a 
“failed housing policy” could not be countered by “surrendering the legal and 
property order.”21 The central topoi of the legal debate about squatting— the 
granting of domestic peace, even to illegal residents, with reference to the 
principle of residential property being obliged to the common good, and the 
consideration of commensurability in cases of eviction by the police22— still 
forced the legal authorities to check the legitimacy of the means used by ex-
ecutive forces.23
In a profound 1972 analysis, SPD politician Hans- Jochen Vogel con-
tended that the distribution of urban space did not exactly cater to the popula-
tion’s needs. He provided a clear- sighted analysis of the economic mechanism 
that he held responsible for the far- reaching urban crisis, which he considered 
a “first- rate problem of human existence.” As he was leaving office as mayor 
of Munich to become federal minister for regional planning, construction, and 
urban development, he wrote a remarkably critical assessment of contempo-
rary capitalism: “The crisis is the crisis of an economic system mushrooming 
beyond its limits. . . . Most clearly this principle can be observed in the compe-
tition for different uses for the same piece of real estate. As a rule, the type of 
use with the highest yield . . . will prevail. . . . Therefore, in a situation of con-
flict, . . . it is always the department store that wins over the cultural centre, the 
bank over the long- established café, the office building over the beer gar-
den. . . . It cannot be denied that this system . . . has contributed to delivering 
the masses from material want. But now it is turning against the people, be-
coming an end in itself, dispelling humanity from our cities.” With his empha-
sis on the “depersonalisation of cities,” Vogel anticipated a number of ideas 
that became crucial for the squatters’ movement over the coming decade: “Liv-
20. “Wohnungskampf und Repression,” Links: sozialistische Zeitung 79 (July– August 1976). 
For an argument in favour of increased penalties for squatting, see Rinsche, “Zur Strafwürdigkeit.”
21. Eduard Dreher and Herbert Tröndle, Strafgesetzbuch und Nebengesetze, 41st ed. (Munich, 
1983), section 123 (5A); Lackner, Strafgesetzbuch, section 123 (3A). For a more in- depth treat-
ment, see Weber, Hausbesetzung.
22. Blankenburg, “Thesen zur Hausbesetzerbewegung,” 41.
23. Anders, “Wohnraum,” 478– 79.
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ing standard does not equal quality of life. Clearly, the quality of life is actually 
declining with increasing consumption. The production of our system is miss-
ing the real needs. It channels our energies into areas that promise growth and 
quick returns whilst detracting from the public . . . investments and services on 
which the quality of our life really depends.”24 According to Vogel, this mecha-
nism was choking inner cities and threatening the ecological balance. Without 
wanting to abolish market and competition, he pleaded for the primacy of pol-
itics over economics, relegating the latter into a servile role. To realise this 
far- reaching vision, he suggested higher taxes, reducing growth in consump-
tion, and adding financial strength to the community— that is, public rather 
than private consumption. This was to be supplemented by a reform of the laws 
governing ownership of urban land by introducing fixed- term usage rights, 
with real estate periodically falling back to the municipality.
The Weisbecker- Haus
The early 1970s also saw rather different strategies for addressing related prob-
lems. In May 1973, the spontaneist newspaper with the aptronymic name Wir 
wollen alles (We want everything)25 was looking at the consumer as an unme-
diated revolutionary agent when reporting a Klauaktion (shoplifting action) by 
the occupants of the Weisbecker- Haus in Berlin’s Kreuzberg district. The 
Weisbecker- Haus was a self- managed collective housing project for homeless 
young people established in an abandoned building in March 1973. It was 
named after a member of Movement 2 June who had been killed by police.26 
The project was legalised via utilisation agreement with the West Berlin gov-
ernment, leaving the occupants in the same formal legal category as inhabitants 
of state- run foster homes and thus entitled to subsistence. In this context, a very 
concrete conflict erupted over regimes of provision where formerly homeless 
young people resorted to their own way of procuring food: “15 people went 
into the shops, packed cans, roast meat, frozen stuff, schnapps, and ham into 
their bags. . . . The store manager did not want to see his tasty things depart just 
24. Hans- Jochen Vogel, Die Amtskette: Meine zwölf Münchner Jahre (Munich, 1972), quoted in 
“‘Das unterirdische Grollen ist schon zu hören’: Münchens Oberbürgermeister Vogel über die 
Krise der Städte,” Der Spiegel 62 (19 June 1972): 62– 63. See also Vogel, Städte im Wandel.
25. This was adopted from their Italian counterparts, Lotta Continua, and their slogan, “Vogli-
amo tutto.” Cf. Lotta Continua, Nehmen wir uns die Stadt.
26. Wir vom Tommy Weisbecker Haus, IISG Amsterdam, ID- 653, Bro 780/17 FOL. See also 
http://www.tommyhaus.org (accessed 30 November 2010). On the similar Georg- von- Rauch- 
Haus, see Georg v. Rauch Haus.
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like that . . . . Perhaps he will have second thoughts at the hospital. . . . On the 
21st of March we had negotiations with a few people from the Senat [West 
Berlin’s government] about the daily rate we were going to get for food. We 
demanded 7.50 DM (other foster homes get 9 DM); however, the Senat only 
wanted to give us 5 DM.  .  .  . Then in the afternoon 200 cops stood at the 
door. . . . Everyone is peeved at rising prices, . . . and more and more people 
[shoplift].”27 “Stagflation,” partly as a consequence of the pricing policies of 
large corporations and of high U.S. expenditures during the Vietnam War had 
already led to drastic price increases, with more on the way as a result of the oil 
crisis.28 Members of the Weisbecker- Haus reported huge initial difficulties in 
organising their collective because people stole from each other or absconded 
with monies earmarked for communal purposes.29
The shoplifting sprees initially seem like manifestations of a crude and 
naive concept of politics that neglects the sphere of production, hardly differs 
from ordinary delinquency, and reflects a self- administered- justice mentality. 
Yet the example of the Weisbecker- Haus shows how the first phase of the Ber-
lin squatters’ movement crystallised around youth centres and self- help initia-
tives and, more broadly, illustrates questions of the use and accessibility of 
urban space. The desire for self- managed spaces was linked with a quest for 
new lifestyles and thus styles of consumption.30
Frankfurt
In Frankfurt, the problems arising from housing shortages and urban politics 
were more explosive than the related issue of fare increases. The same 1973 
issue of Wir wollen alles that reported on the Weisbecker- Haus also printed a 
flyer from the Frankfurt Häuserkampf that came back to the issue of tram fares: 
“[The city] is raising rents for council flats up to 55% . . . , is making the tram-
ways— on which speculators and factory owners don’t depend— more expen-
sive, and is raising electricity and water prices at a higher rate for families than 
for factories. Resistance is possible.”31 In 1972– 73, several joint- stock building 
27. “Mit Säcken ins Warenhaus— Die Lebensmittel rausgeholt,” Wir wollen alles 4 (May 1973): 
12.
28. See Wolfrum, Geglückte Demokratie, 334.
29. Wir vom Tommy Weisbecker Haus, IISG, Bro 780/17 FOL: 9.
30. See Laurisch, Kein Abriss, 32; Willems, Jugendunruhen und Protestbewegungen, 270.
31. Häuserrat, AStA, Lotta Continua, Revolutionärer Kampf, et al., “Ein Gespenst geht um in 
Frankfurt: Wohnungskampf,” Wir wollen alles 4 (May 1973): 13.
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societies in which the city of Frankfurt held the majority of shares raised rents 
for more than twelve thousand small flats in old tenement buildings by 20 to 60 
percent. More than four thousand tenants initially objected to the increases, 
and more than one thousand started legal proceedings.32
A West Berlin monthly, Der lange March, reported on squatters in Amer-
ican slums, London Islington, and Milan’s Via Tibaldi.33 Italy emerged as a 
major source of inspiration. The squats and militant tenants’ rights associations 
(Unione Inquilini) of Northern Italy’s industrial cities attracted political tour-
ism from Germany.34 The Spontis and the Italian far left extra- parliamentary 
organisation Lotta Continua35 tried to transfer this experience to Frankfurt, 
“where the most serious efforts are made to erect the predominant trade, ad-
ministration, and banking metropolis of the FRG . . . , speculation in rents and 
property turns hot  .  .  .  : living space in relatively cheap old buildings is de-
stroyed and replaced by modern office buildings that multiply profits. . . . New 
accommodations are created with smaller rooms, lower ceilings, thinner walls, 
and much higher rents.” The authors of these lines quickly brushed aside the 
new buildings’ improved sanitary facilities— probably misjudging many peo-
ple’s preferences— and pointed to the “terror of the landlords” and to “con-
sumption as a compensatory remedy against the woes of isolation.”36 Criticism 
of the modern high- rises departed from a forward- looking concept of a neigh-
bourly integration of work, social institutions, consumption, and culture: 
“These flats do provide hypermodern sanitary arrangements for the working 
population, only they are not yet prepared to live in the loo. They continue to 
prefer flats that allow you to meet people without disturbing the neighbours; 
that leave you some money for the beer necessary for such meetings; that are 
located in areas with pubs, cinemas, kindergartens, schools, places of work 
within walking distance.”37 The Spontis embraced a decidedly anticapitalist 
approach: “Squatting means to destroy the capitalist plan in the urban 
quarters— means not to pay any rent, means to abolish the capitalist shoe box 
structure. . . . Squatting and rent strikes are the pivotal point for the fight against 
capital outside the factories.”38
Frankfurt, one of the Federal Republic of Germany’s most important busi-
32. On rent strikes, see Häuserrat Frankfurt, Wohnungskampf, 103– 7.
33. Der lange Marsch 4 (May 1973): 7– 8.
34. Koenen, Das Rote Jahrzehnt, 344.
35. Karakayali, “Lotta Continua in Frankfurt.”
36. Der lange Marsch 4 (May 1973): 7– 8.
37. Ibid., 11.
38. Proletarische Front in Wir wollen alles 4 (May 1973), quoted in Geronimo, Feuer und 
Flamme, 39.
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ness locations, became a focal point of the conflicts over squatting. In the 
emerging financial metropolis, municipal politicians prioritised economic 
growth and maximising income through the local business tax, with the idea 
that government spending would then trickle down to benefit ordinary people. 
According to a 1968 SPD election pamphlet, “in Frankfurt, the working people 
benefit from the development of the city. Frankfurt Social Democrats put the 
money where it is most needed.”39 However, the desired convergence of private 
and public consumption did not emerge smoothly, and the politics of housing 
ultimately grew into a distinct chink in the armour of those responsible for ur-
ban restructuring.
Foreign workers and students began squatting in Frankfurt’s West end in 
the autumn of 1970. A year later, the Frankfurt city council yielded to pressure 
from property owners and decided not to tolerate any new squats. Police began 
evictions, and street fighting broke out. When it became apparent that the mis-
use of residential property had become an explosive problem, the ruling SPD 
implemented a municipal order prohibiting the misappropriation of housing 
space. This was aimed at large- scale real estate companies that allowed empty 
buildings to deteriorate in order to make money from modernisation or demoli-
tion in favour of more lucrative new developments. However, the courts de-
clared the municipal order unconstitutional. With the ball back in the SPD’s 
court, the party made the issue its central plank in the 1972 municipal election 
campaign. Even before the situation escalated,  the SPD was seeking to prevent 
violence: according to a campaign advertisement, “Squats are not harmless 
go- ins. They have led to violence. No one can wish the use of force to become 
a political style.” Seeking a middle ground, the ad also pointed out that “those 
who call for law and order and a hard line only see one side, . . . the violence 
of the squatters, and overlook the power and the violence of the owners.”40 The 
government often found itself on the latter’s side of the conflict.
The interplay of different forms of violence became a highly controversial 
topic within the protest movement. A spokesman for the Frankfurt students’ 
union highlighted the tactical dimension of violence: “We want to eliminate 
the ostensible violence on our side to expose the violence of the other side.” 
Another student delegate concurred that the violence of squatting constituted 
“resistance against the violence of the landlords.” He assumed that most of 
those who supported the movement by joining demonstrations had experienced 
39. SPD- Unterbezirk Frankfurt quoted in Stracke, Stadtzerstörung und Stadtteilkampf, 131.
40. “Eigentum verpflichtet: Adel nicht mehr,” SPD campaign advertisement, 6 October 1972, 
quoted in Kraushaar, “Frankfurter Sponti- Szene,” 111. On the militancy of the Frankfurt 
Häuserkampf, see Geronimo, Feuer und Flamme, 39– 46.
Urban Space    215
“societal violence” as tenants.41 Some landlords used drastic methods to dis-
lodge tenants, including foregoing repairs. When old residents were forced out, 
landlords preferred foreign workers for short- term lets.42 Bullies collected 
rents at gunpoint.43 Conversely, squatters feared that violence would stand in 
the way of mass support: “We don’t want police operations to prevent what 
they are meant to prevent: solidarity among the broader population.”44 In the 
long run, considerations regarding the counterproductive effects of violent es-
calations prevailed in the Frankfurt squatters’ movement. After a particularly 
fierce “battle” over the building Kettenhofweg 51, the action group Westend 
dissociated itself from all violence: “Stones are no arguments: groups who 
fight like this . . . isolate themselves from the rest of the population.”45 A local 
chapter of the Arbeiterwohlfahrt (national workers’ welfare organisation) used 
the occasion to denounce all “signs of violence as fascist and anarchist.”46 The 
Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF) was becoming increasingly discredited, and other 
activists increasingly denounced violent means of political struggle.
In May 1976, two weeks after Ulrike Meinhof’s death, Joschka Fischer 
gave a speech on behalf of the Sponti collective at the Frankfurt Römerberg in 
which he tried to rekindle earlier forms of resistance within the parameters of 
everyday life. His speech is often interpreted as a plea for a renunciation of 
terrorism, but it also harks back to the dimension of consumption. The rebels 
that Fischer invoked were not the classical consumers of bread or TV sets; 
rather, they were looking for alternative lifestyles and were prepared to defend 
them by militant means: “In the past, it was the envy of the hungry that the 
bourgeoisie suspected below their abundantly set table; today, it is the frenzy 
of the losers who do not find their way in careers and consumer society.” The 
Frankfurt Spontis invoked nonmaterial values and thus new motivators for 
revolutionary activity: “We are no longer driven by hunger for food, we are 
driven by hunger for freedom, love, tenderness, .  .  . new forms of work and 
social intercourse.” An appeal “to knock off the death trip, . . . to put down the 
41. Frankfurter Rundschau, clipping, 12 April 1973, in Häuserrats- Archiv, vol. 3, April 1973, 
IISG Amsterdam, ID 1989/380 FOL.
42. Bauaufsichtsbehörde, “Berichtszeitraum 1969– 1972,” in Frankfurt baut auf: Dokumenta-
tion zur Nachkriegszeit, http://aufbau- ffm.de/doku/Archiv/Bauaufsicht.html (accessed 30 Novem-
ber 2010).
43. “Harte Kritik Müllers an ‘einem Herrn Schubart,’” Frankfurter Rundschau, 12 April 1973, 
in Häuserrats- Archiv, vol. 3, April 1973, IISG Amsterdam, ID 1989/380 FOL.
44. Frankfurter Rundschau, clipping, 12 April 1973, in ibid.
45. “Steine statt Argumente,” Frankfurter Rundschau, 16 April 1973, in ibid.
46. “Gewalt und Terror als faschistisch abgelehnt,” in ibid.
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bombs and stones” aimed to set a new agenda for the radical left.47 Fischer’s 
quest contained two elements: the continuing spirit of relentlessness in politi-
cal conflict, and the notion of pacifying the search for new lifestyles and 
thereby implicitly making it more compatible with consumer society’s mecha-
nisms of distinction. However, this statement did not change the fact that dur-
ing the following decade, conflicts over housing and squatting remained intrin-
sically coupled with debates over violence and terrorism.
West Berlin
In May 1977, at the height of the manhunt for the assassins of attorney general 
Siegfried Buback, a Christian Democratic city councillor for planning and 
building verbally clashed with a social worker and member of a citizens’ initia-
tive in the Berlin district of Kreuzberg. The city councillor had signed off on 
the demolition of an old fire station used as a community centre. Although the 
social worker categorically rejected violent tactics, he could understand why 
others would resort to such means: “There is a relation between the bomb that 
is destroying these houses and the bombs that are thrown at people.”48 The 
authorities looked for the seeds of terrorism in the squats. The demolition of 
the old fire station was also taken as a point of reference in a statement by the 
imprisoned members of Movement 2 June on the occasion of the Tunix Con-
gress in January 1978. This major meeting of left- wing initiatives marked a 
milestone in the development not only of alternative projects but also of the 
autonomist movement that criticised the decline of militant objectives in the 
light of the German Autumn. The incarcerated comrades invoked old models of 
“everyday resistance” to the eviction of squats, suggesting that activists set 
“fire to Springer’s newspaper self- service boxes and delivery vans” and con-
duct shoplifting sprees at department stores.49 The association of urban de-
struction with violence worked on many levels. Memorable images resulted 
when the U.S. Army was allowed to practice street fighting in the Kreuzberg 
clearance area.50
47. Frankfurter Spontis, “Uns treibt der Hunger nach Liebe, Zärtlichkeit und Freiheit   .  .  .  ,” 
Links 79 (July–August 1976): 11. See also Koenen, Das Rote Jahrzehnt, 331– 35.
48. Quoted in Laurisch, Kein Abriss, 66.
49. “Revolutionäre Guerilla- Opposition aus der Konkursmasse der Bewegung 2. Juni, ‘Tunix,’” 
http://www.bewegung.in/mate_tunix.html (accessed 24 February 2011).
50. Laurisch, Kein Abriss, 27; “Da packt dich irgendwann ‘ne Wut,’” Der Spiegel 52 (22 De-
cember 1980): 29.
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In West Berlin as earlier in Frankfurt, actions by housing societies and 
city councillors appeared to threaten lifestyles and living space. A CDU city 
councillor’s proposals to remodel the public spaces at Mariannenplatz and 
Oranienplatz in Kreuzberg generated massive protests. Much of the conflict 
originated in disturbances to everyday activities. Wooden fences interfered 
with children and their parents and with May Day festivities, and were de-
stroyed or set alight several times: “In the end the entire area had to be guarded 
day and night, with spotlights and dogs.”51
In 1980, a large- scale conflict over squatting, youth riots, and the use of 
police force unfolded in West Berlin, in many ways paralleling earlier events in 
Zurich and Amsterdam. West Berlin, however, was unique in several respects. 
As an island completely surrounded by East Germany, the city suffered from a 
housing shortage. It was a major migration destination not only for migrant 
workers but also for dropouts, draft dodgers, artists, and other members of the 
alternative milieu. Moreover, West Berlin was a major target of a Cold War– 
inspired policy of subsidies and tax allowances favouring various forms of real 
estate speculation.52 Most crucially, Berlin had practiced Mietpreisbindung 
(rent control) since the final year of the First World War; by 1974, it was the 
only city in the FRG with such controls for buildings built before 1950. In 
1979, the government decided to align conditions with West Germany by grad-
ually introducing the Weißer Kreis, a regime of provision that allowed the mar-
ket to set rents. Complete deregulation was planned for 1985, by which time 
rents were expected to increase by up to 200 percent.53
Squatting expanded as a culmination of a range of protest forms against 
housing policies— petitions, informational meetings, and legal complaints— 
that had been practiced by tenants’ organisations and citizens’ initiatives since 
the early 1970s.54 Between 1980 and 1982, about 160 tenement houses in West 
Berlin were occupied by squatters, with between four and five thousand people 
living in those buildings and well over ten thousand willing to demonstrate on 
their behalf. Prior to the revival of the squatting movement in 1989– 90, West 
Berlin’s final squat was legalised in November 1984.55 The squatters were sup-
ported by a number of public figures— scholars, artists, journalists, clerics, and 
51. Laurisch, Kein Abriss,29.
52. See Sedlmaier, “Berlin als doppeltes Schaufenster.”
53. On the peculiar housing situation in West Berlin, see Gaby Morr and Bernd Seiffer, “Weisser 
Kreis— Heisser Kreis,” zitty 13 (1980): 16– 19; Horst Riese, “Wohnen in Berlin,” in Besetzung, ed. 
Müller- Münch, Prosinger, and Rosenbladt, 94– 107; Oehlert and Wild, Mietpreisbindung.
54. See Anders, “Wohnraum,” 482.
55. Willems, Jugendunruhen und Protestbewegungen, 267.
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politicians— who spoke up in favour of the social experiment. However, squat-
ters were also subject to vitriolic coverage in the tabloid press. Confrontations 
with the police frequently turned violent, especially after evictions. Kreuzberg 
became the centre of the movement. The district had become a catchment area 
for those who could not afford the rents elsewhere— students and Turkish im-
migrants— or those who sought cheap space initiatives such as flat- sharing 
communities or alternative businesses.56
Squatters as Alternative Consumers
In trying out new lifestyles, the Berlin squatters built on their predecessors’ 
experience from the 1970s. The Instandbesetzer (“reconditioning occupiers”) 
saw their activities as a symbol for the resistance against the existing system of 
property ownership: “As the name Instandbesetzung implies, it includes a po-
litical line to encroach upon ownership conditions in very concrete terms. Even 
though this is only a little kick in the shin of a capitalist . . . , the attempt is not 
insignificant.”57 Although protesters no longer explicitly hoped to abolish cap-
italism, the fight against consumer society, perceived as an omnipresent form 
of oppression, was still at the fore of their efforts. The squatters’ council, K 36 
outlined its self- conception in June 1980: “We don’t stop at squatting. We live 
in communes . . . rather than in the usual tenements. We want to experience the 
entire context of life and do it here and now. We fight against demolition. . . . . 
We resist consumer terror [Konsumterror] and any form of oppression.”58
Even those who fought “consumer terror” needed some basic necessities 
such as electricity, water, and gas, and the economic component of these needs 
became a bone of contention between initially peaceful squatters and the au-
thorities. Housing societies that owned buildings in the urban renewal areas 
commissioned teams of builders that came to destroy the infrastructure— 
electrical metres, tiled stoves, and windows— in empty as well as already 
squatted buildings.59 A group of Göttingen squatters lamented that the public 
56. Ibid., 270.
57. Jaqueline Klein and Sabine Porn, “Instandbesetzen,” in Besetzung, ed. Müller- Münch, 
Prosinger, and Rosenbladt, 112.
58. Besetzerrat K 36, Wir sind dem Staat ein Dorn im Auge! (Berlin, 1980), IISG Amsterdam, 
ID- Archiv, Bro 1991/13, 2. The name of the squatters’ council derived from the former postcode 
of the eastern part of Kreuzberg, SO 36.
59. “Die Häuser gehören uns,” taz, 2 July 1980, 9; “Seit zwei Wochen ohne Fenster: Mieter 
erstattete Anzeige,” Der Tagesspiegel, 23 August 1980, Papiertiger, folder “Häuser 1978/Jan.– 
Aug. 1980”; Laurisch, Kein Abriss, 102, 172.
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prosecutor was not interested in the owner of a building who had made it unin-
habitable by systematically destroying its interior, even poisoning it with a 
game repellent. Instead, the authorities preferred to investigate those who had 
painted graffiti on the shell of the building to call attention to the destruction. 
In another case, a group of companies from Frankfurt wanted to replace old 
tenements with luxury homes and business premises. Under police protection, 
the houses were destroyed from the inside, supply lines severed, and walls and 
ceilings demolished.60
The destruction of electrical metres was a particular problem for squat-
ters, since municipal power companies refused to install metres in squats.The 
removal of electrical metres forced the squatters to tap into power supply lines, 
which constituted an offence that the police, equipped with a complaint from 
the municipal power company, could easily use to justify searching, arrests, 
and evictions. As with the blockade campaigns, therefore, squatting contained 
the elements for its own criminalisation via breach of domestic peace (sections 
123/124 StGB) or electricity theft (section 248c StGB). At one point Berlin’s 
minister of the interior reported that 4,954 squatters had committed 9,322 
criminal offences, statistics that could be used to draw a picture of the squats 
as havens for criminals.61 Even before the situation escalated violently on the 
night of 12 December 1980, the police had established a special commission to 
observe the squatters and perceived the squatters as a serious threat to public 
security.62 West Berlin’s chief of police, Klaus Hübner (SPD), divided the 
squatters into three groups: “‘Of good will but also a bit dim- witted’ were 
those who wanted to address the housing problems by calculated violations of 
the law. Many young people who had only come to Berlin in 1979 or 80 were 
‘travelling rioters.’ Finally, the third and most dangerous group merely wanted 
to use squatting for their strategy of confrontation and were animated by ‘sym-
pathies for pure terrorism.’”63
That the squatters’ critique hinged on a socially irreconcilable process of 
gentrification— apparently driven by profiteers benefitting from state 
60. Wut im Bauch!, 4, 9, IISG Amsterdam, ID 653, Bro 689/4 FOL.
61. Willems, Jugendunruhen und Protestbewegungen, 268, 278; “Langer Traum vom kurzen 
Sommer,” taz, 9 February 1982.
62. “CDU fordert Sonderkommission des Staatsschutzes gegen Hausbesetzer,” Der Tagesspie-
gel, 3 August 1980, Papiertiger, folder “Häuser 1978/Jan.– Aug. 1980.”
63. “Hauptsache Rechtsstaat: Polizeipräsident Hübner zu Instandbesetzungen,” taz, 5 Decem-
ber 1980, 17; “CDU: Besetzte Häuser wurden Keimzellen rechtsfreier Räume,” Der Tagesspiegel, 
6 September 1980. See also Ortwin Kücholl, “Eindeutige Werbung für den Terror: Interview mit 
Polizeipräsident Hübner über Hintergründe der Hausbesetzungen,” Berliner Morgenpost, 28 Sep-
tember 1980, in Berliner Linie gegen Instandbesetzer, ed. Haberbusch, 9.
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subsidies— was lost in such statements. Urban sociologists have demonstrated 
that the processes of social restructuring that turn originally poor districts 
close to the city centre into affluent neighbourhoods took place in “phases of 
invasion.” Initially, “pioneers” willing to take risks moved into urban renewal 
areas, which remained marked by a high proportion of low- income house-
holds. The influx increased the range of alternative services, cultural events, 
and dining options, an “alternative upgrading” that drew the interest of finan-
cially stronger groups. These “gentrifiers” then crowded out the long- 
established, predominantly low- income population via the modernisation of 
flats and subsequent increases in rents and land prices. Consequently, the pro-
cess of upgrading initiated by members of the alternative milieu often de-
stroyed the local prerequisites for alternative culture.64 The squatters did not 
remain alone in their assessment of gentrification. Urban sociologists, too, 
came to describe the consequences of accelerated tenure fluctuation in a neg-
ative light insofar as the individualised, consumption- intensive lifestyle of the 
gentrifiers disrupted the “former unity of living conditions,” pressuring tradi-
tional residents to adapt to new conditions.65 The results of an ethnographic 
study, however, suggest that perceptions of gentrification crucially rested on a 
symbolic dimension. Barbara Lang’s concept of “symbolic gentrification” 
highlights the constructed nature of the opposition between yuppies and 
members of the alternative milieu. Though she does not deny the effects of 
gentrification on Kreuzberg, she points out that its actual level remained sig-
nificantly below that of other neighbourhoods in other cities— for example, 
Frankfurt’s Westend or Zurich’s inner city.66
The government of West Berlin offered generous subsidies and deprecia-
tion allowances for the modernisation of housing, which in practice amounted 
to rewards for driving out the tenants and ultimately for demolishing run- 
down but cheap turn- of- the- century tenement buildings.67 Critics resisted 
“quarters for the smart set”: “cheap shops are gradually crushed out, and in-
creased pressure is put on the cheaper flats because in an area thus pepped up, 
one can rent out very expensive flats: the old population is crowded out and 
luxury refurbishments are impending.”68 Ultimately, this critique of gentrifi-
64. Friedrichs, Stadtsoziologie, 122– 26; Klaus Ronneberger, “Die Stadt der ‘Wohlanständigen’ 
und die neuen ‘gefährlichen Klassen’: Der Umbau der Städte zu ‘Konsumfestungen,’” in Stadt, 
Jugendkulturen, und Kriminalität, ed. Breyvogel, 16– 36.
65. Herlyn, Leben in der Stadt, 153.
66. Lang, Mythos Kreuzberg, 30. See also Karapin, Protest Politics, 69.
67. Lindner, Jugendprotest, 331.
68. Laurisch, Kein Abriss, 95.
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cation led the alternative milieu to wrestle with itself, since the appropriation 
of substandard housing and eventually entire neighbourhoods by innovative 
youths and the cultural opportunities this process entailed constituted the first 
step on the ladder of upward revaluation. This tendency was perceived even in 
such squatters’ bastions as Krenzberg’s KuKuCK art and cultural centre: 
“Consumption is conquering new terrain, separating artists from audiences 
and leaving the latter in a state where individuals are strangers to each other.”69 
The issue was not new to the squatters’ movement and had its roots in the 
social divides within the alternative milieu. Agit 883 had already advertised a 
March 1969 campaign under the slogan, “Break up left- wing pubs.” A mes-
sage “to all ideologists of the cabbage soup and the lard sandwich” called for 
“the nests of snug left- wing consumption to vanish into thin air. You’ve fallen 
for resourceful petty capitalists.”70
Thirteen years later, an autonomous “Kommando Klaus- Jürgen Rattay” 
committed an attack on a branch of Deutsche Bank, causing material damage 
amounting to two hundred thousand deutsche marks. The operation was named 
after a squatter who had become a martyr of the movement when he was fatally 
injured by a bus during a September 1981 demonstration as a result of police 
driving protesters into heavy traffic. The statement of responsibility for the 
Deutsche Bank attack, however, highlighted a conflict within the alternative 
milieu. The “revolutionary forces of the Cold War front- line city” were asked 
to come out of the pubs: “It is not acceptable that hard- won houses . . . were 
misused in favour of a broader alternative consumer culture à la 68,” since such 
a culture was far from “system change and liberation.”71 A similar dispute fig-
ured in a brawl that erupted during the opening party for a posh lamp store in 
Kreuzberg in the autumn of 1982. A group of slightly drunk Autonomen invited 
themselves to join those whom they characterised as “having a lot of dough.” 
Their involuntary hosts seemed to come from Charlottenburg and now threat-
ened “to spoil the quarter [Kiez].” The district of Charlottenburg was explicitly 
mentioned as an example in which in the wake of “the 1968 movement, the 
face of a district was changed.” The lamp store, however, turned out to be a 
long- established local business that had moved from across the street into 
larger premises. The spectre of fascism came to haunt one of the intruders: was 
such an unpleasant encounter not essentially the same as what “the pigs” did to 
those who looked and lived differently? Did consumption habits really suggest 
69. Cheronimo, “Eingemachtes,” radikal 103 (April 1982): 6.
70. “Aktion ‘Zerschlagt die linken Kneipen,’” Agit 883 6 (20 March 1969).
71. Autonome Zelle, “In Gedenken an?,” radikal 114 (March 1983): 2. Cf. Anders, “Wohnraum,” 
489– 90.
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political position? The author ultimately pledged to work for an environment 
tolerant enough to accommodate a variety of cultures and consumption styles, 
including the more well- to- do subcultures.72 This rift plagued not only the 
larger alternative milieu but also the Autonomen movement, as its more radical 
members continued to occasionally target the manifestations of a materially 
integrated alternative culture.
Militant attacks against manifestations of affluent consumption had two 
targets: the shops and restaurants of the “freak aristocracy,” and the institutions 
of mainstream consumer society. At Easter 1983, the peak of the peace move-
ment, a Festival Committee of Vengeance for Christ gave a militant twist to the 
tradition of Easter marches, announcing a plan to cause “chaos . . . in depart-
ment stores, other high- calorie edifices, and speculators’ strongholds” so that 
the police would disturb the tourist trade. At the Kempinski luxury hotel, cur-
tains caught fire.73 On New Year’s Eve 1980, a bomb threat was issued against 
a club in West Berlin’s Schöneberg area that was frequented by local politi-
cians and dignitaries. A subsequent statement explained that although there 
was no bomb, the threat was directed against the “assembled municipality 
gorging and boozing.” The perpetrators then listed a number of demands taken 
from the squatters’ agenda, including “no luxury refurbishments” and “con-
trolled rents.” The statement closed with a quote from Georg Büchner: “Peace 
to the cottages— war on the palaces!”74
By mid- 1983, forty- seven squats had been cleared by the police, forty- 
five had been legalised via tenancy agreements, and nineteen had been volun-
tarily abandoned by the squatters. The question of how militant the squatters’ 
movement should be did not contribute to its unity. Those who sought to legal-
ise their housing conditions via tenancy agreements75— often brokered by pol-
iticians trying to mitigate the conflict— may have criticised existing regimes of 
provision and the eternal obsession with growth, but they were also ready to 
integrate their way of life into an improved or alternative version of capitalist 
consumer society; more radical squatters of the emerging Autonomen move-
ment, in contrast, explicitly wanted to overthrow that society.76
72. Elbe III, “Die neuen Bunten,” radikal 110 (November 1982): 6– 7.
73. “Ostern 83: Tradition siegt?,” radikal 115– 16 (April– May 1983).
74. “Kommando Sprechstunde,” radikal 86 (January 1981): 13.
75. Willems, Jugendunruhen und Protestbewegungen, 269– 70.
76. See the cartoon “Die Stärke der Bewegung liegt in ihrer Geschlossenheit,” in Laurisch, Kein 
Abriss, 115.
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Violent Escalation
A crucial date for the escalation of the Berlin conflict was the night of 12– 13 
December 1980. When police prevented squatters from taking over a building 
at Fraenkelufer in Kreuzberg, demonstrators set up barricades and smashed 
windows, surprising many observers. According to an investigating committee 
set up by several squatters’ organisations, 270 people were injured, 66 of them 
police officers, and 109 demonstrators were arrested. The police estimated 
property damage at more than three hundred thousand deutsche marks. The 
next day, between three and four thousand people assembled at the 
Kurfürstendamm to protest, again resulting in numerous injuries and arrests as 
well as broken windows.77 Der Spiegel reported: While “street fighters masked 
with Fatah [PLO] shawls used slingshots to hurl steel balls at plastic- armoured 
police . . . , looters indiscriminately gathered spectacle frames, rubber boots, 
and sliced cheese in cracked stores.” Journalists and social scientists diagnosed 
a new emergence of militancy, the police noted a “step change” in the “propen-
sity for violence,” and the alternative tageszeitung castigated the “unleashed 
brutality of the police.”78
A statement printed in taz ten days before the outburst offers some insight 
into the rationale behind attacking shops: “Visit the department stores!” was a 
means “to tie up police forces and to create publicity.”79 Since squatters could 
not hope to “defeat” the police in an “open battle” over a particular building, 
they resorted to a more decentralised strategy, challenging the state monopoly 
on violence in a number of places. Road traffic and shops were the most obvi-
ous targets for such endeavours.80
The offensive against the retail sector was not an entirely spontaneous 
response to the police operation at Fraenkelufer, which started around 5:00 in 
the evening. Two obviously premeditated actions occurred against department 
77. “Dezember 1980 Berlin, zusammengestellt vom ‘Ermittlungsausschuss,’” http://squat.net/
archiv/berlin/12.12.80/1/IniSO36.html (accessed 14 February 2010); KR Brandt (DirVB S III), 
“Zusammenfassender Erstbericht über gewalttätige Auseinandersetzungen zwischen ‘Hausbe-
setzern’ und der Polizei,” 18 December 1980, Papiertiger, folder “Häuserkampf Jun.– Dez. 1980”; 
“‘Innere Unruhen’: Berliner Autonome schlagen zu,” radikal 5 (December 1980): 1– 2.
78. “Da packt dich irgendwann ‘ne Wut,’” Der Spiegel 52 (22 December 1980): 23.
79. “Zeitdokument,” taz, 3 December 1980; KR Brandt (DirVB S III), “Zusammenfassender 
Erstbericht über gewalttätige Auseinandersetzungen zwischen ‘Hausbesetzern’ und der Polizei,” 
18 December 1980, 2– 3, Papiertiger, folder “Häuserkampf Jun.– Dez. 1980.”
80. “Berlins Leid mit den Lücken in der City: Demonstrationen mit Millionenschäden machen 
viele Geschäftsleute mutlos,” Die Welt, 26 October 1982, 18.
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stores on the same day. Mimicking the language used by the RAF, members of 
the “Kreuzberg Mouse Army Faction” admitted having released six hundred 
white mice at a Karstadt branch in Berlin. The statement of responsibility con-
tained an unmistakable pointer to the recently dissolved Movement 2 June and 
declared: “We mice have been sick of this consumer shit for a long time. . . . 
We don’t want any Disneyland— Karstadt into the hands of the mice!”81 At the 
same time, unknown persons placed incendiary devices at Hertie and Karstadt 
department stores in Göttingen, where a new wave of squatting protest had 
flared up. The sprinkler system prevented extensive damage and minimized 
publicity, but parallels with 1968 were noted by the few observers who com-
mented on the incident.82 The fact that negotiations between squatters and the 
Kreuzberg SPD took place on 12 December also weighs against the argument 
that the street demonstrations were a spontaneous response to the police action 
at Fraenkelufer, as squatters commonly contended. Authorities had decided to 
call on the Sozialpädagogisches Institut of the Arbeiterwohlfahrt (the social- 
work unit of a national workers’ welfare organisation) to mediate the conflict. 
Though the squatters claimed that only the police had an interest in undermin-
ing a negotiated settlement, more radical parts of the movement also had such 
an interest.83
In the long run, smashed shop windows generated more publicity than did 
isolated actions against department stores. During the night of 12– 13 Decem-
ber 1980, a total of eighty- one shops and banks suffered broken windows, but 
only seven of the establishments were looted. In addition, police registered two 
cases of arson when stones were followed by Molotov cocktails at a Daimler- 
Benz office and the newspaper Der Tagesspiegel. Damage to public property 
was recorded in only four instances and obviously was not the protest’s main 
focus. The police report shows a crucial time lag between the smashing of shop 
windows and the beginning of looting. The police reported at 19:07 hours that 
150– 200 “troublemakers” were smashing shop windows at a Kaiser’s Kaffee 
supermarket and at other shops and banks as well as damaging private cars. 
However, looting of the supermarket and a shoe shop did not begin until 21:26, 
and an adjacent ALDI discount supermarket was only looted beginning at 
81. AG Spass muss sein!, Spassguerilla, 22; “Mäuse und Mollies im Kaufhaus,” taz, 15 Decem-
ber 1980, 5. Another source states the perhaps more realistic number of 150 mice. “Chronologie 
Häuserkampf Berlin 1979– 1980,” http://autox.nadir.org/archiv/chrono/chro_haus_1.html (ac-
cessed 30 November 2010).
82. “Da packt dich irgendwann ‘ne Wut,’” Der Spiegel 52 (22 December 1980): 24; AG Spass 
muss sein!, Spassguerilla, 22; “Mäuse und Mollies im Kaufhaus,” taz, 15 December 1980, 5.
83. doku- gruppe vom mehringhof, Dokumentation, 5.
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22:18.84 The people who broke the windows, therefore, were not necessarily 
the same ones who could not resist the temptation of unprotected goods behind 
those windows. The looters seem to have behaved not unlike other consumers: 
some reportedly bartered with their booty whilst others returned empty- handed 
after failing to find what they wanted.85 Others debated what could be taken: 
basic consumer durables and snacks seemed all right, but the appropriation of 
“luxury” goods might cast a damning light on the squatters’ movement.86
In another instance involving the April 1982 looting of an ALDI super-
market in Berlin’s Kottbusser Tor neighbourhood following a demonstration 
of support for the people of El Salvador, an activist questioned why the dis-
count retailer had been targeted rather than a higher- end food shop; he also 
wanted to target stores selling televisions.87 The militant newspaper radikal— 
now dubbing itself the “Newspaper of West Berlin’s Looters and 
Troublemakers”— was quite ready to embrace looting as a political strategy. 
Smashing windows “up and down the Kurfürstendamm”— especially those of 
the Kempinski luxury hotel— was already a “well- tried concept.” According 
to radikal, smashing the windows of a bank or looting a supermarket were 
“practical and radical critiques of capitalism.”88 From the perspective of a 
homeless person, a furniture store could seem like a bastion of capitalism, a 
cobblestone through its window like an act of resistance.89 In explaining the 
broken windows, another voice pointed to squatters’ rage at the population’s 
complacency regarding the calamities of the housing situation and the victims 
of violence emanating from the wrecking ball, boarded- up windows, and po-
lice batons. The 12– 13 December police report provides information on the 
injuries policemen suffered during the incident: only three of the sixty- six 
injuries were serious enough to prevent the officers from continuing their mis-
sion; one policeman had to be hospitalized with a complicated leg fracture.90 
84. KR Brandt (DirVB S III), “Zusammenfassender Erstbericht über gewalttätige Auseinander-
setzungen zwischen ‘Hausbesetzern’ und der Polizei,” 18 December 1980, 4– 6, 8, Papiertiger, 
folder “Häuserkampf Jun.– Dez. 1980”; “Im Schuhladen keine Schuhe mehr, beim Optiker keine 
Brille: Plünderer waren da,” Berliner Morgenpost, 14 December 1980; “Plünderungen: Werner 
Orlowsky, Betroffenenvertreter im Sanierungsgebiet,” Extrablatt Berlin 2 (1980): 2, Papiertiger, 
folder “Häuserkampf Jun.– Dez. 1980.”
85. “6 Strumpfhosen gegen 10 Smarties— ein Freudengeplünder,” taz, 15 December 1980, 5.
86. “Gespräch mit einem Streetfighter: ‘Wo Aktion ist, muß ich hin!,’” taz, 19 December 1980, 
17.
87. Cheronimo, “Eingemachtes,” radikal 103 (April 1982): 6.
88. “‘Innere Unruhen,’” radikal 5 (December 1980): 2– 3.
89. “Frühlingserwachen,” radikal 90– 91 (April 1981): 10.
90. KR Brandt (DirVB S III), “Zusammenfassender Erstbericht über gewalttätige Auseinander-
setzungen zwischen ‘Hausbesetzern’ und der Polizei,” 18 December 1980, 5, Papiertiger, folder 
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The squatters reported more than two hundred injuries, including skull frac-
tures, and more than eighty arrests.
An intense public debate ensued. The number of windows being smashed 
during the conflict of the early 1980s greatly exceeded the number broken dur-
ing the protest campaigns of a decade earlier. Boarded- up shop windows on the 
Kurfürstendamm and elsewhere became an omnipresent symbol of the strug-
gle, which provoked loud cries of “terror” and calls for law and order.91 How-
ever, in marked contrast to the debates of the late 1960s, the association of 
broken windows with Nazi violence remained marginal. One of the few state-
ments that drew the parallel came from a Kreuzberg vigilante organisation: 
“We are warning the ‘red Nazis’ . . . who smash shop windows and loot like the 
hordes of the SA. . . . Haven’t you noticed that your kind of class struggle is as 
foolish as Hitler’s race struggle? . . . If you don’t stop wasting the taxes of the 
general public so insanely, scaring off the tourists and new citizens who are so 
important for Berlin, we will soon start reporting you to the police by the 
dozen.”92 The tabloid press, however, largely refrained from the problematic 
Nazi analogy. Nevertheless, protesters had a clear sense that the Springer press 
had to be challenged in what it reported about the squatters, often reducing 
them to rioters, looters, or terrorists.93 To make this point, the protesters issued 
ten thousand copies of a forty- page brochure of reply (Gegendarstellung).94 
The logo for Bild was frequently defaced as Blöd (Stupid) or Blut (Blood),95 
but no major campaign emerged from these impulses.
Even within the movement, some observers had increasing difficulty see-
ing the political content in the widespread opportunistic looting that ensued 
almost routinely after demonstrations or the eviction of squatters. Protesters 
“Häuserkampf Jun.– Dez. 1980.”
91. “Die lange Nacht der Plünderer,” Berliner Zeitung, 13 December 1980; “Wieder flogen 
Steine auf dem Kudamm,” Berliner Zeitung, 16 December 1980; “Gestern Nacht: Blutiger Höhe-
punkt in der City,” Der Abend, 16 December 1980; “Trotz ‘Ruhepause’: Radikale randalierten: 
Chaoten Weihnacht mit Brandsätzen,” Der Abend, 27 December 1980; “Scheiben zertrümmert, 
Molotow- Cocktails flogen,” Berliner Morgenpost, 28 December 1980; “Hinter vernagelten 
Fronten gehen die Geschäfte weiter,” Berliner Morgenpost, 31 December 1980, Papiertiger, folder 
“Häuserkampf Jun.– Dez. 1980.”
92. Flyer signed “Selbstschutz Kreuzberg,” in Instand- Besetzer- Post 7– 8 (30 April 1981): 8, 
APO- Archiv, folder 1303.
93. “Mieterverein und AL treten für Instandbesetzer ein: Nächste Demonstration am Sonna-
bend,” taz, 18 December 1980.
94. Siefert, Rieger, and Bartoszenska, Dokumentation, IISG Amsterdam, Bro 1894/12; “Die 
Wahrheit über den Terror,” Extrablatt Berlin, 1980, Papiertiger, folder “Häuserkampf Jun.– Dez. 
1980.”
95. “‘Innere Unruhen,’” radikal 5 (December 1980): 4; Instand- Besetzer- Post 2 (17 March 
1981): 1, APO- Archiv, folder 1303.
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who claimed squatting and looting as anticapitalist actions or punks who were 
proud of “smashing bigwigs’ cars” met with incredulous disapproval not only 
from conservative observers but also from a previous generation of revolution-
aries. Even after the Berlin squatters’ movement began to decline, looting re-
mained a central topic. Some squatters who no longer wanted to live under 
permanent threat of police action and who were unwilling to sign  tenancy 
agreements provoked their own evictions in a last- ditch attempt to make politi-
cal capital. In this situation of weakness, when the battle for the houses seemed 
already lost, activists still embraced small- scale arson and other actions against 
banks and supermarkets. At one point, between fifty and sixty squatters went 
to “dispossess” a supermarket, giving out the goods to passersby,96 a scenario 
that resembled the Weisbecker- Haus’s “shoplifting action”  ten years earlier 
except that those activists had wanted to keep the haul for themselves. It is safe 
to assume that at least a few of the 1983 looters knew Dario Fo’s play, Non Si 
Paga! Non Si Paga!97
Smashed shop windows and looting were not limited to Kreuzberg. West 
Berlin’s commercial centre and some outer districts also saw plenty of broken 
glass, as did Hamburg, Hannover, Freiburg, and Göttingen, which became an-
other focal point of the West German squatters’ movement and in 1979 hosted 
the first national meeting of squatters from across Germany.98 The Göttingen 
squatters faced very real threats from retail and services development, as in the 
case of some buildings in the Friedrichstraße that were slated to be replaced by 
an upmarket apartment building/shopping centre.99 The confrontation between 
opposite regimes of provision and lifestyles suggested a clear- cut division be-
tween “us and them”: “How then are we supposed to live? Buying, working, 
keeping one’s trap shut .  .  .  . Many people notice that television makes you 
stupid, that department stores and banks are temples of capital. . . . And who 
doesn’t want to buy has to die.” The three thousand square metres that had been 
demolished and turned into “commercial space” could have been put to alter-
native use by playgroups, a workers’ self- help organisation, a carpenters’ 
group, and a print shop: “Films could have been shown that otherwise aren’t 
shown, bands could have performed even if they aren’t stars. Together we 
96. “Entwo(e)hnung: Der Countdown läuft,” radikal 114 (March 1983): 2.
97. Fo, Bezahlt wird nicht!
98. See Schwarzmeier, Die Autonomen zwischen Subkultur, 39– 69; “Hausbesetzertreffen,” ra-
dikal 75 (1980): 20.
99. Wut im Bauch!, 1, IISG Amsterdam, ID 653, Bro 689/4 FOL. See also Ermittlungsaus-
schuss Göttingen, Dokumentation: ein halbes Jahr Abriss- und Polizeistadt Göttingen (Göttingen, 
1981), 9.
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could have built up a pub without anyone making money from it.”100 These vi-
sions yielded to a political conclusion: “Anyone who responds to the desire for 
habitation, life, and diversity with police, defamation, wrecking ball, and dead 
concrete for the rich forfeits their moral legitimacy.”101
At Göttingen’s Reitstallviertel, the university’s riding stables, built in 
1735, had been demolished in 1968 to make way for a new city hall despite 
massive citizen and student protest. The city hall subsequently was built else-
where and the site sold to the department store company Hertie, which, as crit-
ics put it, “planted a shopping brick” that required additional “clear- cutting” in 
1977. Opponents claimed that powerful economic interests had pressured the 
city to agree to the department store’s location.102 In addition to the arson at-
tacks at Göttingen’s Hertie and Karstadt branches on 12 December 1980, sen-
sation was created a few weeks later with inner- city riots on New Year’s Eve 
during which shop windows were smashed and displays looted. The New 
Year’s Eve riots became an annual event.103
Contrary to 1968, violent forms of protest in the early 1980s seemed to 
yield tangible political results. Violent protests generated public awareness, 
whilst the destruction of valuable living space and the squatters’ peaceful 
struggle against it had not spawned much public interest.104 The sacrifices of 
brutal street fighting finally seemed to be leading somewhere since the issue 
now became a major media concern, and the government offered to negotiate 
with squatters.105 A romanticised and nostalgic ideal of authentic lifestyles in 
historically evolved structures stood against dystopian visions of an econo-
mised society: “For years, redevelopment measures have turned entire dis-
tricts into concrete deserts; excessive greed has replaced dreamy medieval . . . 
streets with the grid; people have been deformed into machines of production 
and consumption.” There was a clear sense that resistance paid off: “When our 
life contexts are to be destroyed by government policies, when humanity is 
choked by concrete, cops, and computers, we will offer resistance. We don’t 
100. Wut im Bauch!, 20.
101. Ibid., 17.
102. Ibid., 10. Hertie repeatedly became the object of gentrification critics. See Brigitte 
Abramowski et al., Hertie- Center: Ottensen gehört nicht Büll und Liedtke (Hamburg, 1990), IISG 
Amsterdam, ID 1342, Bro 670/21 fol.
103. “Erinnerungen an Silvester 1980— ‘Silvester- Krawalle,’” Göttinger Stadtinfo, http://www.
goest.de/sylvester_silvester.htm#krawalle (accessed 30 November 2010); Schwarzmeier, Die Au-
tonomen zwischen Subkultur, 77.
104. “Einige Fragen an meine Mitbürger,” radikal 90– 91 (April 1981), 28.
105. Yvonne, “.  .  .  alle Gewalt geht vom Staate aus,” in Sanierung, ed. Aktionskomitee für 
Amnestie, 10– 11, IISG Amsterdam, ID- 6531 B, Bro 758/6 fol.
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want to be turned into programmable humans who vegetate as eating- sleeping- 
and- working machines.”106
The idea that protest employing violent means had ultimately generated 
political results was expressed more soberly by Werner Orlowsky, the propri-
etor of a local chemist’s shop who became a spokesperson for the Kreuzberg 
protest movement: “A single cobblestone yielded more than two years on the 
rehabilitation council.”107 In June 1981, the Alternative Liste (the West Berlin 
branch of the Green Party) made Orlowsky a city councillor for building and 
planning for the district of Kreuzberg, the first time that a member of a German 
Green Party had filled such a position. A rhetorically talented businessman, 
Orlowsky had been courageous enough to support the squatters’ protest. His 
shop was located on the Dresdener Straße, a residential shopping street that 
had been cut off by the brutalist Neue Kreuzberger Zentrum, a semicircular 
string of twelve- storey high- rises featuring 367 flats, two multistorey car parks, 
and fifteen thousand square metres of commercial and retail space. The project 
had  encountered resistance from its inception, and after the financiers declared 
bankruptcy, the government had to step in with a sixty- five- million deutsche 
mark bailout.
By West Berlin standards, this was not even a major scandal. Building 
booms increasingly involved local party politics in dubious lending schemes, 
leading to the January 1981 resignation of the scandal- plagued Dietrich Stobbe 
as West Berlin’s mayor. The governing SPD/FDP coalition was briefly contin-
ued by Hans- Jochen Vogel, who had been sent to the divided city as his party’s 
last- ditch candidate to save a traditional stronghold. Despite his soaring career 
in the SPD, Vogel had never tackled the problems for which he had developed 
theoretical solutions as the hopeful federal minister for regional planning, con-
struction, and urban development. Rather ironically, he now found himself on 
the other side of the conflict. Despite embracing a moderate compromise line 
on squatting, he had to authorise police operations against young protesters 
who subscribed to a critique of the manifestations of capitalism that was not 
terribly far removed from his own criticisms a decade earlier.108
The compromise, the Berliner Linie, was designed to transfer the conflict 
106. “‘Innere Unruhen,’” radikal 5 (December 1980): 2– 3.
107. Orlowsky quoted in Lindner, Jugendprotest, 332. On violence as a political catalyst, see 
Ermittlungsausschuß Mehringhof, Dokumentation; Aust and Rosenbladt, Hausbesetzer, 28. On 
Orlowsky, see “Sanierung haut den gesündesten um,” Der Spiegel 26 (23 June 1980): 32; Klaus 
Pokatzky, “Alternativ und barock: Vom Drogisten zum Baustadtrat von Kreuzberg,” Die Zeit 50 (7 
December 1984).
108. See Anders, “Wohnraum,” 486– 88; Sonnewald and Raabe- Zimmermann, “Berliner Li-
nie,” 59– 62.
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from a criminal to a political level. Under pressure from both the CDU opposi-
tion and the squatters, the Vogel government acknowledged previous mistakes 
in housing policy and thus granted some of the squatters’ points. The defence 
of squats seemed legitimate, and violent means had even proved effective since 
the government wanted to avoid escalation. Protesters’ experiences with police 
brutality added to this pattern of legitimisation.109 The Berliner Linie was grad-
ually eroded by the police and the public prosecutor’s office. It was partly 
abolished, though it continued to exist at least on paper in tenancy agreements 
with squatters, when Vogel was defeated by Richard von Weizsäcker (CDU), 
who took office as mayor of West Berlin in June 1980. The authorities now 
increasingly resorted to forceful eviction. This created a vicious circle: street 
fighting, smashing of shop windows, and looting became the ritualised answer 
to evictions, further legitimising subsequent evictions.110 Justifications could 
be rather simple- minded: the first issue of the squatters’ weekly Instand- 
Besetzer- Post reported, “we took our anger out on banks (the actual master-
minds behind any policy) and on hertie who do nothing other than squeeze the 
hard- earned money out of the pockets of the ‘little’ people.”111 The frequent 
demonstrations on the Kurfürstendamm— 469 in 1982— many of which en-
tailed traffic closures and destruction, brought retailers and the Chamber of 
Industry and Commerce to lobby the government for restrictions on freedom of 
assembly. Economics minister Elmar Pieroth (CDU) declared sympathetically, 
“We can no longer tolerate subversive groups attacking the Kurfürstendamm— 
the lifeblood of a free city.” The government instituted a so- called equity fund 
that paid for the bulk of “riot damage,” but retail organisations frequently 
pointed out that these sums were not enough to prevent a wave of bankruptcies 
in the inner city.112
Similar developments were afoot in other European cities. The course of 
events could be strikingly similar, as squatters from Paris reported in radikal in 
September 1981: a group of about fifty people subscribing to the principle of 
“gratuité totale” tried to force open the blocked- off entrances of a building des-
ignated for demolition. Major conflict with the police resulted, triggering the 
smashing of shop windows and looting.113 Also in September 1981, Berlin 
109. Sonnewald and Raabe- Zimmermann, “Berliner Linie,” 59– 62; Willems, Jugendunruhen 
und Protestbewegungen, 279– 80.
110. Willems, Jugendunruhen und Protestbewegungen, 269.
111. “Von der Razzia zur Räumung?,” Instand- Besetzer- Post 1 (11 March 1981): 3, APO- 
Archiv, 1303.
112. “Berlins Leid mit den Lücken in der City: Demonstrationen mit Millionenschäden machen 
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squatters had invited their colleagues from other Western European cities to the 
international Tuwat Congress, which was steeped in radical slogans. A flyer is-
sued by the “Autonomous Republics of Neukölln and Kreuzberg” declared, 
“Our hostages are their windowpanes, their police cars, their wealth. Make it 
expensive for them!!! The only level on which they can understand something is 
money! Every day, one of our comrades sits in prison there should be 1 million 
DM damage! . . . For every evicted house 1 million extra! For every conviction 
1 million extra!”114 “One million per eviction” became a favourite slogan of the 
movement.115 In July 1982, the clearing of two squats in Berlin resulted in an 
attack on a Wertheim department store in the Steglitz district: stones smashed 
the windows, followed by Molotov cocktails, which ignited a clothes rack. The 
sprinkler system then caused property damage in the millions.116
The legitimacy of militant struggle as “counterviolence” was not ques-
tioned as a matter of principle at the Tuwat Congress. What was discussed was 
the question of where the use of violence was “right” and where it was “un-
necessary.” This differed from the Tunix Congress in 1978, which had marked 
the end of the Sponti movement because a consensus on the use of violent 
means of protest could no longer be reached. Unlike 1978, the movement did 
not uniformly discard violent means. Tuwat can be read as a distinct response 
to Tunix, which seemed to lead to the retreat into alternative lifestyles. The 
rejection of violence in 1978 must be seen in the context of the RAF and the 
German Autumn. Subsequently, debates about the RAF never reached the 
same intensity, but they continued in the early 1980s, with a number of squat-
ters supporting the RAF’s anti- imperialist ideas and many more lumped to-
gether with terrorists in police perceptions and practice.117
Political violence related to the housing conflicts in West Germany in the 1970s 
and 1980s arose from a challenging search for alternative lifestyles and con-
cepts of well- being. A comparative perspective on the Frankfurt and Berlin 
squatters’ movements, however, suggests a few important differences. First, au-
thorities’ responses and their political consequences took different trajectories. 
Frankfurt squatters encountered an uncompromising hard line. A disintegrating 
movement was “conquered” by superior police forces. The SPD government 
114. Quoted in Sonnewald and Raabe- Zimmermann, “Berliner Linie,” 69.
115. “Berlin: Keine Atempause,” taz- Journal 3 (1981): 152; AG Grauwacke, Autonome in Be-
wegung, 54.
116. “Reaktionen auf die Räumungen in Berlin,” taz, 29 July 1982, 4; “Aktion: Wertheimer 
Swimmingpool,” radikal 7 (September 1982): 5.
117. AG Grauwacke, Autonome in Bewegung, 54– 58; Anders, “Wohnraum,” 481.
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under Rudi Arndt made several false steps, and the Frankfurt CDU’s surprising 
victory under Walter Wallmann in 1977 may have been influenced by the legacy 
of the Häuserkampf, but while the conflict lasted, the government survived the 
challenge to its legitimacy. Apart from some crucial corrections to the original 
plans for the restructuring of the financial metropolis, Frankfurt’s transforma-
tion took place. Kreuzberg, conversely, remains a stronghold of alternative life-
styles and protest. West Berlin’s government was far more willing to compro-
mise. The politics of housing grew into a greater challenge to political authority, 
with a historically significant change of government in the middle— and partly 
as a result— of the conflict. The same shift of power brought about the parlia-
mentary debut of a Green Party— the Alternative Liste— that openly pursued the 
squatters’ agenda. Squatters thus retained substantial sympathies among the 
wider population and realised some of their goals both in terms of tenancy 
agreements and in terms of political mobilisation.
Second, the movements’ positions on violence differed. Frankfurt activ-
ists perceived the end of their Häuserkampf in 1974 as a “military defeat,” a 
viewpoint that contributed to the discrediting of militancy within a wider pro-
cess of erosion and division among radicals. In West Berlin, however, mili-
tancy seemed to work, generating tangible political results and remaining a 
mobilising factor beyond the end of the squatters’ movement in 1983.
Finally, differences existed in the critiques of capitalism and regimes of 
provision that the two movements developed and pursued. The Frankfurt squat-
ters’ movement still reflected the three classical stages of revolutionary poli-
tics, imagined as distinct with regard to contents and time: critique of the status 
quo; revolutionary action; new society. At least rhetorically, Frankfurt 
activists— mainly the Spontis— still embraced a revolutionary mission with the 
goal of system change and overcoming capitalism. They hoped to reach their 
goal by shifting the revolutionary subject away from the industrial workers and 
towards those who remained marginalised by affluent society. Political activity 
in the realm of consumption remained a means to larger revolutionary ends. As 
a reflection of their defeats, they gave important support for the emergence of 
a politics of the first person— a focus on the here and now— that brought to-
gether the three elements of the revolutionary triad. Revolution no longer 
played such an emphatic role in West Berlin a decade later, where the move-
ment’s successors also invested in a challenge of capitalism and consumer so-
ciety. However, this effort was more specifically focused on particular aspects, 
drawing on small- scale and concrete alternative designs. The belief that the 




Global Responsibilities:  
In Search of Consumer Morality and Solidarity
“How can it be that in this world every two minutes a human being is dying 
from starvation while McDonald’s is dealing out one hundred million ham-
burgers each year?”
—Die 3 Tornados (1988)1
During the 1970s, environmentalist discourse gained strength in left- wing pol-
itics, eventually surpassing socialism— and thus questions of distribution— as 
the key conception of the alternative milieu. An element of continuity lay in the 
idea of destruction that tied both concepts to issues of consumption. In addition 
to posing threats to localised social contexts, regimes of provision increasingly 
acquired the global dimension of endangering nature as such. If ecological 
problems were associated with violence, it was on a more abstract level. A 
moderating influence came from the fusion of left- wing ideas with bourgeois 
scepticism of growth, especially since the computer simulations of the Club of 
Rome2 and the oil crisis.3
This debate was popularised by a book written by Herbert Gruhl, a mem-
ber of the Bundestag for the CDU and cofounder of a nongovernmental envi-
ronmental organisation, the Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland 
(BUND). In Ein Planet wird geplündert (A Planet Is Being Pillaged), the con-
servative politician came astonishingly close to leftist ideas of neocolonial 
wars for economic motives. The closing passage of this 1975 book argues that 
“wars will approach the faster the more people want ever more goods from the 
same earth. Hence all ‘fanatics of growth’ are by definition ‘war mongers.’”4 
Four years later, when Gruhl had founded the ecological party Grüne Aktion 
1. Büro für ungewöhnliche Maßuahmen, Wut, Witz, Widerstand, 50.
2. Meadows and Meadows, Limits to Growth.
3. See R. Árasch and C. Koch, “Ölkrise”— Krise des Imperialismus (Heidelberg, 1978).
4. Gruhl, Ein Planet wird geplündert, 343.
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Zukunft (GAZ), a forerunner of the Green Party, the notion of destruction was 
much more clearly focused on nature.5 In an essay with the incisive title “Con-
sumption Is Also Destruction” for a volume on organic farming, there are no 
longer any mentions of forms of violence other than that against nature.6
The 1980s and especially the second half of the decade saw a massive 
emergence of ecological approaches to economic questions. Green entrepre-
neurs took up ideas from the 1970s and turned them into alternative schemes 
and enterprises that won market share. A comprehensive bibliography on eco- 
marketing compiled in 1990 illustrates the chronological development: only 
7.8 percent of the listed titles were published before 1980, 28.3 percent ap-
peared between 1981 and 1985, and the remaining 63.9 percent originated be-
tween 1986 and 1990.7 A host of citizens’ initiatives pursued ecological mat-
ters from the standpoint of the consumer. The quarterly Consum Critik appeared 
between 1983 and 1989 and mainly focused on issues of harmful substances in 
food and other consumer goods and on the ecological consequences of indus-
trial agriculture, occasionally invoking solidarity with the Third World.8 Ques-
tions of violence remained almost completely excluded from this  discourse 
focused on German consumers’ health concerns.
Despite the fact that the ecological turn had, by and large, a moderating 
impact on more radical forms of social- revolutionary protest and facilitated 
their absorption by mainstream society, the emerging ecological consciousness 
also pioneered a new sensitivity to the destructive impact of certain consumer 
goods and their entanglement in complex commodity chains. Left- leaning in-
tellectuals, political activists, and critical consumers drew on anti- imperialist 
antecedents and forged a political consciousness about regimes of provision on 
a global scale: peripheral economies tended to export low- cost primary 
goods— coffee, tobacco, sugar, and rubber— while importing military equip-
ment and luxury goods for elite consumption. The mass consumer goods con-
sumed by these elites and the inhabitants of the highly industrialised countries 
were produced predominantly with the latter’s capital. The environmental 
problems of the developed world had their structural counterparts in poverty, 
hunger, and unbalanced distribution in the Third World.9 The political thinkers 
and actors analysed in this chapter raised a fundamental question: Why could 
5. See Mende, “Nicht rechts, nicht links, sondern vorn.”
6. Gruhl, “Konsum ist auch Vernichtung.”
7. Ralf Antes and Petra Tiebler, Bibliographie Öko- Marketing (Oestrich- Winkel, 1990), 4– 5, 
IISG, ID 314, BRO 708/16 FOL.
8. Consum Critik was merged into Verbraucher- Telegramm in 1989.
9. Merchant, Radical Ecology, 25.
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the imperative of economic growth not be replaced by a more balanced distri-
bution of these problems via a focus on the production of certain goods that 
would fulfil basic needs around the world and ease industrial pressure on the 
environment? Many left- leaning intellectuals and political activists turned 
away from conventional modernisation theories and came to answer this ques-
tion with the structuralist tools of some form of dependency theory, blaming 
the hierarchies within the world economic system for enriching industrialised 
countries at the expense of the continued impoverishment of developing coun-
tries.10 Developing countries seemed locked in a structure that forced them to 
export their natural resources at relatively low prices and import consumer 
goods that only local elites could afford. At the same time, most Western gov-
ernments clung to neoliberal concepts of modernisation, warning against al-
terations in power structures that would lead to slowdowns in economic activ-
ity, causing crisis and widespread unemployment.
Within the context of such debates over global regimes of provision and 
power, various campaigns against complex economic patterns emerged that 
targeted concrete service and retail outlets— such as banking facilities, super-
markets, tourist agencies, petrol stations, McDonald’s branches, or coffee 
roasters. Since the 1970s, restaurants and luxury hotels have increasingly be-
come the targets of urban collective action in the Middle East because “they 
represent visible and flagrant transgressions of culturally grounded notions of 
justice: international consumption styles, corruption, and gross inefficiency.”11 
However, campaigns against localities of consumption— and the underlying 
connections between protests in the developed and the developing world— 
remain a thoroughly underresearched dimension of political violence. Accord-
ing to protesters, at such localities of consumption, European customers and 
consumers participated in destruction, exploitation, and murder in the Third 
World. Violent conflict and discourse on violence found their way into political 
protest on several levels as a consequence of a complex process of interaction. 
The critical debates and protests accompanying the meeting of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank in West Berlin in September 
1988 emerge as a culmination of conflicts over global regimes of provision that 
followed on earlier traditions of anti- imperialism, boycotts, and fair trade. 
They are a fascinating precursor to later manifestations of the counterglobali-
10. Dependency theory was introduced to Germany by Senghaas, Peripherer Kapitalismus.
11. Edmund Burke, “Towards a History of Urban Collective Action in the Middle East: Conti-
nuities and Change, 1750– 1980,” in État, Ville, et Mouvements Socieaux au Maghreb et au Moyen- 
Orient, ed. Kenneth Brown, Bernard Hourcade, Michèle Jolé, Claude Liauzu, Peter Sluglett and 
Sami Zubaida (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1989), 52.
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sation movement. Anti- imperialist critiques of regimes of provision that con-
trasted consumerist affluence with hunger and militarism in developing coun-
tries are deeply rooted in left- wing political thought.12
International Regimes of Provision
Defying neoliberal lines of reasoning, campaigns for solidarity with liberation 
struggles focused on the miserable fate of producers in the so- called Third 
World and the destructive potential of globalised consumer capitalism. Theo-
retical critiques of global regimes of provision and challenges to concrete man-
ifestations of global commodity chains formed an important driving force in 
the politicisation of consumption. The idea that Europeans’ consumption of 
imported commodities went hand in hand with violent conflict in the context 
of imperialist exploitation formed a central backdrop to various efforts to dele-
gitimise and alter global commodity chains. The aim was to enhance solidarity 
between consumers and producers. The latter were taken to be the workers 
who harvested or manufactured resources and products but suffered from im-
moral living and working conditions imposed by multinational companies, 
which were perceived as parasitic middlemen. The violence that political activ-
ists diagnosed in such relationships was the product of complex patterns of 
interaction between producers and consumers. The protesters sought to point 
out connections between seemingly separate and spatially far removed con-
texts of this interaction.
Scholarly knowledge of insurgent movements against the social repercus-
sions of globalisation is largely focused on the period since the 1990s and on 
struggles in developing countries: protests against various World Bank– backed 
dam construction projects; fights to curb the activities of timber companies in 
tropical forests; movements to procure labour rights and/or women’s rights in 
developing countries; campaigns against IMF- imposed austerity programmes; 
and demonstrations against corporate globalisation in Seattle (1999) and Ge-
noa (2001).13 Much less is known about the 1980s, about the repercussions of 
Third World struggles in highly industrialised societies, and about the amalga-
mation of new forms of protests with older traditions harking back to anti- 
imperialism and 1968.
12. See Uta G. Poiger, “Imperialism and Consumption: Two Tropes in West German Radical-
ism,” in Between Marx and Coca- Cola, ed. Schildt and Siegfried, 161– 72; Graf, “Vom Nein zum 
Ja,” 153– 64.
13. Harvey, New Imperialism, 166– 67.
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Especially during the second half of the 1980s, a consciousness of the 
destructive potential inherent in globalised consumer capitalism resulted in a 
wave of protest activities that were directed against multinationals and the in-
stitutions of global governance and that sought to further political conscious-
ness. Protesters mounted fundamental challenges to local and global regimes 
of provision— and their interplay— when seeking to legitimise alternative eco-
nomic infrastructures or concrete attacks against institutions of retail and ser-
vices. Alternative scenarios of peaceful regimes of provision were pitted 
against images of violent consumption. Attention was drawn to the misery of 
low- wage labour and to the barbed wire that went along with tariff walls around 
free trade zones. Such arguments were part of an international movement seek-
ing to establish solidarity with the anticolonial liberation struggles.
In July 1973, the title page of the “undogmatic” newspaper Der Lange 
Marsch (The Long March) showed a picture of three European couples in 
beachwear indulging in a lavish buffet below a tropical sunshade. In contrast, 
the bottom of the page, bore images of naked children suffering from kwashi-
orkor, profit forecasts for three German automobile companies, and images of 
heavily armed African soldiers.14 The collage sought to make visible the con-
nections that commercial product communications systematically obscured. 
In one instance, a German sparkling wine company withdrew its advertising 
business from a newspaper that had put the company’s ad next to pictures of 
starving African children because the “context had become too risky.”15 The 
collage reveals the political versatility of polarising and somewhat fuzzy cri-
tiques of regimes of provision. They served as an idealistic agent that built 
bridges between diverse political contexts so that everyday acts of consump-
tion could be pulled together with postcolonial wars. Such critiques of re-
gimes of provision lend themselves to a quotidian and transnational mobilisa-
tion of solidarity networks. This was repeatedly realised in international 
boycott campaigns that aimed to establish a counterpublic against morally 
reprehensible regimes of provision.16 David Harvey’s Marxist interpretation 
suggests that an ongoing crisis of overaccumulation led to capitalism’s in-
creasing reliance on what he calls “accumulation by dispossession”— that is, 
14. Der lange Marsch: Zeitung für eine Neue Linke 5 (July 1973): 1.
15. Eicke, Werbelawine, 126; Eva Heller, Wie Werbung wirkt: Theorien und Tatsachen (Frank-
furt: Fischer), 168.
16. Little general research has been done on boycotts as a historical phenomenon of the 1970s 
and 1980s, although Friedman, Consumer Boycotts, 213– 26, provides some historical perspective 
for the United States. On more recent boycott campaigns, see Micheletti, Political Virtue and 
Shopping; Micheletti, Follesdal, and Stolle, Politics, Products, and Markets; Trautmann, “Pour-
quoi boycotter?”; Hawkins, “Boycotts, Buycotts, and Consumer Activism.”
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neoliberal policies resulting in the centralisation of wealth and power in the 
hands of a few and the suppression of alternative forms of consumption and 
production, especially after 1973. This idea refers to the privatisation and 
commodification of public assets, the financial sector becoming a centre of 
redistributive activity, and the institutions of global governance exerting pres-
sure to open up markets, all backed by state power.17
Protest against these processes did not exhaust itself in boycotts or vio-
lent attacks but also sought a more constructive stance, establishing alterna-
tive commodity chains and economic infrastructures. Such impulses fostered 
the fair- trade movement, which emerged from religious and charitable roots 
after the Second World War and during the 1980s undertook various cam-
paigns to enhance solidarity with producers of tea, coffee, and other colonial 
goods in countries such as India, El Salvador, and Nicaragua.18 Overall, po-
litically coordinated consumer choices were supposed to trigger economic 
consequences, critical discourse, and movement mobilisation as a way to dis-
cipline, delegitimize, or overcome what were seen as morally reprehensible 
regimes of provision.
Anti- Apartheid Campaigns
The most prominent campaign of systematic boycotting developed in the con-
text of the international anti- apartheid movement. The German anti- apartheid 
movement emerged comparatively late. In Britain, a large- scale boycott cam-
paign materialised in 1959– 60 when a group of South African exiles called for 
a boycott of fruits, cigarettes, and other goods that eventually won support 
from the Labour, Liberal, and Communist Parties. Labour leader Hugh 
Gaitskell went on television to ask viewers to refrain from buying South Afri-
can goods, and countless local authorities and individuals heeded this call for 
a moral gesture flanked by solidarity demonstrations. The African National 
Congress embraced economic boycott as a political weapon after the South 
African government’s draconian measures outlawed almost all forms of con-
ventional political activity. From a position of weakness, boycott became the 
chief leverage to campaign for international support. In December 1958, the 
All- African Peoples’ Conference in Accra called on all countries to impose 
17. Harvey, New Imperialism, 137– 82.
18. See Nicholls and Opal, Fair Trade; Raschke, Fairer Handel; Schmelzer, “Marketing Mor-
als, Moralizing Markets”; Quaas, “Selling Coffee.” For an example, see Teekampagnengruppe der 
Indienhilfe e.V., Teatime— für wen? (Herrsching, [1986]), 3– 4, IISG, ID 314, BRO 864/9 FOL.
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economic sanctions against South Africa. This effort eventually grew into the 
international anti- apartheid movement, backed by churches, labour unions, and 
other associations along with the United Nations and the Commonwealth of 
Nations. Boycotts operated in the areas of sports, academia, and business and 
were fuelled by perceptions of the South African government’s abuse of state 
violence as associated with Sharpeville and Soweto.19 Consumer activities 
came to focus on the role of banks, arms dealers, and fruit exporters in uphold-
ing the apartheid regime.
Although there had been some critical focus on South Africa in 1960s 
student politics,20 a more popular German anti- apartheid movement was not 
inaugurated until the 1970s and sprang mainly from church roots. In 1978, fol-
lowing the suggestions of South African women’s groups but not until five 
years after a widespread Dutch boycott of South African oranges, the Evange-
lische Frauenarbeit in Deutschland started issuing brochures that urged Ger-
man consumers, “Don’t buy fruit from South Africa.”21 The German booklet 
took as a point of departure the words of South African prime minister J. B. 
Vorster, who had said in 1972, “Every time a South African product is bought, 
it is another brick in the wall of our continued existence.”22 Although the wom-
en’s organisation did not gain full support from their superiors in the Evan-
gelical Church of Germany, more than ten thousand of the booklets were 
printed, and the campaign had considerable resonance among the liberal bour-
geoisie. For countless women, the practical activity of politicising issues of 
daily shopping by putting up information stands in front of local supermarkets 
became an emancipatory experience.23
A boycott campaign that gained partial support from trade unions and 
political parties only emerged in the second half of the 1980s, when German 
19. Christabel Gurney, “When the Boycott Began to Bite,” http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/his-
tory/aam/aamhist.html (accessed 11 August 2010).
20. Cf. Slobodian, Foreign Front, 21– 25.
21. Evangelische Frauenarbeit, Kauft keine Früchte aus Südafrika!, IISG, ID 314, BRO 2160/5; 
Hildegard Zumach, “Frauen für Südafrika!: ‘Kauft keine Früchte aus Südafrika,’” Mitteilungen 
aus Ökumene und Auslandsarbeit (2002), http://www.ekd.de/ausland_oekumene/berichte/2002/
reader_2002_28.html (accessed 11 August 2010); Wellmer, “Deutsche Anti- Apartheidbewegung”; 
Stelck, Politik mit dem Einkaufskorb.
22. Evangelische Frauenarbeit, Kauft keine Früchte aus Südafrika!, 5. On the Vorster quote and 
the 1973 Dutch boycott, see Esau du Plessis, “Don’t Squeeze a South African Dry,” Africa Today 
21.2 (1974): 59– 68.
23. “Kauft keine Früchte aus Südafrika— Erfahrungen mit einer Boykott- Aktion (1981) ,” in 
Aktionshandbuch Dritte Welt, 6th ed., ed. Bundeskongreß entwicklungspolitischer Aktionsgruppen 
(Wuppertal, 1982), http://www.friedenspaedagogik.de/themen/zivilcourage/aktionen/kauft_ke-
ine_fruechte_aus_suedafrika_1981 (accessed 12 August 2010).
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companies, especially banks, became crucial commercial partners for South 
Africa after the gradual withdrawal of investors from Britain and the United 
States. With Marxist militancy on the decline, boycotting South Africa prom-
ised a concrete project of emancipation that could be realized on a local scale. 
Refraining from South African consumer goods had a performative element, 
allowing people to mark their commitment to an issue of moral politics through 
individual choices of consumption. The fruit boycott was eventually effective 
enough that South African producers adopted a costly packaging system that 
systematically veiled the origin of their produce.24 After the World Council of 
Churches called on private customers to cancel their accounts with banks that 
provided South Africa with loans, the German anti- apartheid movement em-
braced the banking campaign, and in 1987, the Evangelical Church Congress, 
yielding to pressure from grassroots action groups, closed its accounts with 
Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, and Commerzbank. Activists declared 27 May 
1988 a nationwide “day of action against banks.” Mobilising for the event, the 
journal Consum Critik highlighted the fact that white South Africans enjoyed 
one of the highest living standards in the world.25 A decade earlier, South Afri-
can activist Brigalia Bam had already emphasised in her preface to the first 
German fruit- boycott brochure that white South Africans were “bathing in 
luxury” while black children died of malnutrition and innocent people were 
thrown into jail. She saw the economic boycott as a final effort to avert “a ter-
rible race war.”26
The mainstream anti- apartheid movement, with its strong roots in church 
organisations, embraced a decidedly nonviolent outlook that emphasised the 
moral contrast between peaceful boycotts and the South African regime’s reli-
ance on violence. However, during the second half of the 1980s, a militant 
branch of the movement emerged, chiefly represented by the Revolutionäre 
Zellen (RZ) and the autonomists. In the autumn of 1985, a revolutionary cell 
committed bomb attacks against Zahnradfabrik Friedrichshafen, a German 
company that exported parachutes and parts for armoured vehicles, and two 
branches of Daimler- Benz, which sold trucks and cross- country vehicles to the 
South African army. A claim of responsibility for the bombing started with the 
familiar battle cry, “Burn, baby, burn,” and pointed to those injured, interned, 
and executed by South African police forces. Applauding militant raids of 
white residential neighbourhoods in South Africa, the German activists hoped 
24. “Verbraucher: Kap der guten Früchte,” Der Spiegel 49 (30 November 1987): 89– 95.
25. “27. Mai 1988: Bankenaktionstag gegen Apartheid,” Consum Critik 6.2 (1988): 4.
26. Brigalia Bam, preface to Evangelische Frauenarbeit, Kauft keine Früchte aus Südafrika!, 
3– 4.
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that the South African youth resistance movement would not contend them-
selves with fighting for the leftovers from the tables of the white masters but 
would combine criminal appropriation with militant politics.27 Since German 
companies continued to supply crucial parts to the South African apparatus of 
oppression “in defiance of all talk of boycott [and] sanctions,”28 the RZ wanted 
to go beyond mere solidarity campaigns and any “pseudo- ethical cosmetics,” 
such as making South African gold coins an illegal import: “Our topic is not 
disinvestment, minimum wages, an antiracist code of conduct, or hiding the 
Krugerrand in the back drawers: we don’t want to urge fair business policies on 
the almost 150 German multinationals linking the South African subcontinent 
to the exploitation and capital flows of the metropoles. As part of a worldwide 
imperialist structure of exploitation, they are to be attacked here as well as 
there. . . . This must . . . produce conflagrations in their production halls and 
under their consumer shit.”29
Two years later, the RZ launched a bomb attack against the food store 
chain REWE as part of a campaign against racism and sexism, destroying sev-
enteen trucks and trailers in the North Rhine- Westphalian city of Wesel in No-
vember 1987.30 A revolutionary cell’s statement claiming responsibility ac-
cused REWE of profiting from the suppression of African women by “bartering 
away” South African fruits, vegetables, and canned goods in more than seven 
thousand stores. The statement likened the exploitation in multinational facto-
ries and plantations to early capitalism, with female agricultural labourers 
working sixty to seventy hours per week, often forced to bring their children to 
work, and receiving much lower pay than male workers: “The fruit offered in 
our supermarket chains . . . is the product of women’s work under conditions 
that represent the entire spectrum of capitalist and sexist oppression: the mech-
anisation of cultivation methods and subsequent reductions in labour require-
ments have reduced most female workers to the status of seasonal or day la-
bourers; at the same time they have to bear the health consequences of 
capitalised farming operations with pesticides and artificial fertilisers that 
cause diseases.” Moreover, the RZ pointed out, these women were subject to 
the everyday violence of white overseers: according to the group, South Africa 
27. “Anschlag gegen Brüggemann & Brandt, Hagen und Mercedes Lueg, Bochum,” December 
1985, in Früchte des Zorns, ed. ID- Archiv im IISG, 2:532.
28. “Aktion gegen die Zahnradfabrik, Friedrichshafen, und gegen Daimler, Schwäbisch- 
Gmünd,” October 1985, in ibid., 530– 32.
29. “Anschlag gegen Brüggemann & Brandt, Hagen, und Mercedes Lueg, Bochum,” in ibid., 
533.
30. “Verbraucher: Kap der guten Früchte,” Der Spiegel 49 (30 November 1987): 92.
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had the world’s highest incidence of rape. In an attempt to imitate and transfer 
the social and political struggles of South Africa to West Germany, the RZ ap-
plauded women’s roles in these struggles, in the strikes at Daimler- Benz’s 
South African plants, and when organising resistance against rent increases, 
boycotts, and raids on wholesalers. In contrast to their earlier statement, the 
feminist branch of the RZ explicitly commended German women’s church 
groups that had been supporting the boycott for years. The stated goal of the 
attack against REWE was simple: “We want the goods to disappear from the 
shelves.”31
The RZ’s anti- apartheid campaign was probably inspired by the better- 
known arson attacks that the Dutch group RaRa (Revolutionary Antiracist Ac-
tion) carried out against the supermarket chain Makro and Shell petrol stations 
beginning in September 1985. RaRa’s agenda was very clearly focused on the 
militant expression of opposition to South African apartheid. RaRa’s attacks— 
and the militant anti- apartheid campaign more generally— reached the German 
autonomist scene. Shell petrol stations were ubiquitous and therefore a rela-
tively easy target. There is little evidence that autonomists got involved in the 
fruit boycott campaigns: a rare poster from West Berlin shows a drawing of a 
crowd demolishing goods in a supermarket.32 More prominent on the autono-
mists’ agenda were German companies’ South African business relations in the 
field of nuclear and military technology.33 Autonomists interpreted apartheid 
as war. Protests against banks were widespread.34 Commodity boycotts, how-
ever, were marginal to such direct action against multinationals carried out in 
the spirit of solidarity with South African workers’ liberation struggle.35
Anti- Zionist campaigns
Only a small minority of German left- wing radicals were prepared to go so far 
as to put Israel on a level with South Africa and to subscribe to analogous calls 
31. “Aktion gegen Firma REWE,” November 1987, in Früchte des Zorns, ed. ID- Archiv im 
IISG, 2:536– 37.
32. Poster (West Berlin, 1986), http://plakat.nadir.org/plakat_ausgabe.php3?plakat=http://uke.
nadir.org/nadir/plakat/cd/film211/211_10.jpg (accessed 3 October 2011).
33. Poster, “Atomgeschäft: Bundesrepublik— Südafrika,” http://plakat.nadir.org/plakat_aus-
gabe.php3?plakat=http://uke.nadir.org/nadir/plakat/cd/film236/236_17.jpg (accessed 22 January 
2012).
34. Flyer, “Kein Geld für Südafrikas Rassenpolitik” (May 1987), http://plakat.nadir.org/plakat_
ausgabe.php3?plakat=http://uke.nadir.org/nadir/plakat/cd/film275/275_11.jpg (accessed 22 Janu-
ary 2012).
35. Arbeitskreis Internationale Solidarität, Shell raus aus Südafrika.
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to boycott Israeli products. A precursor of such campaigns occurred when the 
Revolutionäre Zellen used boycotts and incendiary attacks against a cinematic 
rendering of their most controversial act: a collaboration with the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) that resulted in the hijacking of an 
Air France plane to Uganda’s Entebbe Airport.  The Israel Defence Forces 
staged a spectacular hostage rescue on 4 July 1976 that resulted in the deaths 
of three hostages; all of the hijackers, including two RZ members; the com-
mander of the Israeli forces; and at least twenty Ugandan soldiers. More than 
one hundred hostages were rescued.36 Before the end of the year, Hollywood 
had released Victory at Entebbe [Unternehmen Entebbe], directed by Marvin J. 
Chomsky and starring Elizabeth Taylor, Kirk Douglas, Anthony Hopkins, and 
Burt Lancaster. The film particularly highlights what has become known as the 
“selection,” an incident in which the hijackers allegedly forced a Jewish couple 
holding Belgian passports to join the Israeli group, knocking the man to the 
ground and humiliating him on account of his Jewish- sounding name.
In January 1977, the RZ and Fighters for a Free Palestine tried to fire-
bomb cinemas in Düsseldorf and Aachen where the film was being shown.37 
Similar attacks had taken place in Rome the previous month.38 A flyer asking, 
“Who are the terrorists?” called on people to disturb screenings of the film.39 
Testifying in court, the perpetrators apprehended in Aachen, Gerhard Albartus 
and Enno Schwall, argued that the film legitimised “racist suppression and 
murder of Palestinians and Africans.”40 The RZ statement stressed that the in-
cendiary devices were not meant to injure anyone, likened the film to racist 
Nazi propaganda, and called for the immediate withdrawal of the film and a 
boycott of any future films about Entebbe.41
Most accounts of the events put a distinct emphasis on the antisemitic 
36. In the absence of a scholarly monograph on the topic, contemporary journalistic accounts 
that include transcripts of eyewitness testimony remain the most comprehensive secondary 
sources. See Stevenson, 90 Minutes at Entebbe; Ben- Porat, Haber, and Schiff, Entebbe Rescue.
37. Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Pressespiegel 5 (10 January 1977): 3, BAK, BMJ, HG 4, 
B 141/62511, 4030 E- 16/77, vol. 1; Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Düsseldorf, Anklageschrift, Ger-
hard Albartus, 5 OJs 2/77 (28 July 1977), 163, BAK, BMJ, HG 4, B 141/62511, 4030 E- 16/77, vol. 
1.
38. “Firebombs Hit Movie Theaters Showing Film on Entebbe Rescue,” Jewish Telegraphic 
Agency, 27 December 1976, Jewish News Archive, http://archive.jta.org/article/1976/12/27/2977164/
firebombs- hit- movie- theaters- showing- film- on- entebbe- rescue (accessed 10 May 2012).
39. Sitting Bull, “Unternehmen- Entebbe: Wer sind die Terroristen?,” anonymous flyer, n.d., 
author’s private collection.
40. Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf, Urteil Albartus/Schwall, IV 2/77, 5 OJs 2/77 (19 January 
1979), 116, BAK, BMJ, HG 4, B 141/62511, 4030 E- 16/77, vol. 2.
41. “Brandanschlag gegen die Vorführung des Entebbe- Films,” January 1977, in Früchte des 
Zorns, ed. ID- Archiv im IISG, 1:129. See also “Entebbe- Film: Wahnsinnig durchgeknallt,” Der 
Spiegel 3 (10 January 1977): 62– 63.
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conduct of the German hijackers, an aspect that has come to dominate the de-
bate, especially in Germany. Although the evidence is complicated by the exis-
tence of dual citizenship, evidence suggests that the “selection” at Entebbe did 
not take place in the way it is usually narrated. Ilan Hartuv, a former employee 
of the Israeli foreign ministry who was one of the hostages, stated unequivo-
cally in a 2011 interview that  the hostages were grouped “based on passports 
and ID cards. There was no selection of Jews versus non- Jews.”42 In itself, 
Hartuv’s account does not say much about the existence of antisemitic motiva-
tions— or lack thereof— among the RZ and the PFLP, but it does raise ques-
tions concerning the evidence on which charges of antisemitism against the 
radical Left are based. It is correct that Israeli citizens were detained at Entebbe 
and threatened with death, but many non- Israeli Jews were released, a fact that 
is usually omitted in descriptions of an Auschwitz- like selection.43
Two years after the events at Entebbe, the RZ attacked the Frankfurt- 
based company Agrexco, owned by the state of Israel and Europe’s largest 
importer of Israeli fruit, causing damage to the building but no casualties. A 
statement tied the attack to alleged cases of Arab workers injecting mercury 
into Israeli oranges. Indeed, oranges injected with mercury had been found in 
Europe in January and February 1978, but it is doubtful that any Palestinian 
organisations were involved in these performative acts of poisoning. Evidence 
suggests that radical European solidarity groups— perhaps the RZ or similar 
Dutch groups— invented this form of protest. Letters threatening to poison Is-
raeli agricultural products in the name of an otherwise obscure Arab Revolu-
tionary Army were received in several European capitals and had been sent 
from Stuttgart. The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the PFLP 
were initially not impressed with this new form of struggle because it had the 
potential to discredit the perpetrators and embraced it only later and on a very 
limited scale.44
The RZ attack and June 1978 statement appear to constitute an attempt to 
42. Yossi Melman, “Setting the Record Straight: Entebbe Was Not Auschwitz,” Haaretz.com, 8 
July 2011, http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/week- s- end/setting- the- record- straight- entebbe- was- 
not- auschwitz- 1.372131 (accessed 10 November 2011). Hostage Moshe Peretz wrote in his con-
temporary journal, “The terrorists separate us from the others: a most dramatic scene. Every person 
who possesses an Israeli passport is called upon to leave the central hall and move to an adjoining 
room. . . . People with dual nationality are also ordered into there.” Peretz’s account is printed in 
Stevenson, 90 Minutes at Entebbe, 27.
43. For a detailed analysis of the contested narratives of the Entebbe hijacking, see Sedlmaier 
and Anders, “‘Unternehmen Entebbe’ 1976.”
44. This account follows the impressively evidenced interpretation provided by Sprinzak and 
Karmon, “Why So Little?”
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correct the public discourse that had unfolded in response to a wave of copycat 
citrus fruit poisonings throughout Europe that also affected non- Israeli or-
anges. The RZ pointed out such attempts were sabotage rather than poisoning, 
since the goal was to make the oranges unusable rather than to kill people, as 
evidenced by the fact that warnings had been issued (though they were ig-
nored). Indeed, elemental mercury is poorly absorbed by ingestion, and toxic-
ity from swallowing is rare. As a result, none of the fifty oranges found con-
taminated with mercury in various European cities threatened anyone’s life.45 
However, the details of mercury’s health hazards are not widely known, and 
mercury, especially in its compounds, can have extremely toxic effects— for 
example, through long- term exposure to mercury vapour or consumption of 
contaminated fish. Thus, though the actual danger posed by mercury in citrus 
fruits was small, the incidents provoked a climate of fear, with detrimental ef-
fects on sales of fruit, the original intention of the perpetrators. The RZ sug-
gested that only a lack of solidarity among the Left and a media smear cam-
paign had raised suspicions of antisemitism, while no one had suffered any 
serious harm; moreover, the cell alleged, the “imperialist state” of Israel fi-
nanced its army to no small degree from the export of citrus fruits. The RZ 
would no longer “idly watch” the “war of extermination against the Palestin-
ians”; instead, the attack was meant as only a prelude to further measures in the 
commercial sphere: “boycott campaigns against Israeli goods, discussions 
with people doing their shopping, but also stink bombs and acid attacks against 
Israeli products, destroying the stocks of Israeli fruit displayed in every depart-
ment store.” The RZ could not resist comparing what they perceived as the 
“expulsion, persecution, and extermination of an entire people” to the “blood 
and soil” politics of the Nazis. At the same time, they explicitly declared that 
their fight against Zionism was also a resolute fight against antisemitism in any 
form.46 The debate about similarities and differences between criticisms of Is-
rael, anti- Zionism, and antisemitism or about structural affinities between anti- 
imperialism and antisemitism was still in its infancy.47
The RZ continued the “campaign for the support of the Palestinian libera-
tion struggle” a year later with a similar attack against another fruit importer, 
45. Ibid.
46. “Aktion gegen die Israelische Import- Gesellschaft Agrexco, Frankfurt,” June 1978, in 
Früchte des Zorns, ed. ID- Archiv im IISG, 1:131– 32.
47. See Gerhard Hanloser, “Bundesrepublikanischer Linksradikalismus und Israel: Antifas-
chismus und Revolutionismus als Tragödie und als Farce,” in Antisemitismus, Antizionismus, Is-
raelkritik, ed. Zuckermann, 194; Volker Weiß, “‘Volksklassenkampf’— Die antizionistische Rez-
eption des Nahostkonflikts in der militanten Linken der BRD,” in Antisemitismus, Antizionismus, 
Israelkritik, ed. Zuckermann, 231; Holzer, “Neue Linke,” 267– 334.
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Hameico. The statement of responsibility again referred to a “fascist genocide 
against the Palestinian people” and accused Zionist arms exports of supporting 
“fascist regimes” in Nicaragua, South Africa, and Argentina. The radicals 
again demanded that companies withdraw Israeli produce and that “antifas-
cist” activists provoke boycotts by injecting butyric acid into “Zionist fruits.”48 
The RZ were early in taking up Israel as a target of their militant boycott cam-
paigns. The British Palestine Solidarity Campaign did not embrace the Boycott 
Israeli Goods Campaign until 1982.49
The Hafenstraße Mural
The precarious mixture of criticism of Israeli foreign politics, anti- Zionism, 
and antsemitism reemerged in the context of the First Intifada of the late 1980s 
when the “Antiimps,” a branch of the autonomist movement that declared itself 
loyal to the goals of the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF), subsumed solidarity with 
Palestine under a rather haphazard notion of anti- imperialism. Similar to the 
RZ, these groups maintained contacts with the PFLP, which had belatedly em-
braced the boycott as a means of winning European support for its fight against 
the Israeli state.50 In 1987, squatters from Hamburg’s Hafenstraße, where, un-
like Berlin, the initial squats from 1981 remained a focal point of political 
conflict throughout the decade, painted a mural on the exterior wall of a tene-
ment building dominated by the slogan, “Boycott ‘Israel’! Goods, kibbutzim, 
and beaches.”51 Above the words was the outline of a machine gun against the 
background of a giant Palestinian flag. To underline the allegedly illegitimate 
nature of the Zionist state, the word Israel appeared in quotation marks, the 
same way the Springer press referred to the “DDR”.
Television footage of Israeli soldiers beating Palestinian children during 
the Intifada apparently had motivated activists to call attention to this conflict. 
48. “Aktion gegen die Import- Firma Hameico Frankfurt,” June 1979, in Früchte des Zorns, ed. 
ID- Archiv im IISG, 1:133.
49. Rosen, Mapping the Organizational Sources, 30.
50. According to Graf, “Vom Ja zum Nein,” 155, the Israel boycott of the radical left started in 
the 1980s and reached a first climax in response to the Sabra and Shatila massacre followed by a 
second climax in support of the First Intifada in 1987. While these dates are not implausible, Graf 
does not support them with any empirical evidence. According to the evidence analysed here, there 
is no clear connection between boycott and the massacre during the Lebanese civil war. Before 
1987, calls for boycotts remained marginal. See poster “Gegen Zionismus und Rassismus: Boykot-
tiert Israel! Unterstützt die Intifada!” (1987), http://uke.nadir.org/nadir/plakat/cd/film230/230_10.
jpg (accessed 31 January 2012).
51. Sigmund and Stroux, Zu bunt, 27– 31; Lehne, Konflikt um die Hafenstraße.
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The boycott explicitly sought to bridge distance: “We wanted it to relate to 
here, something one could do here.”52 In addition to the Manichaean world-
view betrayed by the sweeping condemnation of Israel, the fact that 
kibbutzim— collective communities rooted in utopian and socialist ideals— 
were targeted was especially curious. In the spring of 1988, this problematic 
message triggered grim controversies within and beyond the radical left about 
the extent to which it was antisemitic.53 A discussion meeting at Hafenstraße 
sought to establish the right to criticise the state of Israel without immediately 
being accused of antisemitism. A key speaker was Israeli civil rights activist 
and Fatah member Uri Davis, who had written a book arguing that Israel’s 
policies towards Palestinians were comparable to South Africa’s apartheid 
policies. Davis was also member of Return, a political group that also em-
braced boycott slogans.54
Despite receiving immediate criticism, German activists unleashed a full- 
fledged campaign against Israeli goods in Hamburg and elsewhere. Orange 
crates were knocked over in supermarkets; at an open- air market, blood and red 
paint were poured over Israeli goods, actions understandably perceived as taste-
less in light of the Nazis’ boycott campaigns.55 The Hamburg Antiimps, who 
uneasily noticed applause for their action coming from the far right, displayed a 
rather simplistic historical understanding of National Socialism, and their 
clumsy quotation marks implicitly questioned the state of Israel’s right to exist, 
thus venturing into discursive territory with antisemitic connotations. However, 
one important difference between the Antiimps and Nazi storm troopers lies in 
the fact that the left- wing anti- Zionists symbolically attacked goods of Israeli 
origin from a position of relative weakness and motivated by ideas of interna-
tional solidarity, but they did not physically attack Jewish vendors by means of 
state- sponsored or paramilitary violence and backed by a pervasive eliminatory 
ideology. The same held true for the RZ’s April 1988 bomb attack on the admin-
istrative hub of the Hamburg transport and fruit import company Olff & Sohn. 
Ten years after the attack on Agrexco, the RZ combined boycott rhetoric di-
rected against South Africa with that directed against Israel, branding Hamburg 
fruit merchants the accomplices of these regimes.56
52. Sigmund and Stroux, Zu bunt, 27.
53. Reemtsma, “Andere Wand.”
54. Sigmund and Stroux, Zu bunt, 28– 29; Davis, Israel.
55. Materialien zur Kampagne; “‘Das Gut- Böse- Raster’: Zur Auseinandersetzung um das 
Wandbild in der Hamburger Hafenstraße,” calcül 6 (1999), http://www.conne- island.de/nf/72/24.
html#t01 (accessed 11 April 2011).
56. “Aktion gegen die Transportfirma Olff & Sohn, Hamburg,” April 1988, in Früchte des 
Zorns, ed. ID- Archiv im IISG, 2:537– 38.
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The Hamburg government had the mural painted over and threatened to 
evict the squatters should they resist. Activists only attached banners to the 
scaffolding, which opened another avenue of legitimisation in defence of the 
original message. Large letters painted on bedsheets quoted from United Na-
tions General Assembly Resolution 3379, adopted by a majority of Arab, Third 
World, and Eastern bloc countries on 10 November 1975, which determined 
that “Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination” and thus put Israel 
on a par with the apartheid states of South Africa and Rhodesia.57 The image of 
the Hafenstraße mural continued appearing on anti- Zionist posters and flyers. 
Other smaller murals with a similar message were also quickly painted over: a 
mural in St. Pauli’s Paul- Roosen- Straße showed an open mouth about to bite 
into a piece of “Jaffa” fruit, which mirrored a soldier with a machine gun stand-
ing in front of a doorway from which flowed blood.58 A copy of the Hafen-
straße image was also painted on the walls of Göttingen’s autonomist centre, 
Juzi. The boycott campaign triggered by the Hafenstraße mural undoubtedly 
was a prominent part in German autonomist groups’ political repertoire, but a 
perusal of their journals and posters shows that more conventional protests 
against aspects of Israeli foreign policy— for example, the 1982 Lebanon 
War— were far more frequent.
Boycotts of Multinational Companies
Despite the prominence of the South African and, to a lesser extent, the Israeli 
case, the protest focus on multinational companies proved to be the more sig-
nificant long- term effect in the politicisation of consumption. A pioneering 
case was the struggle against the questionable marketing of milk powder in less 
developed countries by the Swiss company Nestlé— one of the world’s largest 
food and nutrition corporations. A booklet called The Baby Killer published by 
the British aid organisation War on Want in 1974 and a slightly changed Ger-
man translation opened an international campaign that sought to address the 
harmful consequences of breast milk substitutes under conditions of poverty.59 
The campaign initially targeted several baby food companies, but increasingly 
57. Sigmund and Stroux, Zu bunt, 29– 31; United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3379, 
http://daccess- dds- ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/000/92/IMG/NR000092.
pdf?OpenElement (accessed 23 May 2011).
58. Sigmund and Stroux, Zu bunt, 31.
59. Muller, Baby Killer; Duve, Exportinteressen gegen Muttermilch. See Sethi, “Multinational 
Corporations”; Kalt, Tiersmondismus, 400– 489.
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focused on Nestlé since the Third World Action Group from Bern, which had 
undertaken the German translation, had chosen “Nestlé tötet Babies [Nestlé 
kills babies]” for a title, which provoked the incriminated company to sue for 
libel. An internationally highly publicised two- year trial ended with the court 
deciding in favour of Nestlé because they could not be held responsible for 
infant deaths in terms of criminal law. However, the outcome was widely seen 
as a moral victory for the defendants not only because of the rather mild fine, 
but due to the fact that they had succeeded in bringing across their moral and 
political arguments, which eventually triggered a long- lasting international 
boycott campaign.
These arguments were harking back to critiques of regimes of provision 
that the protest movements had pioneered since the late 1960s. Under the head-
ing “Opium for babies,” the newspaper of the Offenbach Sozialistisches Büro 
assembled quotes from the trial: Nestlé’s chairman, who called his company 
the “most multinational of all multinational companies,” was likened to a her-
oin dealer who gave away the first shot for free calculating on the addiction 
that would set in. In the opinion of the Basler Nationalzeitung, Nestlé’s denial 
of any responsibility for the effects of feeding bottles was not unlike an arson-
ist blaming the matches.60 The journalist and SPD politician Freimut Duve 
highlighted a new group of victims and a “final and decisive step in the coloni-
sation of consciousness” via advertisement: “a European export giant tries to 
market what has hitherto been closed off from the market: the giving relation-
ship between mother and baby.”61
The argument that the marketing of artificial substitutes for natural prod-
ucts created disastrous dependencies in less developed countries also featured 
in the early phase of protest against genetic engineering. In November 1984, a 
butyric acid attack against the office of two architects involved in the building 
of a research laboratory for the pharmaceutical company Schering in conjunc-
tion with Freie Universität Berlin was justified by pointing out that sterile 
wheat that did not produce seeds would help create monopolies putting Third 
World consumers at the mercy of American and European companies. In the 
eyes of the protesters this was a conscious strategy to put companies in a posi-
tion “to decide on the existence or starvation of entire populations.”62
In 1981, several groups advocating solidarity with El Salvador, Guate-
mala, and Nicaragua inaugurated a nation- wide boycott campaign against cof-
60. “Opium für Babies,” links 81 (October 1976).
61. Duve, Exportinteressen gegen Muttermilch, 7.
62. “Gentechnologie Buttersäureanschlag auf das Architektenbüro Kiemle & Keidt, das das 
neue Genforschungsinstitut von FU und Schering baut,” Anagan 5 (1985): 21.
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fee companies. A flyer pointed out that while Germans enjoyed coffee as a 
matter of course, those who cultivated it could not even afford the drink: “Each 
attempt of the agricultural labourers to fight social injustice gets violently sup-
pressed. [. . .] We, as consumers, are implicated in this system.”63 An autono-
mist group looted— or “dispossessed” as the activists put it— a Göttingen 
branch of the coffee roaster Eduscho: “This coffee is on its way back to El 
Salvador where it was stolen from its owners— the workers and Indios— for the 
price of poverty.” A commentary in the autonomist paper radikal praised the 
act for combining the liberation struggle of the Salvadorian guerrilla with re-
sistance in Germany.64 It was the ability to connect seemingly far removed 
conflicts that made boycotts of multinational companies an attractive resource 
of mobilisation.
Feminist Solidarity
Rote Zora, a branch of the Revolutionäre Zellen embracing a more independent 
platform in the 1980s, stressed the feminist dimension of the fight against ex-
ploitation and violence in the global economy. Rote Zora formulated its cri-
tique of the interplay of regimes of provision and regimes of violence in a June 
1984 interview for the feminist journal Emma: “When traffickers buy our sis-
ters in the 3rd World and then sell them to German petit bourgeois, that’s legal. 
When women have to do the most monotonous work for subsistence level and 
thereby ruin their health, that’s legal. These are relations of violence that we 
are no longer prepared to accept. .  .  . Denouncing them will not . .  . abolish 
them. . . . This is why we sabotage, boycott, damage, avenge the violence and 
humiliation.” While fighting the “exploitation of women as commodities,” the 
militant women of Rote Zora described themselves as shopping in “disgusting 
supermarkets” and living in “ugly buildings” while they “liked to go for a walk 
or to the cinema, theatre or disco and enjoyed parties and the cultivation of 
idleness.”65
Putting their focus on labour disputes, a classic topic of the Old Left, and 
thus reviving radical traditions on a global scale, Rote Zora committed a fire-
63. Mittelamerika- Komitees in der BRD u. West Berlin, “Boykottiert die Kaffeekonzerne,” 
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64. “Göttingen: Eduscho enteignet,” radikal 103 (April 1982): 27.
65. “Interview mit der Roten Zora,” June 1984, in Früchte des Zorns, ed. ID- Archiv im IISG, 
2:598– 605.
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bomb attack against the Berlin branch office of the textile manufacturer Adler 
on 11 September 1986, triggering a sea change in a labour dispute some eight 
thousand kilometres to the east. The management of the Adler subcontractor 
Flair- Fashion agreed to respond to some of the demands made by striking fe-
male textile workers at its plant in a South Korean free- trade zone. The indus-
trial action initially had been put down violently. Complaints focused on over-
long hours of work, low pay, the prevention of free unions and thus of protest 
and strike, and sexual harassment. Rote Zora’s militant attempt to radicalise a 
solidarity campaign for Third World low- wage workers immediately encoun-
tered criticism: a Berlin- based Korean women’s group and the human rights 
organisation Terre des Femmes feared the consequences of resorting to violent 
means.66 In June and August 1987, Rote Zora struck again: incendiary devices 
devastated ten Adler branch offices throughout West Germany. The statement 
of responsibility mocked Adler’s slogan, “Life with quality,” by asking whose 
quality of life was meant and arrived at a two- pronged critique: “The brittle 
peace between the classes in the metropole is only upheld via cheap consumer 
products. . . . Our privileges, of which consumption is one, are based on the 
exploitation, utilisation, and extermination of people on three continents. Con-
sumption is foisted on us as a replacement for real life.” Adler’s cheap textiles 
were depicted as a shrewd strategy for giving even German welfare recipients 
the feeling of buying colourful and fashionable clothes, of having a place in 
consumer society, while in reality they destroyed subsistence economies in 
countries like Korea, leaving young women with a choice between prostitution— 
Rote Zora noted the forty thousand U.S. servicemen stationed in South Korea— 
and the starvation wages of world- market factories. This charge was woven 
into more general observations concerning capitalism’s commodification of all 
aspects of human life.67
On International Women’s Day 1983, Rote Zora attacked the car of a so- 
called marriage broker and the Philippine consulate in Bonn to make traffick-
ing in women publicly visible. A statement traced the “sex boom” back to the 
U.S. military presence in Southeast Asia, where military bases attracted sex 
workers whose living conditions had been decimated by war. This was eventu-
66. Hoor, “Dritte Welt kleidet uns ein,” 98– 99; Koczy, Stolle, and Pak, Made in Korea. On fe-
male workers in Korea more generally, see Hagan Koo, “From Farm to Factory: Proletarianization 
in Korea,” American Sociological Review 55.5 (1990): 669– 81; Kyung Ae Park, “Women and 
Development: The Case of South Korea,” Comparative Politics 25.2 (1993): 127– 45; Seung- 
Kyung Kim, “‘Big Companies Don’t Hire Us, Married Women’: Exploitation and Empowerment 
among Women Workers in South Korea,” Feminist Studies 22.3 (1996): 555– 71.
67. “Anschlag gegen Adler,” June 1987, in Früchte des Zorns, ed. ID- Archiv im IISG, 2:628– 
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ally transformed into the global business of sex tourism and trafficking in 
Asian women. But the root of the problem ultimately lay in impoverishment 
and indebtedness caused by imperialism. The militant German women de-
clared their solidarity with the Philippine Far Left and accused agro- 
multinationals like Del Monte and Dole of relying on rapes and murders com-
mitted by paramilitary units that cleared tropical forests and delivered the 
survivors to the world market. Rote Zora assumed that more than two hundred 
West German enterprises were taking part in trafficking, advertising, and sell-
ing Asian women like merchandise. Hotels, airlines, and travel agents profited 
from the women’s economic distress. Rote Zora accused the Marcos regime in 
the Philippines of “selling out the country and people to make money out of 
it.”68 A similar attack against an airport shuttle bus operated by a trafficker in 
Münster followed in August 1983. The statement again focused on the degrad-
ing commodification of women, which was tolerated within the confines of 
German society’s relations of violence. Rote Zora contended that the enterprise 
that had been attacked even featured beds so that customers could “try out” the 
women. The radical feminists did not trust the declarations of German and 
Philippine authorities that illegal traffickers would face criminal prosecution 
since both governments contributed to what Rote Zora saw as the root causes 
of the problem.69
The IMF and World Bank
The feminist plank was an important element in the broader criticism of the 
global economic order and the structure of global markets, which, by the late 
1980s, had been condensed in a shared framing of diverse global problems 
among multifarious protest groups that social scientists have labelled the global 
justice movement.70 Protest against economic summit meetings was crucial to 
this process. The first important countersummit confronted the World Eco-
nomic Summit at Bonn in May 1985. Approximately twenty- five thousand 
demonstrators, including members of various autonomist groups, sought to 
challenge those deemed responsible for “starvation, exploitation, and 
imperialism.”71 The emerging political focus on the global economy became 
68. “Aktion gegen den Frauenhändler Kirschner, Köln und das Philippinische Konsulat, Bonn,” 
March 1983, in ibid., 608– 10.
69. “Aktion gegen den Frauenhändler Günter Menger, Münster,” August 1983, in ibid., 610– 11.
70. Rucht, Teune, and Yang, “Global Justice Movement,” 161.
71. Protest manifesto, May 1985, quoted in ibid. See also Holzapfel and König, “Chronik,” 25.
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more powerfully manifest when representatives of the World Bank and of the 
IMF met in West Berlin in September 1988. Critics of these institutions— some 
150 ideologically diverse groups including environmental, autonomist, and 
Third World activists— organised a wealth of counterevents in West Berlin and 
other German cities, including a demonstration that drew eighty thousand peo-
ple. During the protests, a significant number of attacks took place against 
shops and branch offices of international businesses, among them further at-
tacks against Adler retailers that denounced the exploitation of female workers 
in South Korea.72 This time, an entire demonstration against low- cost produc-
tion focused on an Adler outlet in a shopping arcade on the Kurfürstendamm.73 
The autonomist women’s movement attacked pornographic movie theatres and 
travel agents that facilitated sex tourism. These forms of protest receive at most 
brief mention in the scarce literature on this remarkable anticipation of later 
patterns of globalisation protest.74 The ensuing debates featured rhetorical 
strategies that amplified the violence and moral infringement of the opposing 
side, coupled with arguments that justified and neutralised one’s own use of 
force. This reciprocal constellation between activists and security forces— 
operating with associations and comparisons on a global scale— was partly 
responsible for escalating developments.
The Third World debt crisis, which originated in the 1970s and erupted in 
1982, gave the IMF and World Bank enormous power, enabling them to im-
pose controversial free- market conditions on their loans to poor countries and 
on repayments. So- called structural- adjustment loans were meant to address 
developing countries’ lack of control over their budgets when printing money 
for government spending. The World Bank optimistically declared that such 
adjustments would take no longer than five years. The idea was that liberalised 
prices would attract private investments, which, in turn, would trigger growth 
and thus combat poverty.75 Conditions for these short- term adjustments in-
72. “Diesen Kampf werden wir gewinnen. Koreanische Arbeiterinnen: erfolgreiche Kämpfe 
unter härtesten Bedingungen,” Zahltag: Tägliche Massenzeitung gegen IWF und Weltbank 2 (26 
September 1988): 2, WZB- IWF. This is a collection of source materials on the West Berlin meeting 
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volved reducing consumption, especially public consumption. IMF- induced 
currency devaluation led to the “dollarization” of domestic prices, which then 
triggered abrupt price hikes in basic commodities, including food, durables, 
and fuel. More direct repayment conditions curtailed governmental subsidies 
for basic foodstuffs and other vital goods. This tightening of the belt was sup-
posed to ensure debt repayment. On the ground, however, these measures usu-
ally led to price increases for health care, education, public transport, and other 
public goods and consequently to sharp declines in most people’s use of these 
services. At the same time, the IMF failed to insist on higher taxes for those 
segments of the population that were in a position to tighten the belt. Moreover, 
the IMF favoured exports because consumer demand in rich countries prom-
ised higher revenues, but this approach stifled demand in less developed coun-
tries. Pockets of high- income consumption encompassed small segments of 
society, while the brunt of the IMF measures was borne by the weakest, who 
were least responsible for the debt crisis. Crime rates grew, and raids on super-
markets increased, often resulting in “austerity riots” or “IMF riots.” Protest 
waves occurred in at least thirty- nine of the roughly eighty debtor countries 
between 1976 and 1992.76 Walton and Seddon point out that acute starvation 
was less of a factor in causing these riots than was awareness of the interna-
tional origins of austerity and indignation about the elimination of “paternalis-
tic consumer protections,” which beneficiaries viewed and defended as their 
legitimate rights.77
That severe structural problems existed in the global financial system of 
the 1970s and 1980s has been acknowledged by a number of experts, both at 
the time and subsequently. Even UNICEF and the WTO accused the IMF of 
massive abuses of social human rights.78 Critics pointed out that the financial 
system amounted to a large- scale “transfer of economic resources” from debtor 
to creditor countries.79 In the eyes of their critics, IMF bureaucrats illegiti-
mately presumed to determine food prices, bus fares, and school fees in far-
away countries. The consequences of repayment conditions became the focal 
point of a far- reaching critique that sought to point out violations of human 
rights and thus give the lie to the benign intentions to which the leaders of the 
richest countries solemnly confessed at their meetings.
76. Gailus, Contentious Food Politics, 53.
77. Walton and Seddon, Free Markets and Food Riots, 50– 52.
78. See Körner et al., Im Teufelskreis der Verschuldung; Schubert, Internationale Verschuldung; 
Nuscheler, Lern- und Arbeitsbuch Entwicklungspolitik, 367– 70; Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization 
and Its Discontents (New York, 2002).
79. Chossudovsky, Globalisation of Poverty, 78.
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At the second G7 summit meeting, held in Puerto Rico in June 1976, lead-
ers declared that they sought “sustained economic expansion and the resultant 
increase in individual wellbeing” with the “long- term goal of a maximum ex-
pansion of trade.” The question was whose wellbeing they had in mind. At least 
rhetorically, the free- trade message applied to all countries, as any shrinkage of 
world trade was deemed to hurt all countries.80 This mind- set, together with the 
relative strength of the developing countries after the oil crisis, led the IMF and 
World Bank to hand out generous loans to southern countries during the 1970s, 
involving them in the global financial economy to an unprecedented extent.
Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s speech at the opening of the West Berlin IMF 
and World Bank meeting in 1988 touched only very indirectly on critiques or 
protest, citing only the risk of the destruction of nature: “It would certainly be 
a Pyrrhic victory if an increase in prosperity was only to be achieved at the cost 
of destroying nature.” The chancellor then paid lip service to a goal that alleg-
edly united all delegates: “to make living conditions possible all over the world 
that can actually be called humane.”81 He said nothing about living conditions 
during the process that was supposed to enable prosperity for all. Mauricio 
Rosencof, a member of the Uruguayan Tupamaros, accused the Western indus-
trial nations of turning “Latin America into a factory for bananas, coffee, and 
beef, killing more people than smallpox.”82 However, criticism was not limited 
to radical forces. Hans Matthöfer (SPD), the German federal minister of fi-
nance between 1978 and 1982, warned that “capital flight, corruption, and con-
sumption of imported luxuries by the upper classes constituted a Bermuda tri-
angle that would drain any capital injection however large.”83
Autonomists against Global Governance
German autonomist groups started their explicit analysis of IMF policies in 
1985, when West Berlin was first mentioned as a candidate to host the 1988 
meeting. A brochure subtitled “There is method to this destruction” provided 
80. “Joint Declaration of the International Conference, San Juan, Puerto Rico, June 28, 1976,” 
http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/1976sanjuan/communique.html (accessed 16 August 2011).
81. Helmut Kohl, “Jahresversammlung des IWF und der Weltbank in Berlin, Eröffnungsrede” 
(27 September 1988), Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamts der Bundesregierung 119 (29 
September 1988): 1091– 92.
82. “Castro schickte Grußadresse,” Volksblatt, 24 September 1988, 10.
83. Martina Ohm, “Mammutmesse der Finanzen: Zur Tagung des Internationalen Währungs-
fonds und der Weltbank in Berlin,” Der Tagesspiegel, 4 September 1988, Sunday supp. Weltspie-
gel, 1.
256    Consumption and Violence
an interpretation of the mechanisms behind the debt crisis, highlighting the fact 
that military purchases and imports of luxury goods for the rich were usually 
exempt from IMF savings measures. National elites and the maintenance of 
their power enjoyed priority.84 The authors could have carried this point even 
further by pointing out that IMF loans were frequently used to purchase arms 
that were then employed against protesters and the domestic opposition.85 At 
the lower end of the social spectrum, price increases entailed a drastic decline 
in standards of living, to the point of starvation, the spread of diseases, and 
high infant mortality. The mandated wage freezes and currency devaluation as 
well as the preferential treatment accorded to export industries further widened 
social inequalities. These measures frequently encountered resistance and 
were forced through by authoritarian local elites leaning on police and military. 
The authors listed a series of “IMF revolts”: Peru, Egypt (1977); Sudan, Libe-
ria (1979); Bolivia, Turkey (1980); Morocco (1981); Ecuador, Sudan, Bolivia 
(1982); Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador (1983); Tunisia, Morocco, Brazil, Domini-
can Republic, Jamaica, Peru (1984); Bolivia, Sudan, Dominican Republic, Ec-
uador (1985).86 A detailed report described the events in Brazil in 1983, where 
the looting of hundreds of supermarkets and the building of barricades against 
the police were interpreted as resistance to the IMF and its henchmen in the 
Brazilian elite.87 The analysis given is informative and sober- minded, though it 
does not disguise the authors’ political views. The victims of the IMF are mea-
sured in the thousands. This differed starkly from the concluding remarks of 
the brochure, whose authors believed that “hunger crises are strategically and 
soberly contrived by office- chair killers [Schreibtischtäter]; hundreds of thou-
sands of victims are calculated at the conference table.”88
The diffuse notion of the global financial system’s responsibility for un-
fathomable depths of suffering was carried into the actual protest campaign. 
The call for an “International Counter- Congress,” signed by a wide range of 
opposition groups including the Green Party, compared the calamity of the in-
ternational debt crisis with the historical event that epitomised human loss and 
84. “IWF und Widerstand,” in Der Internationale Währungsfond oder Die Vernichtung hat 
Methode (1985), 18– 19, IISG, ID, Bro 603/11 fol.
85. “IWF und Weltbank Angeklagte vor dem Basso- Tribunal: Urteilsspruch als Aufforderung 
zum Neubeginn,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 30 September 1988, 14.
86. “IWF und Widerstand,” in Der Internationale Währungsfond oder Die Vernichtung hat 
Methode (1985), 18– 19, IISG, ID, Bro 603/11 fol; Ahlrich Meyer, “Massenarmut und Existenz-
recht,” Autonomie: Neue Folge 14 (1985): 16– 17.
87. “Brasilien— Bambule gegen Hunger und Verschuldung,” Autonomie: Neue Folge 14 (1985): 
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suffering of the highest magnitude: “Each year the silent dying in the ‘Third 
World’ claims as many victims as the Second World War.”89 However, no sta-
tistics were cited to back up this claim.
A year and a half before the congress, a pamphlet by an autonomist group 
interpreted the capitalist penetration of preindustrial regions as an act of de-
struction and extermination comparable to National Socialism: “Millions 
are  .  .  . driven into starvation. This is no different from genocide.”90 Another 
pamphlet of the West Berlin Autonomen pointed out that global capital had dis-
engaged from the legal constraints of the nation- state. The 15.5 million tons of 
soya that Brazil exported might eliminate malnutrition in that country if it were 
not exported to rich nations to be processed into animal feed. At the same time, 
the Autonomen likened the American- dominated institutions of global gover-
nance to Nazi plans for a New Order of Europe. The Bretton Woods Agreement, 
which had established the IMF and World Bank, sought to outdo the Nazis’ 
plans for an economic empire that would have guaranteed the German people 
“maximum consumption of goods” by exterminating all “unprofitable eaters.” 
Lines of continuity were insinuated via leading German businessmen who had 
played key roles in the economic design of both Nazism and postwar recon-
struction (for example, Hermann Josef Abs and Friedrich Flick) and via Ameri-
can companies such as IBM, ITT, and General Motors that were involved in the 
technological equipment of the German war machinery. This amalgamation of 
valid observations, half- truths, and airy conclusions by analogy with Nazi Ger-
many produced a rallying cry: “The enforced starvation and the worldwide 
genocide in the regions stricken by famine is the intentional result of an econ-
omy of destruction! When it is expected that the people’s misery is threatening 
to erupt in rebellion, arms, police equipment and counterinsurgency specialists 
will be sent into the country! This is yet another source of profit for arms pro-
ducers in the U.S. and their Israeli and West German cronies.”91
Against this backdrop, activists accused the IMF and World Bank of sys-
tematically “organising the poverty” of developing countries. The title page of 
89. “Für die Überwindung der Schuldenkrise: Für eine gerechte Weltwirtschaftsordnung,” 
Dritte Welt 7 (1988): 45.
90. Autonome Gruppen Westberlin, “Verhindern wir den Kongreß,” Unzertrennlich 4 (4 March 
1987), http://autox.nadir.org/archiv/iwf/aufruf.html (accessed 15 August 2011). See also Schwarz-
meier, Die Autonomen, 134– 42.
91. Autonome aus Rest- Berlin, IWF und Weltbank— Was ist das?, February 1988, 8, IISG, ID, 
Bro 602/5 fol. For a more detailed argument assuming lines of continuity between the Neue Ord-
nung and Bretton Woods, see Detlef Hartmann, “Völkermord gegen soziale Revolution: Das US- 
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a brochure for the protest campaign showed a clenched fist breaking off a profit 
curve.92 Another title page showed the skyline of New York with the Empire 
State Building and Chrysler Building— not the World Trade Centre— engulfed 
by giant waterfalls.93 Activists highlighted the dimension of legitimisation as 
central for their endeavour, which identified the customers of banks as a large 
target group: “Banks are particularly reliant on customer trust, and they con-
duct elaborate advertisement and legitimisation campaigns. We can challenge 
them on this level.” The role model was the anti- apartheid campaign.94 Al-
though autonomist groups and more moderate parts of the opposition disputed 
the expediency of certain forms of protest, especially violence, a certain con-
sensus ensured a good deal of cooperation in the planning of protest activities 
that were, by and large, perceived as coming from a more or less united front 
of IMF/World Bank opponents.95
The protests explicitly sought to have a “broad democratic public” with-
draw its support from the IMF and World Bank. Contrasting regimes of provi-
sion were part and parcel of the imagery the protesters invoked: “Protest must 
reveal the misery that is hiding behind the balance sheets and statistics: . . . pov-
erty in the ‘Third World,’ increasing unemployment and new poverty in the 
industrial countries are the basis for their overloaded tables at the gala 
dinners.”96 An example sought to make the consequences of repayment ar-
rangements tangible in terms of household statistics: an average Peruvian 
working- class family would consume 225 bread rolls per month, down from 
448, and 4.1 kilograms of pasta instead of 6.8, a decrease of 690 kcal and 30 g 
of protein per person per day.97 Addressing imbalances in global distribution, 
the journal of the Alternative Liste, West Berlin’s Green Party, which had en-
tered parliament in 1981 and held 10.6 percent of the seats at the time of the 
IMF meeting, employed images of prostitution to note the presence of Asian 
sex workers in the streets and nightclubs of West Berlin: “Who are the gentle-
men who will fill the brothels and other entertainment venues in late Septem-
92. IWF/Weltbank- Kampagne, Rundbrief 4, IISG, ID, ZK 48937.
93. IWF/Weltbank- Kampagne, Rundbrief 3, IISG, ID, ZK 48937.
94. AG Aktionswoche, “Diskussionsvorlage: Zur Begründung von Bankenaktionen,” 2 June 
1988, WZB- IWF.
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ber?” Some of them would be “parasitic elites” from debtor countries that ben-
efitted from IMF and World Bank loans.98 Economic analysis sought to address 
the violence inherent in the monetary system: “These two most powerful insti-
tutions . . . proved that money in the sense of capital profits could not only be 
the carrot but also the deadly stick; . . . they cannily organised the murderous 
effects of their policy, the poverty and the hunger, death and ecological de-
struction behind the debit and credit of the balance sheet and thus made them 
anonymous.”99 In this reading, the enormous security measures taken in West 
Berlin during the meeting testified to the need to suppress the realities and to 
stage an impression of popular consent.100
The ecological dimension of global trade patterns, especially the destruc-
tion of tropical rain forests, played a prominent role in the criticism that politi-
cians from the Green Party and representatives of other ecological initiatives 
lodged against the IMF and German consumers. The latter’s demand for ham-
burgers, instant beef stock, canned animal food, pineapple, cocoa, bananas, 
rubber, furniture, and paper were driving the destruction of this ecosystem. 
Fast- food chains appeared to be responsible for overexploitation. The IMF’s 
debt policy reinforced southern governments’ commercial destruction of rain 
forests from access roads to large- scale dam projects. Taken together, these 
practices threatened not only biodiversity but also the livelihood of populations 
increasingly robbed of traditional sources of income, as local economies be-
came increasingly dependent on export cash crops to generate profits that went 
largely to companies in highly industrialised countries.101 With a dose of ideal-
ism, the traditional lifestyles of indigenous populations appeared to be superior 
regimes of provision that if undisturbed were capable of upholding a sustain-
able symbiosis between humans and rain forests. Economic development fa-
voured large landowners, wood export companies, and gold miners, preventing 
indigenous tribes from cultivating what they wanted to consume and forcing 
them to grow what the populations of industrialised countries wanted to con-
sume. In 1987– 88 the Penan and Punan people of the Malaysian state of Sar-
awak in northern Borneo fought the wood companies with sit- in blockades of 
access roads. Greenpeace distributed their appeal to consumers in industrial 
countries: “Stop buying tropical woods from our forest and from the lands of 
other forest peoples.”102 Protesters called on consumers to exert political pres-
 98. “Sie kommen!,” Stachel 82 (September 1988): 1, WZB- IWF.
 99. Büro für ungewöhnliche Maßuahmen, Wut, Witz, Widerstand, 5.
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sure on the German government, which supported the IMF/World Bank debt 
policy, to boycott international companies implicated in this business and to 
abstain from products that originated from commodity chains based on the 
problematic felling and farming.103 Ecologists criticised the old Socialist Left 
for clinging to the historical workers’ movement, which “seems easier than 
changing one’s own habits of consumption.”104
The RAF against Global Governance
A week before the opening of the West Berlin meeting, the third generation of 
the RAF attempted an  attack on the permanent secretary of the Ministry of 
Finance, Hans Tietmeyer, who was responsible for international monetary pol-
icy and the organisation of economic summits. The machine gun jammed, and 
the car carrying the future president of the Deutsche Bundesbank was hit only 
by a few cartridge cases.
The RAF had first mentioned the IMF and World Bank in their lengthy 
statement at the January 1976 Stammheim trial. Well before the actual debt 
crisis, the first generation of the RAF invoked “the resistance of the . . . third 
world against being plundered by world bank loans.” They regarded the institu-
tions of global governance as tools in an American- ruled global economic sys-
tem whose dictates the developing countries could not evade.105 In 1984, a 
hunger strike statement by RAF inmates advanced a rather compact analysis of 
the debt crisis, arguing that societies of developing countries were being organ-
ised “between barracks, the IMF, and ultimately the use of hunger as a weapon 
against millions of people so that they won’t pose a threat to plans for world 
domination.”106 The French revolutionary guerrilla group Action Directe (AD), 
allied with the RAF in 1985, targeted the World Bank’s European headquarters 
and IMF offices in Paris in June 1982 and again in April 1985. AD also bombed 
companies with commercial links to South Africa and the Citrus Marketing 
103. Unmüßig, “Traurige Tropen,” 50– 53.
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Board of Israel.107 The RAF’s French comrades sought a theoretical grasp of 
the dimensions of consumption in contemporary imperialism, assuming a 
“system of determinants centred on technological power and the deculturation 
of the dominated through a Westernized model of production and consump-
tion.  .  .  . when Western cultural norms have succeeded in crushing all resis-
tance, the popular classes will accede to it while sacrificing their entire lives to 
the dream: the residents of Latin American shantytowns often possess a TV 
and a pickup . . . ; at the same time, their children die of hunger and adolescents 
turn to prostitution.”108
The RAF’s statement on the assassination attempt on Tietmeyer accused 
him of being “responsible for genocide and widespread poverty in the 3rd 
world.” As an organiser of IMF and economic summit meetings, he was held 
responsible for an “imperialist policy of destruction via hunger and counterin-
surgency” for the sake of profit and power. This policy meant death and misery 
for the majority of the people living in southern countries. The statement of-
fered little analysis but tried- and- tested enemy images. In an attempt to bridge 
the old gap between metropole and Third World, the RAF was ready to lump 
together everything from the economic crisis in Ireland to genocide in the de-
veloping world as destroying “the livelihood of millions of people.”109 Ulti-
mately, the activists sought to blame Tietmeyer and other leaders for all of the 
world’s economic misery. Remarkably, the statement made no reference to the 
impending West Berlin meeting.
The RZ against Global Governance
The Revolutionäre Zellen focused more extensively than the RAF on the IMF 
and the rich countries’ role in the global economy. Well before their militant 
attacks against fruit imports from South Africa and Israel, the RZ identified the 
IMF and World Bank as key enemies: “The centralisation of political and eco-
nomic power doesn’t happen at a European Council or a European Parlia-
ment . . . but within the framework of new transnational sovereignties . . . like 
107. Dartnell, Ultra- Left Terrorism, 80, 83, 117, 150, 153, 159.
108. Action Directe International, “Pour un projet communiste,” March 1982, quoted in ibid., 
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the International Monetary Fund . . . or the Trilateral Commission.”110 Like the 
RAF, the Revolutionary Cells identified Konsum— that is, Western afflu-
ence— as something to be overcome by entering a revolutionary struggle.111 
Like the RAF, the revolutionary cells had their own interpretation of the history 
of West German consumer society, though it was less theory- loaded. They inter-
preted the high profit rates of the boom years of the 1950s and 1960s as the ori-
gin of a “societal consensus,” especially among skilled workers and employees. 
They considered the consumer needs of the middle classes oversatisfied, but 
more important, their critique focused on the economic sectors involving “gov-
ernmental consumption”— that is, the armaments and building industries.112
Ever since their emergence in the 1970s, the RZ focused on the economic 
crisis in an attempt to foster a revolutionary situation. According to their analy-
sis, young people, workers, employees, women, foreigners, and the proverbial 
“Auntie Emma,” the owner of an old- fashioned small corner shop, had to pay 
the bill for scheming capitalists.113 The RZ saw their 1974 incendiary attacks 
on various trade associations as attempts “to keep up the crisis, build up an al-
ternative, and transform the economic crisis into a political one.”114 This ap-
proach produced a critique of the RAF’s notion of a pervasive embourgeoise-
ment of the masses. Reminiscent of Ulrike Meinhof, the RZ argued in 
December 1976 that society had not succeeded in “bribing the masses,” as evi-
denced by the wave of militant acts in various contexts, including fare increase 
protests and squatting. In the spirit of solidarity, the RZ acknowledged that 
important impulses for this development originated with the RAF.115
In January 1978, a revolutionary cell diagnosed a shift in the economic 
policies among the member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co- 
Operation and Development, away from the consumer- oriented growth of the 
postwar period and towards securing the Western industrial countries’ domi-
nance. This went hand in hand with high unemployment, sinking real wages, 
and decreasing living standards: “Overproduction and underconsumption ap-
peared simultaneously.”116 Seeking to justify a June 1978 bomb attack on the 
U.S. Army’s Officers’ Mess at the Rhein- Main Airbase that injured seven peo-
110. “Revolutionärer Zorn 4,” January 1978, in Früchte des Zorns, ed. ID- Archiv im IISG, 
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ple, the RZ explained that the Carter administration had used new weapons of 
economic warfare: “The world market that no one can avoid, the credits of the 
International Monetary Fund that no one can repay. This way, dependencies 
are created that are much more effective and destructive than military 
subjugation.”117 The worldwide capitalisation of agriculture destroyed the re-
maining areas of subsistence economy, driving the rural proletariat to the cities 
and creating 250 million homeless people in the Third World. Drawing on 
Cheryl Payer’s critical book about the IMF, the RZ concluded that the IMF’s 
power even surpassed that of the United States.118
In the early 1980s, members of the RZ saw the IMF and international fi-
nance more generally as the actual superpower, dominated by the United States 
but with growing influence by West Germany and France.119 Ultimately, this 
economic analogue to NATO dwarfed and controlled not only national parlia-
ments but also the eastern Cold War camp, thus fatally undermining any claims 
for a communist alternative: “Today the board of directors of Deutsche Bank 
or IMF takes part in deciding whether or not a five- year plan can be accom-
plished. The economic policy of the Comecon countries has degenerated from 
the balancing of shortages between planned and demand economy to mere 
competition for Western credits.”120 In the developing world, indigenous elites 
were complicit in this global conspiracy. The latter’s complaints about the IMF 
needed to be seen critically, since they intended to remove “themselves from 
the line of fire as they participate in and benefit from the ruination of their 
people.”121 The RZ blamed the International Development Association— the 
World Bank’s special branch for lending to the world’s poorest countries— for 
the 1973 famine in Ethiopia that killed one hundred thousand people and asked 
why the news that 450 million people were permanently starving did not trig-
ger the same kind of resistance as brought on by the Vietnam War. The RZ’s 
answer: a loss of tradition, partly as a result of a historiographical tendency that 
“posthumously turned the student movement into a movement of cultural revo-
lution,” neglecting its anti- imperialism. Long before such reasoning became a 
standard facet of critical consumer thinking, the RZ imagined a shirt that could 
speak, telling its wearer about its own “history”— the conditions that had gone 
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into its making, which normally remained obscure at the consumers’ end. Such 
conditions included the low wages of the Korean seamstresses who produced 
it and the discrepancy between the German retail price and the price that the 
multinational company paid to Indian farmers for the raw materials.122
The RZ sought to address the members of the West German population, 
including leftists, who profited from the worldwide imperialist power struc-
tures and the exploitation of the developing world. In a rare reference to Her-
bert Marcuse, they claimed that “social relations of bourgeois society . . . are 
so saturated with commodity relations as to rule out any compromise.”123 Con-
sumption and careers were temptations that chained people to the global debt 
nexus “based on wars of extermination, famines, and unspeakable poverty.” At 
the same time, the RZ explicitly rejected “the anticipated realm of freedom” 
desired by the guerrillas of the RAF. Instead, the RZ envisioned a “long way of 
subversion, of destruction, of a real break with society.”124 In March 1984, a 
revolutionary cell attacked what it saw as West German capital’s analogue to 
the IMF, the Deutsche Entwicklungsgesellschaft in Cologne, an arm of the 
federal government that financed private companies’ investments in develop-
ing economies.125
Hermann Feiling, one of the very few members of the revolutionary cells 
brought to trial, declared in court that the bloody persecution of the opposition 
in Latin American countries was intrinsically linked to “an economic policy 
that means economic genocide for large segments of the population, opening 
the door for the corporations. This policy is enforced by the World Monetary 
Fund [sic], which ties the crisis to political conditions that, for example, in 
Peru lead to 109 out of 1,000 children dying before they are able to walk.”126 
This observation had a rather delicate subtext since Feiling himself was unable 
to walk, having lost both his legs and his eyes during the accidental detonation 
of an explosive device he had intended to place at the Argentine consulate in 
Munich during the 1978 FIFA World Cup. Despite his severe injuries, the pros-
ecuting authorities subjected him— heavily doped with painkillers and without 
legal assistance— to a legally questionable interrogation, obtaining more than 
a thousand pages of information. His testimony provided authorities with their 
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first real insight into the Revolutionary Cells’ internal structures and enabled 
the sentencing of the RZ members who had been arrested in the aftermath of 
the attacks against cinemas showing the Entebbe film. This was the first time 
section 129a of the Criminal Code (Forming terrorist organisations), intro-
duced in August 1976, had effectively been applied. This legal construction 
allowed the authorities to hold the defendants responsible for other acts of the 
RZ well beyond the evidence that proved their individual involvement in the 
firebombing of cinemas.127
Members of the RZ were very careful to point out that their political anti- 
imperialism against U.S. targets should not be mistaken for cultural anti- 
Americanism, explaining that they attacked the Officers’ Mess rather than or-
dinary soldiers or supermarkets, undertaking “campaigns aimed at military 
fuel depots, but not petrol stations in American residential neighbourhoods. 
After all we had good reason to take Reagan’s visit to Europe and the NATO 
summit as occasions of a series of militant action, and not a concert by Sammy 
Davis jr or the continued screening of [the television show] Dallas. . . . It makes 
an enormous difference whether we understand MacDonald [sic] as a U.S. 
nutrition company that has pioneered intensive low- salary labour and world-
wide agro- business or as an expression of  .  .  . Yankee culture.” The RZ dis-
tanced themselves from the “demonisation of blue jeans or Negro music,” pre-
emptively answering the sort of charges of anti- Americanism that were 
regularly levelled against the left.128 Nevertheless, the RZ maintained in 1978 
that “U.S. imperialism” provided the backbone for the IMF’s ruinous policies 
towards developing countries, highlighting the point that Robert McNamara, 
the former U.S. secretary of defense, who had played a large role in escalating 
U.S. involvement in Vietnam before he became president of the World Bank in 
1968, served as a “guarantor of continuity in a strategy of destruction at all 
costs.”129 This revolutionary perspective did not acknowledge that McNamara 
had shifted the World Bank’s focus towards targeted poverty reduction.
A critical focus on McNamara as a representative of the World Bank had 
been established many years earlier. In June 1970, his participation at a confer-
127. See “Isolationshaft und 129a,” ID 161 (22 January 1977), BAK, BMJ, HG 4, B 141/62511, 
4030 E- 16/77, vol. 1; Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf, Urteil Albartus/Schwall, IV 2/77, 5 OJs 2/77 
(19 January 1979), BAK, BMJ, HG 4, B 141/62511, 4030 E- 16/77, vol. 2; “Voll unter Fittichen: 
Ein Mann ohne Beine und Augen als Angeklagter vor Gericht,” Der Spiegel 48 (24 November 
1980): 136– 37; die legalisierung der rechtlosigkeit (1977), Archiv für soziale Bewegungen, 
Freiburg, Bro 1701201.
128. “Beethoven gegen MacDonald,” April 1983, in Früchte des Zorns, ed. ID- Archiv im IISG, 
1:364– 67.
129. “Revolutionärer Zorn Nr. 4,” January 1978, in ibid., 233.
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ence on development aid at Heidelberg— alongside militant criticism of the 
large- scale hydroelectric generating station at Cahora Bassa in Portuguese 
Mozambique— provoked violent skirmishes between police and demonstra-
tors. Between six hundred and two thousand protesters faced off against five 
hundred police officers in a street battle pitting tear gas, water cannons, and 
batons against paint bombs, wooden slats, iron rods, and cobblestones leaving 
seventy- seven officers and fifty demonstrators injured. When the dust settled, a 
second battle broke out in the media, as each side used the vocabulary of “ter-
ror” and “civil war” in blaming the other for the conflict’s escalation. As a re-
sult of this violent demonstration, the Interior Ministry of Baden- Württemberg 
banned the Heidelberg unit of the Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund, 
which had outlasted the federal organisation, dissolved in March 1970. Contro-
versy arose about whether the fact that members of an organisation committed 
criminal offences implied that the entire organisation’s purpose was illegal. In 
drawn- out criminal proceedings five protesters were sentenced to between five 
and twelve months in prison.130 The RAF’s “Urban Guerrilla Concept” explic-
itly applauded the Heidelberg demonstration’s anticolonial focus.131
West Berlin, September 1988
The RAF’s attack on Tietmeyer triggered a further step in the mobilisation of 
the security forces before and during the September 1988 West Berlin IMF/
World Bank meeting, leading to what the spokesperson for the city’s police 
called its largest operation since the war, with more than ten thousand police-
men from throughout West Germany on duty. Although numerous skirmishes 
broke out between police and protesters, the large- scale riots and bomb attacks 
that press and police had envisioned did not materialise. Journalists had been 
quick to put protest into the context of terrorism. The liberal newspaper Der 
Tagesspiegel reported in May 1988 that radicals planned arson and bomb at-
tacks on hotels, public buildings, and banks.132 A spokesperson for the Federal 
Criminal Police Office declared that “terrorist circles” had “a strong interest in 
calling attention to the alleged exploitation of the Third World by the rich in-
130. “Studenten SDS- Verbot: Schlichter Schluß,” Der Spiegel 27 (29 June 1970): 73. See An-
ders, “Juristische ‘Gegenöffentlichkeit’ zwischen Standespolitik”; Schröder, “Heidelberg.”
131. “Das Konzept Stadtguerilla,” in Rote Armee Fraktion, ed. ID- Verlag, 41.
132. Der Tagesspiegel, 3 May 1988, quoted in “IWF- Nachlese: ‘Der größte Polizeieinsatz der 
Berliner Nachkriegsgeschichte,’” Bürgerrechte & Polizei 31.3 (1988): 86.
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dustrial nations.”133 Police searched several houses on the basis of section 129a 
StGB, which allowed the authorities to prosecute political activists who sup-
ported and advertised terrorist organisations even if they had committed no other 
offence. Another controversial legal framework (section 111 StPO) allowed po-
lice to erect so- called control points anywhere in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many and West Berlin, subjecting people to personal security checks and storing 
any personal data thus obtained. Officially, this measure was meant to support 
the search for members of the RAF. However, the exceptional arrangement lasted 
from 24 May until 2 October— when the IMF meeting was over. This particular 
measure was applicable only in conjunction with sections 129a or 89a StGB 
(preparation of a serious violent offence endangering the state)— that is, with the 
most severe political offences.134 During the protests, police initially arrested 624 
people, 501 of whom were taken into custody under police law. Of the 123 indi-
viduals whom the police then officially suspected of crimes, only 7 received a 
warrant of arrest from a criminal court.135 The high numbers of initial arrest were 
immediately publicised in the press leaving the impression that a lot of criminals 
had been caught. Much less publicity was given to the aftermath when it turned 
out that only a small fraction of those arrested had actually committed something 
that a criminal court thought worth pursuing further.
From the protesters’ perspective, the real violence took place elsewhere. 
Activists interpreted food riots and looting in developing countries as evidence 
of resistance to IMF policies. In an effort to create a “new internationalism,” 
the protesters’ campaign against the IMF, which in some respects mimicked 
these forms of protest, was intended to overcome the old divisions between 
revolutionary campaigns in the metropole and on the periphery, especially 
since capitalism’s methods increasingly circumvented such distinctions.136 The 
Autonomen emphasised individual liberation, not some abstract principle of 
international solidarity: “We are part of the exploitative relations here and are 
thus fighting here with the claim to our own liberation.”137 As a consequence, 
activists sought to attach their protest against this abstract nexus to tangible 
objects of everyday experience: “The murderous international monetary sys-
tem  .  .  . is manifesting itself everywhere— i.e., also everywhere in Berlin 
133. “Terror- Anschläge auf Berliner IWF- Treffen befürchtet,” Handelsblatt, 2 May 1988, 
WZB- IWF.
134. Lena Schraut, “IWF- Tagung: ‘Die größte Datenaktion der Polizei,’” Bürgerrechte & Po-
lizei 31.3 (1988): 99– 104; “Die total kontrollierte Stadt: Berlins Schlupflöcher werden IWF- mäßig 
abgeschottet,” taz, 22 September 1988, 8.
135. “IWF- Nachlese,” Cilip, Bürgerrechte, und Polizei 31.3 (1988): 96.
136. “Berliner Überblick,” Unzertrennlich 6 (September– October 1987): 16.
137. “Neuer/Alter Imperialismus,” Unzertrennlich 6 (September– October 1987): 16.
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(West)  . . .  and  . . .  Berlin is open around the clock. This means sufficient 
space and time to make this system visible, smellable, closable, blockable. For 
4 days, in all ends and corners, spanners into the works of capitalist everyday 
life.”138 An autonomist group planning protest activities deemed the slogan 
“Profit, misery, resistance” too abstract and quickly substituted “Attack impe-
rialism in everyday life.” This change allowed them to embrace six somewhat 
more concrete action points, of which four were clearly directed at commercial 
contexts. The first one invoked “collective appropriation— ‘let’s take what be-
longs to us anyway.’” Second, they wanted to disrupt the operations of “the 
system.” The remaining four points named tangible objects of protest: Sie-
mens, police and immigration authorities, department stores, and public trans-
port fare dodging.139
The next step in the autonomist protest strategy was to familiarise people 
with concrete addresses of multinational corporations by means of what they 
called “anti- imperialist city tours.” These four- hour coach trips were directed 
against “white- collar murderers” and went by a number of branch offices, 
among them Siemens and AEG. They pointed out the lesser- known production 
plants of Philip Morris and Jacobs Suchard and asked where the tobacco and 
coffee originated. The police subjected these tours to regular security checks, 
claiming that they helped in preparing criminal acts.140
Protest action against Siemens built an important bridge to the anti- 
nuclear- power movement. A perspective on issues of consumption played a 
crucial role. Siemens was seen to produce goods “that are of no use to us and 
threaten our livelihood” (that is, nuclear and military technology), while the 
company’s electronic articles of daily use were believed to lead to a “further 
alienation of our lives.” These allegations rested on export deals and the exploi-
tation of low- wage labour in developing countries. Pointers to Latin American 
dictatorships and South Africa brought in the dimension of abusive state vio-
lence.141 Autonomist antinuclear groups attached a very broad meaning to the 
concept of energy, as can be obtained from a call for protest action on the oc-
casion of the IMF meeting: “On the one hand, energy is our own labour, our 
fantasy, our agility, which capital seeks to commercialise; on the other hand, 
138. “Grobraster für die Aktionstage,” in IWF/Weltbank- Kampagne, Rundbrief 4:17.
139. IWF/Weltbank- Kampagne (Berlin), “Fazit der Diskussion um die Aktionstage,” July 
1988, 5, IISG, ID 892, BRO 1307/10 fol (b).
140. IWF- Kampagne, “Antiimperialistische Stadtrundfahrt,” July 1988, IISG, ID 892, BRO 
1307/10 fol (c). Similar for Hamburg: Gruppe “Hamburger Antiimperialistische Stadtrundfahrt,” 
Anti- Imperialistische Stadtrundfahrt: IWF in Hamburg (Hamburg, 1988), ID 892, BRO 620/18 
fol.
141. Siemenskoordination, “Was tun mit IWF?,” July 1988, IISG, ID 892, BRO 1307/10 fol (b).
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energy is a commodity that we have to buy so that we don’t freeze off our ass 
in winter. But energy is also our love of life, our refusal, our resisting power 
against the high- performance society that devours ever more energy to assem-
ble their junk like tanks, microchips, plastic bags, genetically engineered plant 
varieties, turbo cows, nuclear power stations.”142
During the protest weeks in September 1988, retail and commerce again 
became the focus. Demonstrations and happenings took place in or in front of 
supermarkets, department stores, shopping centres, clothes shops, amusement 
arcades, pornographic movie theatres, travel agents, airline offices, banks, in-
surance offices, coffee roasters, fast food restaurants, and petrol stations.143 
Windows were smashed at the high- end Hotel Interconti, which hosted con-
vention delegates, apparently in retaliation for the arrest of some protesters.144 
Branch offices of banks and the Europa Center were attacked with stink bombs. 
Expensive- looking cars were vandalised or set alight.145 Hundreds of police-
men in riot gear shielded the windows along shopping streets. The organisers 
of demonstrations complained that they were marching through “deserted 
streets, along barricaded shops.”146
KaDeWe, like many other stores, barred its windows with wooden panels, 
some of which displayed signs that read “We decorate.” A happening with 
pig’s blood and fake dollar bills in front of KaDeWe sought to symbolise the 
blood allegedly stuck to the goods offered within. Department store employees 
decided who could enter the building, banning about one hundred individuals, 
while police filmed the event as evidence. Police ultimately surrounded the 
protesters and, with some use of the baton, escorted them away from the de-
partment store. In the following days, a picture circulated that created the im-
pression of a burning KaDeWe. In reality, however, a burning waste container 
had been photographed from the opposite side of the street to suggest a depart-
ment store engulfed with flames. Through the clouds of smoke one could see a 
row of security personnel on the roof of the department store.147 Another pro-
vocative photograph— playing on the double meaning of Bulle as a pejorative 
142. “Keine Energie für den Kongreß,” Interim 16 (1988), quoted in Geronimo, Feuer und 
Flamme, 187.
143. Büro für ungewöhnliche Maßuahmen, Wut, Witz, Widerstand, 17, 32, 36, 42; Bernd May-
wald, “Auflistung der Veranstaltungshinweise der ‘Tageszeitung’ mit Bezug auf die Tagung von 
IWF und WB im September 1988 in Berlin,” WZB- IWF.
144. “Wessen Straße ist die Straße  . . . ,” Zahltag 5 (29 September 1988): 1.
145. “2:0— Ku’damm bleibt die richtige Adresse,” Zahltag 4 (28 September 1988): 2.
146. Ibid., 32.
147. “Konsumrausch ausgesetzt,” Zahltag 5 (29 September 1988); Büro für ungewöhnliche, 
Wut, Witz, Widerstand, 44– 45.
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term for policeman— showed an officer in riot gear in front of a supermarket’s 
shop window, where a poster advertised an exceptional offer of meat “frisch 
aus der Bullenkeule” (fresh from the bull’s shank).148
During one demonstration, the windows of a McDonald’s were smashed. 
A request to hold a rally in front of McDonald’s to protest the company’s role 
in destroying tropical rain forests had been turned down, so a “puke- in” had 
been staged in front of the fast food restaurant.149 Two years earlier, a London 
group had released a critical pamphlet that became famous and eventually led 
to the monumental “McLibel case.”150 The anarchist cabaret group Die 3 Tor-
nados sarcastically addressed different levels of consumption: “Dear creditors! 
. . . How can it be that in this world every two minutes a human being is dying 
from starvation, while McDonald’s is dealing out one hundred million ham-
burgers each year? Don’t these people know the way to the McDonald’s that 
would save them? . . . Appalled, we are confronted with the bullet- riddled bod-
ies of those lost souls who, in the face of hunger, took up the gun instead of the 
saving plough.”151 Improvised theatre in front of banks and department stores 
sought to relate everyday purchases such as cheap T- shirts from South Korea to 
conditions in the developing world.152 People distributing the protest cam-
paign’s daily newspaper, Zahltag (Payday), were arrested because of an an-
nouncement that read, “We want to meet at KaDeWe, Wertheim, and Bilka . . . 
for a department store inspection. . . . E.g.: spray paint goods from South Africa 
and Israel, distribute flyers, perform invisible theatre, annoy detectives, use the 
chaos to line our pockets, sabotage cash registers.”153
A rally of 250 lesbians left broken windows at numerous porn shops, 
marking sex work and sex tourism as important topics in critiques of regimes 
of provision.154 One slogan proclaimed, “Thailand’s contribution to the global 
market: 1,000,000 prostitutes.”155 A carefully documented brochure recycled 
some material from Rote Zora’s earlier statements. World Bank money was 
148. Büro für ungewöhnliche Maßuahmen, Wut, Witz, Widerstand, 119.
149. Ibid., 42.
150. Greenpeace (London), What’s Wrong with McDonald’s? See also John Vidal, McLibel: 
Burger Culture on Trial (London, 1997).
151. Büro für ungewöhnliche Maßuahmen, Wut, Witz, Widerstand, 50.
152. “Money Makes the World Go Round,” Zahltag 5 (29 September 1988): 2.
153. “Festnahmen von ‘Zahltag’ VerteilerInnen,” Zahltag 4 (28 September 1988): 1.
154. Büro für ungewöhnliche Maßuahmen, Wut, Witz, Widerstand, 36.
155. “Prostitution als Dienst am Volk: Hintergründe zu Sextourismus und Frauenhandel in 
Thailand,” Zahltag 2 (26 September 1988): 2. See Westberliner IWF/Weltbank Frauenplenum, 
Ohne uns Frauen läuft nix; Frauen gegen Imperialismus, Sextourismus und Frauenhandel; Elvira 
Niesner, Prostitution auf den Philippinen (Berlin, 1988); Philippinen Koordination Frauengruppe, 
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depicted as a necessary ingredient in large- scale sexual exploitation, with for-
eign investment pumped into hotels, bars, discos, and brothels. The authors 
calculated that of the seventy U.S. dollars a tourist paid for a night with a sex 
worker, fifty- nine dollars flowed into the hands of foreign entrepreneurs and 
thus partially back to the rich countries. They also pointed out that large- scale 
demonstrations against sex tourism had taken place in the Philippines and 
Thailand during the early 1980s.156
On 16 September 1988, a rally on “women’s work and the department 
store” took place in front of a Hertie branch in the working- class district of 
Neukölln. Half an hour later, the crowd reassembled in front of McDonald’s to 
protest low- wage labour. Flyers emphasised that saleswomen working in Ger-
man retail suffered from the same rationalisation drive that inspired global fi-
nancial politics, creating “flexible” forms of employment with higher perfor-
mance pressure and lower social security. The newly introduced bar- code cash 
registers served as a tangible example of technological innovation that threat-
ened jobs while making work more monotonous.157 The Revolutionary Cells 
had already highlighted this dimension in a 1985 statement concerning their 
nighttime bomb attack against the offices of two software consulting compa-
nies in Hamburg and Dortmund: “Plans for the information- technology- led 
restructuring of department store companies are engineered, . .  . confronting 
the workforce, mainly women, in the form of precarious employment, per-
fected surveillance equipment, and the intensified exploitation of labour.”158
West Berlin experienced a wave of firebombings. An autonomist group 
left an incendiary device at a Bolle supermarket in the Zehlendorf district. 
Police deactivated the device, and the group’s statement explained that the 
store had been targeted because it was located in a particularly well- to- do area 
and continued to sell products from South Africa, Israel, Chile, and El Salva-
dor.159 A REWE supermarket in the southern part of the city  and a Shell petrol 
station were also firebombed.160 On 27 September, the sprinkler system extin-
156. Nora, Dora, Zora, et al., Ansätze zum zusetzen, IISG, BRO 531/16 fol.
157. “Unsere Arbeitsbedingungen werden immer mieser” (flyer), “Kaufhaus” (flyer), “Kampf 
dem Zwang zur Arbeit!” (flyer), September 1988, WZB- IWF.
158. “Angriff gegen Scientific Control Systems (SCS), Hamburg und den Mathematischen 
Programmier- und Beratungsdienst (MPB), Dortmund” (September 1985), in Früchte des Zorns, 
ed. ID- Archiv im IISG, 1:326– 28.
159. “Bombe bei ‘Bolle II’: In Zehlendorfer Bolle Filiale wurde Profi- Brandsatz gefunden,” 
taz, Berlin, 23 September 1988, 17.
160. “Mit einem Brandsatz wurde die Einrichtung eines Rewe- Geschäfts in der Marienfelder 
Chaussee zerstört: Polizeibeamte mußten Masken tragen,” Spandauer Volksblatt, 30 September 
1988, WZB- IWF.
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guished fires on three floors of a Karstadt department store in Charlottenburg 
caused by small- scale incendiary devices that caused only minor damage to 
property. An admission statement signed “Autonomous Cell, dept. Consumer 
Protection” protested Konsumterror and the “stupefaction of the masses,” call-
ing the department store a “symbol of this beat- up two- thirds society [Zwei-
drittelgesellschaft].” The term had emerged in discussions regarding a new 
type of poverty: the proportion of permanently un- and underemployed people 
increased despite the fact that statistics showed that affluence was on the rise. 
As a result, about two- thirds of the population had secure jobs, while the re-
mainder had no or precarious employment and remained more or less excluded 
from economic growth. The brief statement also pointed to the “permanent 
repression of elementary needs” when cashiers were toiling while store detec-
tives received bonuses for catching people who were only taking what was 
rightfully theirs. A very brief news item covering the arson reported only the 
anti- imperialist part of the statement, which claimed that Karstadt was a “guar-
antor of dirty export business with Chile, South Africa, Israel” and called for a 
boycott of goods from those countries.161
It is remarkable how little public attention department store arson gener-
ated in 1988, especially compared to 1968. Perpetrators probably picked 
smaller devices to avoid the “malicious and life- threatening arson” charges that 
had been levelled at the Frankfurt arsonists. However, journalists and perhaps 
even law enforcement officers seem to have had a tacit understanding that ar-
sonists should not receive a public platform to share their views lest they attract 
copycats and create bad publicity for the host city of the IMF meeting or dis-
credit more moderate forms of protest. Nevertheless, the day after the incendi-
ary attack on Karstadt, there were thirteen bomb threats against pornographic 
movie theatres and the Europa Center, which was evacuated and cordoned off. 
An anonymous statement protested sexism and the exploitation of women. Po-
lice closed in on a feminist demonstration and arrested dozens of protesters, 
keeping them in custody overnight.162
The inversionary nature of legitimising enemy images can be obtained 
from a statement by the West Berlin Association of Merchants and Industrial-
161. “IWF- Blues: Heidelberg/Berlin/Göttingen/Bamberg,” taz, 28 September 1988, 5; “Stim-
mung wird immer gereizter,” Volksblatt, 28 September 1988; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, un-
titled clipping, 28 September 1988, WZB- IWF. The statement is printed in radikal 135 (October 
1988): 24.
162. “Kewenig in Bombenstimmung: Vorletzter IWF- Aktionstag wieder mit Protestaktionen, 
Demonstrationen, Festnahmen, und Polizeikessel,” taz, Berlin, 29 September 1988, 17; Büro für 
ungewöhnliche Maßuahmen, Wut, Witz, Widerstand, 42.
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ists: “Who are these travelling ruffians whose brutality is incredible and who 
are no different from violent criminals— Who is funding these people? On 
closer inspection, we see that they, too, live on the social blessings of our 
state.”163 A much- publicised picture of a masked autonomist pushing a shop-
ping trolley converted into a mobile container for dozens of cobblestone pro-
jectiles testifies to a far- reaching inversion of values.164 While protesters 
shouted the rhyming slogan “IWF— Mördertreff!” (IMF— meeting of murder-
ers!), the merchants and industrialists reciprocated their challengers’ accusa-
tions: each depicted the opposing side as mere criminals profiting via illicit 
channels. Both perspectives sought to deny the other’s actions any political 
character and thus legitimacy. For some autonomist activists, rampages and 
rioting became a ritual, a permanent component of an identity- generating life-
style that was easily refreshed on an everyday basis by smashing shop win-
dows or looting supermarkets. If this was the case— as during countless May 
Day demonstrations in Berlin— the communicative nexus between different 
levels of violence receded into the background, and observers found it exceed-
ingly difficult to identify any political message in what seemed mere indul-
gence in violence.
In September 1988, the international nature of the debt crisis provided for 
countless regional and national scenarios where a critical economic and politi-
cal analysis could address connections between regimes of violence and re-
gimes of provision. As a consequence of the large number of Turkish and 
Kurdish immigrants in West Germany, developments in Turkey were a particu-
larly interesting case. Left- wing critics charged that the IMF’s familiar de-
mands for cuts in public expenditures had negative consequences for social, 
health, and educational services. At the same time, it seemed to be in the IMF’s 
interest to increase government spending on military and police forces to fight 
internal unrest— especially the insurgency of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, 
which had begun in 1984— and the arms buildup in NATO’s strategically im-
portant easternmost member state. Critics pointed to the stark contrast between 
this military wealth and weak infrastructures: several towns had running water 
only at night or once a week, and mortality rates for both the general public and 
infants in particular were high as a consequence of the lack of physicians and 
hospitals. German companies such as Siemens, AEG, Mannesmann, Daimler- 
Benz, Hoechst, and Bayer made large profits in Turkey and were held respon-
163. “Stellungnahme des Vereins zur IWF- Tagung,” Mitteilungen des Vereins Berliner 
Kaufleute und Industrieller 152.38 (1988), quoted in Gerhards, Neue Konfliktlinien, 147– 48.
164. “Gegenaktivitäten,” blätter des iz3w 151 (1988): 31.
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sible for “mass poverty, extreme exploitation, and oppression.”165 In hindsight, 
it appears that the liberalisation of the Turkish economy during the 1980s ulti-
mately led the country to enjoy stronger economic growth and greater political 
stability. At the time, however, the critical argument was that development 
went hand in hand with violence. A rougher and catchier rendering of this idea 
found expression in a widespread rallying cry of the protest movement: 
“Deutsche Waffen, deutsches Geld morden mit in aller Welt!” (German arms, 
German money join murder around the world!).
This slogan was not intended to apply to address German leftists collect-
ing money under the slogan “Weapons for El Salvador.” Side by side with the 
article castigating conditions in Turkey, an appeal for donations reported that 
more than four million deutsche marks had been collected to support the Far-
abundo Martí National Liberation Front.166 Seven years earlier, Movement 2 
June member Klaus Viehmann had self- confidently explained the difference, 
referring to the consumer and to global regimes of provision: “some people . . . 
even reject fund- raising campaigns for the liberation movement in El Salvador 
with the argument that this money supported violence, breeding new violence. 
There is a certain cynicism behind this since everyone who pays taxes here, or 
even drinks a cup of coffee— imported from el salvador— supports the war of 
the junta against the people of el salvador. . . . concerns about the use of vio-
lence only set in when it comes to arming the people against their murderers, 
not at the point when the murderers slaughter the unarmed people.”167
Militant protest against the IMF and World Bank received notice in devel-
oping countries. The New Nigerian wrote somewhat optimistically, “Perhaps 
the conscience of the international bankers will respond faster to the bombs 
and guns of European leftist radicals than to the wailing of impoverished and 
dying African children.” Refuting the widespread argument of economic mis-
management as the cause of the debt crisis, the article pointed to “decades of 
economic parasitism.”168 A Pakistani commentator underlined that debt man-
agement forced alien regimes of provision on societies that had become ad-
dicted to aid. This entailed “the obligation to import military hardware, goods 
and commodities from the same source . . . promoting false standards of living 
and perverse values.”169 The International Herald Tribune highlighted the re-
165. “Die Türkei— Ein faschistischer Staat im Sinne des IWF,” Zahltag 5 (29 September 1988): 
3.
166. Freunde der alternativen Tageszeitung e.V., “Spendenaktion: Waffen für El Salvador,” 
Zahltag 5 (29 September 1988): 3.
167. Klaus Viehmann, “Prozesserklärung” (February 1981), radikal 98 (November 1981), 
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ciprocal effect in highly industrialised countries: according to this interpreta-
tion of Ronald Reagan’s supply- side economics, controlled debt made them 
ever richer.170 The Herald from Harare, Zimbabwe, put the two developments 
into one disturbing argument: “There is something seriously wrong with a 
world economy, in which most of the world’s inhabitants face poverty, starva-
tion, and general deprivation while the minority sit on food mountains and 
more expensive consumer goodies than they know what to do with.”171 This 
uneasiness surfaced in Berlin when critics reported on lavish banquets for IMF 
delegates protected by large numbers of security forces.172
During and after the IMF meeting, controversies regarding the handling 
of the  security authorities emerged. Many small- scale protest events had been 
prohibited via traffic laws, and even liberal commentators questioned whether 
West Berlin’s minister of the interior, Wilhelm Kewenig (CDU), had been right 
to subordinate the right to demonstrate to the right to conduct unobstructed 
commerce at the Kurfürstendamm.173 Minister of finance Günter Rexrodt 
(FDP) calculated that the twelve thousand people who came to West Berlin for 
the IMF meeting spent between forty and fifty million deutsche marks. And 
politicians did their best to use the occasion to advertise West Berlin as a busi-
ness location.174 A special investigative unit of the West Berlin police, the Ein-
heit für besondere Lagen und einsatzbezogenes Training, added to its robust 
reputation for brutal conduct during demonstrations. Undercover members of 
the unit had penetrated the autonomist scene, a practice that operated in a legal 
grey zone, since such investigations of “extremist” groups had hitherto been 
the prerogative of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Ver-
fassungsschutz), which was required by law to limit itself to observation and 
could not use physical force.175 In several cases, journalists were maltreated by 
police, triggering indignant complaints by the Deutsche Presse Agentur, As-
170. “Bankers in Berlin,” International Herald Tribune, 28 September 1988, WZB- IWF.
171. “West Berlin Cash Talks,” Herald, Harare, 23 September 1988, WZB- IWF.
172. Vera Gaserow, “Wenn es Nacht wird und die Banker singen: Champagner, ‘deutsch Snaps’ 
und Gesang,” taz, 29 September 1988; “Die heile Welt des IWF: Propaganda- Veranstaltung des 
Wirtschaftssenators zum Internationalen Währungsfond in Luxushotel,” taz, 11 June 1988.
173. “Behinderung und Gefährdung,” Der Tagesspiegel, 29 September 1988, WZB- IWF.
174. Martina Ohm, “Mammutmesse der Finanzen,” Der Tagesspiegel, 4 September 1988, Sun-
day supp. Weltspiegel, 1; “Gäste ließen viel Geld in Berlin,” Volksblatt, 1 October 1988, WZB- IWF.
175. “IWF- Nachlese,” 88– 89. This article downplays militant forms of protest during the IMF 
meeting, claiming that they amounted only to a few smashed windows and bent car aerials (91). 
See also “Polizei: Knochen in Gips,” Der Spiegel 42 (17 October 1988): 42– 44; Wolfgang Gast, 
“Skandaleinheit der Berliner Polizei spielt 007: Sondereinheit EbLT infiltrierte illegal autonome 
Szene,” taz, 17 October 1988, 1– 2; Alternative Liste, Freiheit im Würgegriff, IISG, ID 892, BRO 
1623/12.
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sociated Press, Reuters, and others.176 Following a citizen’s complaint, the 
Federal Court of Justice retrospectively declared illegal the special control 
points that police had erected throughout the Federal Government and West 
Berlin before and during the IMF meeting. The court ruled that the Federal 
Criminal Police Office’s reading of sections 129s StGB and 111 StPO had 
unduly stretched the laws.177
Anti- apartheid protest in the commercial sphere did not subside when the 
IMF/World Bank meeting ended. In December 1988, protesters released doz-
ens of mice— some of them marked “RSA”— in the food hall of a Karstadt 
department store. After the management of Bolle supermarkets had become 
subject to a preliminary investigation for having advertised and labelled as-
paragus from South Africa as originating in Argentina, the windows of a branch 
in Berlin’s Tempelhof district were smashed.178
While these skirmishes continued, one of the most striking examples of 
the problematic consequences of IMF- imposed neoliberal reforms unfolded in 
Venezuela with the Caracazo, a wave of protests, riots, and looting that culmi-
nated in a February 1989 massacre in the country’s capital. As many as three 
thousand people were killed, mostly by security forces. In his populist presi-
dential election campaign, Social Democrat Carlos Andrés Pérez had de-
nounced the IMF for practising “an economic totalitarianism which kills not 
with bullets but with famine.” In February 1989, the victorious Pérez accepted 
an IMF proposal along the lines of the Washington Consensus in return for a 
loan of 4.5 billion U.S. dollars. The agreement required increases in petrol 
prices, which also caused rises in public transport fares, triggering massive 
popular protests.179 These events and the fact that Pérez continued to blame the 
IMF and the rich industrial countries for the violent escalation were noticed in 
the German press, but no further protest activities ensued.180
176. “Farbe des Geldes: Das Spitzentreffen von Währungsfons und Weltbank mißriet zum Po-
lizeispektakel,” Der Spiegel 40 (3 October 1988): 130– 33.
177. Jürgen Gottschlich, “BGH rügt Rebmanns ‘Ausnahmezustand,’” taz, 22 November 1988, 
1– 2.
178. “Getarnter Spargel: Ermittlungsverfahren gegen Coop- Bolle wg. ‘Spargeltarnaktion,’” 
taz, Berlin 4 November 1988: 15; “Protest tiefgekühlt: Bei Karstadt fand man tote Mäuse mit dem 
Aufdruck ‘R.S.A.,’” taz, Berlin, 12 December 1988, 17.
179. Pérez quoted in Chossudovsky, Globalization of Poverty, 36; “Alles ist möglich, alles ist 
nötig,” Der Spiegel 39 (26 September 1988): 29. See Margarita López Maya, “The Venezuelan 
Caracazo of 1989: Popular Protest and Institutional Weakness,” Journal of Latin American Studies 
35.1 (2003): 117– 37.
180. See “Hunderte von Toten in Venezuela,” taz, 2 March 1989; “Krankenhäuser melden 500 
Tote bei den Unruhen in Venezuela,” taz, 4 March 1989.
Global Responsibilities    277
Boycott and fair trade campaigns served activists as a performative signifier of 
commitment. Especially in comparison with earlier anti- imperialist campaigns, 
which had been more clearly motivated by socialist or communist ideals, these 
campaigns mirrored the growing sense of individualism espoused by contem-
porary neoliberalism. Ultimately, fair trade and ethical marketing did not pose 
a fundamental threat to the capitalist system. The fact that consumers were 
willing to pay more for products manufactured and distributed under condi-
tions complying with their moral convictions provided a business model that 
contributed to the dynamism of the capitalist diversification of markets.181
At the same time, militant groups wanted to go beyond such ethically re-
flective consumerism, which they saw as politically limited. The legitimising 
narrative of the early critics of globalisation aimed at the responsibility of po-
litical and economic decision makers and their institutions of global gover-
nance, whose base motives allegedly turned them into exploiters and murder-
ers. Some of these arguments operated at a high level of abstraction. In the 
process, recourse to interpretive elites— critical scholars and experts— offered 
the possibility of investing the “frame” of the social movements that criticised 
regimes of provision with a particular legitimacy. The argumentative potential 
of this precursor to later global justice movements and critiques of 
“globalisation”— the term appeared only very sporadically in 1988— was used 
to rationalise illegal protest acts and symbolic violence against what were per-
ceived as tangible manifestations of questionable global regimes of provision. 
Ideological justifications for throwing stones through shop windows or placing 
incendiary devices in department stores maintained a difficult balancing act 
between friendly and hostile consumption. The morally questionable and argu-
ably parasitic consumption of the global system of capitalism was supposed to 
be attacked and overcome in favour of the legitimate consumption interests of 
the inhabitants of developing countries or of consumers of alternative products 
based on fair trade practices and international solidarity. Under international 
pressure, IMF repayment conditions indeed changed during the 1990s to take 
into account the social interests of receiving societies.182
The militant protest action of the Revolutionary Cells mirrored a para-
digm shift away from a classical anti- imperialism based on Third World libera-
tion movements and towards a global perspective on the injustices of the eco-
nomic process that focused on social struggles and the institutions of global 
181. See Stehr, Moralisierung der Märkte. Stehr’s account does not investigate the dimension 
of violence in the moralisation of the markets. He attributes it to increased incomes and more 
comprehensive knowledge and information on available commodities.
182. Nuscheler, Lern- und Arbeitsbuch Entwicklungspolitik, 368– 70.
278    Consumption and Violence
governance. Campaigns against the industrial economies of South Africa and 
Israel reflected the development of solidarity between the German activists and 
the African National Congress and the PFLP, on the one hand, and the emerg-
ing focus on IMF and World Bank, on the other. The strategy of militant boy-
cott campaigns represented a move away from large- scale terrorist acts on the 
international stage following the public relations disaster of the Entebbe hi-
jacking. From then on, the RZ concentrated on a global process of economic 
restructuring that was manifested in the creeping financial erosion of the East-
ern Bloc, the forced capitalisation of agriculture, and the far- reaching uncou-
pling of the African continent from the profits of world trade. Within this con-
text, the victims of apartheid and racism, especially women, became the 
subjects of revolutionary struggle. The RZ sought to bring these conflicts home 
to West Germany, increasingly attacking German institutions to point out their 
international entanglement and the role of “governmental consumption”— for 
example, in armament industries. The Israeli economy remained a target for 
the RZ, but it was just one of many targets: overall, less than 5 percent of the 
RZ’s militant attacks were directed against Israel. The United States played a 
major role in their critical worldview, but the RZ deliberately steered clear of 
any cultural anti- Americanism not firmly established in a critique of global 
economic structures. The Rote Zora, concentrating on women’s working con-
ditions in the global economy— from factory seamstresses to sex workers— 
introduced the important feminist plank to the radical mobilisation of discon-
tent among West German consumers.
Attacks against retail and service institutions sought to make a moral 
comparison between violence against things in a rich industrial country and the 
violence that reigned in developing countries, assuming that both contexts 
were tied into global economic networks. The strategy of legitimisation was to 
let the attack on a supermarket or a petrol station appear negligible in com-
parison to global injustices such as war and genocide. Pointers to misery, up-
roar, and food riots in the Third World were supposed to excuse violence 
against global corporations. The strategy of legitimisation thus rested on shift-
ing attention away from violent forms of protest and towards the conduct of 
global economic and governmental institutions. This approach was intended to 
shake a narrow definition of violence resting on national, governmental, and 
criminological foundations. Moreover, militant protest highlighted the lack of 
an effective monopoly on violence in large parts of the world, especially con-
cerning the global economic process. In a certain sense, such reasoning also 
shook an influential theoretical critique of violence— as put forward by Han-
nah Arendt in the tradition of Thomas Hobbes— that rested on a theory of the 
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state that made an effective enforcement of governmental power, a lasting 
peace, and legal norms the precondition for the excision of violence from the 
political space.183 Such, however, was not the case in the sphere of action of a 
spatially unbound global economy.
For the most part, the legitimisation of violent protest against a global 
economic nexus was not a question of a fundamental justification of political 
violence or terrorism. It was, rather, the fragmentary legitimisation that could 
be gained from pointers to the violence of the opposing side and from appeals 
to the guilty consciences of affluent consumers, which were effective in mobil-
ising the movement and in propagating alternative regimes of provision. At-
tacks on global regimes of provision and their moral deficits shifted the onus 
of legitimisation onto the opposing side. The boycott campaigns followed a 
pattern of calling attention to the destruction and violence that went hand in 
hand with the production or marketing of consumer goods in faraway coun-
tries. Violence against objects emerged as a militant variation of this type of 
protest.
In another protest scenario, not explicitly discussed in this chapter despite 
its many bridges to the protests against the global economic order, the trajec-
tory went the opposite way: consumer boycotts were instituted only in response 
to violence that threatened to make protest impossible. The earliest antinuclear 
energy protests hardly adopted the viewpoint of the consumer, since lobbyists 
for the energy industry had claimed the consumers’ perspective in the early 
1970s debates about nuclear energy. Shortages and rising prices in the wake of 
the oil crisis allowed industry proponents to present nuclear energy as the 
cleaner and cheaper alternative, entirely in consumers’ interests. A challenge to 
this position was mounted only in response to the major violent confrontations 
that occurred in November 1976 between police and protesters at the site where 
the Brokdorf nuclear power plant was under construction. The idea of boycot-
ting electricity companies was developed with the explicit aim of finding ways 
to continue nonviolent protest after the failure of violent confrontation. The 
main goal was public visibility rather than economic pressure. In some re-
spects, this strategy pointed the way to a practice that became commonplace 
with the liberalisation of the energy market: consumers could simply subscribe 
to delivery packages from companies that did not use nuclear power. Up to that 
point, German consumers had been bound to their local provider, one of the 
eight oligopolistic consortia of the West German energy industry that enjoyed 
comfortable market conditions based on the Energy Industry Act of 1935. The 
183. See Arendt, On Violence.
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example of electricity boycotts not only highlights the difficulties consumer 
protest faced in this situation but also provides an interesting case where the 
trajectory went the other way: violence was not the product of an eventual 
radicalisation of protest; rather, boycotts were embraced only in response to 
violence that threatened to make protest impossible.
Although radical and militant groups eventually lost influence on the 
global justice movements, they played a large role in the unprecedented major 
mobilisations of the 1980s.184 The discourse on global distributive justice went 
hand in hand with transnational advocacy and a “postnational” understanding 
of politics. Such patterns of perception had been pioneered by the radical Left 
since the late 1960s. Their spread into the wider political spectrum made hu-
man catastrophes that occurred in developing countries more visible and am-
plified their impact on domestic politics. At the heart of this process lay a 
transmission of political consciousness from critical intellectuals via political 
activists to ethically motivated consumers. The process was thus a quantitative 
widening and proliferation of critiques of regimes of provision that accompa-
nied a qualitative dilution of more radical alternative regimes of provision. As 
in most other highly industrialised countries, West Germany saw increasing 
percentages of consumers participating or expressing a willingness to partici-
pate in boycotts, from just under a third of the population in 1974 to almost half 
in 1990.185 The anti- apartheid, anti- Nestlé, and anti- IMF campaigns were im-
portant steps in this popularisation of “moral economies” via purchase deci-
sions based on ethical criteria, preparing the way for a new type of capitalism 
in which the image of politically and ecologically responsible production be-
came ever more important.186
184. See Rucht, Teune, and Yang, “Global Justice Movement,” 162; Hierlmeier, Internationa-
lismus, 112.
185. Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization, 312– 13.




In October 1990, the editors of the newly founded journal Clash, an international 
joint venture of autonomist activists from seven European countries, published 
an article on what they called the “annexation of the GDR”: “The commodity 
won out over an independent development by the people in the GDR. . . . The 
commodity is violence! It is the capitalist tool for the colonisation of conscious-
ness that surpasses all previous violent means of capitalism.”1 The language and 
content of this analysis were not new, but the demise of the East German state 
changed an important parameter of the consumption debates analysed in this 
book: the implosion of a tangible other regime of provision. The GDR had 
hardly functioned as a model for the radical left over the preceding thirty years, 
but its existence— despite the increasing influx of Western consumer culture— 
had demonstrated the possibility of a different organisation of production and 
consumption. The idea of Western capitalism creating for itself a “low- wage 
country on ‘German soil’”2 conjured up the perspective that a single all- 
embracing regime of provision would henceforth eliminate or subdue all alterna-
tives. The larger kitchen debate seemed to have come to an end. When analysing 
the causes of the GDR’s failure, the autonomist authors diagnosed the fault in the 
shortcomings of socialist practice, which created a “political vacuum allowing 
the ‘desire’ for commodities to thrive.”3 The GDR’s petit bourgeois planned 
economy, coupled with political repression, had long since squandered the op-
portunity for an authentic and autonomous articulation of needs and political 
positions. Given the sorry state of the socialist project, this task fell to the new 
social movements and their radical vanguard, which, according to the authors, 
included the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF) and other “guerrillas,” the revolution-
ary feminist movement, squatters, and other movements against urban renewal.
1. “Alptraum Kapitalismus: Über die Annektion der DDR,” Clash: Zeitung für/vom Widerstand 
in Europa 1 (October 1990): 50.
2. Ibid., 46.
3. Ibid., 50.
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Social Change and Social Movements
Much like Herbert Marcuse, philosopher and social theorist Oskar Negt ad-
dressed the new social movements of the late 1960s, in which he participated, 
and their challenge to existing regimes of provision under the formula anti-
kapitalistische Bedürfnisrevolte (anticapitalist revolt of the needs).4 Such poli-
tics of needs involved a comprehensive concept of the political that, unlike 
narrower liberal concepts of politics, did not relegate needs into a pre- political 
private sphere. Traditional politics treat the human needs behind political de-
mands on a highly mediated and abstract level. On this level, a demand for 
lower rents or higher social benefits can be articulated, implying that needs for 
food, shelter, and clothing have to be met. However, the details and implica-
tions of such human needs and their psychological dimension— for example, 
the despair that grips someone who cannot pay the rent— remain anterior to 
policy formation. They seldom appear in the classical formation of the political 
will, and if they do, it is only in a marginal or illustrative way.5 The social 
movements addressed in this book sought to bring such needs back into the 
political. They tried to establish legitimate ways of political communication 
that would address consumers’ experiences and make their social and moral 
concerns heard. Commonly used concepts of anticonsumerism prove inappro-
priate: notwithstanding certain rhetorical figures, their critiques of consumer 
society or of specific regimes of provision were not fundamentally anticon-
sumerist. Usually it was not a question of not consuming, of embracing radi-
cally ascetic ideals, but of consuming differently, of attaching alternative social 
or moral values to consumption, and of inflicting less destruction. The acceler-
ated development of affluent society, however, seemed to destroy social fab-
rics, to rob things and lifestyles of their authenticity and legitimacy. To those 
who perceived this phenomenon, it became a significant source of existential 
disillusion and disenchantment with conventional politics.
This book shows that radical aspects and offshoots of the new social 
movements engaged in various struggles over particular regimes of provision 
in West Germany against the backdrop of the overarching Cold War system 
confrontation. These struggles ranged from quotidian articulations of moral or 
political concerns about seemingly trivial issues— for example, relatively mi-
nor fare increases— to militant resistance to international or global regimes of 
provision. A central result is that political violence arose from conflict over 
4. Schütte, Revolte und Verweigerung, 40.
5. Ibid., 125.
Conclusion    283
public commodities, such as transport, media, or housing, and from the politi-
cal metadiscourse attached to commodity purchasing. While activists rarely 
realised their utopian goals, they had tangible effects on the way capitalist re-
gimes of provision organised and presented themselves, from alternative ap-
proaches to urban communities to new strategies embraced by the institutions 
of global governance.
The politicisation of consumption— for example, via boycotting— is a 
communicative technique of favouring and/or discrediting particular interests 
that can be used by any political persuasion. The postwar period was domi-
nated by politicisation impulses from above that emanated from various po-
litical and commercial institutions in Washington, Moscow, Bonn, Berlin, and 
elsewhere before eventually trickling down to (but not determining) the expe-
riences and attitudes of individuals. Project ‘economic miracle’6 attempted to 
depoliticise consumption domestically and harness its political potential to 
the outwardly oriented thrust of Cold War competition. Politically motivated 
boycott campaigns were first embraced and staged by strong players in the 
political contest (the state, large corporations, sizable parts of the population) 
before the extraparliamentary opposition and the new social movements 
seized the method to articulate and mobilise critical minority views: Springer 
used boycott flanked by economic pressure against Blinkfüer and the GDR 
long before the students boycotted Springer; Willy Brandt and the Confedera-
tion of German Trade Unions called for a boycott of the East German– run 
Berlin S- Bahn prior to students protesting public transport fare increases; and 
the CIA- sponsored Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit (Combat Group 
against Inhumanity) committed stink bomb and incendiary attacks against 
East German department stores long before any left- wing protesters launched 
arson attacks.7 The Combat Group against Inhumanity, cofounded in 1948 by 
CDU politician Ernst Benda, who became interior minister in 1968 and a 
judge on the Federal Constitutional Court in 1969, committed sabotage 
against the GDR’s distributive system: counterfeit administrative directives 
misrouted food deliveries and ordered retail price reductions, products and 
foodstuffs were destroyed, bomb attacks against power poles were planned, 
attacks against roads and railways took human lives.8 This case illustrates 
vividly how judgments about the legitimacy of boycotts, militancy, or terror in 
6. See S. Jonathan Wiesen, “Miracles for Sale: Consumer Displays and Advertising in Postwar 
West Germany,” in Consuming Cold War Germany, ed. Crew, 151– 78.
7. For arson attacks on three department stores during the Leipzig Autumn Trade Fair of 1951, 
see Enrico Heitzer, “Affäre Walter”: Die vergessene Verhaftungswelle (Berlin, 2008), 191– 93.
8. Ibid., 59, 107.
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the realm of consumption were and are bound up with the political positions 
of both perpetrators and commentators.
Politicisation impulses from above continued throughout the Cold War 
but increasingly faced competition from impulses from below— from the social 
movements, which sought a third way between the blocs and faulted estab-
lished modes of politicisation. The social movements aimed to expose the 
moral and political problems of the domestic and global dimensions of con-
sumption, which had long- term effects that eventually influenced majority so-
ciety and state institutions. Overall, it does not seem helpful to assume the ex-
istence of a historical threshold separating an earlier period where matters of 
consumption were somehow less morally or politically charged from a later 
period of politicised consumption. What was new since the late 1960s was the 
plurality of competing moral economies from above and from below. Forms 
and practices of protest pioneered in the 1960s and early 1970s were adopted 
and adapted according to changed circumstances, resulting in a proliferation of 
localised campaigns that tended to be more anonymous and less spectacular 
but perhaps more successful in raising public awareness. Such applied cri-
tiques of regimes of provision meant less abstract theory but more direct action 
as well as a professionalisation of protest in the 1980s. An accompanying de-
crease in the size and diversity of social support for protest activities made way 
for smaller but more radical groups. Political communication that addressed 
the moral dimensions of globalised economic structures contributed to a novel 
spatialisation of politics that was manifested in the increased transnational or-
ganisation of protest movements that sought to mirror the intensified connec-
tivity of the global economy.
In this context, one might ask in how far the approaches analysed in this 
book were specifically German reactions to consumer society. Given that com-
parable analyses for France, Italy, Britain, and Denmark simply do not yet ex-
ist, this volume offers a point of departure for future research into the question 
of whether the West German trajectory of radicalisation resulted from stronger 
critical attitudes towards mass consumption or perhaps less developed organ-
isations pursuing the peaceful organisation of consumers. However, the mate-
rial presented here does not seem to suggest a German Sonderweg in radical-
ism but points to rather similar developments regarding squatting movements, 
autonomist groups, and globalisation critics elsewhere. In explaining the inten-
sity of conflict in Germany, the material highlights the potentially explosive 
nature of the legacy of the Nazi past and of the Cold War– system confrontation 
rather than peculiarities of ill- developed institutions of civil society or alleged 
continuities in antidemocratic extremism.
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Strong continuities existed over time as anti- IMF action at department 
stores in 1988 came full circle with earlier campaigns: the KaDeWe remained 
a powerful political symbol, incendiary devices went off on store shelves, and 
even the agitation among those working at the department store resembled 
what Rudi Dutschke and his comrades pursued at KaDeWe in August 1967. 
Contrary to the popular belief that the 1968 movement disintegrated quickly, 
leaving little protest potential, it had clear developmental trajectories that led to 
various protest movements. The overall number of “protest events” in the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany was higher in the period after 1968 than during the 
1950s and 1960s,9 when demonstrations and collective political pursuits were 
more likely to go alongside Cold War– inspired governmental activities. In 
many ways, the economic aspect of opposition grew more prominent. Youth, as 
a socioculturally determined period of life, grew ever longer, which, coupled 
with economic downturn, created the “superfluous” youth that found it diffi-
cult to pursue the trajectories conventional social models held in stock for 
them. Compared to the experience of the boom years of the 1960s, which saw 
the massive expansion of tertiary education opportunities, the 1970s offered a 
decidedly bleaker picture of the economic future. Educated young people join-
ing socially vulnerable groups leading a precarious existence became a wide-
spread and tangible phenomenon. Protest was a possible source of orientation 
and remedy.
The moral and political content of attacks on manifestations of consumer 
society aside, they were ineffective insofar as they hardly impeded the com-
mercial success of the targeted businesses or economic growth based on con-
sumer goods more generally. The campaign against Springer journalism nei-
ther seriously jeopardised its target’s dominance of the newspaper market nor 
substantially changed tabloid journalism, and the few tangible successes of the 
protests against public transport fare increases did not survive the inevitable 
next price hike. The squatters’ movement likewise neither managed to dispose 
of real estate speculation nor change the existing system of property owner-
ship. The squatters of the early 1980s might at least claim a role in a wider 
process that ushered in alternatives to existing regimes of provision in the 
realms of housing and the distribution of urban space. Moreover, squatters 
9. Dieter Rucht and Roland Roth, “Soziale Bewegungen und Protest— eine theoretische und 
empirische Bilanz,” in Sozialen Bewegungen, ed. Roland Roth and Rucht, 646. Strangely, Rucht 
and Roth claim a “significant protest wave” for 1968– 69 even though their own data show clear 
peaks in protest activity in 1967, 1972, and 1983. Numbers for 1968– 69 are roughly equivalent to 
1963– 64 and 1977– 78. Their categorisation of concerns and grievances that led to protest activities 
does not include the dimension of consumer or consumption- related protest.
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were instrumental in establishing informal infrastructures that continued to en-
able projects of self- help, protest, and participation.
What did emerge were alternative economies. By the early 1980s, a 
“countermilieu” had developed in a sense not entirely foreseen by Dutschke or 
Marcuse. The alternative milieu had grown into a relevant section of the econ-
omy in some cities, but this phenomenon was firmly grounded in services and 
consumption and had only a limited basis in production. An analysis of an al-
ternative address book for West Berlin (Stattbuch 2) lists twelve hundred proj-
ects, of which 71 percent were in the services sector (transport, retail, book-
stores, pubs, cinemas, media, child care, social work, culture); the  remainder 
involved political work (23 percent) and production (6 percent).10 However, to 
retrospectively reduce the protests treated in this book to their tangible yield in 
terms of economic or symbolic capital would not do justice to the meaning of 
their intentions. They questioned the abstract reasoning of the bottom line by 
appealing to moral imperatives and by invoking responses to injustices and 
abuses of power, especially in a global context.
The focus on the global consumption nexus sheds new light on the in-
creasing internationalism of the different segments of the radical left since the 
1970s. Recent scholarship under the label “transnational history” has inter-
preted the work of nongovernmental organisations and social movements as a 
decisive contribution to the emergence of a global civil society that has reduced 
the potential of conflict between states.11 By exploring hitherto neglected pre-
cursors of the global justice movement, this book adds an exploration of agents 
of transnationalisation that operated below and often in opposition to the estab-
lished governmental and nongovernmental international organizations, giving 
due weight to the dimension of militancy in response to the apparent failures 
and shortcomings of the globalising process during the crises of the 1970s and 
1980s. The theoretical critiques and political activism of West German radical 
leftists mark both an intriguing contrast and an instructive complement to what 
they would have perceived as exceedingly positive accounts of the highly am-
bivalent globalisation of consumer capitalism, such as Harvard business pro-
fessor Rosabeth M. Kanter’s definition of globalisation as “the world . . . be-
10. Kolenberger and Schwarz, Zum Problem einer “Zweiten Kultur,” 25.
11. Iriye, “Transnational History.” See also Iriye, Global Community; Iriye, “Century of 
NGOs”; Iriye,  Cultural Internationalism and World Order. For an almost exclusively positive in-
terpretation of transnationalisation as a legacy of 1968, see Klimke, Other Alliance; Klimke and 
Scharloth, 1968 in Europe. For a critical assessment of the transnational turn and its normative 
implications, see Goltz and Mark, “Encounters.”
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coming a global shopping mall in which ideas and products are available 
everywhere at the same time.”12
Intellectual Reflections of Regimes of Provision
An economic system based on trust in the civilising properties of economic 
progress and thus of the emergence of consumer societies (harking back to 
August Comte and Adam Smith) was challenged by critics who saw this con-
nection more pessimistically and considered violence and destruction corre-
lates of spatially confined affluent societies. Individuals and their needs were 
imagined as revolutionary subjects or as fighters for more limited forms of 
liberation. Their utopias— or their countercultures— crucially contained vi-
sions of alternative regimes of provision. However, squatters who sought to 
legalise their living conditions via politically negotiated leases continued to 
criticise the existing variant of consumer society, but they ultimately were pre-
pared to integrate their lifestyles into an improved or alternative version of af-
fluent society. In some respects, the loss of utopia over time— the gradual em-
bracing of more limited counterdrafts, which were then integrated into 
improved variants of affluent society— could be read to confirm Marcuse’s 
dystopian vision of a one- dimensional society where critiques and utopian sce-
narios are bound to collapse into a vast realm of commodification. Some of the 
trajectories of radicalisation analysed in this book were attempts to break the 
cycle of modern capitalism, which adopted criticism and opposition and in turn 
served them up as commodities.
Radical concepts of consumption emerged from social movements that 
responded to social change. They reflected changing regimes of provision. The 
analytical approach pursued in this book thus combines socioeconomic devel-
opments with political and artistic responses to the development of modern 
society. Intellectual constructions both built on and entailed social practices 
and political actions and were thus as much part of reality as economic or in-
stitutional conditions. This book demonstrates that intellectual constructions 
such as manipulation or depoliticisation were very closely linked with very 
real socioeconomic developments— for example, retail or media concentra-
tion, fare increases, housing shortages, and the Third World debt crisis. Radical 
12. Rosabeth M. Kanter, World Class: Thriving Locally in the Global Economy (New York, 
1995), quoted in Nuscheler, Lern- und Arbeitsbuch Entwicklungspolitik, 53.
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and even militant concepts had a rational core that responded to tangible socio-
economic developments and were thus not so far removed from what artists, 
intellectuals, more moderate contemporaries, and more recent scholars have 
thought and discovered about the developments and contradictions of con-
sumer societies.
An erosion of revolutionary visions over time and a loss of theoretical 
sophistication might be obtained from a comparison of Jörg Huffschmid’s 
Habermasian analysis of the Springer press with an autonomist pamphlet that 
reduces all evil to the machinations of banks and department stores and other-
wise displays postmodern indifference. Conversely, the squatters’ establish-
ment of more limited free spaces and formation of challenges to governmental 
policies that were sustainable at least in the medium term also points to a more 
rational analysis of society that overcame the verbose and unrealistic revolu-
tionary fantasies of earlier generations. Both the activists of the 1960s and of 
the 1980s wrestled with the legacy of a century- and- a- half of left- wing revo-
lutionary traditions, ideas, and utopias.13 Their ideology and practice dis-
played a tendency to draw the good life— traditionally held out as a carrot of 
the future— into their present. In this respect, they also stood at the end of a 
150- year political learning process. This perspective helps to integrate oppo-
site interpretations— loss of utopian potential versus gain in tangible success— 
into a dialectical step: they had arrived in a political space less riven between 
utopian visions belonging to different levels of historical time. They were 
facing the inconsistencies of the economic process and of various approaches 
to political economy that tried to explain and influence this process. They 
were partially conscious of two centuries of intellectual traditions trying to 
govern and moralise the economic process. They saw their own projects as 
continuations of or alternatives to existing interpretive patterns, which in 
some respects came to an impasse in the 1980s. It became clear that a histori-
cal philosophy that would have fully explained and controlled the economic 
process did not exist and that any venture into the territory of political econ-
omy— of critiques of regimes of provision— was fraught with difficulties and 
inconsistencies. Ultimately, the ideas and actions treated in this book were 
attempts at political orientation in highly complex systems of provision. They 
reflected a quest for moral integrity amidst the irresolvable contradictions of 
the economic process. They were bound to meet their own limits— for exam-
ple, in embracing means that really did not lend themselves to curing the di-
lemmas they sought to address. The contradictory nature of gentrification 
13. Eley, Forging Democracy.
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leading the movement to wrestle with itself— as both originator and critic of 
the process— is a good example for such irresolvable inconsistencies that did 
not allow for an easy way out.
In the final analysis, protesters shared such dilemmas with all other eco-
nomic and political actors because no one has a universal formula for generat-
ing well- being for all. Consequently, everyone must weigh the beneficial and 
destructive potentials of the regimes of provision they partake in, support, or 
disapprove of. This implies that, nolens volens, all historical actors are in-
volved in the competition between different regimes of provision— not only for 
practical implementation but also for political legitimacy— and thus need to 
position themselves vis- à- vis the violence resulting from the friction between 
such competing regimes on various levels.
Consumption and Violence
During the decades after SDS activists Peter Neitzke and Christian Semler 
developed their theory of political action with regard to the distribution sec-
tor in 1969, their three types of political campaigns (the burning of com-
modities, the appropriation of goods by the masses, and the smashing of shop 
windows) remained in the repertoire of actions adopted by the more militant 
branches of the new social movements. Systematic attacks on shop windows 
with paving stones had become a well- established practice. Despite Neitzke 
and Semler’s scepticism regarding this type of protest, it eventually emerged 
as the most prominent. Given their Marxist perspective, they were missing an 
ideological message that would emanate from broken windows and could be 
conveyed to the masses. Though the militant squatters of the early 1980s did 
not go to the same theoretical lengths as their Marxist forebears, they experi-
enced the smashing of windows during confrontations with authorities as 
combining existentialist self- liberation with critiques of tangible regimes of 
provision, which could even amount to political leverage in their struggle 
with the authorities.
In analogy to the dilemmas and diversities of affluent society, the histori-
cal actors examined in this volume were confronted with a wide range of dif-
ferent concepts and interpretations of violence and counterviolence. Activists 
consciously chose violence against objects to propagate their political ideas 
and lifestyles. The rationalised, depersonalised, and latent violence of the pow-
erful was supposed to be pulled out from the “setting of everyday life” (Kulisse 
des Alltags), in which, according to Norbert Elias, it disappeared in the civilis-
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ing process.14 Central to ideological justifications of protest was the idea of 
destruction caused by the prevailing political economy. The labels “violent” 
and “destructive” were essential to this mode of legitimisation, which helped 
to intellectually integrate threatening developments on various levels: the de-
struction of neighbourhoods and their social milieus by speculative builders 
and gentrification; the destruction of livelihoods by tropical deforestation and 
debt crisis; and the destruction of nature by pollution and growth ideology. All 
of these entangled processes seemed to be driven by Western consumers and 
the greed of the rich. Again, a silver bullet that would have solved the larger 
dilemmas between complete nonviolence and political militancy did not exist 
either for the social movements or for the larger debates about the legitimacy 
of various forms of historical violence. The forms of political violence treated 
in the previous chapters— from Cologne students blockading tramway tracks 
in 1966 to the unknown persons placing incendiary devices in Berlin depart-
ment stores in September 1988— were usually accompanied by explicit or im-
plicit scruples and considerations regarding the use of violence. An upper limit 
on the forms of violence employed and the nature of the damage inflicted was 
for the most part integrated into the planning and justification of such acts. One 
might strongly disagree with the perpetrators’ assessments of legitimacy, but 
violence was almost never embraced for its own sake but rather consciously 
intended as a politically calculated means of communication. This also holds 
true for instances when leftist activists embraced anti- Zionist campaigns— for 
historical reasons a particularly difficult field of political communication— 
where their political calculations usually backfired, as was the case with the 
pro- Palestinian boycott campaign triggered by the Hafenstraße mural.
A central message of the analysis presented in this book is that violence 
resulted from complex interactions among several actors (protesters, authori-
ties, media, and intellectuals) and that protest was by no means violent from 
the outset. Violent conflict and discourse on violence found their way into the 
protest scenarios analysed in this book via four avenues: (1) the verbal and 
symbolic violence that was meant to call attention to the factual violence (for 
example, in the Third World); (2) the militant or openly violent tactics em-
braced by specialists in violence (such as the RAF or RZ) but also imagined in 
the press; (3) the often controversial actions of government security forces 
shielding urban retail and commerce from protest activities; and (4) the politi-
cal and legal controversies triggered by the protests, focusing on definitions of 
violence and the legitimisation and delegitimisation of particular forms of po-
14. Elias, Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation, 2:325.
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litical communication. In all of these contexts, violence was a product of inter-
action and a means of communication. Both sides worked with rhetorical strat-
egies that amplified the opposing side’s violence and moral transgressions 
while seeking to neutralise and justify their own use of force.
Militant protest led to adjustments and changes in authorities’ theoretical 
and practical understanding of violence. Some of the protest activities triggered 
complex legal debates that went all the way up to the Federal Court of Justice 
(BGH) or the Federal Constitutional Court, with significant consequences for 
German legal history. The social movements’ discourse on violence prompted 
an inverse discourse on violence among the legal authorities. A central bone of 
contention was whether certain protest activities were to be seen as illicit or 
even criminal offences or rather as political articulations covered by constitu-
tional basic rights, especially freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. 
This pertained to linguistic and intellectual speech acts (for example, the leaflets 
of Kommune I) as well as to performative and physical articulations (for ex-
ample, blockades), while many protest activities combined both aspects (for 
example, boycott campaigns). With its 1969 Laepple verdict concerning pro-
tests against fare increases and its 1972 verdict upholding the civil law claims 
against the “ringleaders” of the Springer blockade, the BGH established a legal 
framework that under the concept of “mental coercion” interpreted the mere 
intention of obstructing or blockading something as violent activity regardless 
of the actual means employed. This legal framework was not effectively re-
scinded by the Federal Constitutional Court until 1995. Concerning the liability 
of “ringleaders,” the BGH had already reversed its interpretation in 1984, ruling 
that only active perpetrators of physical violence could be held liable. On the 
level below these high court decisions, the protest activities of the new social 
movements occupied grey areas of legal discourse, forcing lawyers to come to 
grips with more or less unprecedented challenges. This was the case for Land-
friedensbruch (breach of the public peace) in the context of the demonstrations 
of the late 1960s and Hausfriedensbruch (breach of the domestic peace), which 
became controversial during the squatting movement of the early 1980s. Legal 
opinion was initially far from fixed in both cases, and several years passed be-
fore a certain variance among lower court judgments made way for a prevailing 
opinion. More generally, debates over legal conflicts tended to shift towards 
questions of law and order and away from the controversial contents concerning 
regimes of provision that had triggered the issue. Since 1976, the legal expan-
sion of imputability under section 129a of the Criminal Code (Forming terrorist 
organisations) accelerated this development.
Protesters’ attitudes towards law and justice varied. A point of departure 
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was the impression that it was impossible to effect the desired changes by ap-
pealing to a point of law. Petitions and legal proceedings in favour of protest 
agendas had usually proved fruitless. References to fundamental rights or to a 
right to resist under natural law were made with the claim that the disputed 
speech acts or performative acts were covered by a higher level of justice than 
that embodied by the courts of West Germany. This distrust was nourished by 
Marxist critiques of the bourgeois legal system, by pointers to German law-
yers’ Nazi pasts, and eventually by the insight that the forces of global capital 
were increasingly uncoupled from the legality of the national state. The more 
or less limited performative breaking of rules and laws served as a strategy of 
mobilisation, which quickly brought protesters into prolonged conflicts with 
the authorities. While the illegal act was initially conceived as a means of mak-
ing visible other forms of violence, the authorities’ counterstrategy of high-
lighting the criminality of disputed acts could appear to the perpetrators like a 
large- scale conspiracy designed to cover up injustices that could only be 
brought to light via illegal acts. All of these perspectives tended to situate the 
protesters’ violence— conceived as communicative and limited— relative to 
other forms of violence that were seen as ubiquitous and unrestrained. From 
this perspective, even the phenomenon commonly labelled “terrorism” appears 
to result not primarily from individual shortcomings such as psychological de-
ficiencies,  violence fetishism, or antisemitism but from a radical response to 
major societal changes— that is, the unprecedented growth and diversification 
of the realm of consumption, a dimension neglected by existing research.
On a more abstract level, this analysis shows that the discursive amalgama-
tion of different forms of violence was indispensable to the legitimisation of 
political violence on both sides. An essential aspect of the communicative strat-
egies that challenged dominant regimes of provision via boycotting or other 
forms of mobilization was to bridge distance— both spatially and histori-
cally— to connect seemingly far- removed political struggles. Specific forms of 
protest or violence assumed to be legitimate were justified with reference to 
other forms of past or present violence deemed illegitimate. Challenging forms 
of political violence (emanating from social movements) and preserving forms 
of institutional violence (executed by the authorities) were interlocked in dis-
courses that sought to invert their respective legitimisations while amplifying 
each other in the process. Challengers accused the authorities wielding state 
violence of sharing responsibility for violations of human rights, war, and geno-
cide in the contexts of decolonisation (South African apartheid) or alleged con-
tinuity with National Socialist Germany. The application of state monopoly vio-
lence was in turn justified by associating the challengers with the violence of 
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past and present revolutions and terrorism or with the state violence of the GDR 
and Soviet Union. Analogies with National Socialism usually pointed to the 
Kampfzeit of the NSDAP up to 1934 when shops owned by Jews were attacked.
In this context, the question arises whether anti- Zionist or anti- Israeli boy-
cotts and protests differed fundamentally from other protests in Cold War West 
Germany. On balance, the radical left did not target Israel more than other tar-
gets, but protests against Israel were more intense. Given the unique historical 
past of the Holocaust and the Arab- Israeli conflict, more explosive matter on 
both sides of the debate went into the discursive amalgamation of judgments 
concerning different aspects and periods of Jewish and Israeli history. Antise-
mitic statements— or accusations of antisemitism— sometimes resulted from this 
process. However, judging from the primary sources analysed during the re-
search for this book, antisemitism was not a precondition or motivation for activ-
ism for the majority of radical left- wing activists in Cold War West Germany, 
another important difference from the self- avowed and pervasive antisemitism of 
the Nazis and neo- Nazis to whom the radical Left was often likened.
Restrictive definitions of political violence that exclude certain manifesta-
tions of violence— for example, state violence— are bound to obscure views of 
the legitimisation of political violence, a topic that should be studied more 
explicitly in other historical contexts. Discursive amalgamations of different 
forms of political violence were part of broader strategies of legitimisation and 
delegitimisation. Acceptance and success were decisive for these construc-
tions’ plausibility and ultimately for their continuity or erosion. The continued 
legitimacy of the West German authorities banked on the almost mythical rep-
utation of economic success that the Federal Republic acquired as well as on 
the criminalisation of the more radical parts of the new social movements, a 
strategy that dovetailed with the depoliticisation of their agenda. At the same 
time, authorities made their use of violence appear legitimate and infinitely 
preferable to that of the undemocratic regimes of Germany’s past. Ultimately, 
West German state legitimacy rested on the political attitudes and opinions of 
the vast majority of the population who did not share the socialist ideals ani-
mating the critiques of the challengers. This did not mean that the challengers 
went entirely without acceptance or success. Quite the contrary, they could 
have maintained their multitude of interrelated protest campaigns over several 
decades only by virtue of scoring repeated successes in setting political agen-
das and politicising of regimes of provision in response to crisis; bringing pub-
lic attention to abusive or problematic uses of state power; and mobilising a 
sizeable minority of the population to devote at least some political resources 
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